Paul's new message makes contact with a context provided by an item in his hearer's historical tradition—Deuteronomy—and also by the/a comic genre, which is a structure of the human mind.

Analysis of the relation of form and content in the parable of the wedding feast shows its distinctiveness alongside the true narrative parables and uncovers an emphasis, not so much on the consequences of the Kingdom coming as on the power of the divine to dispose of the human.

Social Media, like Facebook and Twitter, are having a profound effect on the way that human subjects research is being conducted. In light of the changes proposed in ANPRM, in this article I argue that traditional research ethics and regulations may not easily translate to the use of social media in human subjects research. Using the conceptual model of apomediation, which describes the peer-to-peer way in which health information is shared via social media, I suggest that we may need to (...) think again about the suitability of current regulations to deal with social media research. (shrink)

For a cou ple of decades, higher-order the o ries of con scious ness have enjoyed great pop u lar ity, but they have recently been met with grow ing dis sat is - fac tion. Many have started to look else where for via ble alter na tives, and within the last few years, quite a few have redis cov ered Brentano. In this paper such a Brentanian one-level account of con scious ness will be out lined and dis (...) - cussed. It will be argued that it can con trib ute impor tant insights to our under - stand ing of the rela tion between con scious ness and self-aware ness, but it will also be argued that the account remains beset with some prob lems, and that it will ulti mately make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger, if one is on the look out for prom is ing alter na tives to the higher-order the o ries, than to return all the way to Brentano. (shrink)

The diversity and complexity of the arguments and criticisms among philosophers on the question of the actual existence of the self can be condensed into two contrasting issues: The self is an experienced phenomenon that is generalized into a concept to assign to the cognitive subject as a tool for identification, or the self has its own existence as a transcendental entity that is activated and developed through interactions between the cognitive subject and the environment. Dan Zahavi summed up the (...) endless controversy over the formation of the self in phenomenology, existentialism, and new insights in neuroscience to conclude that the existence of the self is only meaningful when it is "the experiential self." My article will focus on two issues: firstly, the self is formed by the interaction between the subject and the object in which the object is actively engaged in the control space of the subject; secondly, the understanding of the subject’s self-perception process, through the perspective of neuroscience, is triggered by the subject seeing itself in the other person. (shrink)

One lists the distinct pairs of categorical premises formulable via only the positive terms, S,P,M, by constructing a six by six matrix obtained by pairing the six categorical P-premises, A, O, A, O, where P* ∈ {P,P′}, with the six, similar, categorical S-premises. One shows how five rules of valid syllogism, select only 15 distinct PCPs that entail logical consequences belonging to the set L+: = {A, O, A, E, O, I}. The choice of admissible LCs can be regarded as (...) a condition separated from the conditions contained in the RofVS: the usual eight PCPs that generate valid syllogisms are obtained when the only admissible LCs belong to the set L: = {A, E, O, I} and no existential imports are addressed. A 64 PCP-matrix obtains when both PCPs and LCs may contain indefinite terms—the positive, S,P,M, terms, and their complementary sets, S′,P′, M′, in the universe of discourse, U, called the negative terms. Now one can accept eight LCs: A, I, where P* ∈ {P,P′}, S* ∈ {S,S′}, and there are 32 conclusive PCPs, entailing precise, “one partitioning subset of U” LCs. The four rules of conclusive syllogisms predict the less precise LCs, left after eliminating the middle term from the exact LCs. The RofCS also predict that the other 32 PCPs of the 64 PCP-matrix are non-conclusive. The RofVS and the RofCS are generalized, and arguments are given, for also accepting as valid syllogisms the conclusive syllogisms formulable via positive terms which entail the LCs A and O. (shrink)

Contingent Valuation has been promoted as a catch-all approach to environmental valuation. While there have been numerous attempts in recent years to place monetary values on environmental amenities, studies have often reported a high frequency of protest, zero or inordinately large dollar-value responses. This paper reports on the results of a survey designed to obtain information on how people actually interpret questions of paying to avoid changes in their views of Rangitoto Island. Evidence suggests that the meaning respondents attach to (...) the actual dollar values they offer or bid are inconsistent with the conventional logic that underlies Contingent Valuation. Instead, respondents might be seen to be expressing views about how things ought to be in society, and that it is simply not right to develop Rangitoto Island. (shrink)

