From the beginning, a code of ethics for bioethicists has been conceived of as part of a movement to professionalise the field. In advocating for such a code, Baker repeatedly identifies ‘having a code of ethics’ with ‘professionalization’. The American Society of Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) echoes this view in their code of ethics for healthcare ethics consultants (HCECs)1 and the subsequent publication in the American Journal of Bioethics.2 Taking for granted that a code of ethics could be a valuable (...) asset for HCECs, this essay has two aims. First, there are good reasons to doubt that the label ‘profession’ has significant meaning for HCECs. Attempts to accurately conceive of a profession fall into two broad camps: substantive and formal. Substantive conceptions should be rejected. Specifically, substantive conceptions beg the question about what it means to be a profession, which produces devastating problems for practical application. Formal conceptions of profession (eg, Davis’ conception3) avoid begging the question, but do so at the cost of identifying the responsibilities of a profession. Using the term ‘professional responsibilities’, then, requires additional explication and classifying HCECs as professionals requires the identification of their role-specific responsibilities.i Second, this essay will critique the ASBH code of ethics for HCECs as a first articulation of these responsibilities. As written, this code of ethics has limited value for HCECs because most of the responsibilities identified in this code do not identify HCEC-specific responsibilities. In closing, some important strategies to improve upon this initial attempt to define the responsibilities of HCECs are identified. For at least the last decade, Baker has encouraged bioethicists to adopt a code of ethics. Throughout this effort, Baker intertwines having a code of ethics with becoming a profession: ‘Is it time for bioethics to assert its integrity by developing …. (shrink)

My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the interpersonal character of intentions. I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency. The main point will be that when acting together with others one must be able to act directly on the intention of another or others in a way that is relevantly similar to the manner in which an agent acts on his or her own intentions. What exactly this means will become (...) clearer once we understand what it is to act directly on one’s own intentions. But I take it to be a fundamental assumption of the prevailing individualism of the theory of action—one at the core of its conception of the separateness of individuals—that one person cannot act directly on another’s intention. I agree that there is an important way in which we are or can be separate and autonomous thinkers and agents. But the way the individualist tries to capture this separateness is misguided. (shrink)

This text proposes an interpretation of the work of Franklin Leopoldo e Silva based on the reading of some of his numerous published articles and books, without neglecting the classes and guidance received from the stage of Scientific Initiation to Postdoctoral studies. Precisely, by highlighting the importance of three thinkers widely studied by Professor Franklin – Berkeley, Bergson and William James –, we suggest that at the heart of this philosophical experience there would be a constant: empiricism. Whether in the (...) classical or radical version, the line we draw in this multiplicity reveals an openness to concrete empiricism. (shrink)

How far can one ascribe a spatial meaning to pain? When I have a pain, for instance, in my leg, how should one understand the “in” in the “pain in my leg”? I argue (contrary to Noordhof) that pain does have a spatial meaning, but (contrary to Tye) that the spatiality of pain is not to be understood in the standard sense of spatial enclosure. Instead, spatiality has a special meaning with regard to pain. By defining pain in phenomenological terms (...) as a disturbed form of bodily perception, I contend that the “in” in “pain in my body” has a dual spatial meaning: firstly, it signifies my internal perceptual relation to a disturbing part of my body; secondly, it denotes the external perceptual relation to my environment that the disturbance forces me to take. Once the spatiality of pain is understood in terms of such a perceptual relation, it is not restricted to localisable hurts, but pertains to all forms of pain, such as affliction and agony. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 25 (4) 2006: pp. 336-349. (shrink)

In this volume, a distinguished philosopher and moral rights theorist examines important changes that have occurred in our thinking about rights since first mention of them was made in early modern times. His inquiry is framed by an opening question and a concluding response. The question is whether the Greeks had any conception of a moral right. Some argue that they did not, on the ground that they had no word for a right. Others claim that they did, since they (...) employed certain locutions, the equivalents of which in our language are tied to some notion of a moral right. Professor Melden reviews in detail some of the most important historical conceptions of rights and examines serious questions raised by the fact that there have been striking changes in our thinking about rights. His discussion elucidates the place of moral rights in the broader network of moral concepts, along with the role they should play in our moral lives. Among the fundamental issues raised and discussed are those concerning the ways in which we are to understand various sorts of rights, the relation of special moral rights to our basic human rights, the now familiar claim that there are animal rights, the nature of moral progress, and the dream of a moral science. (shrink)

