In recent years, to protect the rights and welfare of human subjects, institutions in the USA have begun to set up programmes to monitor ongoing medical research. These programmes provide routine, onsite oversight, and thus go beyond existing oversight such as investigating suspected misconduct or reviewing paperwork provided by investigators. However, because of a lack of guidelines and evidence, institutions have had little guidance in setting up their programmes. To help institutions make the right choices, we used interviews and document (...) analysis to study how and why 11 US institutions have set up their monitoring programmes. Although these programmes varied considerably, we were able to distinguish two general types. ‘Compliance’ programmes on the one hand were part of the institutional review board office and set up to ensure compliance with regulations. Investigators’ participation was mandatory. Monitors focused on documentation. Investigators could be disciplined, and could be obliged to take corrective actions. ‘Quality-improvement’ programmes on the other hand were part of a separate office. Investigators requested to be monitored. Monitors focused more on actual research conduct. Investigators and other parties received feedback on how to improve the research process. Although both types of programmes have their drawbacks and advantages, we argue that if institutions want to set up monitoring programmes, quality improvement is the better choice: it can help foster an atmosphere of trust between investigators and the institutional review board, and can help raise the standards for the protection of human subjects. (shrink)

Critique as Social Practice first appeared in German in 2009, in the series of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt. Its English translation comes out in the recently launched collection...

Emotions are traditionally considered to be brief states that last for seconds or a few minutes at most. However, due to pioneering theoretical work of Frijda and recent empirical studies, it has become clear that the duration of emotions is actually highly variable with durations ranging from a few seconds to several hours, or even longer. We review research on determinants of emotion duration. Three classes of determinants are identified: features related to the emotion-eliciting event, emotion itself, and emotion-experiencing person. (...) Initial evidence on the psychological and neural mechanisms that underlie their effects is discussed. (shrink)

Jean-Marc Mouillie : Le projet philosophique de L'Être et le néant -- Juliette Simont : Genèse du "Néant", genèse de L'Être et le néant (À propos de la morale et de l'ontologie de Sartre) -- Jean-Philippe Narboux : Intentionnalité et négation dans L'Être et le néant -- Timur Uçan : Le problème du solipsisme dans L'Être et le néant -- Kim Sang Ong-Van-Cung : Le corps et l'expérience d'autrui. Un aspect du problème de la négation dans L'Être (...) et le néant -- Laurent Husson : Le cercle de l'autre comme question de méthode. Sur les relations concrètes avec autrui, leur signification et leur portée -- Frédéric Worms : Une théorie radicale des relations humaines -- Jean Bourgault : Le propre de Sartre. Quelques remarques sur une phénoménologie de l'appropriation -- Hadi Rizk : Être et faire, la liberté comme principe d'individuation. (shrink)

Wat dacht Nietzsche, die niet bepaald positief stond ten opzichte van het christendom, eigenlijk over Jezus? Er wordt immers wel beweerd dat je, wat je verder ook van het christendom denkt, onmogelijk tegen Jezus kunt zijn. In zijn vroege werk noemt Nietzsche hem inderdaad 'de edelste mens'. Maar later heeft hij het over 'een grote egoïst' en in 'Der Antichrist' zegt hij zelfs dat Jezus 'een idioot' was. Wat betekent dat allemaal precies binnen het denken van een filosoof die vaak (...) niet rechtstreeks zegt wat hij eigenlijk bedoelt? Kunnen deze gedachten voor ons vandaag nog iets betekenen? Lepers heeft het volledige oeuvre van Nietzsche onderzocht op uitspraken en beschouwingen over en rond de figuur van Jezus. Dat voert hem tot genuanceerde, soms (schijnbaar?) tegenstrijdige, maar altijd uitdagende antwoorden op de vraag wie en wat Jezus in Nietzsches ogen was en wat hij vanuit dat perspectief voor ons zou kunnen zijn. (shrink)

