Kalevi Kull’s target article importantly rejects the argument from biological aesthetics, that beauty is a product of natural selection. Instead, beauty is a reflection of the ongoing diversity of free semiotic choosing and fitting. From this view, biosemiotic aesthetics could become the semiotic branch par excellence, in its theorization of the origins of what has always been the central interest of general semiotics. The narrow argument about sexual selection is couched inside the broader ambition to establish a biological but nonreductive (...) definition and scope for aesthetics itself. One of the most important services biosemiotics can provide to the larger community is to bestow upon it some really unifying general principles applicable to all branches of semiotics, and the theory of biosemiotic aesthetics promises to do just this. General semiotics may later adopt some of Kull’s present theorization and apply it to the textual concerns which Kull prefers to consign to other specialists. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Transformation:Power in Persistence and PerspectiveTyler BendrickWe've got another meth napper," my resident stated. With an introduction like that, it is hard not to be immediately labeled as a "difficult patient." Being the only Spanish-speaking person on the team, I, a third-year medical student, became the primary point of contact for this severely injured patient. He was an only-Spanish-speaking, 36-year-old male admitted [End Page 7] to our trauma service (...) after he was hit by a truck while riding his bicycle. Unbeknownst to me at the time, the 14 days I spent caring for this man would become one of the most pivotal learning experiences of my medical school career. It changed not only how I understand and approach "difficult patients" but expanded my knowledge of the complexities and challenges of the current healthcare system and how we, as physicians and healthcare providers, can deliver the best care to patients with low health literacy and limited resources.So, what is a "meth napper?" I questioned. "Well, meth is a super stimulant," my resident explained. "When people are frequent meth users, they get used to functioning normally with high levels of stimulants in their body, reducing the normal regulation of wakefulness. When the amphetamine is removed (such as upon admission to the hospital), the body is left to fend for itself, and thus patients oftentimes sleep for 23 hours a day for about 3 to 5 days while their body works to detox and normalize hormones."As predicted, my new friend, "Joe," was napping when I first went to see him. Thinking back, the word "napping" does not accurately describe his level of somnolence. He was virtually unarousable, and I took to a sternal rub to wake him up at 5 a.m. after his traumatic exploratory laparotomy the night before. Once aroused, he was furious. "Estoy bien. Tengo dolor y tengo hambre," he grunted at me. (I am fine, and I am in pain and hungry!). "Ok, Joe," I replied in Spanish, "I am just going to do a quick exam and you can go back to sleep. We will give you medications for your pain. You had a big surgery on your intestines, so you cannot eat or drink right now. If everything goes well in the next couple of days and you start walking around, we can advance your diet." He begrudgingly let me examine him, never opening his eyes, and I left and went about my day.We continued this routine for five days. I would periodically check on him and usually found him sleeping. When awake, he refused to work with physical therapists, get up and walk or go to the bathroom, shower, use his spirometer, or converse with the nursing staff. He seemed completely disinterested in recovery. About day three, we slowly advanced his diet to clear liquids so he could quench his thirst. Sometimes his wife was there, and she would ask for updates, to which I could only reply, "We have to wait until he is more awake or willing to work with us." I was getting frustrated, as it seemed that his noncompliance was becoming his barrier to discharge.But on day six, everything changed. I went to check on Joe, and he was wide awake, vomiting, and irate. He shouted that he was in incredible pain, and his incision was wet. He was also complaining that he had not eaten in five days, and was insisting that we were starving him. Again, I calmly explained (as I had multiple times a day for the past five days) that his major abdominal surgery prevented us from feeding him until his intestines healed. We were giving him fluids and nutrition through his IV lines, so he was not starving to death. I rushed to get my resident to examine his oozing wound, and after a CT scan and an x-ray, we discovered what we feared: His wound had opened down to the fascia, "dehiscence," as it is called. On top of this, he now had a bowel obstruction, causing his vomiting. His lack of mobility for the past five days had slowed his... (shrink)

This short paper introduces institutional theory to some long-standing questions about business and society theory. Specifically, institutional theory would seem to offer some potential for understanding why business organisations may adopt CSR practices for non-instrumental reasons.

