My interest here is in the way Leo Strauss and his followers, the Straussians, have dealt with race and rights, race and slavery in the history of the United States. I want, first, to assess Leo Strauss's rather ambivalent attitude toward America and explore the various ways that his followers have in turn analyzed the Lockean underpinnings of the American “regime,” sometimes in contradistinction to Strauss's views on the topic. With that established, I turn to the account, particularly that offered (...) by Harry Jaffa, of how slavery and race comported—or did not—with the Straussian account of the political foundations of the new nation and how latter-day followers of Strauss have dealt with the persisting topic of race and racism in America. Overall, I want to make two large points. First, the Straussian commitment to superhistorical standards provides the Straussians with a moral perspective on slavery, race, and racism. Second, though race and slavery have been less than central among the concerns of most followers of Strauss, the contributions of Jaffa and others have significantly shaped the present American conservative position on race, including the idea of color-blindness. (shrink)

It is tempting to think that we have heard just about all we want or need to know about race. As the above quotes indicate, modern notions of race have always revolved around the faculty of vision, with supplementary contributions from other senses such as hearing, as Arendt notes in a tacit allusion to one mark of Jewish difference—the way they sounded when concentrated in urban settings. Yet two very recent works—Mark M. Smith's How Race Is Made and Anne C. (...) Rose's Psychology and Selfhood in the Segregated South —have much to teach us about how race has “worked”, particularly in the twentieth-century South but also, by implication, in the United States in general. Both works assume that, historically, race is no mere add-on to the self, a kind of externality that, once detected, can be relatively easily excised. Rather, it stands right at the heart of personal and group identity in a nation where race and ethnicity continue to assume surprising new shapes and forms. (shrink)

Introduction: Hannah Arendt's world -- Guilt and responsibility -- The origins of totalitarianism in America -- Rediscovering the world -- Arendt, Tocqueville, and Cold War America -- Arendt, Riesman, and America as mass society -- Arendt and postwar American thought -- Reflections/refractions of race, 1945-1955 -- Arendt, the schools, and civil rights -- The Eichmann case -- Against the liberal grain -- The revolutionary traditions -- The crises of Arendt's republic -- Conclusion: once more: the film, Eichmann, and evil.

Professor Margaret Canovan wrote two studies of the work of German-Jewish émigré political theorist, Hannah Arendt. The first, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt, appeared in 1974, while Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought was published in 1992. Both were intended for the Anglophone world, especially the US and Great Britain, although Arendt’s reception was more favorable in America where she settled in 1941 than in the UK. An historian of political thought at Keele University, UK, Canovan was (...) ideal to bring Arendt to a general academic audience not to aim at a highly specialized readership deeply grounded in German thought. Though Canovan emphasized the conservative dimensions of Arendt’s thought, her conclusion was, finally, that Arendt’s political thought was a form of modern “republicanism” not an argument for inherited political traditions or a plea for New Left radicalism. It was a plea for pluralism, as it were. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt first argued the continuities between the age of European imperialism and the age of fascism in Europe in 'The Origins of Totalitarianism'. This text uses Arwndt's insights as a starting point for further investigations into the ways in which race, imperialism, slavery and genocide are linked.

A Pluralistic Universe is America's favourite philosopher's last complete work before he died in 1910. Nevertheless, it has been somewhat neglected as a final self-reckoning. Indeed the term "pragmatism" occurs pretty rarely in it, while "experience" and "pluralism" abound. As introduced and annotated by H.G. Callaway, the Cambridge Scholars edition offers some valuable background on James and the text itself, particularly for the nonspecialist reader. Besides retaining James's notes, Callaway has also provided his own glosses on important philosophical terms, translations (...) of the foreign phrases James so often fell back on, and an expanded index and new bibliography to the text. It is, as Callaway says, a "reading and study edition" (ix). (shrink)

The riddle Frazer confronts us with in The Golden Bough is posed in the form of a question. ‘Why is this happening?’ - this life and death of the King of the Wood at Nemi? In the related context of his accounts of the fire-festivals in Europe, Frazer refines the question in a more dramatic form: ‘What is the meaning of such sacrifices? Why were men and animals burnt to death at these festivals?’ Frazer recognizes something serious in all (...) this. The practice of human sacrifice is puzzling; it does leave us disquieted! But Frazer's search for what he calls ‘a fairly probable explanation’ of the motives which gave rise to the priesthood of Nemi and its embodiment of the practice of human sacrifice, Wittgenstein in his ‘Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough’ feels, does not help us to understand a practice like the burning of a man! With all the additional data, numerous theories, and the historical tracing of origins we are no closer to resolving the perplexities of the riddle than the riddle itself presents to us daily. (shrink)