How far can one ascribe a spatial meaning to pain? When I have a pain, for instance, in my leg, how should one understand the “in” in the “pain in my leg”? I argue (contrary to Noordhof) that pain does have a spatial meaning, but (contrary to Tye) that the spatiality of pain is not to be understood in the standard sense of spatial enclosure. Instead, spatiality has a special meaning with regard to pain. By defining pain in phenomenological terms (...) as a disturbed form of bodily perception, I contend that the “in” in “pain in my body” has a dual spatial meaning: firstly, it signifies my internal perceptual relation to a disturbing part of my body; secondly, it denotes the external perceptual relation to my environment that the disturbance forces me to take. Once the spatiality of pain is understood in terms of such a perceptual relation, it is not restricted to localisable hurts, but pertains to all forms of pain, such as affliction and agony. (shrink)

The individual informed consent model remains critical to the ethical conduct and regulation of research involving human beings. Parental informed consent process in a rural setting of northern Ghana was studied to describe comprehension and retention among parents as part of the evaluation of the existing informed consent process.

These selections provide a brief but comprehensive introduction to Fichte’s philosophical system and his place in the history of German Idealism. In addition to some of Fichte’s most influential texts, such as the First and Second Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and The Basis of Our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World, Breazeale has translated, for the first time into English, several other writings from the same period, including Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre, Other short essays, (...) including Fichte’s replies to the charge of atheism, extend the discussions of the Introductions and respond to criticisms. Breazeale’s substantial Introduction supplies the context needed for a sound appreciation of Fichte’s enterprise and achievement. (shrink)

The relation between the notions of (medical) invasiveness and (actual or potential) harm has not been systematically discussed nor theoretically grounded, despite its importance to clinical-ethical practice. This paper aims to clarify the notion of invasiveness beyond the traditional notion of invasiveness as breaking skin or inserting mechanical objects into the body. The traditional notion of invasiveness is challenged by counterexamples. Three approaches to the notion of disorder applied here are: deviation from what is common; deviation from what is considered (...) ideal; and disruption of self-organization. Assuming that more extreme measures are related to more harm, all three approaches to the notion of disorder suggest that invasiveness is proportional if not identical to harm, and show no clear relation to the traditional notion of invasiveness. In conclusion, the notion of invasiveness may best be eliminated from medical terminology, replacing it with a detailed understanding of the notion of harm. (shrink)

[R]eflection is a system of thought no less closed than insanity, with this difference that it understands itself and the madman too, whereas the madman does not understand it.– Merleau-Ponty, Phen...

Bd. 1. Briefwechsel 1775-1793 -- Bd. 2. Briefwechsel 1793-1795 --Bd. 4. Briefwechsel 1799-1800 -- Bd. 5. Briefwechsel 1801-1806 -- Bd. 6. Briefwechsel 1806-1810 -- Bd. 7. Briefwechsel 1810-1812 -- Bd. 8. Briefwechsel 1812-1814, Anhang 1815-1818, Nachträge 1789-1810.

Bd. 1. Briefwechsel 1775-1793 -- Bd. 2. Briefwechsel 1793-1795 --Bd. 4. Briefwechsel 1799-1800 -- Bd. 5. Briefwechsel 1801-1806 -- Bd. 6. Briefwechsel 1806-1810 -- Bd. 7. Briefwechsel 1810-1812 -- Bd. 8. Briefwechsel 1812-1814, Anhang 1815-1818, Nachträge 1789-1810.

