According to Hubert L. Dreyfus, Heidegger's central innovation is his rejection of the idea that intentional activity and directedness is always and only a matter of having representational mental states. This paper examines the central passages to which Dreyfus appeals in order to motivate this claim. It shows that Dreyfus misconstrues these passages significantly and that he has no grounds for reading Heidegger as anticipating contemporary anti-representationalism in the philosophy of mind. The misunderstanding derives from lack of sensitivity to Heidegger's (...) own intellectual context. The otherwise laudable strategy of reading Heidegger as a philosopher of mind becomes an exercise in finding a niche for Heidegger in Dreyfus's own unquestioned present. Heidegger is thereby mapped on to an intellectual context which, given its naturalistic commitments, is foreign to him. The paper concludes by indicating the direction in which a more historically sensitive, and thus accurate, interpretation of Heidegger must move. (shrink)

FOR AT LEAST THE LAST TWENTY YEARS, Anglo-American philosophers have displayed two interrelated tendencies in their efforts to make sense of Martin Heidegger. First, they have frequently mapped Heidegger onto debates and problems within contemporary cognitive science and North American philosophy of psychology. Second, they have often attempted to discern deep identities and affinities with more familiar philosophers and traditions, in particular, with Wittgenstein and American pragmatism. That these twin strategies of interpretation are so popular is in large part due (...) to the work of Hubert L. Dreyfus. Dreyfus has pursued both lines of hermeneutic attack with a vengeance, and in so doing has devised an interpretation of Heidegger which makes him appear as a theoretical philosopher whom even hard-nosed cognitive scientists and analytical philosophers of mind can take seriously. (shrink)

The terms 'sustainability' and 'sustainable development' have become established in the popular vernacular in the 25 years or so since the publication of the report of the Brundtland Commission. Often, 'sustainability' is thought to represent some long-term goal and 'sustainable development' a means or process by which to achieve it. Two fundamental and conflicting philosophical positions underlying these terms are identified. In particular, the commonly held notion that sustainable development can be a pathway to sustainability is challenged, and the expedient (...) view that both terms ultimately serve holistic development is questioned. Furthermore, it is argued that perpetuating the unclear and misleading distinction between the two positions will limit the development of efficacious policy, as it will not resonate with the broadest possible gamut of beliefs and value systems. (shrink)

In his essay, ‘Heidegger's Categories in Sein und Zeit’, Robert Brandom argues that Heidegger, particularly in the notion of Zuhandenheit, anticipates his own normatively pragmatist conception of intentionality. He attempts to demonstrate this by marshalling short passages from right across the relevant sections of Sein und Zeit in such a way that they do seem to say what Brandom claims. But does one reach the same conclusion when one examines, more or less in sentence‐by‐sentence fashion, the large slab of text (...) in which Heidegger introduces the notion of Zuhandenheit? I believe not. First, however, let us look at how Brandom reads Heidegger, in particular, how he interprets the notion of Zuhandenheit, which, in contrast both to Macquarrie and Robinson and to Brandom, I shall translate as ready‐to‐handedness.1. (shrink)

In his essay, ‘Heidegger's Categories in Sein und Zeit’, Robert Brandom argues that Heidegger, particularly in the notion of Zuhandenheit, anticipates his own normatively pragmatist conception of intentionality. He attempts to demonstrate this by marshalling short passages from right across the relevant sections of Sein und Zeit in such a way that they do seem to say what Brandom claims. But does one reach the same conclusion when one examines, more or less in sentence‐by‐sentence fashion, the large slab of text (...) in which Heidegger introduces the notion of Zuhandenheit? I believe not. First, however, let us look at how Brandom reads Heidegger, in particular, how he interprets the notion of Zuhandenheit, which, in contrast both to Macquarrie and Robinson and to Brandom, I shall translate as ready‐to‐handedness.1. (shrink)

