According to Renan, the day of Marcus Aurelius’ death could be considered as the decisive moment in the downfall of the ancient civilization. He, thus, wonders: “If Marcus Aurelius, the unique emperor-philosopher, did not succeed in saving the world, who else, then, could have saved it?” He notes that the emperor’s death was followed by the succession to the throne of his corrupted son, Commodus, and his friends, who all were all ignorant. Renan observes that the emperor’s kindness could not (...) have prevented the unfortunate fate that befell the Roman Empire after his death. What we have here is the perennial problem, already established in Plato, regarding the role of the philosopher-king in establishing a good state and educating good citizens. However, the case of Marcus Aurelius, as demonstrated by Renan in his book, shows the inability of philosophy to serve the real needs, which ultimately leads to disastrous and irreparable consequences. The present paper attempts to reconstruct the reasons for the unsuccessful application of philosophy, especially the philosophy of the Hellenistic era, to the administrative system of the Roman Empire. It is argued that the failure is mainly due to political, religious and cultural problems. (shrink)

The present article is divided into two parts: the first focuses on the affections of the soul in general, while the second part investigates the case of melancholy, as it is studied from Aristotle and the Stoics to Galen. The main point of the first part is an analysis of the Chrysippean treatise On the Affections of the Soul as it appears in the Galenic treatise On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato. The analysis identifies several Chry­sippean influences from Plato (...) and Aristotle regarding the psyche. In the second part, the case of melancholy is analyzed through the pseudo-Ar­istotelian treatise Problem XXX 1. The discussion shows the common points between the Aristotelian text and the Chrysippean fragments regarding the issue of melancholy. This article aims to bring to light the evolution of the phenomenon of melancholy in Galen’s thought, which is connected with the study of both medical and philosophical texts already existing before him. (shrink)

The Stoics try to demonstrate, in a theoretical context, more than any other philosophy, the link unifying the parts with the whole, in all areas of existence; namely, from man to divine reason, from god to nature – a tautological link in some cases – from matter to logos or creative pneuma. This unifying bond – hexis or continuity – guarantees the attachment between bodies which are in a state of sympathy which also constitutes their existence. It remains to seek (...) the meaning of this notion; draw on its etymology: according to Bailly’s dictionary, the term hexis in Greek means among other meanings: action of possessing, possession. And according to the dictionary of L.‑S.‑J., hexis derives from the future of the verb ἕξω, from the verb ἔχω, ; in its intransitive form refers to a permanent condition, namely to an act, which results from practice.In order to make an attempt to define this concept or to orient its function, it seems appropriate for us to do some research – we could say historical –, consulting texts prior to Stoicism, examining its place and the nuances it takes in different contexts and finally, follow its interpretation where, according to philosophical approaches, it sometimes means disposition, habit, or situation. Nevertheless, the Stoics give this term an original meaning, different from the one that was granted to it until then. It is the hectic pneuma or the tension prevalent in the universe. In this perspective, we will try to define its function and compare it with the notion of hexis in Aristotle, where it acquires the meaning of metaxy, in his Metaphysics, Δ, 1022b12. (shrink)

Questo articolo in un primo tempo avrà il fine di indagare le carat­teristiche che costituiscono la teologia stoica, così come esse sono presenti nell’Inno a Zeus di Cleante. Per perseguire questo obiettivo, in un secondo tempo bisognerà tracciare la nozione della divinità secondo gli Stoici, insistendo sull’aggettivo πολυώνυμος attribuito a Zeus e rivedere certi punti dell’Inno secondo un’interpretazione personale. Infine, in un terzo e ultimo tempo si tenterà di proporre una esegesi del termine πάνδωρος, anch’esso attribuito a Zeus, e di (...) individuare nella sua etimologia quale sia il rapporto tra la divinità e la vita dell’uomo. (shrink)

