Rodolfo Sacco developed the idea of “mute behaviours” during his studies on mute law. The notion of “mute behaviours” denotes an action that is able to mould a legal relationship without any use of language. Certainly, this concept may give rise to some doubts in relation to the attribution—to a behaviour qualified as mute—of the capability to affect dynamics involving a plurality of people. Aiming to clarify the idea of “mute behaviours” by this point of view, the authors analysed the (...) semiotic terminology used by Sacco himself to explain this notion and the issue of its silent nature. Therefore, the terms “signifying signs” and “symptoms”, deemed by Sacco—respectively—incompatible and compatible with the theory of mute behaviours were considered. The former term was traced back to the notion of conventional and arbitrary sign, the notion of the latter was reconstructed linking it to the concept of signs based on signification and suggesting a possible framework in view of the idea of “presentative meanings” developed by the philosopher Guido Morpurgo-Tagliabue. Clarified this dichotomy by a terminological analysis, the authors noticed—as affirmed by Rodolfo Sacco himself—the impossibility to ascribe the notion of gesture to the mute behaviour’s category, as some exegetes proposed. Consequently to this last remark, the authors tried to analyse the relationship between gestures and “mute behaviours”, identifying the category of “sema-pragmatic acts”, that includes gestures and may be seen as an intermediate phase between “mute behaviours” and legally relevant behaviours operated by speaking. (shrink)

I fatti! I fatti! Caro signore, i fatti sono come siassumono; e allora, nello spirito, non sono più fatti:ma vita che appare, così o in altro modo.Luigi Pirandello 1 Ontologia del giuridico 1.1 Due ontologie del giuridico: ontologia degli oggetti giuridici (Adolf Reinach) vs. ontologia degli enti giuridici (Santi Romano) 1.1.1 Nella filosofia del diritto del xx secolo sono compresenti due ontologie del giuridico:(i) l’ontologia degli oggetti giuridici di Adolf Reinach (1883-1917),(ii) l’ontol...

Zwar kann der Akt – sofern er sich in gesprochenen oder geschriebenen Worten ausdrückt selbst etwas über seine Bedeutung aussagen, seinen eigenen Sinn angeben.Darin liegt sogar eine besondere Eigentümlichkeit des der sozialen und insbesondere der juristischen Erkenntnis gegebenen Materials. Certamente l’atto, in quanto si esprime a voce o per iscritto, di per sé può dire qualcosa attorno al suo senso, può dichiarare il proprio senso.In ciò consiste una speciale caratteristica del materiale og...

According to the Austrian philosopher Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), social and institutional entities are the only entities that can be null, void. The starting point of the article, The “Invalid” and the “Nothing”: At the Origins of Social Ontology, is the analysis of Hans Kelsen’s thesis. But: Why are social entities the only entities that can be null, void? In order to answer this question, in the first part of the article, the author uses two new concepts: validity-imperfection and validity-falsification. The (...) second part of the paper deals with a new ontological question: Are null (void) social entities something? (shrink)

Pragmatic Ambiguity: The Thetic Function of Modality The aim of this paper is to present an overview of the pragmatic aspects of ambiguity present in deontic sentences, which may have three pragmatic functions: a prescriptive or a descriptive or a constitutive function. This type of ambiguity is investigated on the lexical, phrasal, and sentential level. The discussion focuses on the deontic constructions of the German verb sollen and the English shall as they are used in legal texts. It also includes (...) comments on the thetic function of the Latin imperative mood and the subjunctive mood. (shrink)

This book reconsiders the supposed impossibility of deriving "Ought" from "Is". John R. Searle’s 1964 article How to Derive "Ought " from "Is’’ sent shockwaves through the philosophical community by offering a straightforward counterexample to this claim of impossibility: from your promising something- and this is an "is" - it simply follows that you "ought" to do it. This volume opens with a brand new chapter from Searle who, in light of his subsequent philosophical developments, expounds the reasons for the (...) validity of that derivation and its crucial significance for social ontology and moral philosophy. Then, in a fresh interview with the editors of this volume, Searle explores a range of topics including how his derivation relates to constitutive rules, and how he views Wittgenstein’s philosophy, deontic logic, and the rationality of action. The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive into Searle’s essay and its implications by international scholars with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy and sociology of law. With thirteen original chapters, the contributors provide fresh and timely insights on hotly debated issues: the nature of "Ought"; the logical structure of the social world; and the possibility of deriving not only "Ought" from "Is", but "Is" from "Ought". (shrink)

