This short essay explores the importance of fear and violence in the genesis and life of constitutions, with a particular focus on the case of secession. Secession has been seen as a taboo and until recently constitutions tried to avoid mentioning it, considering such a phenomenon as an extra legal fact. A turning point has been represented by the famous Reference of the Canadian Supreme Court on Québec. Finally, in the last part of this work I shall try to present (...) some arguments in favour of the explicit constitutionalization of a secession clause in multi-national federalisms. (shrink)

This study investigates the acquisition of integrated object manipulation and categorization abilities through a series of experiments in which human adults and artificial agents were asked to learn to manipulate two-dimensional objects that varied in shape, color, weight, and color intensity. The analysis of the obtained results and the comparison of the behavior displayed by human and artificial agents allowed us to identify the key role played by features affecting the agent/environment interaction, the relation between category and action development, and (...) the role of cognitive biases originating from previous knowledge. (shrink)

Das Buch enthält die Einführung in die Lektüre sowie den Textkommentar zu den der Analyse der Grundsätze der Modalität gewidmeten "Postulaten des empirischen Denkens überhaupt". Untersucht wird Kants gesamte Theorie der Modalbegriffe (Möglichkeit - Unmöglichkeit, Dasein - Nichtsein, Notwendigkeit - Zufälligkeit) seit Mitte der 1750er Jahre bis zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Die Postulate sind nach Kant nicht objektiv, sondern subjektiv-synthetisch: Der Gegenstand der Erfahrung, welcher zunächst anhand der objektiv-synthetischen Funktionen der Quantität, Qualität und Relation bestimmt wird, lässt sich nun (...) in seinem Verhältnis zum setzenden Subjekt betrachten. Die Postulate thematisieren jedoch nicht - hier liegt die konstitutive Charakteristik dieser synthetischen Urteile a priori - das Subjekt selbst, sondern das Objekt als solches und die Objektivität überhaupt. Wie diese Untersuchung zeigt, antwortet Kant erst hier - nicht in den viel diskutierten Deduktionskapiteln oder in den anderen Grundsatzkapiteln - auf die Frage "Was ist ein Objekt?" und bezieht zugleich Stellung gegenüber anderen philosophischen Theorien der Objektivität des 18. Jahrhunderts: Rationalismus, Empirismus, Idealismus, Skeptizismus. (shrink)

Focused sequent calculi are a refinement of sequent calculi, where additional side-conditions on the applicability of inference rules force the implementation of a proof search strategy. Focused cut-free proofs exhibit a special normal form that is used for defining identity of sequent calculi proofs. We introduce a novel focused display calculus fD.LG and a fully polarized algebraic semantics FP.LG\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbb {FP.LG}$$\end{document} for Lambek–Grishin logic by generalizing the theory of multi-type calculi and their (...) algebraic semantics with heterogenous consequence relations. The calculus fD.LG has strong focalization and it is sound and complete w.r.t. FP.LG\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbb {FP.LG}$$\end{document}. This completeness result is in a sense stronger than completeness with respect to standard polarized algebraic semantics, insofar as we do not need to quotient over proofs with consecutive applications of shifts over the same formula. We also show a number of additional results. fD.LG is sound and complete w.r.t. LG-algebras: this amounts to a semantic proof of the so-called completeness of focusing, given that the standard (display) sequent calculus for Lambek–Grishin logic is complete w.r.t. LG-algebras. fD.LG and the focused calculus fLG of Moortgat and Moot are equivalent with respect to proofs, indeed there is an effective translation from fLG-derivations to fD.LG-derivations and vice versa: this provides the link with operational semantics, given that every fLG-derivation is in a Curry–Howard correspondence with a directional λ¯μμ~\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\overline{\lambda }\mu \widetilde{\mu }$$\end{document}-term. (shrink)

In the present paper, we endow semi De Morgan logic and a family of its axiomatic extensions with proper multi-type display calculi which are sound, complete, conservative, and enjoy cut elimination and subformula property. Our proposal builds on an algebraic analysis of the variety of semi De Morgan algebras, and applies the guidelines of the multi-type methodology in the design of display calculi.