Mersenne's answer to Pyrrhonism begins with a great deal of bombast in his dedicatory letter to the king's brother. The sceptics are the enemies of science, they are unworthy of being called men. Since they cannot support the light of truth within themselves they try to limit all human knowledge to the outward appearance of things, and to reduce mankind to a state as lowly as the stupidest animals. The sceptics are the enemies of God and science. What Mersenne (...) was seeking was a rational way of supporting simultaneously the truths of religion and of physics against the attacks of the Pyrrhonists and the Renaissance humanists. The only sceptic that Mersenne names is Sextus Empiricus. He probably had seen Gassendi's work since they had become friends around this time, and had joined forces in attacking the pernicious influence of the alchemist and Rosicrusian, Robert Fludd. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:?;5. HUME AND SPINOZA It is strange that there has been so little interest in comparing two great philosophers, Hume and -Spinoza, who were both so important and influential in bringing about the decline of traditional religion. Jessop's bibliography indicates no interest in Hume and Spinoza up to the 1930 's. The Hume conferences of 1976, as far as I have been able to 2 determine, avoided the topic. (...) In one of the better new Hume volumes, Livingston and King, Hume, A Re-evaluation, 3 Spinoza is cited twice, and once incorrectly at that. On the other hand, in the massive new Spinoza volume edited by Siegfried Hessing, Speculum Spinozanun 1677-1977, Hume is mentioned four times, but only one of these has any real relevance to Hume's views vis-a-vis Spinoza's. Some discussion of Hume's comments, usually brief, occurs in the commentators. B. M. Laing, in David Hume, (London 1932), has just three short references to Spinoza. John Laird, in Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature, (London 1932) has a couple of cursory references to Spinoza, plus a bit more extended statement of Pierre Bay le" s critique of him. In H. H. Price, Hume's Theory of the External World, (Oxford 1940), there is one paragraph on Hume and Spinoza. In Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London 1941), there are three references to Spinoza. Rachel Kydd, Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise (Oxford 194 6), has the greatest number of references to Spinoza. She was concerned to compare him with Hume on other matters than are dealt with in this paper, namely Spinoza's theory of reason and 9 the passions. In contrast, André Leroy, David Hume, (Paris 1953), has just one paragraph on Spinoza dealing with the immateriality of the soul; and Ernest C. Mossner, in his monumental Life of David Hume, (Austin 1954), has only one reference to Spinoza - James Beattie's denunciation of Hume, Hobbes, Malebranche, Leibniz and Spinoza. Lastly, in a fairly recent commentary by James Noxon, Spinoza is mentioned 66. three times, but not for anything in Hume's text. Noxon does point out (p. 75) that Spinoza is not mentioned in ] 2 Hume's correspondence. John H. Randall has offered an explanation for this neglect of Spinoza by Hume scholars, namely that "Hume stands for all time as the antithesis of Spinoza in his thought". In the England of Hume's day, Spinoza was little known, but still better known at the time than he was in France or England. Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 14 had been twice translated into English anonymously. He had been attacked by Bishop Stillingfleet, by John Evelyn, by Berkeley and several others. But Spinoza was not a major figure, except to the English Deists, and to Hume's early patron, the Chevalier Andrew Michael Ramsay. Most of the information known about Spinoza came from Pierre Bayle' s Historical and Critical Dictionary, where the article "Spinoza" is the longest in the Dictionary, about three hundred pages in length. My suspicion, or hypothesis, is that Hume first became interested in Spinoza through Ramsay, and then learned what he knew about Spinoza from Bayle' s article. When the young David Hume went to France to write his A Treatise of Human Nature in 1734, he went first to see the Chevalier Ramsay, who entertained Hume for about two weeks. Ramsay was a leading Scottish Catholic, was the teacher of Bonnie Prince Charlie, a leading Scottish revolutionary, 18 as well as the Grand Master of the Free Masons. With Ramsay's eclectic views it is not odd that he had a serious interest in Spinoza's theory, and that he was composing answers to it. Ramsay advised Hume about his own book, and Hume felt he had to show Ramsay the Treatise before he 19 brought it back to England. In the Treatise there is a not too well studied section on Spinoza, Of the immateriality of the soul 20 (T240-45). In introducing Spinoza into the discussion of 67. the immateriality of the soul, Hume follows what was common practice in his day, namely to insult Spinoza and his theory... (shrink)

