Technology is no longer confined to the laboratory but has become an established part of our daily lives. Its sophistication offers us power beyond our human capacity which can either dazzle or threaten; it depends who is in control. _Living in a Technological Culture_ challenges traditionally held assumptions about the relationship between `man-and-machine'. It argues that contemporary science does not shape technology but is shaped by it. Neither discipline exists in a moral vacuum, both are determined by politics rather than (...) scientific inquiry. By questioning our existing uses of technology, this book opens up wider debate on the shape of things to come and whether we should be trying to change them now. As an introduction to the philosophy of technology this will be valuable to students, but will be equally engaging for the general reader. (shrink)

Tolerance—though seen to be necessary on a world divided by deep differences—often strikes us as grudgingly given and resentfully received. Conceived more widely, however, tolerance can be seen to occupy the difficult, and contested, terrain between merely putting up with and accepting others.

For nearly a century and a half after his death, Jonathan Edwards remained America's greatest philosopher. His rigorous, systematic vision coupled with a synthetic, creative imagination were unrivalled until the appearance of that great triumvirate of pragmatic philosophers—C. S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey—at the close of the nineteenth century.

For nearly a century and a half after his death, Jonathan Edwards remained America's greatest philosopher. His rigorous, systematic vision coupled with a synthetic, creative imagination were unrivalled until the appearance of that great triumvirate of pragmatic philosophers—C. S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey—at the close of the nineteenth century.

Abstract Two conflicting visions of technology nevertheless agree that scientists and engineers bear little moral responsibility for their inventions. According to one vision, technology is largely autonomous,? that is, self?determinative operating according to its own blind laws independently of human will. According to the other, technology is fully controllable, but control rests solely with ?end?users? as technology is, in itself, value?neutral. After a brief characterization of the domain of technology, each vision of technology is criticized in turn. Despite the many (...) penetrating insights offered by the best exemplar of the first approach? Jacques Ellul?it is shown that his approach rests on unacceptable metaphysical and epis?temological assumptions: because it seemingly explains so much, it explains nothing; and it anthropomorphizes technology. Champions of the value neutrality thesis fail to sustain their argument because they overlook the ways in which various technologies embody the values of particular persons, institutions, or classes. Undermining these two prominent visions of technology opens the way for afresh consideration of the moral responsibilities of the creators and users of technology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:482 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY with Diderot, in 1773, did not generate any excitement on either side: Diderot found the philosopher far less interesting than the patroness; Hemsterhuis, for his part, thought Diderot in person a disappointment, after reading his works. I wish I could say that I found Hemsterhuis an exciting thinker, as he is presented in Moenkemeyer 's useful and informed study. I cannot. On the other hand, (...) this quiet philosopher from Holland stood at one of the great crossroads in the history of European thought. In his struggle against the Atheism he saw emerging from the French Enlightenment, in his stress on essences, known and unknown, as opposed to the atheistic concept of matter, in his doctrine of total personality rather than faculty psychology, in his idea of perfectibilityand the Golden Age that he likened to the afterlife--in these he had found a way out of the sterile impass confronting the disciples of Diderot and d'Holbach. In short, this is a figure of undeniable consequence historically, and he has been too long ignored by American students of philosophy. We should be grateful both to the author and to the publisher for making him known to us in this monograph, the first comprehensive study of Hemsterhuis ever published in English. WALTER E. REX University of California, Berkeley The Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary on Kant's "Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals." By Robert Paul Wolff. (New York: Harper & Row, 1975. Pp. x + 228. $12.50) The Autonomy of Reason reflects Wolff's determination to get out of Kant's system what is good and to get out of Kant's system for good. It thus burns with the conflicting passions of a devoted student who has learned much from a reserved teacher but who now finds it imperative to break with him for precisely the reasons that attracted him initially. This explains why much of the book reads like a declaration of independence yet is based on a sympathetic, even immanent, critique of Kant addressed to Wolff himself. Although he is addressing himself, others may share and will certainly benefit from Wolff's two decades of intense study of Kant. Without question Wolff has written a provocative and important book. Contrary to its title, however, it is not really about the autonomy of reason; and contrary to its subtitle, it is only partly a commentary on Kant's Groundwork. It serves, rather, as a propaedeutic to Wolff's own moral and political views. I believe this at least accounts for some of the puzzling features of the book: its highly personal nature, its style of philosophical commentary, and its devastating introduction. Wolff does not see his task as one of either historical exegesis or philosophical criticism. In the place of both Whiff proposes a "philosophical reconstruction" of the text. This is both desirable and necessary, he says, because "of all the great philosophers, there is none so rich in insights and so plagued by inconsistency as Kant" (p. 4). The resulting reconstruction will be worthwhile provided that affirmative answers can be given to two questions: "Does the interpretation developed here illuminate the text, so that at least some of what Kant says is clearer and more plausible in the light of it; and, more important still, does the interpretation result in an argument whose independent philosophical merit justifies the effort spent grappling with Kant?" (p. 5). A third question suggests itself: would Kant recognize himself as the author of the reconstructed text? This question one must answer in the negative, for the Groundwork that emerges, although certainly Kantian, does not accurately reflect Kantianism. To the extent that this is a criticism, it is so only because the book advertises itself as a commentary. In short, Wolff's book is similar to Strawson's Bounds of Sense in that the value of both lies in salvaging something of worth from the sunken hulk of Kantianism. Wolff's Introduction is particularly revealing, for it consists of a sustained attack on several BOOK REVIEWS 483 of Kant's central metaphysical claims, an attack which, if successful, undermines much of his ethics. As an introduction to a commentary, it prejudices the... (shrink)

