Several authors have made claims about the compatibility between the Free Energy Principle and theories of autopoiesis and enaction. Many see these theories as natural partners or as making similar statements about the nature of biological and cognitive systems. We critically examine these claims and identify a series of misreadings and misinterpretations of key enactive concepts. In particular, we notice a tendency to disregard the operational definition of autopoiesis and the distinction between a system’s structure and its organization. Other misreadings (...) concern the conflation of processes of self-distinction in operationally closed systems and Markov blankets. Deeper theoretical tensions underlie some of these misinterpretations. FEP assumes systems that reach a non-equilibrium steady state and are enveloped by a Markov blanket. We argue that these assumptions contradict the historicity of sense-making that is explicit in the enactive approach. Enactive concepts such as adaptivity and agency are defined in terms of the modulation of parameters and constraints of the agent-environment coupling, which entail the possibility of changes in variable and parameter sets, constraints, and in the dynamical laws affecting the system. This allows enaction to address the path-dependent diversity of human bodies and minds. We argue that these ideas are incompatible with the time invariance of non-equilibrium steady states assumed by the FEP. In addition, the enactive perspective foregrounds the enabling and constitutive roles played by the world in sense-making, agency, development. We argue that this view of transactional and constitutive relations between organisms and environments is a challenge to the FEP. Once we move beyond superficial similarities, identify misreadings, and examine the theoretical commitments of the two approaches, we reach the conclusion that far from being easily integrated, the FEP, as it stands formulated today, is in tension with the theories of autopoiesis and enaction. (shrink)

There has been considerable debate in the literature about the relative merits of information processing versus dynamical approaches to understanding cognitive processes. In this article, we explore the relationship between these two styles of explanation using a model agent evolved to solve a relational categorization task. Specifically, we separately analyze the operation of this agent using the mathematical tools of information theory and dynamical systems theory. Information-theoretic analysis reveals how task-relevant information flows through the system to be combined into a (...) categorization decision. Dynamical analysis reveals the key geometrical and temporal interrelationships underlying the categorization decision. Finally, we propose a framework for directly relating these two different styles of explanation and discuss the possible implications of our analysis for some of the ongoing debates in cognitive science. (shrink)

van Gelder argues that computational and dynamical systems are mathematically distinct kinds of systems. Although there are real experimental and theoretical differences between adopting a computational or dynamical perspective on cognition, and the dynamical approach has much to recommend it, the debate cannot be framed this rigorously. Instead, what is needed is careful study of concrete models to improve our intuitions.

The generation of isometric force at the hand can be mediated by activating a few motor modules. Stroke induces alterations in motor modules underlying steady-state isometric force generation in the human upper extremity. However, how the altered motor modules impact task performance remains unclear as stroke survivors develop and converge to the three-dimensional target force. Thus, we tested whether stroke-specific motor modules would be activated from the onset of force generation and also examined how alterations in motor modules would induce (...) changes in force representation. During 3D isometric force development, electromyographic signals were recorded from eight major elbow and shoulder muscles in the paretic arm of 10 chronic hemispheric stroke survivors and both arms of six age-matched control participants. A non-negative matrix factorization algorithm identified motor modules in four different time windows: three “exploratory” force ramping phases and the stable force match phase. Motor module similarity and between-force coupling were examined by calculating the scalar product and Pearson correlation across the phases. To investigate the association between the end-point force representation and the activation of the motor modules, principal component analysis and multivariate multiple linear regression analyses were applied. In addition, the force components regressed on the activation profiles of motor modules were utilized to model the feasible force direction. Both stroke and control groups developed exploratory isometric forces with a non-linear relationship between EMG and force. During the force matching, only the stroke group showed abnormal between-force coupling in medial-lateral and backward-forward and medial-lateral and downward-upward directions. In each group, the same motor modules, including the abnormal deltoid module in stroke survivors, were expressed from the beginning of force development instead of emerging during the force exploration. The PCA and the multivariate multiple linear regression analyses showed that alterations in motor modules were associated with abnormal between-force coupling and limited feasible force direction after stroke. Overall, these results suggest that alterations in intermuscular coordination contribute to the abnormal end-point force control under isometric conditions in the UE after stroke. (shrink)