Van Heijenoort's main contribution to history and philosophy of modern logic was his distinction between two basic views of logic, first, the absolutist, or universalist, view of the founding fathers, Frege, Peano, and Russell, which dominated the first, classical period of history of modern logic, and, second, the relativist, or model-theoretic, view, inherited from Boole, Schröder, and Löwenheim, which has dominated the second, contemporary period of that history. In my paper, I present the man Jean van Heijenoort (Sect. 1); (...) then I describe his way of arguing for the second view (Sect. 2); and finally I come down in favor of the first view (Sect. 3). There, I specify the version of universalism for which I am prepared to argue (Sect. 3, introduction). Choosing ZFC to play the part of universal, logical (in a nowadays forgotten sense) system, I show, through an example, how the usual model theory can be naturally given its proper place, from the universalist point of view, in the logical framework of ZFC; I outline another, not rival but complementary, semantics for admissible extensions of ZFC in the very same logical framework; I propose a way to get universalism out of the predicaments in which universalists themselves believed it to be (Sect. 3.1). Thus, if universalists of the classical period did not, in fact, construct these semantics, it was not that their universalism forbade them, in principle, to do so. The historical defeat of universalism was not technical in character. Neither was it philosophical. Indeed, it was hardly more than the victory of technicism over the very possibility of a philosophical dispute (Sect. 3.2). (shrink)

When it was first published in France in 1961 as _Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la Folie à l'âge Classique_, few had heard of a thirty-four year old philosopher by the name of Michel Foucault. By the time an abridged English edition was published in 1967 as _Madness and Civilization_, Michel Foucault had shaken the intellectual world. This translation is the first English edition of the complete French texts of the first and second edition, including all prefaces and appendices, some (...) of them unavailable in the existing French edition. _History of Madness_ begins in the Middle Ages with vivid descriptions of the exclusion and confinement of lepers. Why, Foucault asks, when the leper houses were emptied at the end of the Middle Ages, were they turned into places of confinement for the mad? Why, within the space of several months in 1656, was one out of every hundred people in Paris confined? Shifting brilliantly from Descartes and early Enlightenment thought to the founding of the Hôpital Général in Paris and the work of early psychiatrists Philippe Pinel and Samuel Tuke, Foucault focuses throughout, not only on scientific and medical analyses of madness, but also on the philosophical and cultural values attached to the mad. He also urges us to recognize the creative and liberating forces that madness represents, brilliantly drawing on examples from Goya, Nietzsche, Van Gogh and Artaud. The _History of Madness_ is an inspiring and classic work that challenges us to understand madness, reason and power and the forces that shape them. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:In response to criticism of empirical or “positive” approaches to corporate social responsibility (CSR), we defend the importance of these approaches for any CSR theory that seeks to have practical impact. Although we acknowledge limitations to positive approaches, we unpack the neglected but crucial relationships between positive knowledge on the one hand and normative knowledge on the other in the implementation of CSR principles. Using the structure of a practical syllogism, we construct a model that displays the key role of (...) empirical knowledge in fulfilling a firm’s responsibility to society, paying special attention to the implications of the “ought implies can” dictum. We also defend the importance of one particular class of empirical claims; namely, claims from the field of economics. Even positive economic theory, which is often criticized for endorsing profits rather than values, can cooperate in intriguing ways with non-economic concepts in the implementation of CSR goals. (shrink)

This article investigates the claims and complexities involved in the platform-based economics of health and fitness apps. We examine a double-edged logic inscribed in these platforms, promising to offer personal solutions to medical problems while also contributing to the public good. On the one hand, online platforms serve as personalized data-driven services to their customers. On the other hand, they allegedly serve public interests, such as medical research or health education. In doing so, many apps employ a diffuse discourse, hinging (...) on terms like “sharing,” “open,” and “reuse” when they talk about data extraction and distribution. The analytical approach we adopt in this article is situated at the nexus of science and technology studies, political economy, and the sociology of health and illness. The analysis concentrates on two aspects: datafication and commodification. We apply these analytical categories to three specific platforms: 23andMe, PatientsLikeMe, and Parkinson mPower. The last section will connect these individual examples to the wider implications of health apps’ data flows, governance policies, and business models. Regulatory bodies commonly focus on the safety and security of apps, but pay scarce attention to health apps’ techno-economic governance. Who owns user-generated health data and who gets to benefit? We argue that it is important to reflect on the societal implications of health data markets. Governments have the duty to provide conceptual clarity in the grand narrative of transforming health care and health research. (shrink)

Background The European Union aims to optimize patient protection and efficiency of health-care research by harmonizing procedures across Member States. Nonetheless, further improvements are required to increase multicenter research efficiency. We investigated IRB procedures in a large prospective European multicenter study on traumatic brain injury, aiming to inform and stimulate initiatives to improve efficiency. Methods We reviewed relevant documents regarding IRB submission and IRB approval from European neurotrauma centers participating in the Collaborative European NeuroTrauma Effectiveness Research in Traumatic Brain Injury. (...) Documents included detailed information on IRB procedures and the duration from IRB submission until approval. They were translated and analyzed to determine the level of harmonization of IRB procedures within Europe. Results From 18 countries, 66 centers provided the requested documents. The primary IRB review was conducted centrally or locally and primary IRB approval was obtained after one, two or three review rounds with a median duration of respectively 50 and 98 days until primary IRB approval. Additional IRB approval was required in 55% of countries and could increase duration to 535 days. Total duration from submission until required IRB approval was obtained was 114 days and appeared to be shorter after submission to local IRBs compared to central IRBs. Conclusion We found variation in IRB procedures between and within European countries. There were differences in submission and approval requirements, number of review rounds and total duration. Research collaborations could benefit from the implementation of more uniform legislation and regulation while acknowledging local cultural habits and moral values between countries. (shrink)

