This _Guide_ provides students with the scholarly and interpretive tools they need to understand Hume’s _A Treatise of Human Nature _and its influence on modern philosophy. A student guide to Hume’s _A Treatise of Human Nature_. Focuses on recent developments in Hume scholarship. Covers topics such as the formulation, reception and scope of the _Treatise_, imagination and memory, the passions, moral sentiments, and the role of sympathy. All the chapters are newly written by Hume scholars. Each chapter guides the reader (...) through a portion of the _Treatise,_ explaining the central arguments and key contemporary interpretations of those arguments. (shrink)

This paper examines the four counterexamples offered by Lehrer and Richard in 'Remembering Without Knowing'. The analysis which Lehrer and Richard's purported counterexamples attempt to discredit is that remembering p requires knowing that p and believing that p. The counterexamples are considered individually and all are rejected as counterexamples to knowing as a necessary condition of remembering.

The early sections of Book I, Part III of A Treatise of Human Nature are widely studied, and with good reason.(2) They contain Hume's skeptical arguments about what we now call inductive inference or what Hume called reasoning from experience. Very little attention, however, has been paid to Hume's extensive treatment of the social context of belief formation and correction which dominates sections iv-xiii of Part III. When these sections are noticed at all, they are seen as, at best, embellishments (...) and digressions, at worst, as unfortunate muddles. Purified of sections iv-xiii, Part III is simpler (and shorter) than the actual Part III; its arguments are well understood and their influence on Kant and the subsequent history of philosophy is well documented.(3) I will purposefully dirty the waters by attempting to account for the rich examples and the explicit treatment of the social component of belief in these neglected sections. While there are excellent reasons for stressing the importance of Hume's skeptical arguments, the text shows that Hume's had a second major concern, namely to account for the formation and regulation of beliefs as they typically arise in social contexts. (shrink)

The standard interpretation of Hume on testimony takes him to be a reductionist; justification of beliefs from testimony ultimately depends on one's own first-person experience. Yet Hume's main discussions of testimony in the Treatise and first Enquiry suggest a social account. Hume appeals to shared experience and develops norms of belief from testimony that are not reductionist. It is argued that the reductionist interpretation rests on an overly narrow view of Hume's theory of ideas. By attending to such mechanisms of (...) the imagination as abstraction and fictions, it is shown that Hume's theory of ideas does not forestall a non-reductionist social epistemology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:166, FLAGE ON HUME'S ACCOUNT OF MEMORY In the Treatise Hume writes that an impression which "has been present with the mind" may "make its appearance there as an idea," and that it can appear either through the faculty of memory or the faculty of the imagination. Memory and imagination each produces its own species of idea. In "Hume on Memory and 2 Causation" Daniel Flage addresses Hume's carving (...) out of these two species. Flage's main purpose is to show that Hume has a criterion for distinguishing memory ideas from others. I will argue that Flage has not located necessary and sufficient conditions for memory in Hume's discussion of memory. I will show that if Hume intended to provide a criterion at all, it is not the criterion Flage attributes to him, and that the criterion Flage has formulated is not an improvement over what appears to be Hume's criterion. Before looking at the details of Flage's interpretation I want to mention briefly an underlying assumption of the paper. The assumption is that Hume believes that there must be a clear distinction between memories and other perceptions. The assumption is supported by the fact that Hume speaks of the species of memory. However, there is textual evidence against this assumption. In the Treatise Hume emphasizes the ways in which memories are like other perceptions. For example, Hume calls memories impressions, while in distinguishing impressions from ideas he introduces 3 memories as paradigm examples of ideas. The reason Hume calls memories impressions, I believe, is that for the purpose of inference, he takes memories to be equivalent to impressions of sense. Since Hume is willing to put memories in two seemingly incompatible categories, perhaps his primary concern is with the role they play in belief; we make causal inferences 167. from memory and sense, not from the imagination. That Hume's primary concern is with inference, and not with memory per se, is supported by the fact that both Treatise sections devoted to memory are followed by 4 sections which deal with causal inference. Hume thinks that we cannot always distinguish memories from other perceptions "in their operation." It is not clear that he thinks that there must be a sharp distinction at all, since the traditional epistemological purpose for such a distinction, to partition the veridical from the non-veridical, is not obviously Hume's purpose. However, Flage claims that there is a clear criterion of memory in the Treatise. Let's take a look at what he has found. Flage maintains that Hume has both a phenomenal criterion based on vivacity which allows us in a rough and ready way to distinguish memories from imaginings "in their operation," and a formal criterion which "provides one with insight into the complex structure of an idea of memory." (p. 169) The phenomenal criterion does not distinguish memory ideas from others, since, as Hume himself allows, non-memories (e.g. beliefs, delusions, even ideas of the imagination) can have the same vivacity as memories. (Cf. T86) The marking off of memory as a distinct species is accomplished, on Flage's view, by the formal criterion. Hume writes "The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position." (T9) This is what Flage calls Hume's formal criterion, and Flage takes it as both necessary and sufficient for being a memory idea. Flage takes memory ideas to be what he calls relative ideas, ideas which pick out or refer to a unique item. A memory idea, on this view, is a complex idea which uniquely picks out the antecedent complex 168, impression which resembles and is the cause of the idea. Flage writes: The formal criterion is basically a causal thesis: if a particular positive idea (mental image) is a genuine idea of the memory, then at some point in the past there was a complex impression that was the cause (or the original cause) of and exactly (or closely) resembles that positive idea as an idea. (p. 172) In this formulation the criterion is a necessary condition of memory. In a subsequent formulation Flage claims its sufficiency as... (shrink)

