Jean-Marie Straub – Sur Othon, je ne vous dirai qu’une chose. Avec des amis à Vienne, à l’époque, en travaillant, en répétant le texte, on rigolait en disant : voilà une lettre ouverte à Pompidou. Quant au Cézanne, je ne vous dirai pas un mot parce que c’est clair comme de l’eau de roche. J’ai deux choses à dire sur deux autres films différents. Il y en a un, par hasard qui s’appelle Le Fiancé, la Comédienne et le Maquereau. (...) Vous l’avez vu, certains d’entre vous l’ont vu. Mais je tiens à préc... (shrink)

Jean-Marie Straub – Avant de laisser parler nos amis je voudrais savoir si vous avez quelques questions. Et puis après vous déciderez de ce que vous voulez faire, si vous voulez faire un entracte ou pas. Tout ça ne me regarde pas... Bon, ce que j’ai à dire moi avant que vous posiez deux ou trois questions – on ne va pas faire salon parce que vous allez en avoir marre – c’est que je m’étonne que vous soyez aussi (...) nombreux... D’un autre côté c’est un bateau, donc je ne m’étonne pas... Bon, mais... (shrink)

Jean-Marie Straub – Merci d’être là. Je voulais simplement parler du film de l’après-midi : exceptionnellement, le bruit qu’on entend vient du cratère de l’Etna. On est monté là-haut et on a plongé un micro là-dedans. Hochet a gardé son précieux micro. Il a dit à son assistant de mettre le sien. Spectateur – Souvent dans les films, « on entend dire aux femmes » : tu parles comme un homme. Qu’est-ce que ça veut dire? Est-ce que les femmes (...) parlent mieux ou moins bien? J.-M.... (shrink)

Jean-Marie Straub – Je ne vais pas vous faire de grand discours. Ce n’est pas moi qui ai décidé que je présenterai les films de la carte blanche. On m’a dit : il faut faire une carte blanche. La carte blanche, je l’ai faite exprès limitée. J’ai même limité la limitation. Quand on veut se faire beau et qu’on fait des cartes blanches et qu’on est un peu connu, on essaie ou bien un éventail, ou bien on dit : (...) je veux rien d’autre que tous les films de Stroheim par exemple. J’ai fait ça à Avignon... (shrink)

Jean-Marie Straub – Je veux rectifier un petit peu ce que j’ai dit. J’ai dit que c’était un film un peu terroriste. Mais enfin, c’est quand même une des plus belles histoires d’amour qu’on ait racontées à l’écran. Je veux dire que ça s’ouvre et ça se détend à un certain moment. Ça ne reste pas terroriste jusqu’au bout. Est-ce que vous avez des questions? Spectateur – C’est génial si on est Italien et qu’on n’a pas besoin des sous-titres. (...) Sincèrement, quand il faut tout le temps regarder, ce... (shrink)

Contents: IDEALIZATION, APPROXIMATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS IN THE STRUCTURALIST FRAMEWORK. Theo A.F. KUIPERS: The Refined Structure of Theories. C. ULISES and Reinhold STRAUB: Approximation and Idealization from the Structuralist Point of View. Ilkka A. KIESEPPÄ: A Note on the Structuralist Account of Approximation. C. ULISES MOULINES and Reinhold STRAUB: A Reply to Kieseppä. Wolfgang BALZER and Gerhard ZOUBEK: Structuralist Aspects of Idealization. Andoni IBARRA and Thomas MORMANN: Counterfactual Deformation and Idealization in a Structuralist Framework. Ilkka A. KIESEPPÄ: Assessing the (...) Structuralist Theory of Verisimilitude. IDEALIZATION, APPROXIMATION AND THEORY FORMATION. Leszek NOWAK: Remarks on the Nature of Galileo's Methodological Revolution. Ilkka NIINILUOTO: Approximation in Applied Science. Elke HEISE, Peter GERJETS and Rainer WESTERMANN: Idealized Action Phases. A Concise Rubicon Theory. Klaus G. TROITZSCH: Modelling, Simulation, and Structuralism. Veikko RANTALA and Tere VADÉN: Idealization in Cognitive Science. A Study in Counterfactual Correspondence. Matti SINTONEN and Mika KIIKERI: Idealization in Evolutionary Biology. Timo TUOMIVAARA: On Idealization in Ecology. Martti KUOKKANEN and Matti HÄYRY: Early Utilitarianism and Its Idealizations from a Systematic Point of View. IDEALIZATION, APPROXIMATION AND MEASUREMENT. Rainer WESTERMANN: Measurement-Theoretical Idealizations and Empirical Research Practice. Uwe KONERDING: Probability as an Idealization of Relative Frequency. A Case Study by Means of BTL-Model. Reinhard SUCK and Joachim WIENÖBST: The Empirical Claim of Probability Statements, Idealized Bernoulli Experiments and their Approximate Version. Pekka J. LAHTI: Idealizations in Quantum Theory of Measurement. (shrink)

Chris Tucker's paper on the hiddenness argument seeks to turn aside a way of defending the latter which he calls the value argument. But the value argument can withstand Tucker's criticisms. In any case, an alternative argument capable of doing the same job is suggested by his own emphasis on free will.

This collection of essays, addresses, and one interview come from the years 1966-73 and cover a wide spectrum of interest, dealing with such general topics as 'The Absence of God in Modern Culture' and 'The Future of Christianity.'.