(1994). Moral authority in law and criminal justice: Some reflections on Wilson's The Moral Sense. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 44-53.

This article argues that Schelling, contrary to the traditional view which situates him as the mediator between Fichte and Hegel, the link from the absolute activity of the ego to the absolute activity constitutive of transcendental idealism, offered one of the first attempts to ground philosophy in a fundamental passivity. Schelling’s Erlangen lectures (1820-21) in particular provide a penetrating critique of idealistic modes of thought. I will show that these lectures, along with Schelling’s late philosophy as a whole, elaborate consciousness (...) as what is most problematic instead of the firm foundation. Instead of beginning with transcendental consciousness as its terminus a quo he views it as the terminus ad quem, namely, that which is most in need of explanation and justification. Consciousness arises in passivity thought as a preconscious affection. I will first outline the idea of passivity through an exposition of Entsetzung. Next, I will analyze Schelling’s notion of the World Law or law of either/or as the impetus to freedom, that which sets freedom free. I will then show how this manner of thought circumvents traditional metaphysical thinking, i.e., the so-called philosophy of presence. Schelling offers not a will to power but freedom as the will to or not to power, as that which can or can also not be. Lastly, I will briefly outline some of the ramifications of this for Schelling’s philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

F.W.J. von Schelling’s positive philosophy of mythology and revelation questions how one can move from the natural (the negative or mythology) to freedom (the positive or revelation), i.e. from the natural to the supernatural. The move from nature to freedom surpasses the traditional metaphysics of presence. Being is not simply the presencing of nature but the result of a decisive deed surpassing and supplementing nature. Nature can do nothing other than presence. Freedom, however, could also not be. It could remain (...) in concealment and must not necessarily presence as nature does. The origin is a supplement because an unnecessary excess extraneous to nature. In other words, origins always supplement the natural, i.e. they are supernatural and revelatory. Origins bring something novel, i.e. something original, into being but origins themselves remain in non-being and consequently remain un-revealed. The origin cannot exist, i.e. cannot become present, because it is always qualitatively Past. The origin never was but always already has been . Primal repetition was freedom’s subjection of nature to the Past and a deferral of this deed’s consequences to the indefinite Future. (shrink)

F.W.J. von Schelling’s late philosophy of mythology and revelation attempts, among other ventures, to outline monotheism in opposition to polytheism, theism, deism, pantheism, theosophism, negative theology etc. This is far from a repetition of traditional monotheism’s assertion that there is one God. Schelling asserts instead that God is one and this presupposes a foregoing multiplicity. Moreover, God is only one by virtue of His separation from being. God extracts Himself from being; He is not a being. This facet of monotheism (...) excuses Schelling from onto-theo-logy or metaphysics as presence. Alain Badiou also attempts to avoid this critique, but via subtractive ontology. While subtractive ontology is similar to Schelling’s God as withdrawn from all beings, there are essential differences. The contention is that Schelling presents what could be termed 'theo-monism' in contradistinction to monotheism as it is traditionally understood as well as in contradistinction to Badiou’s impersonal, but otherwise similar, subtractive ontology. (shrink)

In this previously unpublished essay, Edward Caird attacks Spencer's Transfigured Realism, before defending an absolute idealist theory of the formation of self-consciousness. Along the way, Caird also considered the writings of Bishop George Berkeley, David Hume, Sir William Hamilton, J.S. Mill and Henry Sidgwick. Yet the primary foci of the essay were Herbert Spencer's writings, particularly First Principles, the second edition of Principles of Psychology and the third volume of Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative . It appears to follow from (...) Caird's 1874 review of the third volume of Spencer's Essays, a piece which concluded with the observation that: 'There are some other points of interest in Mr. Spencer's 'Replies,' particularly his strange representation of Kant's meaning , but it would take too much space to discuss the subject here.'. (shrink)

Much progress has been made recently towards uncovering the mechanisms that control the size to which organisms and their organs grow, and identifying some of the genes responsible. Size control, however, is only half of the equation. In growing to the right size, tissues must also grow to the right shape. A recent paper1 suggests that a hitherto overlooked cellular behaviour governs the size and shape of a growing tissue, and issues a challenge to developmental biologists to identify the molecular (...) mechanisms involved. BioEssays 25:5–8, 2003. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

British Idealists sought to come to terms with, amongst many other things, the existence of knowledge and the development of the evolutionary and geological sciences such as they were expressed in the writings of the likes of Herbert Spencer, George Lewes and William Clifford. Different British Idealists held different attitudes to scientific evolutionary theories. Here, I shall examine the approach of the most profound member of the school — Thomas Hill Green.