Dialogical ethics are a procedural alternative to substantive ethics such as consequentialism, deontology, principlism, casuistry, virtue ethics and care ethics. Dialogical ethics are procedural in that they do not establish goods in advance, unlike substantive ethics, but rather determine goods through a procedure enacted by the actual parties involved (although some substantive notion of justice may still be required); and they are dialogical in that the procedure is that of dialogue, involving both empathic critical discussion and negotiation. A fundamental tenet (...) of dialogical ethics may be the use of appropriate rules of order regulating dialogue among the parties involved. Some of the central characteristics of such rules of order are that they are reciprocally regulated by dialogue, that they override other ethical considerations, and that they institute empathic critical discussion and negotiation within the ethical dialogue. Dialogical bioethics are the application of dialogical ethics to ethical problems in medicine. The approach of dialogical bioethics has proven fruitful for resolving bioethical problems such as that of medical futility, where approaches of substantive ethics have reached an impasse. There is room for further study of special challenges within dialogical bioethics, such as the incompetence of some involved parties, conflicts of interests of third parties, and the cost-effectiveness of this ethical approach. (shrink)

O’Donohue has identified 37 criticisms of the American Psychological Association’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (Ethics Code), although many of his criticisms go far beyond what is found written in the APA Ethics Code, to include the process of adjudicating ethics complaints by the American Psychological Association Ethics Committee, and the process by which the Ethics Code was developed. The authors claim that a major shortcoming of O’Donohue’s article is that he adopted an unrealistically expansive role for (...) the Ethics Code that was not clearly linked to furthering the goals of the ethics code revision. (shrink)

This paper addresses two issues. The first part deals with the classic question of human nature by focussing on the problem of human consciousness, in particular, the relationship between subjective and intentional consciousness. I argue for an essential link between subjectivity and intentionality by suggesting a phenomenological conception of the human condition. On this basis, the second part deals with what I call ‘humane’ ethics. This part shows that my conception of the human condition contains a humane approach to morality.

Though astrophysicists have developed a theoretical framework for understanding how the first stars and galaxies formed, only now are we able to begin testing those theories with actual observations of the very distant, early universe. We are entering a new and exciting era of discovery that will advance the frontiers of knowledge, and this book couldn't be more timely. It covers all the basic concepts in cosmology, drawing on insights from an astronomer who has pioneered much of this research over (...) the past two decades. Abraham Loeb starts from first principles, tracing the theoretical foundations of cosmology and carefully explaining the physics behind them. Topics include the gravitational growth of perturbations in an expanding universe, the abundance and properties of dark matter halos and galaxies, reionization, the observational methods used to detect the earliest galaxies and probe the diffuse gas between them--and much more. Cosmology seeks to solve the fundamental mystery of our cosmic origins. This book offers a succinct and accessible primer at a time when breathtaking technological advances promise a wealth of new observational data on the first stars and galaxies. Provides a concise introduction to cosmology Covers all the basic concepts Gives an overview of the gravitational growth of perturbations in an expanding universe Explains the process of reionization Describes the observational methods used to detect the earliest galaxies. (shrink)

The obscured Thomas precessionof the special theory of relativity (STR) has been soared into prominence by exposing the mathematical structure, called a gyrogroup,to which it gives rise [A. A. Ungar, Amer. J. Phys.59,824 (1991)], and the role that it plays in the study of Lorentz groups [A. A. Ungar, Amer. J. Phys.60,815 (1992); A. A. Ungar, J. Math. Phys.35,1408 (1994); A. A. Ungar, J. Math. Phys.35,1881 (1994)]. Thomas gyrationresults from the abstraction of Thomas precession.As such, its study sheds light on (...) relativistic velocity spaces and their symmetries which are concealed in Thomas precession. In order to uncover new properties of relativistic gyrogroups, we employ in this article the group theoretic concepts of divisible groupsand two-torsion free groupsto construct midpointsin gyrogroups. Systems of successive midpoints then describe straight gyrolinesand suggest a new, natural distance function that involves a Thomas gyration. These, in turn, reveal a new, interesting geometry that underlies relativistic velocity spaces. In this resulting gyrogeometrythe straight gyrolines form geodesics under a distance function which turns out to be the Poincaré hyperbolic distance function relaxed by a Thomas gyration. These geodesics do obey the parallel axiom of Euclidean geometry. Ironically, (i) attempts to understand the parallel postulate of Euclidean geometry gave rise to hyperbolic geometry in which the parallel postulate disappears;(ii) hyperbolic geometry gave rise to Einstein's STR; (iii) Einstein's STR established the bizarre and counterintuitive relativistic effect called Thomas precession, the abstraction of which is called Thomas gyration; and (iv) Thomas gyration now repairs in this article the Poincaré distance function of hyperbolic geometry to the point where the parallel postulate reappears. (shrink)