In 1970, K. Kunen, working in the context of Kelley–Morse set theory, showed that the existence of a nontrivial elementary embedding j:V→V is inconsistent. In this paper, we give a finer analysis of the implications of his result for embeddings V→V relative to models of ZFC. We do this by working in the extended language , using as axioms all the usual axioms of ZFC , along with an axiom schema that asserts that j is a nontrivial elementary embedding. Without (...) additional axiomatic assumptions on j, we show that that the resulting theory is weaker than an ω-Erdös cardinal, but stronger than n-ineffables. We show that natural models of ZFC+BTEE give rise to Schindler’s remarkable cardinals. The approach to inconsistency from ZFC+BTEE forks into two paths: extensions of ZFC+BTEE+Cofinal Axiom and ZFC+BTEE+¬Cofinal Axiom, where Cofinal Axiom asserts that the critical sequence is cofinal in the ordinals. We describe near-minimal inconsistent extensions of each of these theories. The path toward inconsistency from ZFC+BTEE+¬Cofinal Axiom is paved with a sequence of theories of increasing large cardinal strength. Indeed, the extensions of the theory ZFC +“j is a nontrivial elementary embedding” form a hierarchy of axioms, ranging in strength from Con to the existence of a cardinal that is super-n-huge for every n, to inconsistency. This hierarchy is parallel to the usual hierarchy of large cardinal axioms, and can be used in the same way. We also isolate several intermediate-strength axioms which, when added to ZFC+BTEE, produce theories having strengths in the vicinity of a measurable cardinal of high Mitchell order, a strong cardinal, ω Woodin cardinals, and n-huge cardinals. We also determine precisely which combinations of axioms, of the form result in inconsistency. (shrink)

The Wholeness Axiom (WA) is an axiom schema that can be added to the axioms of ZFC in an extended language $\{\in,j\}$ , and that asserts the existence of a nontrivial elementary embedding $j:V\to V$ . The well-known inconsistency proofs are avoided by omitting from the schema all instances of Replacement for j-formulas. We show that the theory ZFC + V = HOD + WA is consistent relative to the existence of an $I_1$ embedding. This answers a question about the (...) existence of Laver sequences for regular classes of set embeddings: Assuming there is an $I_1$ -embedding, there is a transitive model of ZFC +WA + “there is a regular class of embeddings that admits no Laver sequence.”. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce the Wholeness Axiom , which asserts that there is a nontrivial elementary embedding from V to itself. We formalize the axiom in the language {∈, j } , adding to the usual axioms of ZFC all instances of Separation, but no instance of Replacement, for j -formulas, as well as axioms that ensure that j is a nontrivial elementary embedding from the universe to itself. We show that WA has consistency strength strictly between I 3 (...) and the existence of a cardinal that is super- n -huge for every n . ZFC + WA is used as a background theory for studying generalizations of Laver sequences. We define the notion of Laver sequence for general classes E consisting of elementary embeddings of the form i :V β → M , where M is transitive, and use five globally defined large cardinal notions – strong, supercompact, extendible, super-almost-huge, superhuge – for examples and special cases of the main results. Assuming WA at the beginning, and eventually refining the hypothesis as far as possible, we prove the existence of a strong form of Laver sequence for a broad range of classes E that include the five large cardinal types mentioned. We show that if κ is globally superstrong, if E is Laver-closed at beth fixed points, and if there are superstrong embeddings i with critical point κ and arbitrarily large targets such that E is weakly compatible with i , then our standard constructions are E -Laver at κ . , there is an extendible Laver sequence at κ .) In addition, in most cases our Laver sequences can be made special if E is upward λ -closed for sufficiently many λ. (shrink)

