Dans les années 1930, la phénoménologie est en France un courant philosophique encore relativement confidentiel. Il est vrai que certains jeunes philosophes gravitant autour de la revue philosophique d’avant- garde Recherches philosophiques s’y intéressent (Kojève, Sartre, Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty, Aron, etc.), que l’œuvre publiée de Husserl est connue des grands universitaires français, et qu’elle fait l’objet de lectures théologiques (Héring, Chestov, etc.), mais cela est sans commune mesur...

At Protagoras 353de, Socrates gives three possible reasons for calling some pleasures ‘wrong’. Scholarly attention has focused on the second of these, according to which pleasures are ‘wrong’ when they have negative consequences. This paper argues that the first reason corresponds to beliefs held by Democritus, among others; and that the third reason is the view adopted by Socrates in the dialogue.

In the fall of 2005, Mark C. Taylor, the controversial public intellectual and widely respected scholar, suddenly fell critically ill. For two days a team of forty doctors, many of whom thought he would not live, fought to save him. Taylor would eventually recover, but only to face a new threat: surgery for cancer. "These experiences have changed me in ways I am still struggling to understand," Taylor writes in this absorbing memoir. "After the past year, I am persuaded that (...) I have done enough fieldwork to write a book that combines philosophical and theological reflection with autobiographical narrative. Writing is not only possible but actually seems necessary." _Field Notes from Elsewhere_ is Taylor's unforgettable, inverted journey from death to life. Each of his memoir's fifty-two chapters and accompanying photographs recounts a morning-to-evening experience with sickness and convalescence, mingling humor and hope with a deep exploration of human frailty and, conversely, resilience. When we confront the end of life, Taylor explains, the axis of the lived world shifts, and everything must be reevaluated. As Taylor sorts through his remembrances, much that once seemed familiar becomes strange, paradoxical, and contradictory. He reads his experience with and against ghosts from his past, recasting the meaning of mortality, sacrifice, solitude, and abandonment, along with a host of other issues, in light of modern ways of dying. "You never come back from elsewhere," Taylor concludes, "because elsewhere always comes back with you.". (shrink)

Notes on the text and interpretation of passages in Plutarch's Life of Alexander.

In a recent article, Mario Günther presented a conditional that is claimed to be connexive. The aim of this short discussion note is to show that Günther’s claim is not without problems.

An assertion is existentially known if and only if: (i) the speaker knows that the sentence she uses to make the assertion expresses a true proposition; (ii) she makes the assertion based on that knowledge; and (iii) she does not believe, have justification for, or know the proposition asserted. Accordingly, if existentially known assertions could be made correctly—as argued by Charlie Pelling in his ‘Assertion and the Provision of Knowledge’—this would show that the norm of assertion cannot be the speaker's (...) belief in, justification for or knowledge of the proposition. In this paper, I try to show that Pelling's argument is inconclusive, as it rests on two assumptions which can be resisted. In turn, I offer a pair of alternative strategies to explain how we can deal with existentially known assertions under the assumption that the speaker's knowledge is the norm of assertion. (shrink)

It is a well known empirical observation that natural axiomatic theories are pre-well-ordered by consistency strength. For any natural theory $T$, the next strongest natural theory is $T+\mathsf{Con}_T$. We formulate and prove a statement to the effect that the consistency operator is the weakest natural way to uniformly extend axiomatic theories.