There has been a time in my teaching career that I used to cite in my introductory classes ‘Moral Philosophy’ from Erica Jong's Fear of Flying . The situation leading up to the quote is that the main character, Isadora, is asked a sexual favour by her brother in law, Pierre. Her answer and the subsequent dialogue read then as follows: ‘I can't’ , I said. ‘Come on,’ Pierre said, ‘I'll teach you.’ ‘I didn't mean that … I meant that (...) I can't; morally , I can…’. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper an argument is developed to the effect that (1) there is no moral ground for individual persons to feel responsible for or guilty about crimes of their group to which they have in no way contributed; and (2) since there is no irreducibly collective responsibility nor guilt at any time, there is no question of them persisting over time. In the second part it is argued that there is nevertheless sufficient reason for innocent (...) individual members of a group (that persists over time) to take on responsibility and guilt for the evil other (earlier) members have committed. The reason depends on the acceptability of a particular psychological theory of personal identity. (shrink)

According to the traditional conception of morality one's feeling of guilt is appropriate if and only if one has culpably done wrong. The feeling must involve this propositional content. In recent literature, however, two opposite developments can be discerned. First there is a tendency to expand the range of things one can appropriately feel guilty about. So, for example, it is argued that there is nothing wrong in feeling guilt about actions done involuntarily, or done by others, or about thoughts (...) which just happen to the subject of the feeling . This position is criticized on the ground that guilt is a painful emotion and should therefore be suffered only if it is deserved. On the other hand, there are also arguments in the literature to the effect that agent regret should be substituted for guilt , and that the range of appropriate guilt feelings should be limited . The main objection to Williams's proposal is that it would mean an impoverishment of the moral world: guilt feeling implies, as agent regret does not, the recognition that one could and should have acted otherwise. As to Gibbard's position, it is demonstrated that it is based on a disputable metaethics. In addition to that, it is argued that Gibbard's view of guilt feeling as an adaptive syndrome is untenable. (shrink)

This is the first book that pays systematic attention to ontological issues impinging on this question.

In a Dutch weekly it was recently stated that man's moral powers are overestimated in the christian faith. The proponent of this belief, the Dutch–American philologist and philosopher Staal seems to me to be closer to the truth of this matter than his distinguished German colleague Nietzsche. The latter used to fascinate me as a young student with his devastating criticisms of christian culture and the christian view of life. According to Nietzsche, the christian religion has not too high, but (...) rather too low a view of mankind: it wanted man to be ugly and evil; in this way it has succeeded in making man so. The insignificance, ugliness and sinfulness of man is the outcome of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Someone who is being told again and again how insignificant, bad and sinful he is, will end up believing it and behave accordingly. A not implausible theory, I thought at that time. However, as I see the matter now, I would support Staal rather than Nietzsche . The christian faith has an optimistic view of man. Does it overestimate him? Does it attribute imaginary moral powers to him? Does it demand the morally impossible? A positive answer to these questions is not unreasonable if one does not want to go beyond a secular, evolutionist or sociobiological under-standing of man and does not take into consideration the affirmations of the Church. (shrink)

[Masaryk and Korsgaard on God and Moral Obligation: Toward a Moral Argument for the Existence of God].

Romans 7: 14 if. has traditionally been one of the most frequently discussed passages in the whole of the Pauline Corpus. Nevertheless, this pericope has attracted attention more because it is consistently regarded as a crucial part of Paul's theology, than because of its intrinsic exegetical problems. The main issue is whether the ‘split personality’ and the weakness of will should be regarded as essential to the life of the believing Christian; or, rather, as characteristic for those who are not (...) ‘in Christ’ and therefore beyond the power of his Spirit. For the systematic theologian, the question of whether the first person singular in these verses should be understood in an autobiographical sense is a subordinate one. However this particular question is answered, we are still confronted by the main issue. (shrink)

The article deals with the classical idea that God's will is the foundation of moral obligation. The particular theory should be understood as a theory of a certain moral practice. Therefore, its 'Sitz im Leben' is first invoked by means of an episode of Walter Scott's The Heart of Midlothian. Then a strong version of the theory is stated and defended against a couple of current and classical objections. A successful defense would give rational support to the theory, but it (...) would not qualify the theory as the best in the field. That depends on the quality of its rivals. One of those, Christine Korsgaard's recent impressive Kantian reflective endorsement view is discussed. The conclusion is that it does not provide stronger grounds for the reality and inescapability of moral obligations than the divine command theory. (shrink)