Versions of Laver sequences are known to exist for supercompact and strong cardinals. Assuming very strong axioms of infinity, Laver sequences can be constructed for virtually any globally defined large cardinal not weaker than a strong cardinal; indeed, under strong hypotheses, Laver sequences can be constructed for virtually any regular class of embeddings. We show here that if there is a regular class of embeddings with critical point κ, and there is an inaccessible above κ, then it is consistent for (...) there to be a regular class that admits no Laver sequence. We also show that extendible cardinals are Laver-generating, i.e., that assuming only that κ is extendible, there is an extendible Laver sequence at κ. We use the method of proof to answer a question about Laver-closure of extendible cardinals at inaccessibles. Finally, we consider Laver sequences for super-almost-huge cardinals. Assuming slightly more than super-almost-hugeness, we show that there are super-almost-huge Laver sequences, improving the previously known upper bound for such Laver sequences. We also describe conditions under which the canonical construction of a Laver sequence fails for super-almost-huge cardinals. (shrink)

We improve results of Marczewski, Frankiewicz, Brown, and others comparing the σ-ideals of measure zero, meager, Marczewski measure zero, and completely Ramsey null sets; in particular, we remove CH from the hypothesis of many of Brown's constructions of sets lying in some of these ideals but not in others. We improve upon work of Marczewski by constructing, without CH, a nonmeasurable Marczewski measure zero set lacking the property of Baire. We extend our analysis of σ-ideals to include the completely Ramsey (...) null sets relative to a Ramsey ultrafilter and obtain all 32 possible examples of sets in some ideals and not others, some under the assumption of MA, but most in ZFC alone. We also improve upon the known constructions of a Marczewski measure zero set which is not Ramsey by using a set theoretic hypothesis which is weaker than those used by other authors. We give several consistency proofs: one concerning the relative sizes of the covering numbers for the meager sets and the completely Ramsey null sets; another concerning the size of non(CRU 0); and a third concerning the size of add(CRU 0). We also study those classes of perfect sets which are bases for the class of always first category sets. (shrink)

We suggest a new approach for addressing the problem of establishing an axiomatic foundation for large cardinals. An axiom asserting the existence of a large cardinal can naturally be viewed as a strong Axiom of Infinity. However, it has not been clear on the basis of our knowledge of ω itself, or of generally agreed upon intuitions about the true nature of the mathematical universe, what the right strengthening of the Axiom of Infinity is—which large cardinals ought to be derivable? (...) It was shown in the 1960s by Lawvere that the existence of an infinite set is equivalent to the existence of a certain kind of structure-preserving transformation from V to itself, not isomorphic to the identity. We use Lawvere's transformation, rather than ω, as a starting point for a reasonably natural sequence of strengthenings and refinements, leading to a proposed strong Axiom of Infinity. A first refinement was discussed in later work by Trnková—Blass, showing that if the preservation properties of Lawvere's tranformation are strengthened to the point of requiring it to be an exact functor , such a transformation is provably equivalent to the existence of a measurable cardinal. We propose to push the preservation properties as far as possible, short of inconsistency. The resulting transformation V→V is strong enough to account for virtually all large cardinals, but is at the same time a natural generalization of an assertion about transformations V→V known to be equivalent to the Axiom of Infinity. (shrink)

We describe a fairly general procedure for preserving I3 embeddings j: Vλ → Vλ via λ-stage reverse Easton iterated forcings. We use this method to prove that, assuming the consistency of an I3 embedding, V = HOD is consistent with the theory ZFC + WA where WA is an axiom schema in the language {∈, j} asserting a strong but not inconsistent form of “there is an elementary embedding V → V”. This improves upon an earlier result in which consistency (...) was established assuming an I1 embedding. (shrink)

We describe a fairly general procedure for preserving I3 embeddings j: V λ → V λ via λ-stage reverse Easton iterated forcings. We use this method to prove that, assuming the consistency of an I3 embedding, V = HOD is consistent with the theory ZFC + WA where WA is an axiom schema in the language {∈, j} asserting a strong but not inconsistent form of “there is an elementary embedding V → V”. This improves upon an earlier result in (...) which consistency was established assuming an I1 embedding. (shrink)