Dans le Philèbe de Platon, Socrate fait valoir que la vie bonne doit consister en la connaissance et le plaisir. Une partie de cette démonstration consiste en une analyse des parties de la connaissance où la connaissance peut être plus ou moins pure, plus ou moins mêlée d’éléments étrangers tels que la sensation ou l’expérience. Lorsqu’elle est pure, elle s’attache à la vérité, pure et simple. Car, nous devons l’admettre, la connaissance est vraie, quoiqu’elle puisse être d’autre par ailleurs. La (...) connaissance peut rendre les humains bons, c’est-à-dire leur permettre de bien faire, de manière fiable et souple, mais elle a son bien au-delà de l’existence humaine – elle n’est pas limitée à l’existence humaine. Nous suggérons ici que Platon détermine en fait la connaissance à partir de sa finalité – sa cause finale est utilisée pour déterminer sa cause formelle : ce que vise la connaissance nous dit ce qu’elle est. Au lieu de nous fournir une analyse selon l’aporie finale et insatisfaisante du Théétète (« l’opinion vraie accompagnée de raison »), la connaissance est ainsi dotée d’une justification fonctionnelle. Une partie de cette proposition est que la connaissance se doit d’être vraie ; c’est ce qui garantit sa stabilité : elle est à elle-même sa propre fin. Le bien de la connaissance, c’est la vérité. C’est ce qui lui permet de se comporter comme un guide pour l’âme. Les attributs additionnels de ce clan, qui est celui de la connaissance, découlent de la vérité et de leur relation à elle : exactitude, clarté et pureté. Car dans la mesure où ils sont purs et sans mélange avec des éléments étrangers tels que la pratique ou la sensation, ils ne s’intéressent qu’à des unités exactes, de choses qui sont ce qu’elles sont, de sorte que leur clarté n’est en rien troublée. C’est la dialectique qui recherche et établit cela. (shrink)

Parva naturalia ist eine Gruppe kleinerer Schriften, die folgende Einzeltitel umfasst: De sensu et sensato, De memoria et reminiscentia, De somno et vigilia, De insomniis, De divinatione per somnum, De longaevitate et brevitate vitae, De iuventute et senectute. Der Titel Parva naturalia geht auf den mittelalterlichen Philosophen und Aristoteliker Aegidius Romanus zurück. Die Parva naturalia vervollständigen das Projekt von De anima, indem sie die darin entwickelten Definitionen der Seele und ihrer Vermögen für die Erklärung eines weiten Spektrums unterschiedlicher Leistungen und (...) Verhaltensweisen des Lebendigen zur Anwendung bringen. (shrink)

Gau $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$$ apāda, whilst accepting much of the argumentation and style of Nāgārjuna's philosophy, aligns himself firmly with the ātman/ svabhāvatā tradition of Vedānta; his view of ātman is inspired by an absorption of Nāgārjuna's dialectical method. For both Nāgārjuna and Gau $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$$ apāda, the basis of both the Madhyamaka and Advaitic perspectives is the impossibility of change (na anyathabhāva). For Nāgārjuna this entails ni $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{h}$$ svabhāvatā, for Gau $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$$ apāda it means absolute svabhāvatā. Both accept that the belief in (...) an ‘own nature’ (which amounts to all views of reality) entails a non-active, unchanging absolute. Nāgārjuna takes this as grounds for a rejection of svabhāvatā, Gau $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$$ apāda accepts this as proof of its reality. The real dividing line between the two thinkers is on the question of the necessity (or not) of even positing a ‘nature’ to things. Nāgārjuna denies the possibility of an underlying and unchanging substratum behind all manifestations, Gau $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{d}$$ apāda argues that for there to be an appearance there must be a thing that appears. It is this point, the debate over ātman (svabhāva) or anātman (ni $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{h}$$ svabhāva) at its most fundamental level, that is the real dividing line between the philosophies of the Buddhist and the Advaita Vedāntin. (shrink)