Il faut examiner le débat autour du stoïcisme de Montaigne. Les critiques qui ont vu le jour présentent un Montaigne qui s'intéresse à la philosophie, un humaniste qui essaie de survivre en des temps troublés et d'exercer son esprit pour s'affranchir des contraintes morales et sociales. Pourtant, si l'on regarde de plus près la construction et la genèse des Essais, on s'aperçoit que Montaigne continue d'étudier patiemment les textes anciens, et particulièrement les textes stroïciens, jusqu'à la fin de sa vie. (...) Il affirme que sa recherche est l'homme. Et, tout au long de cette recherche, se développe un dialogue entre Montaigne et lui-même, dans la mesure où son projet explicite est de se connaître. Cette position elle-même ne saurait se comprendre que dans un éclairage stoïcien : cette position du moi - Montaigne - qui débat avec l'homme - Montaigne pris dans l'Univers -, c'est celle où l'homme est Montaigne lui-même dans son rapport au cosmos, où cet « empire dans un empire » trop souvent rebattu se trouve dans la recherche de Montaigne étendu aux dimensions de l'univers. C'est cette persistance du stoïcisme, notamment de la rhétorique stoïcienne, qui anime et rend justice à l'oeuvre de Michel de Montaigne. (shrink)

Aus Anlass des 2400. Geburtstages von Aristoteles fand vom 7. bis 9. Januar 2016 an der Universität Heidelberg ein internationales Aristoteles-Symposium statt. Die gemeinsam vom Philosophischen Seminar' der Universität und vom 'Zentrum für historische Ontologie organisierte Veranstaltung eröffnete eine Reihe von insgesamt zehn Tagungen, die unter dem übergreifenden Titel 'Aristotle today - Aristoteles heute - Aristote aujourd'hui' standen und bis zum Januar 2017 in verschiedenen Ländern durchgeführt wurden. Der nun vorliegende Band mit Beiträgen der Auftaktveranstaltung in Heidelberg verfolgt das doppelte (...) Ziel, die Aktualität der aristotelischen Philosophie zu beleuchten und zugleich das aristotelische Werk im Kontext der antiken Philosophie zu situieren. Die Beiträge sind mehrheitlich in deutscher, aber auch englischer und französischer Sprache verfasst. Autoren*innen sind Thomas Buchheim, Roman Dilcher, Andrea Falcon, Dorothea Frede, Jens Halfwassen, Annette Hilt, Otfried Höffe, Anton Koch, Walter Mesch, Maria Protopapas-Marneli, Evanghelos Moutsopoulos, Christina Rossitto und Hans-Peter Schütt"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to argue for a position holding that epigenetic responsibility primarily should be a political and not an individual responsibility. Epigenetic is a rapidly growing research field studying regulations of gene expression that do not change the DNA sequence. Knowledge about these mechanisms is still uncertain in many respects, but main presumptions are that they are triggered by environmental factors and life style and, to a certain extent, heritable to subsequent generations, thereby reminding of aspects (...) of Lamarckism. Epigenetic research advances give rise to intriguing challenges for responsibility relations between the society and the individual. Responsibility is commonly understood in a backwards-looking manner, identifying causally responsible actors to blame for a bad outcome. If only a backwards-looking responsibility model is applied, epigenetics might give rise to arduous responsibility ascriptions to individuals for their health and the health of their future descendants. This would put heavy responsibility burdens on actors constrained by unequal social and economic structures. In contrast, a forward-looking responsibility notion takes account of structural conditions and pay attention to who is best placed to do something about conditions contributing to bad outcomes. A forward-looking responsibility notion would partly free disadvantaged individuals from responsibility, and identify actors with power and capacity to do something about structural factors constraining genuine choice. (shrink)

A Philosophy to Live By highlights Murdoch's distinctive conception of philosophy as a spiritual or existential practice and enlists the resources of her thought to explore a wide range of thinkers and debates at the intersections of moral philosophy, religion, art, and politics.