Clear and distinct perception is the centrepiece of Descartes’s philosophy — it is the source of all certainty — but what does he mean by ‘clear’ and ‘distinct’? According to the prevailing approach, what it means for a perception to be clear is that its content has a certain objective property, like truth. I argue instead that clarity is at least partly a subjective, phenomenal quality whereby a content is presented as true to the perceiving subject. Clarity comes in degrees. (...) Any weak degree of clarity, available to the senses, can be merely subjective, since what it presents as true may not actually be true. But complete clarity, available to intellectual perception, has an objective dimension, since what it presents as true is always some truth, some bit of reality. Further, I argue that the other perceptual qualities that Descartes identifies — obscurity, confusion, and distinctness — are all defined in terms of clarity. Of particular note is the fact that distinctness is not a positive feature to be added to clarity: a distinct perception is just a completely clear perception. (shrink)

In this paper I shall focus on Castaneda's notion of quasi-indicators and I shall defend the following theses: (i) Essential indexicals (‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’) are intrinsically perspectival mechanisms of reference and, as such, they are not reducible to any other mechanism reference...

Conservatism about perceptual justification tells us that we cannot have perceptual justification to believe p unless we also have justification to believe that perceptual experiences are reliable. There are many ways to maintain this thesis, ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. Most of these ways lead to at least one of two problems. The first is an over-intellectualization problem, whereas the second problem concerns the satisfaction of the epistemic basing requirement on justified belief. I argue that there is at (...) least one Conservative view that survives both difficulties, a view which has the further ability to undercut a crucial consideration that has supported Dogmatist views about perceptual justification. The final section explores a tension between Conservatism and the prospects of having a completely general account of propositional justification. Ironically, the problem is that Conservatives seem committed to making the acquisition of propositional justification too easy. My partial defense of Conservatism concludes by suggesting possible solutions to this problem. (shrink)

Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom “I” refers, we show that there are occasionswhen it is not always obvious. In demonstratingthis we challenge Kaplan's assumptionthat the utterer, agent and referent of “I” arealways the same person.We begin by presenting what weregard to be the received view about indexicalreference popularized by David Kaplan in hisinfluential 1972 “Demonstratives” before goingon, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle'sanswering machine paradox which may be thoughtto threaten this view, and his deferredutterance method of (...) resolving this puzzle. Insection 3 we introduce a novel version of theanswering machine paradox which suggests that,in certain cases, Kaplan's identification ofutterer, agent and referent of “I” breaks down.In the fourth section we go on to consider arecent revision of Kaplan's picture by Predelliwhich appeals to the intentions of the utterer,before arguing that this picture is committedto unacceptable consequences and, therefore,should be avoided if possible. Finally, insection 5, we present a new revision ofKaplan's account which retains much of thespirit of his original proposal whilst offeringa intuitively acceptable way to explain all ofthe apparently problematic data. In doing so,we also show how this picture is able toexplain the scenario which motivated Predelli'saccount without appealing to speakerintentions. (shrink)

We defend the view that an indexical uttered by an actor works on the model of deferred reference. If it defers to a character which does not exist, it is an empty term, just as‘Hamlet’and‘Ophelia’are. The utterance in which it appears does not express a proposition and thus lacks a truth value. We advocate an ontologically parsimonious, anti‐realist, position. We show how the notion of truth in our use and understanding of indexicals as they appear within a fiction is not (...) a central issue. We claim that our use and understanding of indexicals rests on the fact that their cognitive contribution is not exhausted by their semantic contribution. (shrink)

According to proponents of the continuity hypothesis, metaphors represent one end of a spectrum of linguistic phenomena, which includes various forms of loosening/broadening, such as category extensions and approximations, as well as hyperbolic interpretations. The continuity hypothesis is used to establish that the inferences derived from the set of linguistic expressions mentioned above result from the same or nearly similar pragmatic processes. In this paper, we want to challenge that particular aspect of the continuity hypothesis. We do so based on (...) considerations and analysis of an understudied linguistic phenomenon that we call the metaphorical uses of proper names (MPNs). We first explain how MPNs represent a unique linguistic class distinguishable from, for example, nicknames. In addition, we offer some remarks on how MPNs can be understood against the background of current debates between referentialists and predicativists about names. Our discussion leads us to conclude that MPNs are categorically different from literal interpretations of proper names. We spell out the consequences that the results of our analysis have for the continuity hypothesis. (shrink)