This book draws upon the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Heidegger to provide an alternative elaboration of John McDowell’s thesis that in order to understand how self-conscious subjectivity relates to the world, perception must be understood as a genuine unity of spontaneity (‘concept’) and receptivity (‘intuition’). Thereby it clarifies McDowell’s critique of Donald Davidson and develops an alternative conception of perceptual experience which gives sense to McDowell’s claim that self-conscious subjectivity is so inherently in touch with its world that scepticism (...) about the latter must be incoherent. It also develops a more accurate, historically oriented critique of the metaphysics constraining one to construe perceptual experience in ways which misrepresent how self-conscious subjectivity bears upon the world. It shows that many of McDowell’s meta-philosophical views are implicitly Husserlian and that had McDowell developed them further, he would have avoided the paradoxical meta-philosophy he adopts from Wittgenstein. In conclusion, it intimates the central weakness in Husserl’s position which takes one from Husserl to Heidegger. The book is written in terms accessible to analytic philosophers and will thus enable them to see the central differences between analytic and phenomenological approaches to intentionality and self-consciousness. (shrink)

At least phenomenologically the way communicative acts reveal intentions is different from the way non-communicative acts do this: the former have an "addressed" character which the latter do not. The paper argues that this difference is a real one, reflecting the irreducibly "conventional" character of human communication. It attempts to show this through a critical analysis of the Gricean programme and its methodologically individualist attempt to explain the "conventional" as derivative from the "non-conventional". It is shown how in order to (...) eliminate certain counterexamples the Gricean analysis of utterer's meaning must be made self-referential. It is then shown how this in turn admits an "ontological difference" which undercuts all methodological individualism: meaning something by an utterance must then have a certain intrinsic, irreducible "conventionality" and "intersubjectivity". Objections to this claim are raised and dealt with. It is suggested that any problem of origin might be resolvable by rejecting the semantic reductionism of Grice's programme. An internal relation between self-consciousness, intersubjectivity and language is suggested. The paper ends by speculating that the self-conscious subject is intrinsically embodied and related to other subjects in that for it its body is essentially a medium of signs with which to express its "inner states" to others. (shrink)

Heidegger's central concern is the question of being (Seinsfrage). The paper reconstructs this question at least for the young (pre- Kehre) Heidegger in the light of two interconnected hypotheses: (1) the substantial content of the question of being can be identified by seeing it as a response to (Marburg) neo-Kantianism; and (2) this content centres around the claim that, pace the neo-Kantians, 'epistemological' concerns are grounded in 'ontological' ones, for which reason 'ontology' must precede 'epistemology' as a form of philosophical (...) inquiry. In section I the general position of (Marburg) neo-Kantianism is sketched. In section II the implications of the neo-Kantian position for the concepts of truth and reality, reason, and experience, are outlined; significant similarities to Sellars, Davidson, and Brandom are revealed. Finally, in section III Heidegger's analysis of everydayness is shown to yield a distinct critique of the neo-Kantian relativization of the concept of the real to the theoretically knowable. From this critique it emerges why Heidegger thinks that 'ontology' precedes 'epistemology'. The project of fundamental ontology marked by the question of being thus shows itself to be at least in part a response to the aporia of Marburg neo-Kantianism. (shrink)

Current interpretations of Heidegger's notion of das Man are caught in a dilemma: either they cannot accommodate the ontological status Heidegger accords it or they cannot explain his negative evaluation of it, in which it is treated as ontic. This paper uses Simmel's agonistic account of human sociality to integrate the ontological and the ontic, indeed perjorative aspects of Heidegger's account. Section I introduces the general problem, breaks the exclusive link of Heidegger's account to Kierkegaard and delineates the general form (...) of a solution. Section II then sketches Simmel's conception of sociology and sociality. Section III determines what Heidegger is trying to do in Chapter Four of Division I in Being and Time in order to formulate a strictly ontological account of das Man. Section IV uses Simmel's account of sociality to build into this ontological account an inherent tendency to display the negative features Heidegger ascribes to das Man. In conclusion, section V points to how the proposed account of das Man intimates the character of fundamental ontology as nascently a form of critical theory. It also explains the extent to which Heidegger's perjorative characterisations of das Man and the Man-selbst are legitimate. (shrink)