What I set out to do is to cast some doubt on the thesis that, in Bernard Williams's words, any appeal to God in morality “either adds nothing at all, or it adds the wrong sort of thing”. A first conclusion is that a morality of real, inescapable and (sometimes) for the agent costly obligations, while being at home in a theistic metaphysic, does not sit easily with metaphysical, atheistic naturalism. The second conclusion is that Christine Korsgaard's impressive ethical project (...) which is neutral towards theism and atheism fails in giving a satisfying account of such obligations. My final claim is that a theistic account in terms of a strong divine command theory might succeed where non- and atheistic accounts seem to founder. (shrink)

There has been a time in my teaching career that I used to cite in my introductory classes ‘Moral Philosophy’ from Erica Jong's Fear of Flying . The situation leading up to the quote is that the main character, Isadora, is asked a sexual favour by her brother in law, Pierre. Her answer and the subsequent dialogue read then as follows: ‘I can't’ , I said. ‘Come on,’ Pierre said, ‘I'll teach you.’ ‘I didn't mean that … I meant that (...) I can't; morally , I can…’. (shrink)

Responding to the commentaries by Corey Anton and Ian Angus, I outline anew, and so seek to further clarify, the starting points of and motivations behind my reflection about the concrete-abstract distinction and the ways in which this plays out in technology use, seen from an epistemological standpoint. My eventual purpose is to begin to develop, on the basis of the conceptual exercise, guidelines for an emancipatory ‘art of living with technology,’ that circles around the attempt to think beyond (...) the immediate concrete, into the direction of the ‘abstract conditions’ shaping that ‘concrete.’. (shrink)

This brief commentary on Yoni Van Den Eede’s rumination, “Concrete/,” explores residual conceptual ambiguities and raises questions about information technologies and the felt sense of primacy regarding selves and communities.

This chapter describes a philosophical approach to theorizing justice, mapping out some main strands of the tradition leading up to contemporary political philosophy. We first briefly discuss what distinguishes a philosophical approach to justice from other possible approaches to justice, by explaining the normative focus of philosophical theories of justice – that is, a focus on questions not about how things actually are, but about how things ought to be. Next, we explain what sorts of methods philosophers use to justify (...) theories of justice. Following this, in the longest section, we highlight major questions about justice that have drawn the attention of philosophers, and indicate how competing conceptions of justice have arisen from differing answers to these questions. The goal here is not to answer but to elucidate some of the larger questions about justice, as well as to establish a framework for understanding and distinguishing different kinds of claims about justice and some of the relations between them. (shrink)

Objectives: Efficient procedures for obtaining informed (proxy) consent may contribute to high influenza vaccination rates in nursing homes. Yet are such procedures justified? This study’s objective was to gain insight in informed consent policies in Dutch nursing homes; to assess how these may affect influenza vaccination rates and to answer the question whether deviating from standard informed consent procedures could be morally justified. Design: A survey among nursing home physicians. Setting & Participants: We sent a questionnaire to all (356) nursing (...) homes in the Netherlands, to be completed by one of the physicians. Results: We received 245 completed questionnaires. As 21 institutions appeared to be closed or merged into other institutions, the response was 73.1% (245/335). Of all respondents 81.9% reported a vaccination rate above 80%. Almost 50% reported a vaccination rate above 90%. Most respondents considered herd immunity to be an important consideration for institutional policy. Freedom of choice for residents was considered important by almost all. Nevertheless, 106 out of 245 respondents follow a tacit consent procedure, according to which vaccination will be administered unless the resident or her proxy refuses. These institutions show significantly higher vaccination rates (p < 0.03). Conclusions: In our discussion we focus on the question whether tacit consent procedures can be morally justifiable. Such procedures assume that vaccination is good for residents either as individuals or as a group. Even though this assumption may be true for most residents, there are good reasons for preferring express consent procedures. (shrink)