This paper examines the four counterexamples offered by Lehrer and Richard in 'Remembering Without Knowing'. The analysis which Lehrer and Richard's purported counterexamples attempt to discredit is that remembering p requires knowing that p and believing that p. The counterexamples are considered individually and all are rejected as counterexamples to knowing as a necessary condition of remembering.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Imagination in Hume’s Philosophy: The Canvas of the Mind by Timothy M. CostelloeSaul TraigerTimothy M. Costelloe. The Imagination in Hume’s Philosophy: The Canvas of the Mind. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018. Pp. xv + 312. Hardback. ISBN: 9781474436397. $107.00.If anything about Hume’s philosophy can be characterized as widely accepted, it is that the imagination is front and center in Hume’s account of the mind. The aim of (...) Timothy Costelloe’s book is to fully develop the observation, that the imagination, as Hume understands it, is “the canvas of the mind.” Costelloe amply demonstrates that the imagination is a broad canvas, ranging from Hume’s epistemology and metaphysics, to his aesthetics, moral and political philosophy, history, philosophy of religion, and his general conception of philosophy itself. Seven substantial chapters cover these areas, and show how Hume takes the imagination to play a pivotal role in each.One of the many strengths of this book is that Costelloe responsibly mines the secondary literature, carefully explaining the interpretations he seconds and those he finds wanting. The attention to the relevant secondary literature is apparent from the start, where Costelloe laments the surprising dearth of book-length treatments of Hume on the imagination, but helpfully highlights both the lesser known Hume-centric monographs on the imagination by Furlong and Wilbanks, as well as more widely read interpretations.The introductory chapter makes important distinctions and introduces some main concepts. Hume differentiates the imagination’s “combinatory power” from its “creative power.” While the uninhibited ability to concatenate ideas might also be seen as a creative act, Costelloe sees the creative power where the imagination [End Page 173] “generates a class of ideas—‘fictions’ of a certain sort—independent of experience and according to its own inner logic” (21). This characterization makes sense when viewing the imagination’s function as directed towards a goal, such as achieving coherence or creating an aesthetically pleasing effect. Costelloe suggests that achieving an aesthetically pleasing effect is an element in any exercise of the imagination’s creative power. The imagination creates easy transitions among ideas where there were none, where doing so is pleasurable, or aided by the passions.Costelloe introduces his account of Hume’s fictions as errors of the imagination whereby ideas are formed in a manner different from the standard derivation from antecedent impressions. He insists, helpfully, that fictions are not illusions, but rather errors of a different kind. Though both involve error, fictions, unlike illusions, are not described in terms of jest or irony (30).Though he acknowledges that Hume does not describe any fictions as “artificial,” Costelloe finds it helpful to draw a distinction between natural and artificial fictions. Natural fictions are generated without reflection. Artificial fictions, such as those created by poets and philosophers, issue from “the voluntary act of imagination” (31). Costelloe holds that artificial fictions “are rarely taken to refer to objects with real existence and that any professed belief is really a matter of people being persuaded of something and taking the ideas in question as having real referents, thus only lending themselves to their existence for one reason or another” (31). This is a bit unclear. Certainly, poetic fictions are voluntary creations not intended to refer to real objects. But substance, and the double existence of ideas and external objects, as philosophical fictions, surely both involve belief and the corresponding existential commitments on the part of the philosophers who are committed to them. It is also difficult to see the purported contrast between belief and taking ideas to have real referents.Chapter 2, on metaphysics, is the longest chapter in the book, and it addresses the fictions of the imagination in Hume’s account of space and time, continued and distinct existence, liberty and necessity, and personal identity. Costelloe is sensitive to the worry that classifying Hume’s subject in Book 1 of the Treatise as metaphysics may appear to be slighting the central epistemological concerns and failing to appreciate Hume’s nascent cognitive psychology. Such worries fall away as Costelloe explores the roles that the imagination plays in the formation of our conception of duration without change, and the identity... (shrink)

Impressed by Isaac Newton's success at explaining the apparently diverse and chaotic physical world with a few universal principles, David Hume (1711-1776), while still in his teens, proposed that the same might be done for the realm of the mind. Through observation and experimentation, Hume hoped to uncover the mind's "secret springs and principles." Hume's proposal for a science of the mind was published as..

