ABSTRACTPhilosophers and scholars from other disciplines have long discussed the role of empathy in our moral lives. The distinct relational value of empathy, however, has been largely overlooked. This article aims to specify empathy’s distinct relational value: Empathy is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable in virtue of the pleasant experiences we share with others, the harmony and meaning that empathy provides, the recognition, self-esteem, and self-trust it enhances, as well as trust in others, attachment, and affection it fosters. Once we (...) better understand in what ways empathy is a uniquely relational phenomenon, we can unveil its relevance to morality, which avoids the strictures of both partiality and impartiality. On the one hand, it is the relational value of empathy that grounds defeasible reasons to empathize insofar as empathy is morally called for by a particular relationship. On the other hand, it is precisely... (shrink)

Colleagues are not only an integral part of many people’s lives; empirical research suggests that having a good relationship with one’s colleagues is the single most important factor for being happy at work. However, so far, no one has provided a comprehensive account of what it means to be a colleague. To address this lacuna, we have conducted both an empirical as well as theoretical investigation into the content and structure of the concept ‘colleague.’ Based on the empirical evidence that (...) we present in this paper, we argue that ‘colleague’ is a dual character concept that has both a descriptive and a normative basis for categorization. Its descriptive dimension is characterized by three features, according to which two people are colleagues if they work for the same institution and know each other, or if they work for the same institution and work in the same field. An independent normative dimension is revealed, which shows that, as colleagues, we are expected to fulfill substantial normative expectations. Understanding the expectations that are encoded in the very structure of this concept is crucial to lay the groundwork for an ethics of collegiality. (shrink)

Although collegial relationships are among the most prevalent types of interpersonal relationships in our lives, they have not been the subject of much philosophical study. In this paper, we take the first step in the process of developing an ethics of collegiality by establishing what qualifies two people as colleagues and then by determining what it is that gives value to collegial relationships. We argue that A and B are colleagues if both exhibit sameness regarding at least two of the (...) following three features: the same work content or domain of activity; the same institutional affiliation or common purpose; and/or the same status or level of responsibility. Moreover, we describe how the potential value of collegial relationships is grounded in the relationship goods that two colleagues have reason to generate qua colleagues, namely, collegial solidarity and collegial recognition. Two interesting conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis are that one has to be proficient at one’s work if one is to be considered a good colleague and that we are also more likely to be better colleagues if we regard the work we do as valuable. Finally, we draw special attention to the working conditions that are conducive to the generation of good collegial relationships and suggest some policies to promote them. (shrink)

To show affective empathy is to share in another person's experiences, including her emotions. Most philosophers who write about emotions accept the broadly cognitivist view that emotions are rationally connected with beliefs. We argue that affective empathy is also rationally connected with belief; you can only share in another's emotions insofar as you can share certain of her beliefs. In light of that claim, we argue that affective empathy brings both epistemic dangers and epistemic benefits, that the ideal of universal (...) empathy cannot be built upon affective empathy, and that affective empathy cannot be the basis of morality. (shrink)

In his Metaphysics of Morals (particularly in the Doctrine of Virtue), but also in other late works, Kant extends and refines the content of his earlier works on ethics (Groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason) to a considerable extent. These revisions and extensions not only show the limitations of an exclusive interpretation of Kants ethics as a deontological ethics of principles. His thoughts are also relevant for a large number of questions of theoretical morality currently under discussion. Thus, the distinction (...) drawn in the Doctrine of Virtue between perfect and imperfect obligations informs the problem of the solvability of moral conflicts and the role of supererogatory actions. Kant goes further into the question of what it means to be a good person, what moral significance is contained in close human ties such as friendship, and what role is played by happiness and the so-called obligations towards oneself. The papers each discuss Kants central ideas in the context of his earlier writings, but also within the context of our contemporary ethical debates. Thus attention is drawn to the significance and possible extent of an ethics of virtue understood in the Kantian sense. (shrink)

Humans have a fundamental need to belong. This, need, as Kimberley Brownlee argues in her book Being Sure of Each Other grounds the human right against social deprivation. But in addition to having a human right against social deprivation, we also have a right to associational freedom, which is grounded in our right to autonomy. We cannot be forced into relationships; we are free to choose our friends and loved ones.? In this paper I discuss what our right to associational (...) freedom morally permits us to do when are already in an intimate relationship and, relatedly, what our relationship-dependent duties require of us in such cases. What exactly are the constraints on our right to associational freedom? And what is the content and scope of our relationship-dependent duties, given that our right to associational freedom conflicts with the fulfillment of these duties?? After providing some clarifications as to how we should understand intimate relationships that have ended, I will first highlight what relationship-dependent duties are and how they correlate with a right to associational control. I will then discuss several break-up scenarios, the aim of which is to determine the conditions that justify constraints being imposed on the right to associational freedom and to delineate the scope of relationship-dependent duties. (shrink)