Vi sono varie forme di impossibilità normativa. Una prima forma si incontra quando un fatto naturale al quale il diritto attribuisce un significato normativo è impossibile. Una seconda consiste nell’impossibilità di un atto o fatto la quale derivi dalla presenza o assenza di una norma. Vi è poi una terza forma di impossibilità normativa che si incontra quando si afferma che da una certa realtà oggetto di normazione derivano necessariamente limiti all’attività di normazione stessa. Di una quarta forma si può (...) parlare quando ci si riferisce a un’impossibilità derivante dalle specifiche relazioni che intercorrono tra norme di un sistema normativo dinamico. Le forme di impossibilità normativa sono indagate, nei contributi raccolti in questo volume, da diverse angolazioni: la filosofia del diritto, la filosofia morale, la logica, la filosofia della conoscenza, la scienza del diritto penale. (shrink)

We discuss the meaning of “being alive” and “being dead.” Our primary aim is to pave the way for a sound and accurate ethical debate concerning these two concepts. In particular, we analyze a metabolic approach and a genetic one and discuss the reasons for their failure to constitute a good starting point for successive debates. We argue that any ethical or social discussion of topics involving life and death must introduce cultural constructs such as, on the one hand, the (...) concept of clinical death and, on the other hand, the concept of existence. We argue that these two cultural constructs, although consistent with biomedical knowledge, cannot be ontologically grounded in it. To conclude, we apply our findings to the case of human embryos. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose two agent-based simulation models for the evolution of language in the framework of evolutionary language games. The theory of evolutionary language games arose from the union of evolutionary game theory, introduced by the English biologist John Maynard Smith, and language games, developed by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. The first model proposed is based on Martin Nowak’s work and is designed to reproduce and verify the results Nowak obtained in his simplest mathematical model. For the (...) second model, we extend the previous one with the introduction of a world where the languages live and evolve, and which influences interactions among individuals. The main goal of this research is to present a model which shows how the presence of a topological structure influences the communication among individuals and contributes to the emergence of clusters of different languages. (shrink)

This collection of case studies in public management bridges the gap between mainstream CSR - confined to the for-profit corporations - and the vast bodies of workers and organizations that make up government and its public administration. The variety and discretion of managerial endeavours in public management calls for accountability and responsibility of government beyond current legal instruments: The book argues that CSR must be brought to bear with government. In government in fact, knowledge management is not a linear process, (...) but the result of working with passion of the parts, implying discretionary behaviour and creativity which in turn imply choice and responsibility. Cases ranging from the USA to Central America, New Zealand and Europe all confirm the complex nature of public management, entailing partnership synergy for disaster recovery, the intertwined link between management and new technology and mindfulness at individual level. The cases are set in a framework by theoretical essays on bureaucratic behaviour and unknown stakeholders. Public-sector management has long drawn upon principles, tools, and techniques developed in the private sector, aiming to infuse bureaucracies with touches of efficiency and productivity. But good governance is also central to good management. This fascinating, wide-ranging volume shows how ideas from the Corporate Social Responsibility movement apply to the governance and administration of public agencies. A series of detailed and informative case studies, written by researchers and practitioners with deep knowledge of their industries and agencies, explores the challenges of managing public and government agencies in a socially responsible manner. The book offers a nuanced and balanced portrait that calls for greater public involvement and oversight in keeping public organizations on track. Highly recommended! Peter G. Klein University of Missouri Norwegian School of Economics and Mises Institute Here are six compelling case studies that reveal the relevance, even the imperative, of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the public sector. In doing so, the authors simultaneously expand the role of CSR and provide us with a refreshed concept of government and public management. The authors then lay the theoretical groundwork for their observations in ways that enrich our understanding of both CSR and the evolving roles of government in our lives. This is "must reading" for corporate officers and for public managers. Thomas R. Sexton Stony Brook University, NY College of Business and School of Professional Development. (shrink)

The paper discusses an ethical analysis of three common cases involving the most popular requests in rhinoplasty. As the nose plays a fundamental role in the aesthetics and physiognomy of the human face, the request for rhinoplasty may be an expression of both subjective discomfort and objective dysfunction. The paper aims, therefore, to fill the gap between qualitative-subjective impressions related to bodily self-perception and its quantitative-objective assessment. Ethical evaluation should start with consideration of the formal object and circumstances of the (...) act, by posing the following question: Is this a real clinical case? Only after an undoubtedly positive answer to this question, should we consider specific case-related aspects; i.e., the best scientific evidence, available nosography and informed consent, before conducting an ethical evaluation of the case. DOI: 10.5294/pebi.2016.20.1.8. (shrink)