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:381 IMPRESSIONS, IDEAS, AND FICTIONS I. Introduction Under the heading of "fiction," Selby-Bigge's index to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature lists no fewer than seventeen distinct fictions. There is the fiction of perfect equality, of continued and distinct existence, of substance and matter, of substantial forms, accidents, faculties and occult qualities, the fiction of personal identity, and many others. The notion of a fiction is central in Hume's philosophy. (...) As the title of this paper suggests, I believe that fictions are so important that what is commonly called Hume's theory of impressions and ideas ought to be called the theory of impressions, ideas, and fictions. Although fictions are at the heart of a number of Treatise passages, they have 2 generally received very little sustained treatment. This paper is a start at filling a gap in Hume interpretation. I hope to lay the groundwork for a complete study of Hume's fictions. There are some obvious questions to be addressed in such a study: Is there just one type of fiction or are there many? Is there an essential feature or set of features shared by all fictions? Is the characterization of a view as involving a fiction always a criticism of that view? If fictions are in some sense false or wrong, what do they contrast with? What notions are true or correct? Does Hume's account of fictions mesh with an account of truth? If there is no account of truth, how can there be an account of fictions? These questions, by no means the only ones which can be raised, are related. They can be seen as hovering around the issue of whether Hume's notion 382 of a fiction is an ontological notion. Is calling something a fiction denying the existence of that thing? Does believing in fictions (e.g., believing that there are persons) amount to holding a false belief that something exists when in fact it does not? Should we read Hume as claiming, for example, that there are no substances because he calls substance a fiction? Answering 'yes' to these questions has obvious implications for the questions raised in the last paragraph. I believe that while the deflationist reading is not completely wrong, it is wrong enough to account for much confusion in Hume interpretation. Many readers of the Treatise think, for example, that in calling the self a fiction Hume is denying the existence of persons. This makes it completely mysterious why Hume talks about persons throughout the Treatise in a common-sense way, as if they do exist. Though I cannot investigate all the consequences of my interpretation of Hume's fictions for the numerous issues which involve fictions in the Treatise, it is my hope that clarifying Hume's notion of fiction will help shed light on those other notions, such as personal identity, which Hume calls fictions. I will offer an interpretation which attempts to locate some general features of fictions in the Treatise passages where Hume invokes them. Although there are different fictions, Hume has a core notion of fiction which is fundamentally epistemological rather than ontological. There will be space in this paper to look at only a few fictions, those which occur in or before "Of scepticism with regard to the senses." I believe, however, that the interpretation can be generalized. Finally, I will suggest how my interpretation provides answers to the above questions. 383 II. Fiction and Imagination It is tempting to think of Hume's notion of a fiction as an ontological notion because in contemporary usage, the notion of a fiction is ontologically loaded. Fictions are things we construct in our heads; they are the result of concatenating ideas in the imagination. Golden mountains and the Wicked Witch of the East are fictitious; they don't represent anything which exists. If Hume is using this notion of fiction, then he must be doing deflationary ontology. On this view, to call something a fiction is to demote it to the status of something thought up in one's imagination; it is to accord it the rank of something whose existence is not to be accepted. There is some support... (shrink)

Essay, Ii8) Although theorizing about ideas figures prominently in philosophy before him, Locke introduced what became known as the "New Way of Ideas," by considering all metaphysical and epistemological questions through an examination of the nature and origin of the mind's content. Although sometimes disagreeing with him on important details, other empiricists of the modern era follow Locke by first theorizing about the origin of ideas, and second by classifying ideas into types, based on origin and characteristics discovered by mental (...) inspection. The shared features of the empiricist notion of ideas is that ideas are not innate, and that they are the result of sensation and reflection. (See INNATENESS). (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Critiques of Hume's Account Memory, Belief, and Causal Inference The Creation and Discovery of Personal Identity Memory and Imagination in Other Hume Texts References Further Reading.

The Hans Reichenbach Collection is part of the Archives of Twentieth Century Philosophy of Science, which also houses the Rudolf Carnap and Frank Ramsey Collections. The Archives of Twentieth Century Philosophy of Science is located in the Special Collections Department of the University of Pittsburgh's Hillman Library. In the past few years work on the recently acquired Hans Reichenbach Collection has resulted in a useful research source. Although the collection contains many notes, manuscripts, and recordings, efforts at organizing the collection (...) have centered on the wealth of correspondence contained in the collection. A great deal of this organizational work has now been completed, and this part of the collection is open to study by interested scholars. (shrink)

The aim of Fred Wilson’s detailed treatment of Hume’s theory of causal inference is to show that although Hume posed a skeptical challenge concerning the justification of beliefs through causal inference, Hume also presents a solution to that challenge, a solution that includes a justification of causal inference. Wilson’s Hume is not a skeptic, but rather a vindicator of the norms of scientific inquiry. This study is wide-ranging, both in terms of the texts Wilson interprets and the connections he draws (...) to the views of other philosophers, both modern and contemporary. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME ON FINDING AN IMPRESSION OF THE SELF 47 1 1. Introduction Descartes held that reflection on "the commonest matters", for example our recognition of a piece of wax, reveals our more fundamental awareness of ourselves. And further, if the [notion or] perception of the wax has seemed to me clearer and more distinct, not only after the sight or the touch, but also after many other causes have (...) rendered it quite manifest to me, with how much more [evidence] and distinctness must it be said that I now know myself, since all the reasons which contribute to the knowledge of wax, or any other body whatever, are yet better proofs of the nature of my mind!2 Even if I only seem to see a piece of wax, when I have no eyes to see and there is no wax before me, I still know something. I know myself. When I judge that the wax is soft I am aware of myself as so judging. When I judge that the wax is hard, I am aware that I_ judge it so. I cannot have knowledge of external bodies without having certain knowledge of myself, because even my mere beliefs reveal my self-knowledge. Descartes exploited the insight that he is more intimately conscious of his own mind than anything else to establish that he is "a mind or a soul... a thing which thinks".3 Philosophers who did not share Descartes' rationalism still held the view that we are intimately conscious of ourselves, and that our awareness of other things enhances our self-awareness, and is epistemically dependent on it. Butler claimed that our awareness of ourselves was beyond doubt, since to doubt that awareness presupposes that we already have it. Whenever we "turn our thoughts upon ourselves" we have 48 "certain conviction, which necessarily and every moment, rises within us" of our personal identity. In A Treatise of Human Nature Hume argues against both the intelligibility of the notion of immaterial substance, and the claim that we have simple awareness of our selves independently of our awareness of other objects. when Hume turns his attention squarely to the topic of personal identity in the Treatise, he has already dismissed the rationalist notion of immaterial substance or soul. He attacks the view which tempted rationalists and empiricists alike, that our awareness of ourselves is distinct from our feeling and thinking, but is often enhanced by such experience. Hume's argument has been and continues to be influential. Recent Wittgenstein interpretation suggests that the Tractatus discussion of the unencounterability of the self in experience is directly borrowed from Hume.5 Chisholm's views concerning self-awareness are motivated in part by problems he locates in Hume's negative argument. Chisholm argues that the report that he finds no impression of self commits Hume to the existence of a subject of experience.6 Most recently, Nozick suggests that Hume did not consider the possibility that our awareness of ourselves might be isolated by employing •7 special techniques, such as yoga or meditation. In this paper I will focus on the passage in the Treatise where Hume reports his failure to find an impression of the self and presents this as an argument against the theory of self-awareness which many philosophers found irresistible. Although Hume's argument has been influential and is often discussed in contemporary literature, the Treatise passage in which it occurs appears confused. The confusion is cleared up only when it is seen that Hume really presents two 49 different arguments against the view that we are intimately conscious of ourselves. Finally I suggest how Hume's actual arguments pave the way for his positive views. 2. The Difficulty Hume's discussion of personal identity in the Treatise begins with his consideration of the view of "some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF."8 After characterizing the view, Hume rejects it, having found that we have no idea of self "after the manner it is here explain'd". The unnamed philosophers, as Hume understands them, take the idea of the self to be a simple idea. For Hume, a... (shrink)