Eros Corazza presents a fascinating investigation of the role that indexicals play in our thought. Indexicality is crucial to the understanding of such puzzling issues as the nature of the self, the nature of perception, social interaction, psychological pathologies, and psychological development. Corazza draws on work from philosophy, linguistics, and psychology to illuminate this key aspect of the relation between mind and world. By highlighting how indexical thoughts are irreducible and intrinsically perspectival, Corazza shows how we can (...) depict someone else's indexical thought from a third-person perspective. The phenomenon of quasi-indexicality is introduced here: to represent Jane saying, "I am prosperous", we use what Castañeda termed a quasi-indicator in a report of the form "Jane said that she is prosperous". Corazza argues that quasi-indicators play such an important role in our linguistic, social, and psychological life that they have a cognitive primacy over other mechanisms of reference. Quasi-indexicality also emerges as a key notion when we come to consider our ability to understand other minds. Corazza argues that indexicality and quasi-indexicality are two sides of the same coin, best understood within the framework of direct reference. (shrink)

On considère généralement que Marx n’a jamais envisagé le monde rural que comme un archaïsme condamné par le progrès de l’histoire. L’objectif de cet article est de problématiser cette idée, en examinant les différentes tensions qui travaillent la réflexion de Marx sur la terre et les paysans. Nous montrons que deux découvertes complémentaires le conduisent à relativiser sa croyance au caractère progressiste du développement capitaliste : la découverte des tendances écocidaires du capitalisme et celle de la vivacité des communes agraires. (...) De ces deux découvertes, il résulte que Marx critique finalement le capitalisme du point de vue de ses effets sur la terre et celles et ceux qui la travaillent. C’est donc aussi de ce point de vue que doivent être repensées la nature, la valeur et les conditions de réalisation du communisme. (shrink)

In a recent book, Jeffrey King (King 2001) argues that complexdemonstratives, i.e., noun phrases of the form `this/that F, are not singular terms. As such,they are not devices of direct reference contributing the referent to the proposition expressed.In this essay I challenge King's position and show how a direct reference view can handle the datahe proposes in favor of the quantificational account. I argue that when a complex demonstrativecannot be interpreted as a singular term, it is best understood as a (...) case of deferredreference – in which case it should be viewed as an anaphora inheriting its value from a quantifiedterm – or as an emphatic description. (shrink)

It is argued that, in order to account for examples where the indexicals `now' and `here' do not refer to the time and location of the utterance, we do not have to assume (pace Quentin Smith) that they have different characters (reference-fixing rules), governed by a single metarule or metacharacter. The traditional, the fixed character view is defended: `now' and `here' always refer to the time and location of the utterance. It is shown that when their referent does not correspond (...) to the time and/or location of the utterance, `now' and `here' work in an anaphoric way, inheriting their reference from another noun phrase. The latter may be explicit or implicit in the discourse. It is also shown that `now' and `here' can inherit their reference from a presupposed or tacit reference. In that case, they are coreferential with what will be labeled a `tacit initiator'. This anaphoric interpretation has the merit of fitting within the Kaplanian distinction between pure indexicals (`now', `here', `today', etc.) and demonstratives (`this', `that', `she', etc.). (shrink)

It is argued that the pronouns `she' and `he' are disguised complexdemonstratives of the form `that female/male'. Three theories ofcomplex demonstratives are examined and shown to be committed to theview that `s/he' turns out to be an empty term when used to refer toa hermaphrodite. A fourth theory of complex demonstratives, one thatis hermaphrodite friendly, is proposed. It maintains that complexdemonstratives such as `that female/male' and the pronoun `s/he' can succeed in referring to someone independently of his or her gender.This (...) theory incorporates: (i) a multiple proposition view, i.e., theview that an utterance of a sentence containing a complex demonstrativeexpresses two (or more) propositions, namely the background proposition(s)and the official one; (ii) that the referent of a complex demonstrativeis a component of the official proposition expressed whether it satisfiesthe nominal part of the demonstrative expression or not; (iii) that thenominal part of a complex demonstrative only affect the background proposition(s) and (iv) that the utterance inherits its truth-value onlyfrom the official proposition. (shrink)