This paper examines Thomas Hill Green's changing attitude to the Reform Question between 1865 and 1876. sketches the Radical landscape against which Green advocated reform between 1866 and 1867, paying particular attention to the respective positions of Gladstone, J.S. Mill and Bright on the relationship between responsible citizenship and class membership. examines Green's theories of social balance and responsible citizenship at the time of his lectures on the English Civil War. argues that, contrary to the established scholarship, Green's Radicalism was (...) closer to Bright than to Gladstone and Mill during this period. counters Richter's claim that Green abandoned democracy following the 1874 General Election, while arguing that even sympathetic commentators misunderstand Green's attitude to the Reform Question immediately after this date. (shrink)

Our course on social justice and health began as an experiment between Roger Williams University School of Law and the Warren Alpert Medical School of Brown University. As a course for both law and medical students, it broke relatively new ground by focusing on the intersection between law and the social determinants of health and the ways in which lawyers and doctors might partner to address social and health disparities. The course blends professionalism, ethics, and problem-solving by using case studies (...) that raise practical challenges at the intersection of poverty, law, and health. This kind of collaborative, interdisciplinary teaching presents many challenges and rewards, which I discuss in this essay. (shrink)

The primary purpose of this paper is to defend three controversial claims that arise out of T.H. Green’s arguments in the first two books of the Prolegomena to Ethics. The first claim—which I defend in §1—is that one should not try to separate the aspects of Green’s metaphysical theory that are set out in book one of the Prolegomena from the theory of the will he developed in book two. The second claim—defended in §2—is that it is possible for an (...) atheist to accept Green’s arguments for the existence of an eternal consciousness. The third claim—again, defended in §2—is that the eternal consciousness is a potential of every individual mind, rather than being some type of mystical ‘super-person’ of which any particular human consciousness is a mere adjunct. (shrink)

This Savonarola of our century can fill a hall at the drop of a leaflet. But where the inflammatory friar of Florence was silenced by hanging and roasting at the stake, Chomsky's punishment is to be consigned to media oblivion in his own land.

The British Idealist movement flourished between the 1860s and 1920s and exerted a very significant influence in the USA, India and Canada, most notably on John Dewey and Josiah Royce. The movement also laid the groundwork for the thought of Oakeshott and Collingwood. Its leading figures – particularly Green and Caird – have left a number of complete or near complete manuscripts in various British university archives, many of which remain unpublished. This important collection widens access to this unpublished material (...) by transcribing, editing and then publishing the most significant pieces. The project focuses on the moral, political, and religious writings – the areas of most interest to scholars. This annotated, critical edition opens them up to the academic community. (shrink)

The title of this work suggests its substance very well. The author expounds and criticizes the views of George Herbert Mead, as found in Mind, Self, and Society and The Philosophy of the Present, and Jean-Paul Sartre, as set forth in Transcendence of the Ego and Being and Nothingness. He finds that Mead’s account of the self as a social object in which reflective consciousness arises and Sartre’s emphasis upon existential spontaneity provide an instructive study in contrasts but are not (...) irreconcilable opposites. Indeed, he appears to be striving for a Hegelian synthesis in which the two views perish and are resurrected in a higher view which includes the truth of both. (shrink)

The concept of artificial intelligence is not new nor is the notion that it should be granted legal protections given its influence on human activity. What is new, on a relative scale, is the notion that artificial intelligence can possess citizenship—a concept reserved only for humans, as it presupposes the idea of possessing civil duties and protections. Where there are several decades’ worth of writing on the concept of the legal status of computational artificial artefacts in the USA and elsewhere, (...) it is surprising that law makers internationally have come to a standstill to protect our silicon brainchildren. In this essay, it will be assumed that future artificial entities, such as Sophia the Robot, will be granted citizenship on an international scale. With this assumption, an analysis of rights will be made with respect to the needs of a non-biological intelligence possessing legal and civic duties akin to those possessed by humanity today. This essay does not present a full set of rights for artificial intelligence—instead, it aims to provide international jurisprudence evidence aliunde ab extra de lege lata for any future measures made to protect non-biological intelligence. (shrink)