We subject others and are ourselves subjected to risk all the time - risk permeates life. Despite the ubiquity of risk and its imposition, philosophers and legal scholars have devoted little of their attention to the difficult questions stimulated by the pervasiveness of risk. When we impose risk upon others, what is it that we are doing? What is risking's moral significance? What moral standards govern the imposition of risk? And how should the law respond to it? This book highlights (...) these important but neglected questions and offers novel answers to them in a systematic way, constructing a normative framework of risk imposition that draws upon a wide range of insights from diverse sources within philosophy and legal theory.Oxford Legal Philosophy publishes the best new work in philosophically-oriented legal theory. It commissions and solicits monographs in all branches of the subject, including works on philosophical issues in all areas of public and private law, and in the national, transnational, and international realms; studies of the nature of law, legal institutions, and legal reasoning; treatments of problems in political morality as they bear on law; and explorations in the nature and development of legal philosophy itself. The series represents diverse traditions of thought but always with an emphasis on rigour and originality. It sets the standard in contemporary jurisprudence. (shrink)

Beherrschten vor 20 Jahren noch Industriekonglomerate, Energiekonzerne und Banken die Rangliste der wertvollsten Unternehmen, wurden diese längst von Internetgiganten wie Google, Apple, Amazon und Tencent abgelöst. Digitale Technik ist allgegenwärtig: Wir tragen Hochleistungsrechner in unseren Taschen herum, Waschmaschinen können sich mit dem Internet verbinden. Doch erschöpft sich darin das Neue am digitalen Kapitalismus? 0Philipp Staab beleuchtet den digitalen Kapitalismus aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven, um ihn präziser auf den Begriff zu bringen. Er zeigt, wie digitale Überwachungs- und Bewertungspraktiken in immer mehr Bereiche (...) der Wirtschaft vordringen und dabei die soziale Ungleichheit verschärfen. Das Spezifische am digitalen Kapitalismus, so Staab, ist die Herausbildung 'proprietärer Märkte': Kam es früher darauf an, Dinge herzustellen und mit Gewinn zu verkaufen, geht es im Zeitalter der Unknappheit um das Eigentum an den Märkten selbst. (shrink)

Felix Kaufmanns Wissenschaftstheorie Hans-Georg Zilian. X KAUFMANN, DIE ÖKONOMEN UND DAS A PRIORI Bei den österreichischen Grenznutzentheoretikern, mit deren Arbeiten sich Kaufmann vor allem auseinandersetzte, ist von ...