In the first part of this paper I critically examine some of the main interpretations of “classical” Yogācāra philosophy of Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Among these interpretations, based on extant textual and contextual data, I consider philologically unlikely both metaphysical-idealistic readings, which ascribe to these authors the view that ultimate reality is a mental or subjective stuff, and epistemological-idealistic readings which advocate that either Yogācāra suspends judgment on the existence of the extramental or that it maintains that the extramental exists (...) in itself and ultimately. Instead, I consider more likely the thesis that classical Yogācāra upholds an epistemological idealism that, while admitting epistemological priority of the mental over the extramental, rules out the ultimate existence of both the former and the latter. This exclusion, however, does not amount to the exclusion of every metaphysics, but rather to the adoption of a metaphysics of emptiness conceived, in fact, as absence of the mental/extramental dichotomy. In the second part of the paper this reading of classical Yogācāra is compared with the interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy that I elsewhere called “realistic antimetaphysical”, and I reach the conclusion that, while with respect to epistemology between early Madhyamaka and classical Yogācāra there is continuity, regarding metaphysics these two schools are deeply distinct and discontinuous: while Nāgārjuna conceives of emptiness as an extinction of any metaphysical view, Yogācāra emptiness actually presents itself as a metaphysical point of view. (shrink)

This work suggests how much human sciences can learn from a booklet almost all cultures know, The Little Prince. It stimulates to read them in their anthropological aspects of behavior facing alterity, highlighting its value without proposing it as educational element to homogenize the different. The reflection is thus focused on the demolishing and lasting effects of European culture during its colonization of American and African people. The contribution ends with Ferraioli and De Vitoria's considerations on a society based on (...) the axiom of the free circulation of men and goods, and the legitimization of thinking given by natural law. (shrink)

Premessa p.9 Capitolo I: Identità ebraica e nuovo pensiero p.13 Capitolo II: Qohelet nel “nuovo pensiero” p.81 Capitolo III: Etica e politica: un dialogo tra religioni? p. 149 Capitolo IV: Dal trascendentalismo all’esteriorità: fondazione etica della maestria p.207 Capitolo V: Dal primato della politica al primato dell’etica p.245 Capitolo VI: Emmanuel Lévinas: per una trascendenza non idolatrica p.287 Capitolo VII: Dall’umanismo dei superbi all’umanismo dell’altro uomo p.231.

Contrary to the fairly standard view of Aquinas on temperance according to which this virtue habituates the concupiscible appetite to move in ways that accord with reason spontaneously, that is, independently of any immediate command from reason, the author of this paper argues that temperance is a virtue which "(1) disposes the concupiscible appetite to remain more or less still in the absence of any command from reason to move, thus preventing vehement, spontaneous passions of any sort, ordinate or inordinate, (...) from arising in the concupiscible appetite prior to reason's immediate command; and (2) also disposes the concupiscible appetite to obey reason's command so that a person may incite, increase, decrease, or curb a passion as needed." The paper ends by noting a lacuna in Aquinas's teaching on temperance. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine that to which Plato alludes. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is histori­cally very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing the Phaedo: a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, (...) this paper will investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes’ denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo, given that the latter work in all prob­ability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study is divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called “second navigation” emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain “common opinions” are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which – as is argued – must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7–8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denominative logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called “final argument.” Here, Antisthenes’ presence seems somewhat more nuanced, given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immor­tality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attrib­utes, the differences and their opposites, and the opposites of opposites. (shrink)

Our paper is concerned with theories of direct perception in ecological psychology that first emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. Ecological psychology continues to be influential among philosophers and cognitive scientists today who defend a 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) approach to the scientific study of cognition. Ecological psychologists have experimentally investigated how animals are able to directly perceive their surrounding environment and what it affords to them. We pursue questions about direct perception through a discussion of (...) the ecological psychologist’s concept of affordances. In recent years, psychologists and philosophers have begun to mark out two explanatory roles for the affordance concept. In one role, affordances are cast as belonging to a shared, publicly available environment, and existing independent of the experience of any perceiving and acting animal. In a second role, affordances are described in phenomenological terms, in relation to an experiencing animal that has its own peculiar needs, interests and personal history. Our aim in this paper is to argue for a single phenomenological or experiential understanding of the affordance concept. We make our argument, first of all, based on William James’ concept of pure experience developed in his later, radical empiricist writings. James thought of pure experience as having a field structure that is organized by the selective interest and needs of the perceiver. We will argue however that James did not emphasize sufficiently the social and intersubjective character of the field of experience. Drawing on the phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch, we will argue that psychological factors like individual needs and attention must be thought of as already confronted with a social reality. On the phenomenological reading of affordances we develop, direct perception of affordances is understood as taking place within an intersubjective world structured by human social and cultural life. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is not so much to show the presence of Antisthenes in the dialogue, but rather to examine what Plato alludes to. The controversy over ideas between the two Socratics is historically very well-attested, as can already be seen in the Cratylus. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that this controversy must have affected Plato when he was writing a dialogue in which the importance of ideas and his new logic is undeniable. Hence, this paper will (...) investigate the following question: what impact could Antisthenes’ denominative and definitory logic have on the equally denominative and definitory logic presented in the Phaedo given that the latter work in all probability preceded the Sathōn? In light of what is said in the dialogue, the answer focuses primarily on what would not be said. Thus, this study has been divided into two parts: Part one shows how the so-called “second navigation” emerges as an objection to the insufficiency of the responses given by the physiologists. Tellingly, certain “common opinions” are regarded as perplexing and individuals holding them are referred to with the indeterminate tis, which – as is argued – must have included Antisthenes. Indeed, Tht. 108c7–8 reports the latter to have made common opinions a cornerstone of his denomi­native logic. Part two, on the other hand, is devoted to examining the so-called “final argument.” Here, Antisthenes’ presence seems some­what more nuanced given his incomplete knowledge of the new logic of irreversible opposites which was worked out by Plato for the purpose of demonstrating the immortality and indestructibility of the soul. On the other hand, Antisthenes is likely to have prompted Plato to specify the relationship between ideas and things in the definitory logic, since the proponent of the theory of oikeios logos refused to distinguish between the substance and its attributes, the differences and its opposites as well as the opposites of opposites. (shrink)