Background. Since the nineties, policymakers and theorists working across several disciplines started to entertain the notion of directly engaging the public in matters of public concern. Accompanying this was the attempt to resort to deliberative democracy in order to make such an involvement effective. Seizing on its intrinsic dialogic nature, some scholars proposed the application of public deliberation to the realm of public bioethics. Drawing upon the theory and practice of deliberative public bioethics, the purpose of this paper is to (...) shed light onto the figure of the bioethical expert and its role in public bioethics, and relatedly, to investigate how deliberation may be implemented in a public bioethics context. Methods. We set up a large-scale experiment to investigate whether, and to what extent, different moderation styles impact on participants’ moral preferences. The study combines a survey of a representative sample of the general population with a laboratory experiment based on a random sample of students that ex-ante has identical attitudes to the general population.Results. Findings show that: i) different moderation styles can significantly influence deliberative outcomes; iii) the effects of deliberation are not necessarily immediate, but may be revealed after the end of deliberative session; iii) participants tend to better appreciate a bioethical expert acting as “passive moderator”, namely as someone who acts in order to ensure non-domination and non-interference, thus allowing the creation of basic conditions for equality within the deliberative setting.Conclusions. Our experiment represents an example of how deliberation can be employed in public bioethics. (shrink)

An important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward embodied and participatory aspects of social understanding. Empirical results already imply that social cognition is not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms. To galvanize this interactive turn, we provide an operational definition of social interaction and distinguish the different explanatory roles – contextual, enabling and constitutive – it can play in social cognition. We show that interactive processes are (...) more than a context for social cognition: they can complement and even replace individual mechanisms. This new explanatory power of social interaction can push the field forward by expanding the possibilities of scientific explanation beyond the individual. (shrink)

Colonial ascidians offer opportunities to investigate how developmental events are integrated to generate the animal form, since they can develop similar individuals (oozooids from eggs, blastozooids from pluripotent somatic cells) through very different reproductive processes, i.e. embryogenesis and blastogenesis. Moreover, thanks to their key phylogenetic position, they can help in the understanding of the molecular mechanisms of morphogenesis and their evolution in chordates. We review organogenesis of the ascidian neural complex comparing embryos and buds in terms of topology, developmental mechanisms (...) and terminology. We propose a new interpretation of bud territories, and reconsider nervous system development based on recent results suggesting that ascidians have vertebrate placodal and neural‐crest‐like cells. Comparing embryonic and blastogenic development in Botryllus schlosseri, we propose that the bud has territories with a placodal potentiality, suggesting that chordate ancestors possessed neurogenic placodes, and that the genetic pathways regulating neurogenic placode formation were co‐opted for new developmental processes, such as blastogenesis. BioEssays 28: 902–912, 2006. © 2006 Wiley periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

A novel theoretical framework for an embodied, non-representational approach to language that extends and deepens enactive theory, bridging the gap between sensorimotor skills and language. -/- Linguistic Bodies offers a fully embodied and fully social treatment of human language without positing mental representations. The authors present the first coherent, overarching theory that connects dynamical explanations of action and perception with language. Arguing from the assumption of a deep continuity between life and mind, they show that this continuity extends to language. (...) Expanding and deepening enactive theory, they offer a constitutive account of language and the co-emergent phenomena of personhood, reflexivity, social normativity, and ideality. Language, they argue, is not something we add to a range of existing cognitive capacities but a new way of being embodied. Each of us is a linguistic body in a community of other linguistic bodies. The book describes three distinct yet entangled kinds of human embodiment, organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective; it traces the emergence of linguistic sensitivities and introduces the novel concept of linguistic bodies; and it explores the implications of living as linguistic bodies in perpetual becoming, applying the concept of linguistic bodies to questions of language acquisition, parenting, autism, grammar, symbol, narrative, and gesture, and to such ethical concerns as microaggression, institutional speech, and pedagogy. (shrink)