ÖZ “Tanzanya’da Leibzig Misyoner Cemiyeti Misyonerliği, Karşılaşılan Zorluklar ve Kullanılan Yöntemler” isimli makale “Tanzanya’da Misyonerlik Faaliyetler Lutheran Kilise Örneği” isimli yüksek lisans tezine dayanmaktadır. Makale, Lutheran misyonerliğinin Tanzanya’da faaliyetlerine nasıl başladıkları, ilerleme yöntemleri ve karşılaşılan güçlükleri anlama noktasında önem arz etmektedir. Makalede ana konuya odaklanmadan önce, Tanzanya hakkında genel bir bilgilendirme yapılmış, ardından Leibzig Misyon Cemiyeti’nin (LMS) faaliyetlerine nasıl başladığı, kronolojik bir şekilde açmış olduğu istasyonlar, bu istasyonlarda karşılaşmış olduğu zorluklar ve kullanılan yöntemler hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Ayrıca, Tanzanya’da Lutheran misyoner (...) cemiyetlerinin, Tanzanya Evanjelik Lutheran Kilisesi (Tanzania Evangelical Lutheran Church in Tanzania) ELCT ile tek bir kilise çatı altında toplanması ele alınmıştır. Son olarak, ELCT’nin kabul etmiş olduğu ilkeler ve Martin Luther’in öğretilerinin Afrika’daki yansımaları üzerinde durulmuştur. Makale, sadece misyonerleri ve misyonerlik faaliyetlerini değil, ayrıca muhatap olunan ve yüzyıllardır sömürgeleştirilen Afrika halkını anlamamıza da yardımcı olmaktadır. Araştırma, Lutheran misyonerliğinin Tanzanya’da başlamış olduğu 19. yüzyıl sonu ve yoğunlaştığı 20. yüzyıl ile sınırlandırılmıştır. Otto von Bismarck’ın (1815-1898) katkılarıyla gerçekleşen Berlin Konferansı sayesinde, batılı ülkelerin bayrakları ile haçları da sömürge topraklarına girmiştir. Tanzanya'da Lutheran Misyon, Johann Ludwig Krapf (1810-1881) ve Johannes Rebmann'ın (1820-1876) CMS tarafından görevlendirilmeleri sonucu başlamıştır. LMS, CMS'den 1892 tarihinde görevi devralmıştır ve Machame, Mamba, Old Moshi, Pare, Meru'da faaliyet göstermiştir. Misyon faaliyetleri süresince, savaşlar, kıtlık ve salgın, çok eşlilik, sünnet uygulaması, tanrı anlayışı gibi birçok zorlukla karşılaşılmıştır. Zorluklar, onları ortadan kaldırmaya yardımcı olacak; eğitim, sağlık, bütüncül hizmet, ortak dil (lingua franca), Kutsal Kitap çevirileri, ev ziyaretleri, yerli yardımcılar ve yerlileştirme gibi yöntemleri de beraberinde getirmiştir. Tanzanya’da LMS dışında; Katolik Kutsal Ruh Babaları (Holy Ghost Father/ Spiritanlar), Katolik Beyaz Babalar (Peres Blancs), Katolik Benediktinler, Anglikan Kilise Misyon Topluluğu (Chuch Missionary Society) CMS, Anglikan Üniversitelerin Orta Afrika Misyonu (The Universities’ Mission to Central Africa) UMCA gibi misyon grupları mevcuttur. Tanzanya'da bulunan Lutheran Misyon toplulukları, Evanjelik Lüteriyen Kilisesi (ELCT) adı altında 1963 yılında tek bir çatı altında toplanmıştır. ELCT bugün 5,2 milyon üyesi ile Tanzanya nüfusu içinde hatırı sayılır bir yere sahiptir. Bu çalışmada, deskriptif yöntem kullanılmıştır. Ulaşılabilen tüm ilk kaynaklara inilerek Lutheran misyonerler ve Tanzanya hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Çalışmada Türkçe kaynaklara yer verilmekle birlikte yabancı kaynak kullanımına ve misyon topluluklarının bilinen kısaltmalarının kullanılmasına önem gösterilmiştir. Anahtar Kelimeler; Tanzanya, Hıristiyanlık, Misyonerlik, Lutheranizm, Leipzig Misyon Cemiyeti. (shrink)

What makes careless conduct careless is easily one of the deepest and most contested questions in negligence law, tort theory, and moral theory. Answering it involves determining the conditions that make the imposition of risk unjustifiable, wrong, or impermissible. Yet there is a still deeper as well as overlooked and undertheorized question: Why does subjecting others to risk of harm call for justification in the first place? That risk can be impermissibly imposed upon otherspresupposes that imposing risk is the kind (...) of thing that can be impermissible. Unless imposing risk can be impermissible after all, unjustified risking is literally impossible. In this discussion, I explore what I call the moral significance of risking, arguing that the moral significance of risking resides in a certain kind of nonmaterial autonomy interest that is implicated whenever one imposes risk of harm on another. (shrink)

It is the purpose of this article to make the positive case for an under-appreciated conception of rights: specified rights. In contrast to rights conceived generally, a specified right can stand against different behaviour in different circumstances, so that what conflicts with a right in one context may not conflict with it in another. The specified conception of rights thus combines into a single inquiry the two questions that must be answered in invoking the general conception of rights, identifying the (...) content of a right in light of what is justifiable to do under the circumstances. I present the case for specificationism in four sections, focusing on property rights. First, I argue that rights are based upon more fundamental reasons, and that this instrumentalism is compatible only with specificationism—a fact necessity cases illuminate. Next, I explain how specificationism embodies a fully moralized understanding of rights, and point to a dilemma that one faces in denying this. Third, I argue that the gap in property rights exposed in necessity cases entails that there is no right-based duty to compensate in such cases. Finally, I offer an error theory to explain the (false) attraction of the general conception of property rights. (shrink)