After discussing some difficulties that contextualism and minimalism face, this paper presents a new account of the linguistic exploitation of context, situationalism. Unlike the former accounts, situationalism captures the idea that the main intuitions underlying the debate concern not the identity of propositions expressed but rather how truth-values are situation-dependent. The truth-value of an utterance depends on the situation in which the proposition expressed is evaluated. Hence, like in minimalism, the proposition expressed can be truth-evaluable without being enriched or expanded. (...) Along with contextualism, it is argued that an utterance’s truth-value is context dependent. But, unlike contextualism and minimalism, situationalism embraces a form of relativism in so far as it maintains that semantic content must be evaluated vis-à-vis a given situation and, therefore, that a proposition cannot be said to be true/false eternally. (shrink)

According to the subset account of realization, a property, F, is realized by another property, G, whenever F is individuated by a non-empty proper subset of the causal powers by which G is individuated (and F is not a conjunctive property of which G is a conjunct). This account is especially attractive because it seems both to explain the way in which realized properties are nothing over and above their realizers, and to provide for the causal efficacy of realized properties. (...) It therefore seems to provide a way around the causal exclusion problem. There is reason to doubt, however, that the subset account can achieve both tasks. The problem arises when we look closely at the relation between properties and causal powers, specifically, at the idea that properties confer powers on the things that have them. If realizers are to be ontically prior to what they realize, then we must regard the conferral of powers by properties as a substantive relation of determination. This relation of conferral is at the heart of a kind of exclusion problem, analogous to the familiar causal exclusion problem. I argue that the subset account cannot adequately answer this new exclusion problem, and is for that reason ill-suited to be the backbone of a non-reductive physicalism. (shrink)

In this paper I challenge the common wisdom (see Dummett and Davidson) that sentences are the minimal units with which one can perform a speech act or make a move in the language game. I thus sit with Perry and Stainton in arguing that subsentences can be used to perform full-fledged speech acts. In my discussion I assume the traditional framework which distinguishes between the proposition expressed and the thought or mental state (possibly a sentence in Mentalese) one comes to (...) grasp when using/understanding an utterance (or sentence-in-a-context) expressing a proposition. Unlike Stainton, I will argue that the proposition expressed by a subsentential assertion and its corresponding thought are not the end product of a pragmatic process of free enrichment. I shall defend the view that a thought may concern something without the thinker having to represent that very thing. This should help us to resist the view that with the utterance of a subsentence enrichment is mandatory. I will further argue that subsentences and their corresponding thoughts are situated. Because of that we can successfully interact and engage in joint ventures using subsentences and be guided by thoughts without having to enrich them. The fact that the actors’ unenriched thoughts are co-situated may suffice to explain the positive outcome of their joint project. Last but not least, I will also show how the picture I propose gains further support by taking on board Perry’s distinction between reflexive truth conditions and incremental truth conditions (or official content). Since competent speakers can grasp an utterance’s reflexive truth conditions without having to grasp its official content (roughly, the proposition expressed) they can successfully interact without their thoughts having to undergo a process of free enrichment. Moreover, if I’m right in arguing that an utterance’s reflexive truth conditions are the best tool to classify the semantic features of one’s mental state (or sentence in Mentalese), we can further explain mental causation and linguistic communication without appealing to free enrichment. (shrink)

In this paper, we put forward a position we call “situationalism” (or “situated minimalism”), which is a middle-ground view between minimalism and contextualism in recent philosophy of language. We focus on the notion of free enrichment, which first arose within contextualism as underlying the claim that what is said is typically enriched relative to the logical form of the uttered sentence. However, minimalism also acknowledges some process of pragmatic intrusion in its claim that what is thought and communicated is typically (...) enriched relative to what is said. We show that situationalism dispenses with free enrichment both at the level of what is said (proposition expressed) and of what is thought (mental level). According to situationalism, an alleged underdetermined utterance can, pace minimalism, be true in one situation while false in another, and two people using the same alleged underdetermined sentence can be characterized, pace contextualism, as having said the same thing. (shrink)

Indexical reference is personal, ephemeral, confrontational, and executive. Hence it is not reducible to nonindexical reference to what is not confronted. Conversely, nonindexical reference is not reducible to indexical reference. (Castañeda 1989, p. 70).