Flew's challenge to the religious believer asks him to specify what would count as a disproof for, e.g. ‘There is a God’. A statement of such a specifiable condition I called an ‘empirical denial’. In my earlier paper I was concerned to show that a statement is a statement whether or not it has such an empirical denial. I was not particularly concerned to show that there are some statements which do not have an empirical denial; my concern was to (...) show that it is not essential that they do. It was in connection with this point that the statement ‘John loves Mary’ was discussed. But this very same example may indeed serve as an example of a statement for which, in certain complex situations, there is no empirical denial. That is, in some circumstances, no matter what empirical conditions are specified, when the statement ‘John loves Mary’ is made, they could obtain and still John might love Mary, as the developing situation would make clear. If the condition specified is that John is cruel to Mary and shows no concern for her, details could always emerge in such a situation to explain why, even though he loved her, he was cruel and showed no concern. And so on. (shrink)

The Carol J. Adams Reader gathers together Adams's foundational and recent articles in the fields of critical studies, animal studies, media studies, vegan studies, ecofeminism and feminism, as well as relevant interviews and conversations in which Adams identifies key concepts and new developments in her decades-long work. This volume, a companion to The Sexual Politics of Meat (Bloomsbury Revelations), offers insight into a variety of urgent issues for our contemporary world: Why do batterers harm animals? What is the relationship between (...) genocide and attitudes toward other animals? How do activism and theory feed each other? How do race, gender, and species categories interact in strengthening oppressive attitudes? In clear language, Adams identifies the often hidden aspects of cultural presumptions. The essays and conversations found here capture the decades-long energy and vision that continue to shape new ways of thinking about and responding to oppression. (shrink)

This book contains new essays in honor of Melvin J. Lerner, a pioneer in the psychological study of justice. The contributors to this volume are internationally renowned scholars from psychology, business, and law. They examine the role of justice motivation in a wide variety of contexts, including workplace violence, affirmative action programs, helping or harming innocent victims and how people react to their own fate. Contributors explore fundamental issues such as whether people's interest in justice is motivated by self-interest or (...) a genuine concern for the welfare of others, when and why people feel a need to punish transgressors, how a concern for justice emerges during the development of societies and individuals, and the relation of justice motivation to moral motivation. How an understanding of justice motivation can contribute to the amelioration of major social problems is also examined. (shrink)

In an article in Philosophy R. G. Swinburne set out to argue that none of Hume's formal objections to the design argument ‘have any validity against a carefully articulated version of the argument’ . This, he maintained, is largely because Hume's criticisms ‘are bad criticisms of the argument in any form’ . The ensuing controversy between Swinburne and Olding 1 has focused upon the acceptable/unacceptable aspects of the dualism presupposed in Swinburne's defence of the design argument; upon whether any simplification (...) is achieved by reducing scientific explanation to agent explanation; and upon the problems which arise from taking a man's acting upon his body as the analogy for understanding a disembodied agent acting upon matter. In this article I shall refer to the Swinburne-Olding controversy when appropriate but my main concern is to return to Swinburne's original article and argue, seriatim , that Hume's individual criticisms of the design argument are for the most part a great deal more powerful than Swinburne allowed. I shall contend that cumulatively they destroy the design argument as any sort of rational foundation for theistic belief. But first I shall indicate briefly the character of the argument together with one or two of the distinctions and refinements in terms of which it has been found helpful to carry on the discussion in recent years. (shrink)

In Religious Studies xxvi Harold W. Noonan and Charles B. Daniels severally take issue with my ‘Reincarnation and Relativized Identity’. Both make valuable points but both, I think, have somewhat missed the point of my original article. In that paper I singled out five different views on the possibility of life after death: that we are reincarnated in the self-same body we had in our pre-mortem state; that we are reincarnated in another — in a different — body; that we (...) continue to exist in a disembodied form, which may or may not culminate in re-embodiment; that pre-mortem life is a dream from which postmortem life is the awakening; that none of the above holds: there is no life after death. (shrink)

Between 1787, and the end of his life in 1832, Bentham turned his attention to the development and application of economic ideas and principles within the general structure of his legislative project. For seventeen years this interest was manifested through a number of books and pamphlets, most of which remained in manuscript form, that develop a distinctive approach to economic questions. Although Bentham was influenced by Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, he (...) neither adopted a Smithian vocabulary for addressing questions of economic principle and policy, nor did he accept many of the distinctive features of Smith's economic theory. One consequence of this was that Bentham played almost no part in the development of the emerging science of political economy in the early nineteenth century. The standard histories of economics all emphasize how little he contributed to the mainstream of late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century debate by concentrating attention on his utilitarianism and the psychology of hedonism on which it is premised. Others have argued that the calculating nature of his theory of practical reason reduced the whole legislative project to a crude attempt to apply economics to all aspects of social and political life. Put at its simplest this argument amounts to the erroneous claim that Bentham's science of legislation is reducible to the science of political economy. A different but equally dangerous error would be to argue that because Bentham's conception of the science of legislation comprehends all the basic forms of social relationships, there can be no science of political economy as there is no autonomous sphere of activity governed by the principles of economics. This approach is no doubt attractive from an historical point of view given that the major premise of this argument is true, and that many of Bentham's ‘economic’ arguments are couched in terms of his theory of legislation. Yet it fails to account for the undoubted importance of political economy within Bentham's writings, not just on finance, economic policy, colonies and preventive police, but also in other aspects of his utilitarian public policy such as prison reform, pauper management, and even constitutional reform. All of these works reflect a conception of political economy in its broadest terms. However, this conception of political economy differs in many respects from that of Bentham's contemporaries, and for this reason Bentham's distinctive approach to problems of economics and political economy has largely been misunderstood. (shrink)