This~chapter~describes a philosophical approach to theorizing justice, mapping out some main strands of the tradition leading up to contemporary political philosophy. We first briefly discuss what distinguishes a~philosophical approach to justice from other possible approaches to justice, by explaining the~normative~focus of philosophical theories of justice a sh that is, a focus on questions not about how things actually~are, but about how things~ought~to be. Next, we explain what sorts of methods philosophers use to justify theories of justice. Following this, in the (...) longest section, we highlight major questions about justice that have drawn the attention of philosophers, and indicate how competing conceptions of justice have arisen from differing answers to these questions. The goal here is not to answer but to elucidate some of the larger questions about justice, as well as to establish a framework for understanding and distinguishing different kinds of claims about justice and some of the relations between them.KEYWORDS:Justice, political philosophy, normative theory, methods, theory of justice. (shrink)

Lee and Schwarz interpret meta-analytic research and replication studies as providing evidence for the robustness of cleansing effects. We argue that the currently available evidence is unconvincing because publication bias and the opportunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom appear to have inflated meta-analytic effect size estimates, and preregistered replications failed to find any evidence of cleansing effects.

Ethical guidelines protecting medical research participants have been criticized for stripping the sociocultural contexts of research. This critique is urgent considering ongoing calls to account for participant diversity in recruitment and inclusion procedures. Our intersectional analysis of illness narratives explores how sociostructural factors might play a role in participants’ exposure to research-related harm in clinical trials. Although widening participation does respond to generalizability concerns, we argue that gendered, classed, and ableist processes of self-silencing could simultaneously enhance risk of harm for (...) participants with multiple oppressed identities. To prevent this, researchers might actively involve participants when designing trials. (shrink)

There are many ways to assess face perception skills. In this study, we describe a novel task battery FEAST (Facial Expression Action Stimulus Test) developed to test recognition of identity and expressions of human faces as well as stimulus control categories. The FEAST consists of a neutral and emotional face memory task, a face and object identity matching task, a face and house part-to-whole matching task, and a human and animal facial expression matching task. The identity and part-to-whole matching tasks (...) contain both upright and inverted conditions. The results provide reference data of a healthy sample of controls in two age groups for future users of the FEAST. (shrink)

Women often embody the central values and practices of their religious tradition. When they leave their community, women find a part of the “religious tapestry” remaining with them long after their disengagement. In this article, we draw from research in the UK and Finland to explore women’s efforts to unlearn parts of their former religious belonging. We draw on in total thirty-five interviews with women who disengaged from the Mormon Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Conservative Laestadianism. We conceptualize un/learning as a (...) multi-layered process consisting of both un-learning and re-learning. We explore women’s narratives about negotiating bodily limits, conduct and belonging, and understand these as suggesting experiences of a threefold un/learning: gendered, spatial-social and epistemic. We argue that examining gendered and embodied un/learning helps to understand women’s disengagement processes from minority Christian traditions in Western and Northern European secularized contexts such as the UK and Finland. (shrink)

To determine what the speaker in a cooperative dialog meant with his assertion, on top of what he explicitly said, it is crucial that we assume that the assertion he gave was optimal. In determining optimal assertions we assume that dialogs are embedded in decision problems (van Rooij 2003) and use backwards induction for calculating them (Benz 2006). In this paper, we show that in terms of our framework we can account for several types of implicatures in a uniform way, (...) suggesting that there is no need for an independent linguistic theory of generalized implicatures. In the final section, we show how we can embed our theory in the framework of signaling games, and how it relates with other game theoretic analyses of implicatures. (shrink)

Even in the Netherlands, where the practice of physician-assisted death (PAD) has been legalized for over 20 years, there is no such thing as a ‘right to die’. Especially patients with extraordinary requests, such as a wish for PAD based on psychiatric suffering, advanced dementia, or (a limited number of) multiple geriatric syndromes, encounter barriers in access to PAD. In this paper, we discuss whether these barriers can be justified in the context of the Dutch situation where PAD is legally (...) permitted for those who suffer unbearably and hopelessly as a result of medical conditions. Furthermore, we explore whether there are options to address some of the barriers or their consequences, both within the Dutch legal framework or by adjusting the legal framework, and whether these options are feasible. We conclude that although there are insufficient arguments to overrule the doctor’s freedom of conscience in the Netherlands, there are ways to address some of the barriers, mainly by offering support to doctors that would be willing to support a request. Moreover, we believe it is morally required to reduce or mitigate where possible the negative consequences of the barriers for patients, such as the long waiting time for those who suffer from psychiatric disorders, because it is unlikely the adjustments suggested to the system will ensure reasonable access for these patient groups. (shrink)