It is argued that, contrary to appearances, description-names (e.g.: "The Roman Empire", "The Beatles", "The Holy Virgin",...) do conform to Millianism, i.e. the view that proper names are directly referential expressions, referring regardless of whether the relevant individual satisfies some associated description or not. However, description-names name and describe. Some arguments supporting this peculiarity and a logic to handle description-names are proposed. It will be shown that the best framework with which to accommodate description-names is a multiple-proposition theory, according to (...) which a given utterance may express several propositions. (shrink)

Summary The present work focuses on the transformations of the psychotherapeutic field through the relationship dynamics which occur within it. The first part of this article starts with a brief outline of the Gestalt psychological understanding of the field concept, also in its application to the psychotherapeutic situation, followed by a brief review of the introduction of the field concept into the psychoanalytic theory formation. After this, the first author first presents the theoretical concept underlying a new approach he has (...) developed for observing the relationship dynamics in psychotherapy. Mirroring a formation of both psychoanalytic and Gestalt theory of the main author, this new approach is based on the combination of psychoanalytic and Gestalt psychological concepts. According to the clinical experience and insights of the author, the phenomenological and relational approach of Gestalt theory fits well with the psychoanalytic approach; on this basis, a criterion for recording the progress of therapy can be developed. This criterion is the phenomenology of the development of the qualities of the relationships of the client, as they become visible in his dream narrations and the subsequent associations in the analysis room and continue to develop during the session and the further course of therapy. The relationship dynamics in the dream narration is thus compared with those which develop in the course of the subsequent associations. This is demonstrated and further elaborated in the second part of this article on the basis of a clinical case. The clinical example shows how the relationship dynamics develop in this sense in the individual therapy sessions and over a longer course of therapy. The associated transformations of the therapeutic field give a good indication of the progress of therapy. The main author gained such insights into the transformations of the therapeutic field and the progression of therapy, which are visible in the course of therapy, from the careful application of the criterion “MDAC of relational dynamics”. In the specific case, there was also a high degree of correspondence between the results of the application of this phenomenological criterion and the empirical evidence of the symptom questionnaire, a self-report measure requested by the patient himself during the course of the therapy. (shrink)

In combining a pluri‐propositionalist framework (Bach‐style) concerning alleged conventional implicatures, and a pluri‐propositionalist framework (Perry‐style) distinguishing various levels of content associated with a single utterance, I defend a Grice‐inspired model of communication. In so doing, I rely on the distinction between what is said, i.e. what is semantically encoded, and what is pragmatically implicated. I show how the notion of same‐saying plays a central role in dealing with problems pertaining to communication insofar as it permits us to posit a stability (...) of content among interlocutors. I also show how people can be classified as same‐sayers in different ways, viz. if they express the same (minimal) proposition/content or if they utter the same sentence. If A utters ‘I'm happy’ and B replies: ‘C said that too’, what B said can mean either that C said that A is happy—thus C and A expressed the same proposition—or that C utters the same words—they both utter ‘I'm happy’ and in so doing express different propositions, i.e. that A is happy and that C is happy respectively. (shrink)