Waiting time is widely used in health and social policy to make resource allocation decisions, yet no general account of the moral significance of waiting time exists. We provide such an account. We argue that waiting time is not intrinsically morally significant, and that the first person in a queue for a resource does not ipso facto have a right to receive that resource first. However, waiting time can and sometimes should play a role in justifying allocation decisions. First, there (...) is a duty of fairness prohibiting line-cutting where a sufficiently just queue exists. Second, waiting time has several morally attractive features that can justify its incorporation into allocation schemes. Where candidates are in relevantly similar circumstances, allocating by waiting time is relatively efficient, maximizes distribution equality relative to other Pareto efficient distributions, and treats candidates fairly. The claim that allocation using waiting time is fair is controversial. Some have claimed that formal lotteries are a fairer way to select among equal beneficiaries. We argue that lotteries are no fairer than allocation based on waiting time when it is equiprobable how a prospective queue will be ordered. In practice, lotteries share many of the disadvantages of queues; which is fairer will depend on contingent features of the allocation scenario. The upshot is that first-come, first-served is in fact a just way to allocate resources in many of the cases where it seems pre-theoretically compelling, and waiting time has unique normative properties which frequently justify its incorporation into resource allocation schemes. (shrink)

Cognition Through Understanding presents a selection of Tyler Burge's essays that use epistemology to illumine powers of mind. The essays focus on epistemic warrants that differ from those warrants commonly discussed in epistemology--those for ordinary empirical beliefs and for logical and mathematical beliefs. The essays center on four types of cognition warranted through understanding--self-knowledge, interlocution, reasoning, and reflection. Burge argues that by reflecting on warrants for these types of cognition, one better understands cognitive powers that are distinctive of persons, (...) and of human beings. The collection presents three previously unpublished independent essays, in addition to substantial, retrospective commentary. The retrospective commentary invites the reader to make connections that were not fully in mind when the essays were written. (shrink)

In this study, Tyler Frick aims to display and commend the theological ontology that arises from a careful analysis of Karl Barth's understanding of divine action.

Tyler Burge presents an original study of the most primitive ways in which individuals represent the physical world. By reflecting on the science of perception and related psychological and biological sciences, he gives an account of constitutive conditions for perceiving the physical world, and thus aims to locate origins of representational mind.

The complexity of supply chains means that it is difficult to tell where national security arguments begin and end. That may weaken some of the traditional arguments for free trade for the same reasons that we accept the difficulty of rational economic calculation in a socialist society. National security arguments for protectionism may not remain restricted to very small and manageable segments of the economy. Liberals and cosmopolitans will need to pay greater heed to these problems. This essay also considers (...) why complex supply chains may create problems for a carbon tax and for the notion of corporate social responsibility. (shrink)

In Subjects That Matter, Namita Goswami attends to philosophy’s institutional and disciplinary failures to reconcile its identitarian claims to universality and reason with the feminist and postcolonial modes of thinking it traditionally keeps at bay. This essay places Goswami’s critique within a context of “the thought from outside,” which, beginning with Foucault’s reading of Blanchot, continuing through the geopolitics of Dussel’s philosophy of liberation, and prominent in Catherine Malabou’s conceptualization of plasticity, demonstrates how political critiques of philosophical hegemony contain an (...) implicit theorization of “literature.” If “literature” gives voice to the thought from outside, does it in turn “decolonize” philosophy? If so, what itinerary of thought ought to follow the relationship between this literary decolonization of philosophy and its imbrication within the fold of philosophical thought? How to conceptualize the plastic relation between inside and outside, between center and periphery, without subordinating the latter to the hegemony of the former? This essay argues for a coherence between Goswami’s and Malabou’s materialist understandings of difference and a conceptualization of literature as an “outside” to philosophy that operates “excentrically” “inside” philosophy. (shrink)