_Arguing about Law_ introduces philosophy of law in an accessible and engaging way. The reader covers a wide range of topics, from general jurisprudence, law, the state and the individual, to topics in normative legal theory, as well as the theoretical foundations of public and private law. In addition to including many classics, _Arguing About Law_ also includes both non-traditional selections and discussion of timely topical issues like the legal dimension of the war on terror. The editors provide lucid introductions (...) to each section in which they give an overview of the debate and outline the arguments of the papers, helping the student get to grips with both the classic and core arguments and emerging debates in: the nature of law legality and morality the rule of law the duty to obey the law legal enforcement of sexual morality the nature of rights rights in an age of terror constitutional theory tort theory. _Arguing About Law_ is an inventive and stimulating reader for students new to philosophy of law, legal theory and jurisprudence. (shrink)

Justice, equality, and righteousness—these are some of our greatest moral convictions. Yet in times of social conflict, morals can become rigid, making religious war, ethnic cleansing, and political purges possible. Morality, therefore, can be viewed as pathology-a rhetorical, psychological, and social tool that is used and abused as a weapon. An expert on Eastern philosophies and social systems theory, Hans-Georg Moeller questions the perceived goodness of morality and those who claim morality is inherently positive. Critiquing the ethical "fanaticism" of (...) Western moralists, such as Immanuel Kant, Lawrence Kohlberg, John Rawls, and the utilitarians, Moeller points to the absurd fundamentalisms and impracticable prescriptions arising from definitions of good. Instead he advances a theory of "moral foolishness," or moral asceticism, extracted from the "amoral" philosophers of East Asia and such thinkers as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Niklas Luhmann. The moral fool doesn't understand why ethics are necessarily good, and he isn't convinced that the moral perspective is always positive. In this way he is like most people, and Moeller defends this foolishness against ethical pathologies that support the death penalty, just wars, and even Jerry Springer's crude moral theater. Comparing and contrasting the religious philosophies of Christianity, Daoism, and Zen Buddhism, Moeller presents a persuasive argument in favor of amorality. (shrink)

The infringing/violating distinction, first drawn by Judith Jarvis Thomson, is central to much contemporary rights theory. According to Thomson, conduct that is in some sense opposed to a right infringes it, while conduct that is also wrong violates the right. This distinction finds a home what I call, borrowing Robert Nozick's parlance, a "moral space" conception of rights, for the infringing/violating distinction presupposes that, as Nozick puts it, "a line (or hyper-plane) circumscribes an area in moral space around an individual." (...) In this paper, I argue against the moral space conception of rights, and more specifically, against incorporating the infringing/violating distinction into a theory of rights. There are other compelling ways to think about rights and it is my goal to stimulate their exploration. (shrink)

Introduces contemporary American philosophy of technology through six of its leading figures. The six American philosophers of technology whose work is profiled in this clear and concise introduction to the field—Albert Borgmann, Hubert Dreyfus, Andrew Feenberg, Donna Haraway, Don Ihde, and Langdon Winner—represent a new, empirical direction in the philosophical study of technology that has developed mainly in North America. In place of the grand philosophical schemes of the classical generation of European philosophers of technology, the contemporary American generation addresses (...) concrete technological practices and the co-evolution of technology and society in modern culture. Six Dutch philosophers associated with Twente University survey and critique the full scope and development of their American colleagues’ work, often illustrating shifts from earlier to more recent interests. Individual chapters focus on Borgmann’s engagement with technology and everyday life; Dreyfus’s work on the limits of artificial intelligence; Feenberg’s perspectives on the cultural and social possibilities opened by technologies; Haraway’s conception of the cyborg and its attendant blurring of boundaries; Ihde’s explorations of the place of technology in the lifeworld; and Winner’s fascination with the moral and political implications of modern technologies. American Philosophy of Technology offers an insightful and readable introduction to this new and distinctly American philosophical turn. Contributors are Hans Achterhuis, Philip Brey, René Munnik, Martijntje Smits, Pieter Tijmes, and Peter-Paul Verbeek. (shrink)

Written in the 1960s, TRUTH AND METHOD is Gadamer's magnum opus. Looking behind the self-consciousness of science, he discusses the tense relationship between truth and methodology. In examining the different experiences of truth, he aims to "present the hermeneutic phenomenon in its fullest extent.

Hans Joas is one of the foremost social theorists in Germany today. Based on Joas’s celebrated study of George Herbert Mead, this work reevaluates the contribution of American pragmatism and European philosophical anthropology to theories of action in the social sciences. Joas also establishes direct ties between Mead’s work and approaches drawn from German traditions of philosophical anthropology. Joas argues for adding a third model of action to the two predominant models of rational and normative action—one that emphasizes the (...) creative character of human action. This model encompasses the other two, allowing for a more comprehensive theory of action. Joas elaborates some implications of his model for theories of social movements and social change and for the status of action theory in sociology in the face of competition from theories advanced by Luhmann and Habermas. The problem of action is of crucial importance in both sociology and philosophy, and this book—already widely debated in Germany—will add fresh impetus to the lively discussions current in the English-speaking world. (shrink)