Van Heijenoort’s main contribution to history and philosophy of modern logic was his distinction between two basic views of logic, first, the absolutist, or universalist, view of the founding fathers, Frege, Peano, and Russell, which dominated the first, classical period of history of modern logic, and, second, the relativist, or model-theoretic, view, inherited from Boole, Schröder, and Löwenheim, which has dominated the second, contemporary period of that history. In my paper, I present the man Jean van Heijenoort (Sect. 1); (...) then I describe his way of arguing for the second view (Sect. 2); and finally I come down in favor of the first view (Sect. 3). There, I specify the version of universalism for which I am prepared to argue (Sect. 3, introduction). Choosing ZFC to play the part of universal, logical (in a nowadays forgotten sense) system, I show, through an example, how the usual model theory can be naturally given its proper place, from the universalist point of view, in the logical framework of ZFC; I outline another, not rival but complementary, semantics for admissible extensions of ZFC in the very same logical framework; I propose a way to get universalism out of the predicaments in which universalists themselves believed it to be (Sect. 3.1). Thus, if universalists of the classical period did not, in fact, construct these semantics, it was not that their universalism forbade them, in principle, to do so. The historical defeat of universalism was not technical in character. Neither was it philosophical. Indeed, it was hardly more than the victory of technicism over the very possibility of a philosophical dispute (Sect. 3.2). (shrink)

The conception of social justice presented and defended in Philippe Van Parijs, "Real Freedom for All" entails, among other implication, the justification of an unconditional basic income. It was the subject of seven critical comments that forms issue 22 and part of 23 of ANALYSE & KRITIK. In this article, Van Parijs offers a comprehensive reply.

In this essay, I take up James Conant and Cora Diamond’s suggestion that “to take the difference between saying and showing deeply enough is not to give up on showing but to give up on picturing it as a ‘what’ ”. I try to establish that the Tractatus’s talk of “showing” is more coherent than is usually appreciated, that it is indeed a key to the internal unity of the book, and that it positively helps us to work our way (...) into the practice of philosophy, which its author understood as a practice of logical clarification. Thus, it is not a stretch of latent nonsense whose sole function is to conjure up an illusion of sense for the sake of displaying its disintegration. While Wittgenstein’s concept of showing is not meant to “make up for” the impossibility of saying certain things, neither does it stand in need of being “redeemed.” Whether or not it is to prove ultimately coherent, the Tractatus’s talk of “showing,” I shall argue, is certainly not to be “thrown away” in the name of the Tractarian conception of logic, for the simple reason that it essentially belongs with it. (shrink)

If one is committed to a “Rawlsian” conception of justice, is one not also necessarily committed to a “Christian” personal ethics? MOE explicitly, if one believes that social justice requires the maximinning of material conditions, should one not use one's time and resources as well as one can in order to assist the poorest? The paper offers a very partial answer to these questions by arguing for the following two claims: (1) Contrary to what is implied by some egalitarian critics (...) of Rawls, the idea of a well‐ordered society does not require maximin‐guided choices at the individual level, and hence leaves room for legitimate incentive payments.(2) Despite Rawls's own neglect of this fact, a limited form of patriotism does constitute an individual “natural duty” following from a commitment to maximin social justice. (shrink)

This introduction to the special issue on data and agency argues that datafication should not only be understood as the process of collecting and analysing data about Internet users, but also as feeding such data back to users, enabling them to orient themselves in the world. It is important that debates about data power recognise that data is also generated, collected and analysed by alternative actors, enhancing rather than undermining the agency of the public. Developing this argument, we first make (...) clear why and how the question of agency should be central to our engagement with data. Subsequently, we discuss how this question has been operationalized in the five contributions to this special issue, which empirically open up the study of alternative forms of datafication. Building on these contributions, we conclude that as data acquire new power, it is vital to explore the space for citizen agency in relation to data structures and to examine the practices of data work, as well as the people involved in these practices. (shrink)