En la autobiografía viquiana el relato es precisamente la puesta en obra del tiempo, el tiempo se vuelve el protagonista absoluto de la narración a través de la continua remisión dialógica entre el tiempo de la escritura y el tiempo de la vida.In Vico's autobiography, the tale is precisely the narration of time. This way, time becomes the absolute protagonist of the narration, through the continuous dialogical connection between the time of the writing and the time of life.

We informally discuss some recent results on the incompleteness of formal systems. These theorems, which are of great importance to contemporary mathematical epistemology, are proved using a variety of conceptual tools provably stronger than those of finitary axiomatisations. Those tools require no mathematical ontology, but rather constitute particularly concrete human constructions and acts of comprehending infinity and space rooted in different forms of knowledge. We shall also discuss, albeit very briefly, the mathematical intelligence both of God and of computers. We (...) hope in this manner to help the reader overcome formalist reductionism, while avoiding naive Platonist ontologies, typical symptoms of Godelitis which affected many in the last seventy years. (shrink)

Este estudio analiza el problema de la relación entre metafísica e historia en la filosofía viquiana, y cómo ésta es capaz de reconducir el certum al verum. Plantea el autor cómo Vico mantiene unidos los modelos racionales, posibilitando un universalismo ético que permite conjugar la normatividad del juicio universal y la diferencia histórico-cultural de lo individual.PALABRAS CLAVE: Vico, ética, universalismo ético, identidad, diferencia, historicidad.The problematic relationship between metaphysics and history in Vichian philosophy is here analysed –and the way it transforms (...) certum into verum. The author considers Vico’s attempts to keep rational models together, allowing the appearance of an ethical universalism that combines universal judgment normativity and historical-cultural difference of the individual.Keywords: Vico, ethics, ethical universalism, identity, difference, historicity. (shrink)

La differenza tra i concetti di sa?s?ra e nirv??a stabilita dal Buddha (VI-V sec. a.C.) nel suo primo sermone sembra essere messa in discussione dall’equiparazione dei due termini effettuata da N?g?rjuna (II sec. d.C.) in un passaggio-chiave delle sue MK2. Questo articolo, in primo luogo, difende la tesi che la contraddizione sia soltanto apparente e che la relazione, di differenza o di identità, tra le due dimensioni dipende dal registro filosofico, rispettivamente epistemologico e ontologico, usato – in entrambi i casi (...) per finalità soteriologiche – dal Buddha e da N?g?rjuna. In secondo luogo, cercheremo di provare che, in ogni caso, l’ontologia di N?g?rjuna, lungi dall’essere una novità filosofica o un’evoluzione rispetto al pensiero del fondatore del buddhismo è, al contrario, una delle possibili applicazioni della dottrina del non-sé (an?tma-v?da) – probabilmente il contributo più importante e originale del pensiero buddhista alla storia della filosofia universale – esposta dal Buddha nel suo secondo sermone. (shrink)

Sezione 1. Sullo sviluppo del concetto di creazione. L'idealismo magico. Creation, idealism and a new aestheicism.--sezione 2. Estetismo assoluto-una teoria della scienza. Coscienza ed energia-sul problema del rapporti tra psicologia e fiscia. Le monde n'est-il qu' un rêve? Vie et esthéticité. Aestetismus und der Ernst des Lebens (aus zwei Briefen).