At least phenomenologically the way communicative acts reveal intentions is different from the way non-communicative acts do this: the former have an “addressed” character which the latter do not. The paper argues that this difference is a real one, reflecting the irreducibly “conventional” character of human communication. It attempts to show this through a critical analysis of the Gricean programme and its methodologically individualist attempt to explain the “conventional” as derivative from the “non-conventional”. It is shown how in order to (...) eliminate certain counterexamples the Gricean analysis of utterer’s meaning must be made self-referential. It is then shown how this in turn admits an “ontological difference” which undercuts all methodological individualism: meaning something by an utterance must then have a certain intrinsic, irreducible “conventionality” and “intersubjectivity”. Objections to this claim are raised and dealt with. It is suggested that any problem of origin might be resolvable by rejecting the semantic reductionism of Grice’s programme. An internal relation between self-consciousness, intersubjectivity and language is suggested. The paper ends by speculating that the self-conscious subject is intrinsically embodied and related to other subjects in that for it its body is essentially a medium of signs with which to express its “inner states” to others. (shrink)

Many still seem confident that the kind of semantic theory Putnam once proposed for natural kind terms is right. This paper seeks to show that this confidence is misplaced because the general idea underlying the theory is incoherent. Consequently, the theory must be rejected prior to any consideration of its epistemological, ontological or metaphysical acceptability. Part I sets the stage by showing that falsehoods, indeed absurdities, follow from the theory when one deliberately suspends certain devices Putnam built into it , (...) presumably in order to block such entailments. Part II then raises the decisive issue of at what cost these devices do the job they need to do. It argues that - apart from possessing no other motivation than their capacity to block the consequences derived in Part I - they only fulfil this blocking function if they render the theory unable to deal with fiction and related 'make-believe' activities. Part III indicates the affinity Putnam's account has with the classically 'denotative' view of meaning, and thus how its weaknesses may be seen as a variant of the classical weakness of 'denotative' approaches. It concludes that the theory is a conceptual muddle. (shrink)

Einleitung: zur Aktualität Natorps Daß an Tiefe und Scharfsinn die deutsche akademische Philosophie des späten 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts der heutigen sprachanalytischen Philosophie nicht nachsteht, läßt sich sehr schön am Beispiel von Paul Natorp zeigen, der neben seinem Lehrer, Freund und Förderer Hermann Cohen Mitbegründer des Marburger Neukantianismus war. Nämlich sowohl auf die Frage, worin die intentionale Gerichtetheit von Bewußtseinszuständen und -erlebnissen besteht, wie auch auf die Frage, was es heißt, sich der eigenen Bewußtseinszustände und -erlebnisse bewußt zu sein, (...) gibt Natorp subtile Antworten, die auch heute noch vertreten werden. Ja, in einer Hinsicht zeigt sich Natorp den ihm nahestehenden zeitgenössischen Philosophen sogar überlegen. Denn aus einer Antwort auf die Frage nach der Intentionalität des Bewußtseins, die ihn u.a. mit Davidson, Dretske und Fodor verbindet, leitet er eine zunächst frappierende Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Selbstbewußtsein ab, eine Antwort, die etwa Davidson, Dretske und Fodor nicht geben würden, die sie aber angesichts ihrer Auffassung von Intentionalität geben sollten: Selbstbewußtsein im eigentlichen Sinne ist unmöglich. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl’s account of the horizonal character of simple, sensuous perception provides a sophisticated account of perceptual intentional content which enables plausible responses to key issues in the philosophy of perception and in Heidegger interpretation. Section 2 outlines Husserl’s account of intentionality in its application to such perceptual experience. Section 3 then elaborates the notion of perceptual horizon in order to draw out, in Section 4, its implications for four issues: firstly, the relation between the object perceived and perceptual appearance (...) ; secondly, the relation between the subject perceiving and perceptual appearance; thirdly, what sense of the body is inherent to perceptual experience of the horizonal kind; and fourthly, what John McDowell is getting at when he claims that traditional conceptions fail to capture how perception puts us in cognitive contact with the world. The paper concludes by using the interpretation developed to show how Husserl’s account of perceptual experience as horizonal enables one to draw out the sense and worth of what Heidegger means by worldliness and the “Da” of Dasein. (shrink)