Este ensaio tem como objetivo afirmar a leitura e a escrita enquanto processo ativo tradutório, por meio da reimaginação do Texto de Partida As cidades invisíveis, redigido em 1972 pelo autor italiano Ítalo Calvino. O ensaio é tecido mediante a noção de fragmentos, tal como entendido por Tavares, em que a escrita se constitui como uma experimentação do pensamento. Toma como ponto de partida as pistas deixadas pelo viajante Marco Polo, na obra de Calvino, a qual foi lida e reinventada (...) pelos acadêmicos do Curso de Pedagogia de uma Instituição de Ensino Superior localizada no interior do Rio Grande do Sul. Um Roteiro de Procedimentos Escrileitores – escritura e leitura – das Cidades de Calvino foi disponibilizado aos estudantes, tendo como proposição mostrar nove regras, cujo objetivo consistiu em servir à operação tradutório-inventiva. A partir delas, os estudantes arriscaram uma leitura ativa e uma escritura viva, ou seja, uma escritura tradutória, que não visa à recuperação literal do texto, mas privilegia uma escrileitura inventiva e traduções-reinvenções. Como aporte teórico, o texto aproxima-se do pensamento da diferença, de Roland Barthes, de Gilles Deleuze, além das teorizações da tradução literária propostas por Haroldo de Campos. Trata-se de experimentar a prática da leitura e o ensaio da escrita gerando novas interpretações ao Texto de Partida. Nesse sentido, ler-e-escrever configuram-se como uma prática aberta, jamais definitiva e tampouco estática. Em síntese, o texto propõe defender que os Textos de Partida são sempre fisgados pelos processos tradutórios e, por isso, novamente reinventados via leitura e escrita em Textos de Chegada. Palavras-chave: Tradução. Recriação. Pedagogia. Educação. (shrink)

Objects partially resemble when they are alike in some way but not entirely alike. Partial resemblance, then, involves similarity in a respect. It has been observed that talk of “respects” appears to be thinly‐veiled talk of properties. So some theorists take similarity in a respect to require property realism. I will go a step further and argue that similarity in intrinsic respects (partial intrinsic resemblance) requires properties to be immanent in objects. For a property to be immanent in an object (...) is roughly for it to be wholly present in that object. (So understood, immanence does not imply repeatability, and thus tropes count as immanent.) If two objects are intrinsically similar in one way but not another, there must be a difference between the two ways. And if the similarity is between the objects as they are in themselves, then this difference, too, must be within the objects. Partial intrinsic resemblance thus requires internal structure. Without it, there can be no distinctions between ways in which things are intrinsically alike and ways in which they aren't. I will argue, further, that distinctions between properties that transcend objects fail to account for the possibility of partial intrinsic resemblance. (shrink)

We defend the view that an indexical uttered by an actor works on the model of deferred reference. If it defers to a character which does not exist, it is an empty term, just as ‘Hamlet’ and ‘Ophelia’ are. The utterance in which it appears does not express a proposition and thus lacks a truth value. We advocate an ontologically parsimonious, anti-realist, position. We show how the notion of truth in our use and understanding of indexicals (and fictional names) as (...) they appear within a fiction is not a central issue. We claim that our use and understanding of indexicals (and names) rests on the fact that their cognitive contribution is not exhausted by their semantic contribution. (shrink)

Summary The present work focuses on the transformations of the psychotherapeutic field through the relationship dynamics that occur within it. The first part of this article starts with a brief outline of the Gestalt psychological understanding of the field concept, also in its application to the psychotherapeutic situation, followed by a brief review of the introduction of the field concept into the psychoanalytic theory formation. After this, the first author first presents the theoretical concept underlying a new approach he has (...) developed for observing the relationship dynamics in psychotherapy. Mirroring a formation both psychoanalytic and gestaltic of the main author, this new approach is based on the combination of psychoanalytic and Gestalt psychological concepts. According to the clinical experience and insights of the author, the phenomenological and relational approach of Gestalt theory fits well with the psychoanalytic approach; on this basis, a criterion for recording the progress of therapy can be developed. This criterion is the phenomenology of the development of the qualities of the relationships of the client, as they become visible in his dream narrations and the subsequent associations in the analysis room, and continue to develop during the session and the further course of therapy. The relationship dynamics in the dream narration is thus compared with those that develop in the course of the subsequent associations. This is demonstrated and further elaborated in the second part of this paper on the basis of a clinical case. The clinical example shows how the relationship dynamics develop in this sense in the individual therapy sessions and over a longer course of therapy. The associated transformations of the therapeutic field give a good indication of the progress of therapy. The main author gained such insights into the transformations of the therapeutic field and the progression of therapy, which are visible in the course of therapy, from the careful application of the criterion “manifest dream/associations comparison of relational dynamics”. In the specific case, there was also a high degree of correspondence between the results of the application of this phenomenological criterion and the empirical evidence of the symptom questionnaire, a self-report measure requested by the patient himself during the course of the therapy. (shrink)