IDEAS. LOCKE used the term "to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks." (Essay , Ii8) Although theorizing about ideas figures prominently in philosophy before him, Locke introduced what became known as the "New Way of Ideas," by considering all metaphysical and epistemological questions through an examination of the nature and origin of the mind's content. Although sometimes disagreeing with him on important details, other empiricists of the modern era follow Locke by first theorizing (...) about the origin of ideas, and second by classifying ideas into types, based on origin and characteristics discovered by mental inspection. The shared features of the empiricist notion of ideas is that ideas are not innate, and that they are the result of sensation and reflection. (See INNATENESS). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:173. PERCHANCE TO DREAM: A REPLY TO TRAIGER1 In "Hume on Memory and Causation" I argued that Hume took ideas of the memory to be relative ideas corresponding to definite descriptions of the general form "the complex impression that is the (original) cause of a particular positive idea m and which exactly (or closely) resembles m, " where 'm' is a variable ranging over positive ideas (mental images). My (...) argument was based primarily upon what I called Hume's formal criterion, i.e., Hume's contention that, unlike the imagination, memory preserves "the same order and form with the original impressions" (T9), it preserves "the original order and position of its ideas" (T85). Saul Traiger has recently taken exception to my interpretation of Hume, suggesting that my interpretation suffers from at least four defects. First, Traiger maintains that there is evidence that Hume took some ideas of the memory to be simple, while my account requires that they are all complex. Secondly, he maintains that my interpretation will not allow Hume to remember dreams or the contents of his imaginings, and Traiger contends that this provides at least prima facie evidence against my interpretation. Thirdly, he maintains that my account of the formal criterion is not sufficient to distinguish ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination. Finally, he raises several questions regarding the temporal reference of ideas of the memory. I do not believe that any of Traiger's points require a significant modification of my account. I shall begin by discussing his third and fourth points and then focus 2 on his first and second points. 1. Memories and fictions. Traiger suggests that if my account of the formal criterion is correct, the formal criterion is not sufficient to distinguish 174, ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination, "because there are complex ideas which are caused by resembling complex impressions but which are not memories" (FHAM, p. 170). He illustrates this by appealing to a writer of fiction who might appeal to some of his memories in constructing his fictitious world. Why, then, would not the resulting ideas of fiction count as ideas of the memory, since they meet both the causal conditions and the order and position requirements? The answer is that in the case of an idea of fiction one does not conceive of one's positive idea as a representative of some other perception. It is only because one conceives of the positive idea of which one is aware in memory as a representative of some other particular perception or perceptions that questions of form and order come into play. 2. Temporal reference. At several places in his paper, Traiger raises questions concerning the temporal reference of ideas of the memory. He suggests, first, that Hume's concern with "order" was with temporal order, rather than the order and arrangement of simple ideas in the complex positive component of an idea of the memory (FHAM, p. 168), and, secondly, that "when we remember, we place an impression in its temporal context, its place among a temporal sequence of perceptions" and this "temporal reference is generally not secured by the causal and resemblance relations an idea bears to an antecedent impression" (FHAM, p. 171). Regarding the first of these claims, it is clear that an idea of the memory can be "true" only if it represents a past impression or event, and since Hume construed representation in terms of resemblance (T233), this indicates that at least part of his concern with "order" must be with the arrangement of simple ideas in the complex positive component of an idea of the memory. Were it not for 175. such a correspondence between the "order" of simple ideas in the positive component of one's relative idea of the memory and the "order" of the simple impressions in the original impression, one's idea of the memory could not represent the original impression. Resemblance, however, plays no role in determining what the temporal position of the original impression was, and this brings us to Traiger's second point. Since Hume's account of time would seem to require that one locate a past impression within a series... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:173. PERCHANCE TO DREAM: A REPLY TO TRAIGER1 In "Hume on Memory and Causation" I argued that Hume took ideas of the memory to be relative ideas corresponding to definite descriptions of the general form "the complex impression that is the (original) cause of a particular positive idea m and which exactly (or closely) resembles m, " where 'm' is a variable ranging over positive ideas (mental images). My (...) argument was based primarily upon what I called Hume's formal criterion, i.e., Hume's contention that, unlike the imagination, memory preserves "the same order and form with the original impressions" (T9), it preserves "the original order and position of its ideas" (T85). Saul Traiger has recently taken exception to my interpretation of Hume, suggesting that my interpretation suffers from at least four defects. First, Traiger maintains that there is evidence that Hume took some ideas of the memory to be simple, while my account requires that they are all complex. Secondly, he maintains that my interpretation will not allow Hume to remember dreams or the contents of his imaginings, and Traiger contends that this provides at least prima facie evidence against my interpretation. Thirdly, he maintains that my account of the formal criterion is not sufficient to distinguish ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination. Finally, he raises several questions regarding the temporal reference of ideas of the memory. I do not believe that any of Traiger's points require a significant modification of my account. I shall begin by discussing his third and fourth points and then focus 2 on his first and second points. 1. Memories and fictions. Traiger suggests that if my account of the formal criterion is correct, the formal criterion is not sufficient to distinguish 174, ideas of the memory from ideas of the imagination, "because there are complex ideas which are caused by resembling complex impressions but which are not memories" (FHAM, p. 170). He illustrates this by appealing to a writer of fiction who might appeal to some of his memories in constructing his fictitious world. Why, then, would not the resulting ideas of fiction count as ideas of the memory, since they meet both the causal conditions and the order and position requirements? The answer is that in the case of an idea of fiction one does not conceive of one's positive idea as a representative of some other perception. It is only because one conceives of the positive idea of which one is aware in memory as a representative of some other particular perception or perceptions that questions of form and order come into play. 2. Temporal reference. At several places in his paper, Traiger raises questions concerning the temporal reference of ideas of the memory. He suggests, first, that Hume's concern with "order" was with temporal order, rather than the order and arrangement of simple ideas in the complex positive component of an idea of the memory (FHAM, p. 168), and, secondly, that "when we remember, we place an impression in its temporal context, its place among a temporal sequence of perceptions" and this "temporal reference is generally not secured by the causal and resemblance relations an idea bears to an antecedent impression" (FHAM, p. 171). Regarding the first of these claims, it is clear that an idea of the memory can be "true" only if it represents a past impression or event, and since Hume construed representation in terms of resemblance (T233), this indicates that at least part of his concern with "order" must be with the arrangement of simple ideas in the complex positive component of an idea of the memory. Were it not for 175. such a correspondence between the "order" of simple ideas in the positive component of one's relative idea of the memory and the "order" of the simple impressions in the original impression, one's idea of the memory could not represent the original impression. Resemblance, however, plays no role in determining what the temporal position of the original impression was, and this brings us to Traiger's second point. Since Hume's account of time would seem to require that one locate a past impression within a series... (shrink)