The much-anticipated anthology on Plato’s_Timaeus_—Plato’s singular dialogue on the creation of the universe, the nature of the physical world, and the place of persons in the cosmos—examining all dimensions of one of the most important books in Western Civilization: its philosophy, cosmology, science, and ethics, its literary aspects and reception. Contributions come from leading scholars in their respective fields, including Sir Anthony Leggett, 2003 Nobel Laureate for Physics. Parts of or earlier versions of these papers were first presented at the (...) _Timaeus_ Conference, held at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign in September of 2007._ To this day, Plato’s _Timaeus_ grounds the form of ethical and political thinking called Natural Law—the view that there are norms in nature that provide the patterns for our actions and ground the objectivity of human values. Beyond the intellectual content of the dialogue’s core, its literary frame is also the source of the myth of Atlantis, giving the West the concept of the “lost world.” From Platonic space to Presocratic vortices, from Philosopher-Kings to Craftsman-Gods and from modern physics to the myth of Atlantis, _One Book, The Whole Universe_ presents in one volume the most up-to-date and penetrating scholarship on Plato’s _Timaeus_ by some of the greatest minds alive today. Contributors__ _Ann Bergren Gábor Betegh Sean Carroll Alan Code Zina Giannopoulou Verity Harte Thomas Kjeller Johansen Charles H. Kahn Anthony J. Leggett Anthony A. Long Stephen Menn Richard D. Mohr Kathryn A. Morgan Alexander P.D. Mourelatos Ian Mueller Thomas M. Robinson Barbara M. Sattler Allan Silverman Jon Solomon Anthony Vidler Matthias Vorwerk Donald Zeyl. (shrink)

This book gives a descriptive analysis of specific Madhyamika texts. It compares the ideology of Kumarajiva (a translator of the four Madhyamika treatises 400 A.D.) with the ideologies of the three Chinese contemporaries - HuiYuan, Seng-Jui and Seng-Chao. It envisages an intercultural transmission of religious and philosophical ideas from India to China.

Although numbers as Volume 4, this is the second of the Complete Works to appear, following_ The History of King Richard III_. The Latin text is based on the editions of 1516, 1517, and 1518, fully collated and with the variant readings; the parallel English text is a thoroughly revised version of the translation by G. C. Richards. Also included are the letters on the book exchanged by More and his friends, their tributes, and the marginal glosses of (...) the early editions. The text is followed by a commentary on the relation of _Utopia_ to its own age and as it has been interpreted by scholars. The editors' Introduction included an outline of the genesis and composition of _Utopia_, edited by Father Surtz, will also appear in the Yale Paperbound format. Father Surtz is professor of English at Loyola University, and Mr. Hexter is professor of history at Yale University. Previously announced. (shrink)

Reeve's new book will be hailed by scholars and prove welcome both to senior undergraduates in classics and to graduates in philosophy who also face a major examination on the Nicomachean Ethics. This masterpiece of Aristotle can at first overwhelm us with a great bundle of partly ordinary, partly technical uses of such terms as theos, phronësis, endoxa, nous, epistëmë, eudaimonia, phainomena, philia, aporiai, and hëdonë. Reeve tries generously to clarify all these and more, also to relate their meanings to (...) each other. Scholars with whom he most likes to interact include J. L. Ackrill, J. M. Cooper, T. H. Irwin, Martha C. Nussbaum, and Richard Kraut. Behind the exposition of the epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological ideas in the Nicomachean Ethics, Reeve challenges a traditional understanding of Aristotle's view as involving a radical chörismos between scientific knowledge and ethical knowledge. Reeve complains that in contemporary literatures the difference between these types of knowledge is exaggerated and their similarity is to a large extent ignored. Reeve argues that most of the sciences--notably physics, biology, psychology--do not offer entirely unconditional scientific knowledge. Rather, like ethical knowledge, they constitute knowledge with the status of cognizing hös epi to polu. (shrink)

‘The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for particular purposes.’ Among the many purposes for which Wittgenstein assembled reminders, the deeper understanding of the religious life would have to qualify as one. Though on first reading this would hardly seem obvious, I hope to make this abundantly clear through an examination of his later literature. There are two ways in which he sheds light on religious issues: first , by the personal passion of his own life and the (...) forthright display of intellectual integrity expected of any professional thinker toward any discipline , and, second , by making his philosophical investigations descriptive. Any analysis of religious issues or the understanding of the religious life should involve the high degree of personal integrity and the rigorously descriptive method which Wittgenstein makes apparent throughout his writing. (shrink)

This latest book, whose editors were among those who prepared the first two volumes, centers on Popkin's crucial role in bringing together scholars from around ...