A contemporary debate concerning the epistemology of testimony is portrayed by its protagonists as having its origins in the eighteenth century and the respective views of David Hume and Thomas Reid. Hume is characterized as a reductionist and Reid as an anti-reductionist. This terminology has been widely adopted and the reductive approach has become synonymous with Hume. In Sect. 1 I spell out the reductionist interpretation of Hume in which the justification possessed by testimonially-acquired beliefs is reducible to the epistemic (...) properties of perception, memory and inductive inference. This account of testimony is taken to be found in the section ‘On Miracles’ of Hume’s Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. In Sect. 2 I introduce the distinction between global and local reductionism, and Coady’s interpretation of Hume as a global reductionist. He takes Hume’s position to be untenable. The rest of the paper explores alternative interpretations of Hume. Section 3 develops a local reductionist interpretation of Hume on testimony. It is argued, though, that such an approach is unstable and, in response, Sect. 4 turns to anti-reductionism in its contemporary forms and in Reid’s teleological account. In Sect. 5 I argue for an anti-reductionist account of Hume, one drawn from his discussion of the testimony of history in the Treatise of Human Nature, thus moving away from the usually exclusive focus upon the discussion of miracles in the first Enquiry, upon which the reductionist interpretation is based. Given the standard meaning of ‘Humeanism’ in the current debate, my interpretation amounts to the claim that Hume is not a Humean with respect to testimony. (shrink)

Hume is usually taken to have an evidentialist account of testimonial belief: one is justified in believing what someone says if one has empincal evidence that they have been reliable in the past. This account is impartialist: such evidence is required no matter who the person is, or what refotions she may have to you. I, however, argue that Hume has another account of testimony, one grounded in sympathy. This account is partialist, in that empincal evidence is not required in (...) order for one to be justified in believing some of the assertions of one's friends. (shrink)

There are various forms of teleological thinking central to debates in the early modern and modern periods, debates in which David Hume (1711–1776) is a key figure. In the first section, we shall introduce three levels at which teleological considerations have been incorporated into philosophical accounts of man and nature, and sketch Hume’s criticisms of these approaches. In the second section, we turn to Hume’s non-teleological ‘science of man’. In the third section, we show how Hume has an account of (...) human flourishing that is not dependent on teleology. In the fourth section, we shall speculate as to the relation between Hume’s account of human nature and contemporary evolutionary accounts of morality and reasoning. (shrink)

One kind of successful communication involves the transmission of knowledge from speaker to hearer. Such testimonial knowledge transmission is usually seen as conforming to three widely held epistemological approaches: reliabilism, impartialism and evidentialism. First, a speaker must be a reliable testifier in order that she transmits knowledge, and reliability is cashed out in terms of her likelihood of speaking the truth. Second, if a certain speaker's testimony has sufficient epistemic weight to be believed by hearer1, then it should also be (...) believed by hearer2. Third, the normative constraint here is evidentially grounded: whether or not a hearer should believe a speaker depends on the evidence the hearer has that the speaker is telling the truth. I argue that there are cases of testimonial knowledge transmission that are incompatible with these three claims. This is when one accepts the testimony of an intimate friend. (shrink)

Overestimation of one’s ability to argue their position on socio-political issues may partially underlie the current climate of political extremism in the U.S. Yet very little is known about what factors influence overestimation in argumentation of socio-political issues. Across three experiments, emotional investment substantially increased participants’ overestimation. Potential confounding factors like topic complexity and familiarity were ruled out as alternative explanations. Belief-based cues were established as a mechanism underlying the relationship between emotional investment and overestimation in a measurement-of-mediation and manipulation-of-mediator (...) design. Representing a new bias blind spot, participants believed emotional investment helps them argue better than it helps others ; where in reality emotional investment harmed or had no effect on argument quality. These studies highlight misguided beliefs about emotional investment as a factor underlying metacognitive miscalibration in the context of socio-political issues. (shrink)

Social media, meaning digital technologies and platforms such as blogs, wikis, forums, content aggregators, sharing sites, and social networks like Facebook and Twitter, have profoundly changed the way that information can be shared online. Now, almost anyone with a broadband internet connection or a smart phone can share ideas, data, and opinions with just about anyone else on the planet. This change has serious implications for the way in which human subjects research can be conducted and, concomitantly, for the ways (...) in which such research may be regulated. This article explores some of these issues. (shrink)

In certain situations, lies can be used to pass on knowledge. The kinds of cases I focus on are those involving a speaker's devious manipulation of the hearer's irrational or prejudiced thought. These cases show that sometimes a speaker's knowledge of a hearer's mind is necessary for the testimonial transmission of knowledge. They also support a 'seeding' model of knowledge transmission, rather than one that is akin to the postal delivery of complete parcels of information.

_An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge_ guides the reader through the key issues and debates in contemporary epistemology. Lucid, comprehensive and accessible, it is an ideal textbook for students who are new to the subject and for university undergraduates. The book is divided into five parts. Part I discusses the concept of knowledge and distinguishes between different types of knowledge. Part II surveys the sources of knowledge, considering both _a priori_ and _a posteriori_ knowledge. Parts III and IV provide (...) an in-depth discussion of justification and scepticism. The final part of the book examines our alleged knowledge of the past, other minds, morality and God. O'Brien uses engaging examples throughout the book, taking many from literature and the cinema. He explains complex issues, such as those concerning the private language argument, non-conceptual content, and the new riddle of induction, in a clear and accessible way. This textbook is an invaluable guide to contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

Hume claims that education is ‘disclaimed by philosophy, as a fallacious ground of assent to any opinion’ (T 1.3.10.1) and that it is ‘never... recogniz'd by philosophers’ (T 1.3.9.19). He is usually taken to be referring here to indoctrination. I argue, however, that his main concern is with association and those philosophers who emphasize the epistemic dangers of the imagination. These include Locke, Hutcheson and Descartes, but not Hume himself. Hume praises education, highlighting its role in the formation of general (...) rules, and in fostering social conditions that encourage the growth of knowledge and moral virtue. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 7, Page 30-31, July 2012.