Persons and passions : an introduction / Christopher Williams What are the passions doing in the Meditations? / Lisa Shapiro Love in the ruins : passion in Descartes’ Meditations / William Beardsley The passionate intellect : reading the opposition of reason and emotions in Descartes / Amy Schmitter Material falsity and the arguments for God’s existence in Descartes’ Meditations / Cecilia Wee Reason unhinged : passion and precipice from Montaigne to Hume / Saul Traiger Reflection and ideas in Hume’s (...) account of the passions / Lilli Alanen Sympathy and the unity of Hume’s idea of self / Donald Ainslie Hume’s voyage / Janet Broughton Artifice, desire, and their relationship : Hume against Aristotle / Alasdair MacIntyre Hume and morality’s "useful purpose" / David Gauthier Reflection and well-being / Robert Shaver Friendship and the law of reason : Baier and Kant on love and principles / Sergio Tenenbaum Cruelty, respect, and unsentimental love / Michele Moody-Adams Trust as an affective attitude / Karen Jones Trusting "first" and "second" selves : Aristotelian reflections on Virginia Woolf and Annette Baier / Jennifer Whiting. (shrink)

This paper asks whether adult children have aduty of justice to act as caregivers for theirfrail, elderly parents. I begin (Sections I.and II.) by locating the historical reasons whyrelationships within families were not thoughtto raise issues of justice. I argue that thesereasons are misguided. The paper next presentsspecific examples showing the relevance ofjustice to family relationships. I point outthat in the United States today, the burden ofcaregiving for dependent parents fallsdisproportionately on women (Sections III. andIV.). The paper goes on to (...) use Rawls''theoretical tool of the veil of ignorance toargue that caring for parents should not belinked to a person''s sex and more generally,that there is no duty of justice to assume therole of caregiver for dependent parents(Sections V.). Although justice does notprovide the moral foundations for parent care,I show that it nonetheless places importantlimits on the instinct to care. I concludethat the voice of justice should be audible,and is intrinsically present, withinfamilies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:429 THE HUME LITERATURE FOR 1985 The Hume literature from 1925 to 1976 has been thoroughly covered in my book Fifty Years of Hume Scholarship: A Bibliographical Guide (Edinburgh University Press, 1978; £9.50), which also lists the main earlier writings on Hume. (The book is still in print.) Publications of the years 1977 to 1984 were listed in previous issues of Hume Studies. What follows here will bring the (...) record up to the end of 1985. Readers are invited to inform me of any omissions, and keenly requested to send me offprints of their own articles and reviews. Hardly any do so at present, and it would greatly ease the labour of collection. The intention is to maintain a complete bibliographical record of critical work on Hume, by the regular publication in Hume Studies of this annual bibliography, with addenda consisting of items omitted through ignorance in previous years. References to recently appearing reviews (of books from earlier lists) are given at the end. The following abbreviations of journal titles are used here: APQ American Philosophical Quarterly HPQ History of Philosophy Quarterly JHI Journal of the History of Ideas JHP Journal of the History of Philosophy JP Journal of Philosophy PAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society PB Philosophical Books PQ Philosophical Quarterly PR Philosophical Review RIP Revue Internationale de Philosophie RM Review of Metaphysics TLS Times Literary Supplement 430 Other abbreviations should be obvious enough, and mainly follow the British Standard (no. 4148). AGASSI, J. "The Unity of Hume's Thought", Hume Studies (10th Anniv. Issue), 87-109. AUSTIN, W. H. "Philo's Reversal", Phil. Topics 13, no. 2, 103-12. BADIA CABRERA, M. A. "Hume's Natural History of Religion: Positive Science or Metaphysical Vision of Religion", Diálogos 20, 71-8. BAIER, A. Postures of the Mind, ch. 10 ("Promises, Promises, Promises"), ch. 11 ("Civilizing Practices"). London, etc. BEHAN, D. P. "Hume's Labyrinth", HPg 2, 309-22. BENNETT, D. "Hume's Pride", in B. Vermazen, Essays on Davidson, 89-91. Oxford. BIRO, J. L. "Hume and Cognitive Science", HPQ 2, 