Our modern scientific explanation of colour as a subjective impression has replaced a ‘pre-theoretical’ notion of colour as an intrinsic property of objects, which was mainstream in ancient thought. Why have we lost such pre-theoretical notion, and what have we lost by losing it? I argue that most ancient Greek philosophers exploited this pre-theoretical assumption – one that was obvious to them – in terms and ways that are still worthy of attention in the context of contemporary philosophy of colour. (...) I offer an in-depth analysis of the theories of a number of early Greek philosophers, as well as of Plato in the Timaeus, showing that they tend to share the idea that colour is an essential property of external bodies and therefore plays a causal role in perception. Then I focus on a comparison between Democritus’ stance and Aristotle’s in order to highlight a significant contrast between the two. Democritus' theory is an exception in ancient thought because it traces the colour phenomenon back to a refraction of atmospheric light through atomic aggregates. Aristotle, instead, posits the presence of colour and light in the bodies themselves. Finally, I interpret Aristotle's account as the most complex attempt in ancient thought to weld together what we call the ‘manifest image’ of colour and its ‘scientific image’. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to argue for a position holding that epigenetic responsibility primarily should be a political and not an individual responsibility. Epigenetic is a rapidly growing research field studying regulations of gene expression that do not change the DNA sequence. Knowledge about these mechanisms is still uncertain in many respects, but main presumptions are that they are triggered by environmental factors and life style and, to a certain extent, heritable to subsequent generations, thereby reminding of aspects (...) of Lamarckism. Epigenetic research advances give rise to intriguing challenges for responsibility relations between the society and the individual. Responsibility is commonly understood in a backwards-looking manner, identifying causally responsible actors to blame for a bad outcome. If only a backwards-looking responsibility model is applied, epigenetics might give rise to arduous responsibility ascriptions to individuals for their health and the health of their future descendants. This would put heavy responsibility burdens on actors constrained by unequal social and economic structures. In contrast, a forward-looking responsibility notion takes account of structural conditions and pay attention to who is best placed to do something about conditions contributing to bad outcomes. A forward-looking responsibility notion would partly free disadvantaged individuals from responsibility, and identify actors with power and capacity to do something about structural factors constraining genuine choice. (shrink)

This special focus issue brings to the Journal of Religious Ethics fresh considerations of moral anthropology as practiced by four emergent voices within the field. Each of these essays, in varying ways, seeks not only to advance an understanding of ethics in a particular time, place, and context, but to draw our attention to shared aspects of the human condition: its discontinuities and fractures, its practices of perception and attention, its interplays of emotion, intuition, and reason, and its thoroughly intersubjective (...) nature. To learn something of Thai Buddhist life-worlds, contemporary Russian modes of being, or the experience of immorality in today's China, each essay argues in turn, is to gain new insight into ourselves. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze the role of science and technology studies journal editors in organizing and maintaining the peer review economy. We specifically conceptualize peer review as a gift economy running on perpetually renewed experiences of mutual indebtedness among members of an intellectual community. While the peer review system is conventionally presented as self-regulating, we draw attention to its vulnerabilities and to the essential curating function of editors. Aside from inherent complexities, there are various shifts in the broader political–economic (...) and sociotechnical organization of scholarly publishing that have recently made it more difficult for editors to organize robust cycles of gift exchange. This includes the increasing importance of journal metrics and associated changes in authorship practices; the growth and differentiation of the STS journal landscape; and changes in publishing funding models and the structure of the publishing market through which interactions among authors, editors, and reviewers are reconfigured. To maintain a functioning peer review economy in the face of numerous pressures, editors must balance contradictory imperatives: the need to triage intellectual production and rely on established cycles of gift exchange for efficiency, and the need to expand cycles of gift exchange to ensure the sustainability and diversity of the peer review economy. (shrink)

Certain emotional processes “bypass the will” and even awareness, whereas others arise due to the deliberative evaluation of objects, states, and events. It is important to differentiate between the automatic versus reflective origins of emotional processes, and sensory versus conceptual bases of diverse negative and positive emotions. A taxonomy of emotions based on different origins is presented. This taxonomy distinguishes between negative and positive automatic versus reflective emotions. The automatic emotions are connected with the (a) homeostatic and (b) hedonistic regulatory (...) mechanisms. The reflective emotions—uniquely human—are described in reference to deliberative processes and appraisals based on two types of conceptual and verbalized evaluative standards: (a) ideal self-standards and (b) general, axiological standards of good and evil. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam is one of the world’s leading philosophers. His highly original and often provocative ideas have set the agenda for a variety of debates in philosophy of science, philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. His now famous philosophical thought experiments, such as the ‘Twin earth’ and ‘the brains in the vat’ have become part of the established canon in philosophy and cognitive science. _Reading Putnam_ is an outstanding overview and assessment of Hilary Putnam’s work by a team of (...) international contributors, and includes replies by Putnam himself. Divided into clear sections, it contains chapters on key aspects of Putnam’s large body of writing, including: Scientific realism and the changes that Putnam’s thought has undergone on this topic analyticity and ontology, including the important interconnections between the views of Putnam and Quine Putnam’s arguments concerning externalist views of meaning and reference, questions of conceptual relativity, and his preoccupation with ethics through a denial of the fact–value dichotomy Putnam’s developing views on perception. Offering an excellent survey of Putnam’s work, _Reading Putnam_ is essential for those studying philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science, as well as for anyone interested in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