Actions expressing emotions (such as caressing the clothes of one's dead friend in grief, or tearing apart a photograph out of jealousy) pose a notorious challenge to action theorists. They are thought to be intentional in that they are in some sense under the agent's control. They are not thought to be done for a reason, however, because they cannot be explained by considerations that favor them from the agent's point of view. This seems to be the case, at least, (...) if one subscribes to the Davidsonian standard model of action explanation. So far, philosophers have had three different reactions to this challenge. Rationalists insist that such actions can be rationalized by re-interpreting them. Arationalists insist that there simply is no reasoning process moving agents in emotional states to act. A third reaction questions the intentionality of such actions altogether. All three reactions, however, share the assumption underlying the standard account: if an agent is thought to act for a reason - and hence acts intentionally - he must entertain a desire and some means-end belief reflecting his reasoning process about how to attain what he desires by acting. In this paper, I try to show that this reflective reasoning mechanism is only one way to rationalize an action. Another way is by tracing an action to an unreflective valuing stance respresenting reasons the agent has from his point of view. Emotions are attitudes that help to grasp reasons the agent has. Since emotions come with a strong motivational potential they move the agent to act expressively. But the agent typically allows himself to do so, thereby monitoring the way in which he does it. To the extent that the agent unreflectively acts on a motive that is itself representative of his point of view, his expressive actions can be regarded as rationalizable. (shrink)

Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.

Actions expressing emotions pose a notorious challenge to those concerned with the rational explanation of action. The standard view has it that an agent's desires and means‐end beliefs rationally explain his actions, in the sense that his desire‐belief conglomerates are seen as reasons for which he acts. In light of this view, philosophers are divided on the question of whether actions expressing emotions fall short of being rational, or whether the standard model simply needs to be revised to accommodate them (...) as rational. In this paper, I will show that a core class of actions expressing emotions can be explained as rational, yet not within the framework of the standard model. Instead, such actions can be thought of as grounded in reasons provided by the evaluative perspective that an agent has acquired over time, and by which he has come to identify himself. What moves him to act expressively is the fact that he faces rational pressure to revise or re‐affirm his ongoing evaluative perspective in light of changes in his environment that call that very perspective into question. Such expressive actions serve the function of helping the agent re‐adapt to the environment and re‐establish coherence within his evaluative perspective so as to avoid inner division. (shrink)

Practical conflicts pervade human life. Agents have many different desires, goals, and commitments, all of which can come into conflict with each other. How can practical reasoning help to resolve these practical conflicts? In this collection of essays a distinguished roster of philosophers analyse the diverse forms of practical conflict. Their aim is to establish an understanding of the sources of these conflicts, to investigate the challenge they pose to an adequate conception of practical reasoning, and to assess the degree (...) to which that challenge can be met. These essays will serve as a major resource for students of philosophy but will also interest students and professionals in related fields of the social sciences such as psychology, political science, sociology and economics. (shrink)

Actions expressing emotions pose a notorious challenge to those concerned with the rational explanation of action. The standard view has it that an agent's desires and means‐end beliefs rationally explain his actions, in the sense that his desire‐belief conglomerates are seen as reasons for which he acts. In light of this view, philosophers are divided on the question of whether actions expressing emotions fall short of being rational, or whether the standard model simply needs to be revised to accommodate them (...) as rational. In this paper, I will show that a core class of actions expressing emotions can be explained as rational, yet not within the framework of the standard model. Instead, such actions can be thought of as grounded in reasons provided by the evaluative perspective that an agent has acquired over time, and by which he has come to identify himself. What moves him to act expressively is the fact that he faces rational pressure to revise or re‐affirm his ongoing evaluative perspective in light of changes in his environment that call that very perspective into question. Such expressive actions serve the function of helping the agent re‐adapt to the environment and re‐establish coherence within his evaluative perspective so as to avoid inner division. (shrink)

Frankfurt verteidigt die Auffassung, daB ,,x hatte anders handeln konnen" keine not- wendige Bedingung fiir Freiheit und Verantwortlichkeit ist. ...