As yet, there is no enactive account of social cognition. This paper extends the enactive concept of sense-making into the social domain. It takes as its departure point the process of interaction between individuals in a social encounter. It is a well-established finding that individuals can and generally do coordinate their movements and utterances in such situations. We argue that the interaction process can take on a form of autonomy. This allows us to reframe the problem of social cognition as (...) that of how meaning is generated and transformed in the interplay between the unfolding interaction process and the individuals engaged in it. The notion of sense-making in this realm becomes participatory sense-making. The onus of social understanding thus moves away from strictly the individual only. (shrink)

A proposal for the biological grounding of intrinsic teleology and sense-making through the theory of autopoiesis is critically evaluated. Autopoiesis provides a systemic language for speaking about intrinsic teleology but its original formulation needs to be elaborated further in order to explain sense-making. This is done by introducing adaptivity, a many-layered property that allows organisms to regulate themselves with respect to their conditions of viability. Adaptivity leads to more articulated concepts of behaviour, agency, sense-construction, health, and temporality than those given (...) so far by autopoiesis and enaction. These and other implications for understanding the organismic generation of values are explored. (shrink)

This paper reformulates some of the questions raised by extended mind theorists from an enactive, life/mind continuity perspective. Because of its reliance on concepts such as autopoiesis, the enactive approach has been deemed internalist and thus incompatible with the extended mind hypothesis. This paper answers this criticism by showing (1) that the relation between organism and cogniser is not one of co-extension, (2) that cognition is a relational phenomenon and thereby has no location, and (3) that the individuality of a (...) cogniser is inevitably linked with the question of its autonomy, a question ignored by the extended mind hypothesis but for which the enactive approach proposes a precise, operational, albeit non-functionalist answer. The paper raises a pespective of embedded and intersecting forms of autonomous identity generation, some of which correspond to the canonical cases discussed in the extended mind literature, but on the whole of wider generality. In addressing these issues, this paper proposes unbiased, non-species specific definitions of cognition, agency and mediation, thus filling in gaps in the extended mind debates that have led to paradoxical situations and a problematic over-reliance on intutions about what counts as cognitive. (shrink)

Several authors have made claims about the compatibility between the Free Energy Principle and theories of autopoiesis and enaction. Many see these theories as natural partners or as making similar statements about the nature of biological and cognitive systems. We critically examine these claims and identify a series of misreadings and misinterpretations of key enactive concepts. In particular, we notice a tendency to disregard the operational definition of autopoiesis and the distinction between a system’s structure and its organization. Other misreadings (...) concern the conflation of processes of self-distinction in operationally closed systems and Markov blankets. Deeper theoretical tensions underlie some of these misinterpretations. FEP assumes systems that reach a non-equilibrium steady state and are enveloped by a Markov blanket. We argue that these assumptions contradict the historicity of sense-making that is explicit in the enactive approach. Enactive concepts such as adaptivity and agency are defined in terms of the modulation of parameters and constraints of the agent-environment coupling, which entail the possibility of changes in variable and parameter sets, constraints, and in the dynamical laws affecting the system. This allows enaction to address the path-dependent diversity of human bodies and minds. We argue that these ideas are incompatible with the time invariance of non-equilibrium steady states assumed by the FEP. In addition, the enactive perspective foregrounds the enabling and constitutive roles played by the world in sense-making, agency, development. We argue that this view of transactional and constitutive relations between organisms and environments is a challenge to the FEP. Once we move beyond superficial similarities, identify misreadings, and examine the theoretical commitments of the two approaches, we reach the conclusion that far from being easily integrated, the FEP, as it stands formulated today, is in tension with the theories of autopoiesis and enaction. (shrink)

The enactive approach provides a perspective on human bodies in their organic, sensorimotor, social, and linguistic dimensions, but many fundamental issues still remain unaddressed. A crucial desideratum for a theory of human bodies is that it be able to account for concrete human becoming. In this article I show that enactive theory possesses resources to achieve this goal. Being an existential structure, human becoming is best approached by a series of progressive formal indications. I discuss three standpoints on human becoming (...) as open, indeterminate, and therefore historical using the voices of Pico della Mirandola, Gordon W. Allport, and Paulo Freire. Drawing on Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy of individuation we move from an existential to an ontological register in looking at modes of embodied becoming. His scheme of interpretation of the relation between modes of individuation allows us to understand human becoming in terms of a tendency to neotenization. I compare this ontology with an enactive theoretical account of the dimensions of embodiment, finding several compatibilities and complementarities. Various forms of bodily unfinishedness in enaction fit the Simondonian ontology and the existential analysis, where transindividuality corresponds to participatory sense-making and Freire’s joint becoming of individuals and communities correlates with the open tensions in linguistic bodies between incorporation and incarnation of linguistic acts. I test some of this ideas by considering the plausibility of artificial bodies and personal becoming from an enactive perspective, using the case of replicants in the film Blade Runner. The conclusion is that any kind of personhood, replicants included, requires living through an actual history of concrete becoming. (shrink)