This paper explores one aspect of God’s omniscience, that is, his knowledge of human minds. In §1 I spell out a traditional notion of divine knowledge, and in §2 I argue that our understanding of the thoughts of others is a distinct kind of knowledge from that involved in knowledge of the physical world; it involves empathizing with thinkers. In §3 I show how this is relevant to the question of how, and whether, God understands the thoughts of man. There (...) is, we shall see, some tension between the alleged direct nature of God’s intuition-based knowledge and the empathetic nature of understanding other. (shrink)

Lisciandra poses a challenge for robustness analysis as applied to economic models. She argues that substituting tractability assumptions risks altering the main mathematical structure of the model, thereby preventing the possibility of meaningfully evaluating the same model under different assumptions. In such cases RA is argued to be inapplicable. However, Lisciandra is mistaken to take the goal of RA as keeping the mathematical properties of tractability assumptions intact. Instead, RA really aims to keep the modeling component while varying the corresponding (...) mathematical formulation. Thus, her argument concerning whether the associated mathematical properties of certain assumptions can be kept intact is irrelevant to the success of RA. Furthermore, we explicate and develop Lloyd’s account of “model robustness” to provide solutions to Lisciandra’s challenges. Our solutions are, namely, error analysis and independent empirical support. We conclude that although complex economic models do face potential dangers, there are solutions and robustness analysis need not be given up.. (shrink)

For Hume virtues are character traits that are useful and agreeable to ourselves and to others. Such traits are wide-ranging, from moral virtues such as benevolence to intellectual virtues such as courage of mind and penetration. This paper focuses on Hume’s account of the latter. I argue that Hume is a virtue epistemologist, principally interested in the role that intellectual character traits play in social interactions rather than in the justifiedness of particular beliefs. I shall argue that this interpretation is (...) consonant with his mitigated skepticism, and that it calls for a reappraisal of the marshalling of Hume and Reid into the contemporary debate between reductionists and non-reductionists with respect to the epistemology of testimony. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Candide Hume and Common Life Gardens and Tranquility Notes.

Religious art can reconfigure our conception of God’s omniscience. This should be seen in terms of divine understanding, with empathy and love required for God’s understanding of human beings. §I surveys reasons to think that God can empathize with us. §II and §III consider different ways that religious art has attempted to represent such empathetic relations. There are images of Christ’s suffering that elicit empathy in the viewer, and there are depictions of God’s empathetic understanding of humanity. §IV and §V (...) consider the epistemic roles of art and how religious art can reconfigure how we think of God’s omniscience. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the development of cubism by Picasso and Braque at the beginning of the twentieth century can be illuminated by consideration of long-running philosophical debates concerning perceptual realism, in particular by Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary properties, and Kant’s empirical realism. Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler, Picasso’s dealer and early authority on cubism, interpreted Picasso and Braque as Kantian in their approach. I reject his influential interpretation, but propose a more plausible, Kantian reading of cubism.

In most countries, the alcohol industry enjoys considerable freedom to market its products. Where government regulation is proposed or enacted, the alcohol industry has often deployed legal arguments and used legal forums to challenge regulation. Governments considering marketing regulation must be cognizant of relevant legal constraints and be prepared to defend their policies against industry legal challenges.

There is a clean image of knowledge transmission between thinkers that involves sincere and reliable speakers, and hearers who carefully assess the epistemic credentials of the testimony that they hear. There is, however, a murkier side to testimonial exchange where deception and lies hold sway. Such mendacity leads to sceptical worries and to discussion of epistemic vice. Here, though, I explore cases where deceit and lies are involved in knowledge transmission. This may sound surprising or even incoherent since lying usually (...) involves saying something that is false. Even if a liar unwittingly tells the truth, those believing their testimony would not acquire knowledge. In §1, however, I suggest a range of examples where lies can be used to transmit knowledge. The kinds of cases upon which I focus are those involving ‘engineered knowledge’, where a speaker skilfully manipulates another into having a true belief. Such cases are epistemologically significant for several reasons. First, they are counter-examples to a range of widely held assumptions about knowledge. We have, for example, cases where sincerity is not necessary for knowledge transmission, where there is knowledge from falsehood, and, as we shall discuss in §2, knowledge that is fragile or not safe. Second, in §3 and §4 I suggest that engineered knowledge is best captured by a virtue theoretic approach to testimonial transmission. (shrink)