257-74. BLANDINO, G. "Le causalitate. Discussion sur le criticas de D. Hume" [in Interlingua, with French and English], Aquinas 28, 247-57. BRICKE, J. "Locke, Hume and the Nature of Volitions", Hume Studies (10th Anniv. Issue), 15-51. BROOKS, D. "Hume's Bundle Theory of the Mind", S. African J. Phil. 4, 75-84. BROOKS, D. H. M. "Strawson, Hume, and the Unity of Consciousness", Mind 94, 583-6. CAMPBELL, K. "John Passmore and Hume's Moral Philosophy", Hume Studies 11, 109-24. CAPALDI, N. "The Historical and Philosophical Significance of Hume's Theory of the Self", in A.J. Holland, Philosophy, Its History and Historiography, 271-85, Dordrecht, etc. 431 CARLSON, G. R. "Hume and the Moral Realists", Australas. J. Phil. 63, 407-18. CHAKRABARTI, T. K. "Hume's Definitions of Cause", J. Indian Council Phil. Res., 67-75. CHEN, W. -S. Article (in Chinese) on Hume on personal identity, in Phil. Rev. (Taiwan) 8, 123-42. CLARK, S. R. L. "Hume, Animals and the Objectivity of Morals", P£ 35, 117-33. CLERO, J. P. La philosophie des passions chez David Hume. (301 pp.) Paris. DANIEL, S. C "The Problem of Identity of Objects in Hume's Philosophy", Indian Phil. Q. 12, 1916. DAVIE, W. "Hume on Morality, Action, and Character", HPQ 2, 337-48. DEWITT, R. "Hume's Probability Argument of I, iv, 1", Hume Studies 11, 125-40. DONNICI, R. "Husserl sull' etica di Hume. Dalle lezioni inedite del 1902", Rivista di storia della filosofia 40, 449-70. ENC, B. "Hume on Causal Necessity: A Study from the Perspective of Hume's Theory of Passions", HPQ 2, 235-56. FERREIRA, M.J. "Hume's Naturalism - 'Proof and Practice", P£ 35, 45-57. FLAGE, D.E. "Hume on Memory and Causation", Hume Studies (10th Anniv. Issue), 168-88. [11 (1985) 166-72] FLAGE, D.E. "Perchance to Dream: A Reply to Traiger", Hume Studies 11, 173-82. (on Traiger 1985b) FLAGE, D.E. "Hume's Ethics", Phil. Topics 13, no. 3, 71-88. FLEW, A. "Impressions and Experiences: Public or Private?", Hume Studies 11, 183-91. 432 FOGELIN, R.J. Hume's Skepticism... (shrink)

Lists the practical problems found in the manuscript of Book III of the Algebra which were not included in the printed text. The author believes that their omission reflects the influence of Bombelli's discovery of Diophantus.

On June 5, 2024, the Australian Capital Territory passed a law to permit voluntary assisted dying (“VAD”). The Australian Capital Territory became the first Australian jurisdiction to permit nurse practitioners to assess eligibility for VAD. Given evidence of access barriers to VAD in Australia, including difficulty finding a doctor willing to assist, the Australian Capital Territory’s approach should prompt consideration of whether the role of nurses in VAD should be expanded in other Australian jurisdictions. Drawing on lessons from Canada, which (...) currently permits nurse practitioners to assess patient eligibility, we argue that the time has come for Australian jurisdictions to expand the role of nurses in VAD systems. This would be an important step in ensuring access to VAD for patients in practice. Attention, however, must also be paid to ensuring adequate remuneration of nurses (and doctors) if this goal of promoting access is to be achieved in practice. (shrink)

Although many historians of science have devoted a good part of their working life to the study and cataloguing of scientific manuscripts, no systematic bibliography of their work is available. The present checklist—a first attempt to prepare such a bibliography—has been compiled using P. O. Kristeller's Latin manuscript books before 1600 as a guide. Material for a supplement is being collected. Readers are invited to send their comments and suggestions.

A minority of physicists has endorsed some claims made for anomalous effects related to consciousness. A smaller number have attempted experiments to establish the veracity of such claims. The nature of these claims, in particular those for psychokinesis, is reviewed. Most of the experimental work bearing on these claims conducted by professional scientists has not yielded convincing evidence in their support. What are frequently stated to be the most credible claims are not, in fact, persuasive and furthermore the appeals to (...) quantum mechanics by way of explanation are questionable. (shrink)

This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should characterize epistemic rationality.