Autonomie bezeichnet im Allgemeinen die Fähigkeit, sich selbst zu bestimmen und sein Verhalten oder Leben nach eigenen Regeln, Zielen oder Werten zu führen. Dazu gehören u. a. die Vorstellung von Selbstkontrolle, von Unabhängigkeit, vom eigenen Willen sowie die Idee, eine mündige, selbstständige und authentische Person zu sein, die frei von äußeren Beschränkungen und inneren Zwängen ist.

De acuerdo con una concepción muy extendida, una persona tiene una voluntad débil cuando actúa libre e intencionalmente en contra de su juicio acerca de lo que es mejor. De esta concepción puede distinguirse una alternativa según la cual una persona tiene una voluntad débil cuando actúa en contra de..

Die Frage nach dem Wert der Kindheit lässt sich prinzipiell in zwei verschiedenen Weisen verstehen. Zum einen geht es darum herauszufinden, ob und in welcher Hinsicht es gut oder schlecht ist, ein Kind zu sein. Das Interesse gilt daher dem speziellen oder distinkten Wert, welcher der Kindheit etwa im Unterschied zum Erwachsensein zukommt. Zum andern wird untersucht, ob und wenn ja, inwiefern Kindheit als erste Phase menschlicher Entwicklung ein wertvoller Teil eines guten Lebens ist und wie dieser genauer gefasst werden (...) kann. Hierbei liegt der prudentielle Wert von Kindheit im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit. (shrink)

Bis vor wenigen Jahren hätte ein Beitrag zur Familienethik mit einem Hinweis darauf begonnen, dass es sich dabei um ein philosophisches Forschungsdesiderat handelt. In der Zwischenzeit hat sich die Situation merklich verändert: Zahlreiche Sammelbände, Monographien und Aufsätze zeugen davon, dass sich die Familienethik zunehmender Beachtung erfreut und die Beziehung zwischen Eltern und Kindern ebenso wie die Rechte und Pflichten von Eltern und Kindern untereinander eine eingehendere Analyse verdienen. In dieser Einleitung werden einige gesellschaftliche und innerphilosophische Entwicklungen skizziert, die zur zunehmenden (...) Beachtung der Familienethik geführt haben. Darüber hinaus wird ein Überblick über die Beiträge des Schwerpunktes gegeben. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine how an agent can cause and rationally guide his actions. A common approach explains an action by the agent's motives which cause and rationalize it. Given the fact that an agent does not always identify with the motives that propel him to action, the common approach does not account for an agent's autonomy in his acting. Consequently, I focus on the question whether an agent can rationally guide his action such that he controls his action (...) by his own causal powers without being just moved to it. In this endeavour, Harry Frankfurt's more recent work in which he tries to specify recalcitrant dispositions like "caring" as conditions of autonomy, and hence as conditions of an action's rational guidance, will serve me as a case in point. (shrink)

Gemeinsame Handlungen werden traditionellerweise über eine Form beziehungsweise über eine Beziehung verschiedener Absichten zueinander erklärt. Der Aufsatz verteidigt die Auffassung, dass manche gemeinsame Handlungen vollständiger erklärt werden können mit Rekurs auf die bestimmten interpersonellen Beziehungen, die zwischen zwei oder mehreren Handelnden bestehen. Interpersonelle Beziehungen, die von handelnden Personen wertgeschätzt werden, werden durch gemeinsame Handlungen realisiert. Dies ist allerdings nur dann der Fall, wenn die Handelnden in ihrem gemeinsamen Handeln zum Ausdruck bringen, dass sie auch die Beziehung zum Teil um ihrer (...) selbst willen wertschätzen. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 6, pp 641 - 651 During the last three decades, moral philosophy has seen an increased interest in the ethics of special relationships. The relationship that has gained the most attention in recent years is the family. While there has been some progress in understanding family relationships and their ethical implications, there is still much theoretical ground to cover. In this special issue of the Journal of Moral Philosophy, we present four papers that discuss new (...) questions concerning the rights and duties that are implied by the relationship between parents and children. These include the question whether persons have a right to parent their biological offspring, or a duty to adopt a child, rather than create one; under which circumstances dependent children owe their parents gratitude for the care they provide; and how family relationships can lead to moral blackmailing and thus to moral exploitation of some of their members. (shrink)