A proposal for the biological grounding of intrinsic teleology and sense-making through the theory of autopoiesis is critically evaluated. Autopoiesis provides a systemic lan- guage for speaking about intrinsic teleology but its original formulation needs to be elaborated further in order to explain sense-making. This is done by introducing adaptivity, a many-layered property that allows organisms to regulate themselves with respect to their conditions of via- bility. Adaptivity leads to more articulated concepts of behaviour, agency, sense-construction, health, and temporality than (...) those given so far by autopoiesis and enaction. These and other implications for understanding the organismic generation of values are explored. (shrink)

Enactive cognitive science combines questions in epistemology, ontology, and ethics by conceiving of bodies as open-ended and mutually transforming through activity. While enaction is not a theory of ethics, it can contribute to its foundations. We present a schematization of enactive ideas that underlie traditional distinctions between Being, Knowing, and Doing. Ethics in this scheme begins in the relation between knowing and becoming. Critical of dichotomous thinking, we approach the questions of alterity and ethical reality. Alterity is relevant to the (...) enactive approach, but not in the radical sense of transcendental arguments. We propose difference, instead, as a more generative concept. Following Simondon, we see norms and values manifest in webs of past and future acts together with their potentialities for becoming. We propose a transindividual concept of moral attunement that includes ethical know-how and consciousness raising. Through generative difference and attunement to configurations of becoming, enaction underpins an ethics of participation linking virtue ethics and ethics of care. (shrink)

The sensorimotor approach to perception addresses various aspects of perceptual experience, but not the subjectivity of intentional action. Conversely, the problem that current accounts of the sense of agency deal with is primarily one of subjectivity. But the proposed models, based on internal signal comparisons, arguably fail to make the transition from subpersonal computations to personal experience. In this paper we suggest an alternative direction towards explaining the sense of agency by braiding three theoretical strands: a world-involving, dynamical interpretation of (...) the sensorimotor approach, an enactive description of sensorimotor agency as contrasted with organic agency in general, and a dynamical theory of equilibration within and between sensorimotor schemes. On this new account, the sense of oneself as the author of one’s own actions corresponds to what we experience during the ongoing adventure of establishing, losing, and re-establishing meaningful interactions with the world. The meaningful relation between agent and world is given by the precarious constitution of sensorimotor agency as a self-asserting network of schemes and dispositions. Acts are owned as they adaptively assert the constitution of the agent. Thus, awareness for different aspects of agency experience, such as the initiation of action, the effort exerted in controlling it, or the achievement of the desired effect, can be accounted for by processes involved in maintaining the sensorimotor organization that enables these interactions with the world. We discuss these processes in detail from a non-representational, dynamical perspective and show how they cohere with the personal experience of agency. (shrink)

This book presents the framework for a new, comprehensive approach to cognitive science. The proposed paradigm, enaction, offers an alternative to cognitive science's classical, first-generation Computational Theory of Mind. _Enaction_, first articulated by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in _The Embodied Mind_, breaks from CTM's formalisms of information processing and symbolic representations to view cognition as grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment. A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its embodied (...) action in the world constitutes its perception and thereby grounds its cognition. _Enaction_ offers a range of perspectives on this exciting new approach to embodied cognitive science. Some chapters offer manifestos for the enaction paradigm; others address specific areas of research, including artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, neuroscience, language, phenomenology, and culture and cognition. Three themes emerge as testimony to the originality and specificity of enaction as a paradigm: the relation between first-person lived experience and third-person natural science; the ambition to provide an encompassing framework applicable at levels from the cell to society; and the difficulties of reflexivity. Taken together, the chapters offer nothing less than the framework for a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science. Contributors: Renaud Barbaras, Didier Bottineau, Giovanna Colombetti, Diego Cosmelli, Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo. Andreas K. Engel, Olivier Gapenne, Véronique Havelange, Edwin Hutchins, Michel Le Van Quyen, Rafael E. Núñez, Marieke Rohde, Benny Shanon, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Adam Sheya, Linda B. Smith, John Stewart, Evan Thompson. (shrink)