P. O. Bodunrin, in his 1981 essay, asks: ‘Is there an African Philosophy, and if there is, what is it?’ This question has occupied centre stage among younger African intellectuals for about a decade now. The most articulate among these intellectuals, who are themselves philosophers, are Bodunrin , Kwasi Wiredu , H. Odera Oruka , Marcien Towa and Eboussi Boulaga , and Paulin Hountondji . These philosophers among others are in dialogue with one another and currently are seen to be (...) the principal architects of a new orientation in African thought. (shrink)

This is the third edition of a classic book first published in 1960, which has sold thousands of copies in two paperback edition and has been translated into several foreign languages. Popkin's work ha generated innumerable citations, and remains a valuable stimulus to current historical research. In this updated version, he has revised and expanded throughout, and has added three new chapters, one on Savonarola, one on Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, and one on Pascal. This authoritative treatment of the (...) theme of scepticism and its historical impact will appeal to scholars and students of early modern history now as much as ever. (shrink)

Public and professional debates have come to rely heavily on a special type of reasoning: the argument-from-ignorance, in which conclusions depend on the _lack_ of compelling information. "I win my argument," says the skillful advocate, "unless you can prove that I am wrong." This extraordinary gambit has been largely ignored in modern rhetorical and philosophical studies. Yet its broad force can be demonstrated by analogy with the modern legal system, where courts have long manipulated burdens of proof with skill and (...) subtlety. This legal, philosophical, and rhetorical study by Richard H. Gaskins provides the first systematic treatment of arguments-from-ignorance across a wide range of modern discourse—from constitutional law, scientific inquiry, and moral philosophy to organizational behavior, computer operation, and personal interaction. Gaskins reviews the historic shifts in constitutional proof burdens that have shaped public debate on fundamental rights and, by analogy, on the fundamental status of intellectual and cultural authority. He shows how similar shifts have dominated polemical battles between scientific and ethical modes of authority, affecting both academic and popular discussion. Finally, he discovers the philosophical roots of default reasoning strategies in the arguments of Kant and nineteenth-century Kantian schools. Concluding that shifting proof burdens are inescapable in a world of scientific and moral uncertainty, Gaskins emphasizes the common strategic ground shared by dogmatic and skeptical reasoning. Using Hegelian strategies, he describes a more pluralistic temper that can move critical thinking beyond polemics and strengthen our capacities for common discourse. (shrink)

Wittgenstein, in his characteristic way of indirectly bringing us to see an important feature in human life, said: ‘… art shows us the miracles of nature… We say: “Just look at it opening out!” This essay discusses how works of art ‘blossom’ and thus elicit an imaginative human response. Its various parts focus on the connected theme that some sensible component is essential to the production and comprehension of art. Each part, however, investigates a different aspect of the theme and (...) could stand on its own. What will be argued about this aesthetic factor in art will also be shown to cast light on our understanding of certain narrative texts and ceremonial acts of religion. (shrink)

i. In the Philosophical Investigations , Ludwig Wittgenstein yoked together these remarks: Essence is expressed by grammar. Grammar tells what kind of object anything is.

A comprehensive exploration of the philosophical issues raised by mysticism. This work is a comprehensive study of the philosophical issues raised by mysticism. Mystics claim to experience reality in a way not available in normal life, a claim which makes this phenomenon interesting from a philosophical perspective. Richard H. Jones’s inquiry focuses on the skeleton of beliefs and values of mysticism: knowledge claims made about the nature of reality and of human beings; value claims about what is significant and (...) what is ethical; and mystical goals and ways of life. Jones engages language, epistemology, metaphysics, science, and the philosophy of mind. Methodological issues in the study of mysticism are also addressed. Examples of mystical experience are drawn chiefly from Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta, but also from Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and Daoism. “This is a significant extension of the seminal work by Walter Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy. That work has stimulated much literature, all of which Jones manages to review here. He critically extends Stace’s universal core and embeds it in a sophisticated discussion of the extent, range, and metaphysical implications of mysticism.” — Ralph W. Hood, Jr., coauthor of The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach. (shrink)

Many existing biomedical vocabulary standards rest on incomplete, inconsistent or confused accounts of basic terms pertaining to diseases, diagnoses, and clinical phenotypes. Here we outline what we believe to be a logically and biologically coherent framework for the representation of such entities and of the relations between them. We defend a view of disease as involving in every case some physical basis within the organism that bears a disposition toward the execution of pathological processes. We present our view in the (...) form of a list of terms and definitions designed to provide a consistent starting point for the representation of both disease and diagnosis in information systems in the future. (shrink)

Richard H. Bell analyzes the social and political thought of Simone Weil, paying particular attention to Weil's concept of justice as compassion. Bell describes the ways in which Weil's concept of justice stands in contrast with liberal 'rights-based' views of justice, and focuses upon central aspects of her thought, including 'attention,' human suffering and 'affliction,' and the importance of 'a spiritual way of life' in reshaping the individual's role in civic life.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.