'Ethics' was not developed as a separate branch of philosophy in Buddhist traditions until the modern period, though Buddhist philosophers have always been concerned with the moral significance of thoughts, emotions, intentions, actions, virtues, and precepts. Their most penetrating forms of moral reflection have been developed within disciplines of practice aimed at achieving freedom and peace. This Element first offers a brief overview of Buddhist thought and modern scholarly approaches to its diverse forms of moral reflection. It then explores two (...) of the most prominent philosophers from the main strands of the Indian Buddhist tradition – Buddhaghosa and Śāntideva – in a comparative fashion. (shrink)

In South Asia, the period between 1100 and 1300 CE was a particularly prolific time for theorists from India's three main indigenous religions - Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism - to articulate their views on the face-to-face gift encounter. Their gift theories shaped a cosmopolitan sensibility that shared ethical and aesthetic values that reached across regional, sectarian, and religious boundaries. This book explores the ethical and social implications of unilateral gifts of esteem, offering a perceptive guide to the uniquely South Asian (...) contributors to theoretical work on the gift. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Philosophy of Emotion in Buddhist Philosophy (and a Close Look at Remorse and Regret)Maria HeimIt is an honor to guest-edit a special issue for the Journal of Buddhist Philosophy for its inaugural issue, and even more to be invited to write a somewhat longer article than is typically the privilege of the guest editor. It was thought that something of a broader statement of the state of (...) the field in this emerging subfield of philosophy might itself be useful in situating current work and aspirations for future endeavors.That the study of emotions in Buddhist philosophy is still in its infancy is somewhat surprising given that Buddhist texts offer 2,500 years of exceedingly fine-grained analyses and reflections on experience.1 It could be that scholars have been thrown off by the word "emotion" itself, given that the English term does not map easily onto Buddhist categories. No single term in any Buddhist language does exactly what "emotion" does. Of course, "emotion" does not map precisely onto premodern Western categories of experience (affections, passions, sentiments, and so on) either, and has a notably shallow history even in European contexts, dating in something like its current usage only to the early nineteenth century (see Dixon 2003 for this history). And if "emotion" fits only awkwardly with Buddhist categories, it should occasion no surprise that many of the debates and dichotomies preoccupying Western philosophy on emotions—is emotion affective or cognitive? Physical or mental? Socially constructed or universal? Are emotions feelings? Evaluations? Motivations?—ill fit the debates and discussions that Buddhist texts offer about experience. The modern [End Page 2] Western categories and terms of the discussion may well inhibit Buddhist philosophical participation in these debates.I have found that this predicament is best met by calling into question the putative universalism of the English term and the assumption that "emotion" names a natural or ontological category. Increasingly, philosophers and neuroscientists are casting doubt on the notion that emotion is a natural kind (Rorty 2004; Griffiths 2004; Barrett 2006, 2017). That emotion is not easy to distinguish from feelings, motives, moods, and propositional attitudes, and that lists of emotions, when elaborated, seem hardly to fall into a generic family of phenomena, suggesting that its boundaries and borders are not carved in nature. This has implications for how "emotions" are to be studied in the lab, as Lisa Feldman Barrett suggests; the natural-kind view "underlies the major questions, the experimental designs, and the interpretation of empirical findings that characterize emotion research as a domain of scientific inquiry," even while the empirical evidence increasingly suggests that this view is the "result of an error of arbitrary aggregation" (Barrett 2006). For reasons piling up in the empirical literature, it is coming to look less and less likely that the English term emotion carves nature at the joints.2This situation can help us shake free of "emotion" early on, even if we may not be able to part entirely with it. A special issue on "the philosophy of emotion" gestures toward the kinds of phenomena these papers take up, even if they vary in the extent to which they find "emotion" to be analytically useful when interpreting Buddhist texts. Indeed, stepping away from assumptions of English-language universalism clears the deck for looking at very different, but no less meticulous and reflective, ways of carving up experiences of the very sort we do get in Buddhist texts. The way forward, in my view, is to permit English words like emotion, affect, and feeling to open the door to the kinds of phenomena we might want to investigate. We can at the same time resist tightly defining what these English terms mean, defending the borders around them, or closely tethering Buddhist conceptions to them. Working with Buddhist categories and meta-categories suggests ways to treat experiences that are, from the ground up, different than the modern West. These in turn can interrupt its supposed universalism and offer fresh questions and interventions.For example, Emily McRae's paper in this issue on kleśas—dysfunctional mental states—offers a Buddhist intervention for how philosophers might reconfigure and aggregate experience differently... (shrink)