Philosophers readily talk about merely verbal disputes, usually without much or any explicit reflection on what these are, and a good deal of methodological significance is attached to discovering whether a dispute is merely verbal or not. Currently, metaphilosophical advances are being made towards a clearer understanding of what exactly it takes for something to be a merely verbal dispute. This paper engages with this growing literature, pointing out some problems with existing approaches, and develops a new proposal which builds (...) on their strengths. (shrink)

forthcoming in R. Cameron, B. Hale and A. Hoffmann (ed.s), The Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford University Press. Presents a concept-grounding account of modal knowledge.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Persons and Passions: Essays in Honor of Annette BaierLorenzo GrecoJoyce Jenkins, Jennifer Whiting, and Christopher Williams, eds. Persons and Passions: Essays in Honor of Annette Baier. Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. Pp. 368. ISBN 0-268-03263-7, Cloth, $53.00.Annette Baier stands out as a figure of prime importance on the contemporary philosophical horizon. This volume finally brings the proper recognition she deserves, presenting a rich collection (...) of essays in her honor. Persons and Passions proves to be extremely interesting both for the discussion of Baier’s own philosophical reflection and as an example of how Baier represents an unparalleled source of inspiration for anyone concerned with the philosophers who have been at the forefront of her interests. Although Baier’s preference is surely for David Hume, her intellectual curiosity and scholarly mastery cover a wider area spanning from Descartes to Kant.This is well represented by the structure of Persons and Passions: the volume is composed of sixteen essays which broadly fall into three groups, respectively concerned with the philosophy of Hume, Descartes or Kant. Lisa Shapiro, William Beardsley, Amy Morgan Schmitter, and Cecilia Wee are all concerned with the philosophy of Descartes, in particular as it is presented in the Meditations on First Philosophy. A major segment of the volume is devoted to examining diverse tenets of Hume’s thought, with essays by Saul Traiger, Lilli Alanen, Donald Ainslie, Janet Broughton, Alasdair MacIntyre, David Gauthier, and Robert Shaver. Then, in their papers, Sergio Tenenbaum and Michele Moody-Adams defend a Kantian explanation of the notions of friendship and cruelty. Finally, Karen Jones and Jennifer Whiting close the book by exploring the specular notions of trust and distrust. Baier’s lessons have been carefully absorbed by all contributors. A detailed analysis of the essays would take more space than a review allows, so I will concentrate only on those concerned with Hume, and try to single out from them the trace of Baier’s teaching.The notions of person and passion (as Christopher Williams explains in his useful introduction) are central to Baier’s general approach to philosophy, and they play an important part in the section of the book dedicated to Hume. Traiger looks into the relation between reason and the passions starting from the example of the man hanging over a precipice in an iron cage Hume introduces in A Treatise of Human Nature 1.3.13, and investigates how other philosophers before Hume had explained the reason-passions relation by means of the same argument. Traiger’s conclusion is that whereas for Montaigne, Pascal and Malebranche the precipice phenomenon proves that our passions will always overwhelm our best reasoning (in turn, demonstrating the separation of mind and body), for Descartes and Hume [End Page 229] it is not so. But whereas in Descartes this is because of the power reason possesses as a separate and independent faculty to silence the passions, in Hume the instance of the fear we feel before a precipice is a clear illustration of the interdependence of reason, passion, and imagination, which occupy “a shared arena, where regularities can be investigated and appropriate conclusions drawn” (114).Many of the essays echo one of the main features of Baier’s interpretation of Hume, namely the necessity of defining a peculiar kind of naturalism which has to be conceived within the frame of the reflective practices in which human beings are engaged as social animals. Alanen offers an analysis of the structure of the passions in Hume, starting from a consideration of the various ways the notion of reflection can help clarify the nature of passions and their intentionality. She defends a form of “natural intentionality” (133), according to which passions are intentional acts with bodily expressions which do not need to presuppose conceptually articulated propositions or judgments. In doing this Alanen discusses the role played by emotional exchange among human beings in the constitution of a unified notion of the self. A similar topic is at the center of Ainslie’s essay, which presents a thorough exploration of the principle of sympathy and of the role the self occupies within its mechanism. Ainslie... (shrink)

We examined the affective consequences of everyday attention lapses and memory failures. Significant associations were found between self-report measures of attention lapses , attention-related cognitive errors , and memory failures , on the one hand, and boredom and depression , on the other. Regression analyses confirmed previous findings that the ARCES partially mediates the relation between the MAAS-LO and MFS. Further regression analyses also indicated that the association between the ARCES and BPS was entirely accounted for by the MAAS-LO and (...) MFS, as was that between the ARCES and BDI-II. Structural modeling revealed the associations to be optimally explained by the MAAS-LO and MFS influencing the BPS and BDI-II, contrary to current conceptions of attention and memory problems as consequences of affective dysfunction. A lack of conscious awareness of one’s actions, signaled by the propensity to experience brief lapses of attention and related memory failures, is thus seen as having significant consequences in terms of long-term affective well-being. (shrink)

Are there dispositions which not only do not manifest, but which could not manifest? We argue that there are dispositions to Ф in circumstances C where C is impossible, and some where Ф is impossible. Furthermore, postulating these dispositions does useful theoretical work. This paper describes a number of cases of dispositions had by objects even though those dispositions are not possibly manifest, and argues for the importance of these dispositions.