L’usage de corpus n’est pas réservé aux linguistes. Néanmoins ceux-ci en sont des utilisateurs patentés, du fait, entre autres, que leurs analyses portent sur des productions linguistiques ou langagières non finies dont l’étude ne peut s’opérer que sur un échantillon. Mais pour que l’analyse prétende à quelque validité, cet échantillon doit être représentatif. Représentatif de quoi? D’une réalité qui à la fois préexiste à l’analyse et qu’il contribue à cerner et à établir. D’où toute une palette de corpus dont les (...) principaux types en usage dans la discipline, selon les matériaux utilisés, selon la clôture imaginée, selon la fonction assignée…, sont brièvement rappelés. La réflexion est ensuite centrée sur la délimitation de la place et de la fonction du corpus entre faits, analyses et théories ; il est montré, quelques exemples à l’appui, empruntés à la démarche du dialectologue et du lexicologue, que le corpus ne saurait être qu’un construit et que sa construction fait partie intégrante du prisme théorique à travers lequel le linguiste entend appréhender le réel. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I The Extended Auction II Working in the Peep Show, Flirting in the Square III Insurance Behind a Veil of Ignorance IV Dworkin's Hybrid Scheme V Four Objections to Dworkin VI Ackerman Generalized VII Not Enough Redistribution? VIII Too Much Redistribution? Acknowledgement.

L’usage de corpus n’est pas réservé aux linguistes. Néanmoins ceux-ci en sont des utilisateurs patentés, du fait, entre autres, que leurs analyses portent sur des productions linguistiques ou langagières non finies dont l’étude ne peut s’opérer que sur un échantillon. Mais pour que l’analyse prétende à quelque validité, cet échantillon doit être représentatif. Représentatif de quoi ? D’une réalité qui à la fois préexiste à l’analyse et qu’il contribue à cerner et à établir. D’où toute une palette de corpus dont (...) les principaux types en usage dans la discipline, selon les matériaux utilisés, selon la clôture imaginée, selon la fonction assignée…, sont brièvement rappelés. La réflexion est ensuite centrée sur la délimitation de la place et de la fonction du corpus entre faits, analyses et théories ; il est montré, quelques exemples à l’appui, empruntés à la démarche du dialectologue et du lexicologue, que le corpus ne saurait être qu’un construit et que sa construction fait partie intégrante du prisme théorique à travers lequel le linguiste entend appréhender le réel. (shrink)

This paper investigates a particular philosophical puzzle via an examination of its status in the writings of Wittgenstein. The puzzle concerns negation and can take on three interrelated guises. The first puzzle is how not-p can so much as negate p at all – for if p is not the case, then nothing corresponds to p. The second puzzle is how not-p can so much as negate p at all when not-p rejects p not as false but as unintelligible – (...) for if p is unintelligible, then p is nothing but scratches and sounds and does not seem apt for negation. And the third puzzle is how “not” could be anything but hopelessly equivocal if it sometimes (per the first puzzle) requires, and sometimes (per the second puzzle) precludes the intelligibility of p. The paper investigates these three puzzles, their respective structures, and their relations to each other. The second puzzle is expounded as the centre of gravity, and in countering two objections to the threefold puzzle, a special predicament is expounded with regard to the second puzzle’s concern with unipolar propositions – propositions that do not admit of an intelligible negation. The text concludes by indicating the first steps that could potentially lead us out of the threefold puzzle. (shrink)

This article discusses the meaning of the notion of virtuality in modern physics. To this end, it develops considerations on the introduction and establishment in nuclear physics of two independent concepts at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s: that of the virtual state, used in the context of neutron scattering studies, and that of the virtual transition, useful for the theoretical understanding of strong nuclear forces, which forms the basis of what are now called virtual particles. Their comparative analysis (...) highlights the theoretical nature of virtual entities and processes in modern physics. It also shows how the virtual has been associated with various purely physical attributes, leading to a form of polysemy of the term, from the beginning of the application of these concepts. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, EarlyView.

How is it possible, at the same time, to claim that there is a causal primacy of the productive forces over the relations of production and to recognize that the development of the productive forces causally depends on the nature of the relations of production? This irritating puzzle, which threatens the very core of historical materialism, had never received a satisfactory solution until G. A. Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History. The latter asserts that only a functional interpretation of historical (...) materialism can effect the required reconciliation. On one reading of the "primacy puzzle", however, this claim turns out to be trivial, while on the only other plausible reading it turns out to be false. Having delineated this dilemma, the article sketches an alternative solution. (shrink)