This co-edited volume compares Chinese and Western experiences of engineering, technology, and development. In doing so, it builds a bridge between the East and West and advances a dialogue in the philosophy of engineering. Divided into three parts, the book starts with studies on epistemological and ontological issues, with a special focus on engineering design, creativity, management, feasibility, and sustainability. Part II considers relationships between the history and philosophy of engineering, and includes a general argument for the necessity of dialogue (...) between history and philosophy. It continues with a general introduction to traditional Chinese attitudes toward engineering and technology, and philosophical case studies of the Chinese steel industry, railroads, and cybernetics in the Soviet Union. Part III focuses on engineering, ethics, and society, with chapters on engineering education and practice in China and the West. The book’s analyses of the interactions of science, engineering, ethics, politics, and policy in different societal contexts are of special interest. The volume as a whole marks a new stage in the emergence of the philosophy of engineering as a new regionalization of philosophy. This carefully edited interdisciplinary volume grew out of an international conference on the philosophy of engineering hosted by the University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. It includes 30 contributions by leading philosophers, social scientists, and engineers from Australia, China, Europe, and the United States. (shrink)

Einleitung: zur Aktualität Natorps Daß an Tiefe und Scharfsinn die deutsche akademische Philosophie des späten 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts der heutigen sprachanalytischen Philosophie nicht nachsteht, läßt sich sehr schön am Beispiel von Paul Natorp (1854–1924) zeigen, der neben seinem Lehrer, Freund und Förderer Hermann Cohen (1842–1918) Mitbegründer des Marburger Neukantianismus war. Nämlich sowohl auf die Frage, worin die intentionale Gerichtetheit von Bewußtseinszuständen und -erlebnissen besteht, wie auch auf die Frage, was es heißt, sich der eigenen Bewußtseinszustände und -erlebnisse bewußt (...) zu sein, gibt Natorp subtile Antworten, die auch heute noch vertreten werden. Ja, in einer Hinsicht zeigt sich Natorp den ihm nahestehenden zeitgenössischen Philosophen sogar überlegen. Denn aus einer Antwort auf die Frage nach der Intentionalität des Bewußtseins, die ihn u.a. mit Davidson, Dretske und Fodor verbindet, leitet er eine zunächst frappierende Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Selbstbewußtsein ab, eine Antwort, die etwa Davidson, Dretske und Fodor nicht geben würden, die sie aber angesichts ihrer Auffassung von Intentionalität geben sollten: Selbstbewußtsein im eigentlichen Sinne ist unmöglich. (shrink)

This book is an abridged translation of Arens' work Kommunikative Handlungen. Its aims are complex and three-fold: to bring together Anglo-American and Continental thought on the nature of language and action ; to identify a logic of development within the American pragmatist movement and subsequent Continental thought inspired by this tradition ; and to resolve the differences between, and thereby integrate, the pragmatics of K. O. Apel and Jürgen Habermas.

Carleton B. Christensen, Self and World: From Analytic Philosophy to Phenomenology Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s10743-010-9078-2 Authors Morten S. Thaning, Department of Philosophy, Politics, and Management, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark Journal Husserl Studies Online ISSN 1572-8501 Print ISSN 0167-9848 Journal Volume Volume 26 Journal Issue Volume 26, Number 3.

A letter protesting the publication of a homophobic rant in the Proceedings of the APA.