Analyse: La théorie développée dans la lignée de Frege, prédit que les pensées sont pertinentes tant pour la caractérisation de la valeur cognitive que pour l'attribution d'attitudes.

In formulating the puzzle about cognitive significance in ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, Frege rejects the approach he suggested in the Begriffsschrift on the ground that if the utterance of a sentence of the form a = b is understood as ‘a’ and ‘b’ referring to the same object we lose the subject matter. In this note, we will show how Frege’s concerns can be understood and circumvented.

Recreational Drugs European Network (ReDNet) project aims to use the Psychonaut Web Mapping Project database (Psychonaut Web Mapping Group, 2009) containing novel psychoactive compounds usually not mentioned in the scientific literature and thus unknown to clinicians as a unique source of information. The database will be used to develop an integrated ICT prevention approach targeted at vulnerable individuals and focused on novel synthetic and herbal compounds and combinations. Particular care will be taken in keeping the health professionals working directly with (...) young people showing problematic behaviors regularly updated in terms of novel compounds and combinations as well. A user-friendly project website will be developed aimed primarily at delivering the information/prevention approaches, but will also be a way of communicating with project partners and relevant stakeholders (e.g. thematic forum facilities, instant messages, blogs, video chat, wikiblog, newsletters distributed via mailing list). The website will support various ICT prevention tools, including an SMS alert service. Different areas and sections will be aimed specifically at the different target groups. -/- . (shrink)

It is commonly accepted, after Frege, that identity statements like “Tully is Cicero” differ from statements like “Tully is Tully”. For the former, unlike the latter, are informative. One way to deal with the information problem is to postulate that the terms ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’ come equipped with different informative values. Another approach is to claim that statements like these are of the subject/predicate form. As such, they should be analyzed along the way we treat “Tully walks”. Since proper names (...) can appear in predicative position we could go as far as to dismiss the sign of identity altogether, some told us. I will try to discuss the advantages and/or disadvantages of this approach and investigate whether Frege’s view that the ‘is’ of identity must be distinguished from the ‘is’ of predication can be reconciled with the fact that names can appear in predicative position. (shrink)

We sometimes strive to achieve difficult goals when our evidence suggests that success is unlikely – not just because it will require strength of will, but because we are targets of prejudice and discrimination or because success will require unusual ability. Optimism about one’s prospects can be useful for persevering in these cases. That said, excessive optimism can be dangerous; when our evidence is unfavourable, we should be at most agnostic about whether we will succeed. This paper explores the nature (...) and rational significance of agnostic practical commitments. Most importantly, the rationality of striving against the odds can depend on investing in a plan for failure: a plan B. I aim to make headway on an account of what backup plans are, how they are related to primary plans, and whether the standard norms of plan rationality apply to our agnostic commitments. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper discusses three aspects of Karen Bennett’s theory of building relations, as articulated in her book Making Things Up: the inclusion of causation among the building relations, the denial that non-fundamental things add to the complexity of a theory, and the claim that building relations are one-sided relations that are themselves built. Section 1 gives a brief overview. Section 2 seeks to motivate a distinction between building relations and making relations, and questions whether the deep structural similarities among (...) building relations has the methodological consequences that Bennett claims. Section 3 argues against the claim that considerations of ontological simplicity in theory choice are restricted to non-fundamental entities. Section 4 raises objections to the idea of a one-sided building relation. (shrink)