Nel 1488 Laura Cereta compone una lettera indirizzata a Bibulus Sempronius, al quale scrive una risposta indignata. Secondo Cereta, quest’uomo debole, spudorato e fuorviato non è in grado di riconoscere le virtù femminili; in più non è a conoscenza di importanti figure femminili prosperate in passato e non si mostra il doveroso rispetto nei confronti delle donne intellettuali. Per questi motivi, viene esaminata la difesa da parte dell’autrice delle capacità intellettuali diachroniche delle donne, nonché la contestualizzazione della comprensione e dell’integrazione (...) dei valori umanistici nella sua opera. Inoltre, Cereta sottolinea la necessità dell’educazione femminile e il diritto delle donne ad essere riconosciute intellettualmente uguali accanto agli uomini illustri. (shrink)

Drawing on a rich variety of Indian texts across multiple traditions, including Vedanta, Buddhist, Yoga and Jain, this collection explores how emotional experience is framed, evoked and theorized in order to offer compelling insights into human subjectivity. Rather than approaching emotion through the prism of Western theory, a team of leading Indian philosophers showcase the unique literary texture, philosophical reflections and theoretical paradigms that classical Indian sources provide in their own right. From solitude in the Saundarananda and psychosomatic theories of (...) disease in the Yogavasistha to female lament in Greek, Sinhala Buddhist and Sanskrit epic tales, their chapters reveal the range and diversity of the phenomena encompassing the English term 'emotion'. In doing so, they contribute towards a more cosmopolitan, comparative and pluralistic conception of human experience. Adopting a broad phenomenological methodology, this handbook reframes debates on emotion within classical Indian thought and is an invaluable resource for researchers and students seeking to understand the field beyond the Western tradition. (shrink)

This volume also includes "Metaphysics and Ethics," a classic essay by Iris Murdoch.

Aristocles of Messene is a first century AD Aristotelian philosopher who discusses the thought of ancient Greek philosophers, including Plato, Zeno, Pyrrho, and Epicurus, as well as Eleatic and Cyrenaic philosophies. His main contribution is his testimony on Pyrrhonism, and his political verve makes his On Philosophy an interesting and amusing read for specialists and non-specialists alike.

An overview of Hilary Putnam's engagement with pragmatism.

After a brief introduction about the problem of leopardian sources, I wish to introduce here a description of the diffusion of Addison’s theories about the Imagination in Italy at the time of Leopardi, trying to highlight their influence on his thinking and his philosophy. The third chapter is dedicated to the analysis of an important excerpt of the Zibaldone where Leopardi quotes Addison and his Catone to introduce an interesting reflection about the pleasure of beauty and the role of imagination, (...) almost as a way to face Addison issues.This excerpt represents an occasion to compare the theories of Addison and Leopardi about Aesthetics and also the similarities and the differences between them. The last part of the paper is dedicated to the results of the analysis and the conclusions. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo tiene como objetivo indagar si la mímesis ―o imitación― tal como la entiende René Girard (1923-2015), afecta el juicio ético ―o evaluación moral― de una acción que el ejecutivo realiza en la empresa. En la primera parte, se caracteriza el juicio ético de acuerdo con una revisión de la literatura de ética empresarial (2010-2020). En la segunda parte, se sintetiza cómo Girard explica la conformación de la sociedad a partir de la mímesis, una fuerza impulsora ambivalente que (...) se manifiesta en el deseo de ser como el otro y de diferenciarse del otro, el deseo de apropiarse de lo del otro y la rivalidad. En la tercera, se ilustran las ideas de Girard con ejemplos de la dinámica organizacional. En la cuarta y última parte, se realiza la discusión a fin de responder la pregunta de investigación. Se concluye que, si el sujeto decide no ejercer su capacidad de discernimiento, la mímesis ofrece elementos y oportunidades o bien para el autoengaño respecto de la moralidad y responsabilidad de una acción, o bien para la omisión del juicio ético individual. Abstract: This article aims to investigate whether mimesis ―or imitation― as understood by René Girard (1923-2015), affects the ethical judgment ―or moral evaluation― of an action that the executive performs in the company. First, this text offers a characterization of the ethical judgment according to the business ethics literature review (2010-2020). Second, this article provides a synthesis of Girard´s theory of mimetic desire. Girard conceived the mimesis as a main social driving force from which emerge both, the desire to be like the other and to differentiate from the other. This ambivalent and paradoxical force leads human beings to order and union, or to rivalry and revenge. Third, this inquiry illustrates Girard's ideas with examples of organizational dynamics. In the fourth and last part, the discussion leads to answering the research question. Study’s limitations are pointed out. This inquiry concludes that if the decision-making subject decides not to exercise his/her discernment and rather to remain in the mimesis' blindness, the executive will find elements and opportunities for self-deception or substitution of his/her own ethical judgment with others imitation. (shrink)