Oregon is the only state in the United States where a physician may legally prescribe a lethal dose of barbiturate for a patient intending suicide. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act was passed by voters in 1994 and came into effect after much legal wrangling in October of 1997. At the same time, a cabinetmaker named Pat Matheny was struggling with progressive weakness from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or ALS. I met with Pat and his family for a lengthy interview in (...) October 1998 in Coos Bay, Oregon, for a television news report on his decision to get a lethal prescription. Below is an extract from that interview. On the day this introduction was written, 10 March 1999, Pat took the prescribed lethal overdose of barbiturates and died at home. His illness was taking his voice, he could not move his hands or legs, and breathing was becoming very difficult. His mother told me he knew that was for him. (shrink)

Relations between J. A. C. Chaptal, pioneer of heavy chemical industry in France, and A. L. Lavoisier, reformer of chemical theory, are examined in the light of unpublished correspondence they exchanged in the period 1784–1790. The letters, together with Chaptal's early publications, allow a reconstruction of his conversion to Lavoisier's antiphlogistic chemistry. They also reveal a series of petitions that Chaptal made to Lavoisier, in the latter's official capacity as a director of the Régie des poudres et salpêtres, for relief (...) from the controlled price of saltpetre for his acid works in Languedoc. Finally, the relationship is explored as a window on the interplay between chemical theory and industrial practice during the period of the Industrial Revolution. (shrink)

Uncertainty and affect are fundamental and interrelated aspects of the human condition. Uncertainty is often associated with negative affect, but in some circumstances it is associated with positive affect. In this paper, we review different explanations for the varying relationship between uncertainty and affect. We identify “mental simulation” as a key process that links uncertainty to affective states. We suggest that people have a propensity to simulate negative outcomes, which results in a propensity towards negative affective responses to uncertainty. We (...) also propose the existence of several important moderators of this process, including context and individual differences such as uncertainty tolerance, as well as emotion regulation strategies. Finally, we highlight important knowledge gaps and promising areas for future research, both empirical and conceptual, to further elucidate the relationship between uncertainty and affect. (shrink)

In recent decades, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has become a powerful forum for trade liberalization and regulatory harmonization. OECD members have worked to reconcile divergent national regulatory approaches, applying a single framework across sovereign states, in effect determining whose knowledge-making practices would guide regulatory action throughout the industrialized world. Focusing on US regulators, industry associations, and environmental groups, this article explores the participatory politics of OECD chemical regulation harmonization in the late 1970s to early 1980s. These efforts (...) were conditioned by differential institutional access and resources among stakeholders who sought to shape regulatory knowledge rules. Facing competing European and US approaches to chemical data—a minimum “base set” of test data versus case-by-case determinations—OECD members chose the European approach in 1980. However, US regulatory politics shifted with the election of President Reagan, prompting industry associations to lobby the US government to block the agreement. Examining the micropolitics of these standards in the making, I demonstrate that while long-term structures advantaged industrial actors, ideological alignment with the US government precipitated their decisive influence. The case illustrates the importance of attending to the distinctive politics of international harmonization and the effects on transnational knowledge-making and regulatory intervention. (shrink)

From the desire to find support and confirmation for our personal sensory observations, and from the human interest in sharing our experiences with others, there emerges a basic principle of scientific method: We demand the possibility of intelligible communication and agreement concerning individuals' sensory perceptions in particular and their experiences in general. This requirement is made both for the natural and social sciences. The raw material offered for logical organization must be capable of exhibiting an inter-subjective character—such material, or protocols, (...) must be acceptable in common to all concerned. And it must be acceptable for logical organization or systematization in some science. (shrink)

For some fifteen years in his chemistry lectures in Edinburgh, Joseph Black taught that phlogiston possesses absolute levity. It was not an aberration on Black's part: he justified the notion on experimental grounds. Moreover, the existence of a nongravitating substance capable of entering the composition of bodies raised intriguing possibilities for uniting physical and chemical phenomena. The doctrine became something of a tradition in Edinburgh, but was subject to growing criticism, particulary with the growth of pneumatic chemistry. By the early (...) 1780s, Black found the hypothesis was no longer tenable and quietly dropped it, leaving a void in the explanation of weight relations in combustion which his students were quick to fill with Lavoisier's oxygen theory. (shrink)