Craig casts doubt upon the project of trying to give the traditional sort of necessary and sufficient conditions for A knows that p. He interprets the inadequacy of existing analyses of knowledge as evidence that our concept of knowledge is complex and diffuse, and concludes that we should aim to understand it by thinking about the rôle the concept plays in our lives, rather than by trying to find necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of knowledge ascriptions.There is surely (...) something right about Craig's view: we are unlikely to succeed in any attempt to analyse away the intricacies in our concept of knowledge. We cannot realistically hope to uncover a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for A knows that p which are in all cases either clearly satisfied or clearly not satisfied. Nor, I suspect, is it possible to offer necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge which are widely accepted as being more securely understood than knowledge itself. (shrink)

To participate in health research, there is a need for well-administered informed consent. Understanding of informed consent, especially in international health research, is influenced by the participants' understanding of information and the meaning attached to the information communicated to them regarding the purpose and procedure of the research. Incorrect information and the power differential between researcher and participants may lead to participants becoming victims of harmful research procedures. Meningitis epidemics in Kano in early 1996 led to a response from drug (...) companies, especially Pfizer, as well as humanitarian workers from Médecins Sans Frontiers, which resulted in an unethical trial. Pfizer's drug trial during the epidemics has left a lasting controversy, which has yet to be resolved. This paper examines the key issues surrounding the controversy, discusses the context of informed decision-making, the ethical issues and implications of the incident, and concludes with some recommendations. Relevant texts, journals, Internet materials, newspaper articles and documentary materials on the conduct of the Pfizer's Trovan trial have been consulted. Four types of action (act intuitively, act rationally, act ignorantly, and act contextually – based on information provided) are identified as possible options for decision making. Participants most likely acted in ignorance due to poor understanding of the information contained in the verbal informed consent administered, thereby raising ethical issues. It is concluded that health research ethics committees have an important role to play nationally and locally in overseeing research, and in avoiding future occurrences. (shrink)

The goal of the research programme I describe in this article is a realist epistemology for arithmetic which respects arithmetic's special epistemic status (the status usually described as a prioricity) yet accommodates naturalistic concerns by remaining fundamentally empiricist. I argue that the central claims which would allow us to develop such an epistemology are (i) that arithmetical truths are known through an examination of our arithmetical concepts; (ii) that (at least our basic) arithmetical concepts are accurate mental representations of elements (...) of the arithmetical structure of the independent world; (iii) that (ii) obtains in virtue of the normal functioning of our sensory apparatus. The first of these claims protects arithmetic's special epistemic status relative, for example, to the laws of physics, the second preserves the independence of arithmetical truth, and the third ensures that we remain empiricists. Preliminaries Justifying and grounding concepts Cameras and filters An epistemology for arithmetic Concluding remarks. (shrink)

Boghossian claims that we can acquire a priori knowledge by means of a certain form of argument, our grasp of whose premises relies on the existence of implicit definitions. I discuss an objection to his ‘analytic theory of the a priori’. The worry is that in order to employ this kind of argument we must already know its conclusion. Boghossian has responded to this type of objection in recent work, but I argue that his responses are unconvincing. Along the way, (...) I resist Ebert’s reasons for thinking that Boghossian’s argument fails to transmit warrant from its premises to its conclusion. (shrink)

Addresses the question of why we find Fitch's knowability 'paradox' argument surprising.

In recent work Timothy Williamson argues that the epistemology of metaphysical modality is a special case of the epistemology of counterfactuals. I argue that Williamson has not provided an adequate argument for this controversial claim, and that it is not obvious how what he says should be supplemented in order to derive such an argument. But I suggest that an important moral of his discussion survives this point. The moral is that experience could play an epistemic role which is more (...) epistemically significant than a mere 'enabling' role but not equivalent to an evidential role. (shrink)

This note concerns a puzzle about probability which has recently caught the attention of a number of philosophers. According to the current philosophical consensus, the solution to the puzzle reveals that one can acquire new information, sufficient to change one's credences in certain events, just by having a certain experience, even though one knew all along that one would have an experience which felt exactly like this. I argue that the philosophical consensus is mistaken.

Wrongful life is an action brought by a defective child who sues to recover for pecuniary or emotional damages suffered as a result of being conceived or born with deformities. In such cases, plaintiff alleges that the negligence of a responsible third party,1 such as physician, hospital, or medical laboratory, is the proximate cause of plaintiff's being born or conceived and thus being compelled to suffer the debilitating effects of a deformity. The child does not sue to recover for the (...) deformity, but rather it is claimed in such cases that the child's life is itself a wrong to the child; hence, the name wrongful life.The present essay explores how the language of rights enters into wrongful life suits and critically evaluates rights appeals in these cases. Philosophical analysis yields the result that the ascription of rights to plaintiffs in wrongful life suits entails consequences we are unwilling to accept. (shrink)

This comprehensive and important volume includes contributions by activists, journalists, lawyers and scholars from twenty-one countries. The essays map the directions the movement for women's rights is taking--and will take in the coming decades--and the concomittant transformation of prevailing notions of rights and issues. They address topics such as the rapes in former Yugoslavia and efforts to see that a War Crimes Tribunal responds; domestic violence; trafficking of women into the sex trade; the persecution of lesbians; female genital mutilation; and (...) reproductive rights. (shrink)

Lewis has argued that quasi-realism is fictionalism. Blackburn denies this, offering reasons which rely on a descriptive reading of quasi-realism. This note offers a different, more general argument against Lewis's claim, available to prescriptive as well as descriptive quasi-realists.

Societal aging raises challenging ethical questions regarding the just distribution of health care between young and old. This article considers a proposal for age-based rationing of health care, which is based on the prudential life span account of justice between age groups. While important objections have been raised against the prudential life span account, it continues to dominate scholarly debates. This article introduces a new objection, one that develops out of the well-established disability critique of social contract theories. I show (...) the implications of this critique for the prudential life span account and for the special case of age-group justice. The result is that age-based rationing based on the prudential life span approach is not supported, and that the prudential life span approach itself is not the best way to think about allocating health care between age groups. I propose an alternative approach that avoids the disability objection, and consider its implications for specific proposals for age-based rationing of health care. (shrink)