«Fortaleza» y «debilidad» son dos adjetivos que se han utilizado prolijamente en la literatura científica sobre institucionalismo para describir la permanencia o, por el contrario, la porosidad y maleabilidad de las reglas y principios rectores en los que están atrincheradas las instituciones que sobreviven en equilibrio y, por tanto, no son alteradas unilateralmente.

This article argues that citizens are responsible for the way they participate in political communication and debate, including for the quality of the pieces of information they post or disseminate on social media. This view contrasts with approaches that prioritise institutional responsibility in combating misleading information. Instead, in the article’s perspective, public and private institutional interventions are justified only when they aim at sustaining citizens in upholding their epistemic duties and contribute to an environment that facilitates responsible communicative exchanges.

It is presumed that there is an opposition between the spontaneous, discovered, personal and natural on the one hand, and the taught, imitated, adopted, and artificial, on the other. The opposition is manifested in different kinds of human activity and its products. It can be evaluated and provides a framework for several theories. It is accepted, for instance that, on the one hand, the most valuable are expressive experiences which harmonize with dispositions and sensitivity of man, and on the other, (...) those which are yielded by obtaining knowledge and expanding one’s culture. In artistic creativity inspiration, creativity, originality, and individual expression are the most respected factors but the meaning of a work and the use made of the available stock of creative means are also evaluated. Considering conception of man, the development of the pertinent dispositions which determine particular uniqueness of human individual, is highly estimated but the meaning of the consequences of socialization and education is as well stressed. If man confined himself to expressive acts only, the development of his personality would manifest just what he is. However, an adoption of the generally accepted external values implies a danger of the unauthentic and imitative life. The adoption of values of culture has to undergo in a specific process called internalization of values. But knowledge of values is not all that matters. They must be experienced and included into individual world, they must be accepted and adjusted to the personal traits of the individual. By internalization of values, what is alien to and inherited by man is transformed into a personal and essential element of his life, enriching him by new possibilities of unfolding dispositions of his nature. We apprehend man as ens per se: he becomes himself, due to his own activity, but essential substance of his personality is mode of objectively existing values. The article stresses the importance of activity and contact of man with reality, which constantly bring to light new possibilities of experiencing and acting. In the contact with the world man comes across the phenomena which are contrary to his natural inclinations: by adopting a conscious attitude to them and including them into accepted system of beliefs, he becomes enriched with new values. These oppositions provide a background to the construction of system of values in the world of man. (shrink)

The starting point of these reflections on the personality-creating function of moral examples is a differentiation between two concepts of man: one, which puts stress on the fact that human nature is predetermined and the man’s task is therefore to develop his talents and endowments in order to become a compete man, and the other, which emphasizes the fact that man is himself a specific and uniquely precious value, and thus he should endeavor to learn about himself and how he (...) should realize himself to his own image. In the first instance we have “an ethics of examples”, in the second, “an ethics of authenticity”. In the first case we have a man who creates himself, in the second, a man who is in search for himself. These two conceptions describe different attitudes toward the world and toward oneself. We can reach for their synthesis, however, if we assume that through the search for himself man creates himself, by finding out what his authentic intentions are, man creates himself, and thereby avoids petrification in the established schemes, functioning in social life. Thus he becomes a more valuable individual in his society. (shrink)