ObjectivesA growing number of studies indicate that coping with the experience of a crisis event, which causes a breach in the individual’s fundamental beliefs regarding the world and his/her place in it, can result in posttraumatic growth. Positive emotions can have an undoing effect on negative emotional arousal and broaden an individual’s scope of action, and they can foster posttraumatic growth. This study aimed to examine relations between prioritizing positivity, styles of rumination, coping strategies, and posttraumatic growth.MethodsOne hundred and sixty-four (...) Polish adults took part in the study, filling out questionnaires to measure prioritizing positivity, hope, and self-efficacy. Twelve to fifteen months later, 104 of them accepted the invitation to the second part of the study. The participants reported the intensity of rumination associated with the most critical event in their lives, which took place between the first and second stages of the study and the coping strategies they used. Posttraumatic growth and life satisfaction were also measured.ResultsResults from hierarchical regressions found that higher levels of prioritizing positivity, deliberate ruminations, and religious coping and lower level of intrusive ruminations were associated with posttraumatic growth. The results also indicate that self-esteem was a significant predictor of life satisfaction.ConclusionsThe results of the prospective study confirm that individual differences in prioritizing positivity can relate to a process of posttraumatic growth. Prioritizing positivity was associated with the use of an active coping strategy and deliberate but not intrusive ruminations. Previous studies on the role of prioritizing positivity have focused on the impact on the level of wellbeing of seeking positive emotions in everyday life. Our results show the importance of prioritizing positivity in coping with stress and trauma. These results can be used to design effective psychological intervention techniques to support people experiencing trauma and psychological crises. The results also indicate that life satisfaction has different predictors from posttraumatic growth. (shrink)

The aim of the study was to verify the hypothesis that positive affective tone of narratives is connected to the experience of posttraumatic growth among transplant patients. Kidney transplant patients and liver transplant patients participated in the study. In the first stage, about 10 weeks after transplant, the participants told two stories about important, freely chosen events from their lives. During the second meeting 10-12 months later we measured posttraumatic growth. Results indicated that the affective tone of narratives about past (...) events was associated with the level of post-traumatic growth measured 10-12 months later. This proves that the affective tone of narratives about life, understood as a relatively constant individual characteristic, promote posttraumatic growth. (shrink)

According to unconscious perception hypothesis (UP), mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously. The proponents of UP often support it with empirical evidence for a more specific hypothesis, according to which colours can be seen unconsciously (UPC). However, UPC is a general claim that admits of many interpretations. The main aim of this paper is to determine which of them is the most plausible. To this end, I investigate how adopting various conceptions of (...) colour and perceptual phenomenal character affects UPC’s resilience to objections. This brings me to the conclusion that the most plausible reading of UPC is the one according to which the phenomenal character of colour perception (i) is constituted by colours qua primitive mind-independent qualities of the environment and (ii) is not essentially tied to consciousness. My conclusion not only identifies the most plausible interpretation of UPC, but also highlights and supports an unorthodox version of the relational theory of perception, which is a perfectly viable yet so far overlooked stance in the debate about unconscious perception. (shrink)

Brain activity determines which relations between objects in the environment are perceived as differences and similarities in colour, smell, sound, etc. According to selectionism, brain activity does not create those relations; it only selects which of them are perceptually available to the subject on a given occasion. In effect, selectionism entails that perceptual experience is diaphanous, i.e. that sameness and difference in the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by sameness and difference in the perceived items. It has been argued (...) that diaphaneity is undermined by phenomenological considerations and empirical evidence. This paper considers five prominent arguments of this sort and shows that none of them succeeds. (shrink)

The results of econometric modeling are fragile in the sense that minor changes in estimation techniques or sample can lead to statistical models that support inconsistent causal hypotheses. The fragility of econometric results undermines making conclusive inferences from the empirical literature. I argue that the program of evidential pluralism, which originated in the context of medicine and encapsulates to the normative reading of the Russo-Williamson Thesis that causal claims need the support of both difference-making and mechanistic evidence, offers a ground (...) for resolving empirical disagreements. I analyze a recent econometric controversy regarding the tax elasticity of cigarette consumption and smoking intensity. Both studies apply plausible estimation techniques but report inconsistent results. I show that mechanistic evidence allows for discriminating econometric models representing genuine causal relations from accidental dependencies in data. Furthermore, I discuss the differences between biological and social mechanisms and mechanistic evidence across the disciplines. I show that economists mainly rely on mathematical models to represent possible mechanisms. Still, claiming the actuality of the represented mechanisms requires establishing that crucial assumptions of these models are descriptively adequate. I exemplify my approach to assessing the quality of mechanistic evidence in economics with an analysis of two models of rational addiction. (shrink)

Approximately one in six top economic research papers draws an explicitly causal conclusion. But what do economists mean when they conclude that A 'causes' B? Does 'cause' say that we can influence B by intervening on A, or is it only a label for the correlation of variables? Do quantitative analyses of observational data followed by such causal inferences constitute sufficient grounds for guiding economic policymaking? The Philosophy of Causality in Economics addresses these questions by analyzing the meaning of causal (...) claims made by economists and the philosophical presuppositions underlying the research methods used. The book considers five key causal approaches: the regularity approach, probabilistic theories, counterfactual theories, mechanisms, and interventions and manipulability. Each chapter opens with a summary of literature on the relevant approach and discusses its reception amongst economists. The text details case studies, and goes on to examine papers which have adopted the approach in order to highlight the methods of causal inference used in contemporary economics. It analyses the meaning of the causal claim put forward, and finally reconstructs the philosophical presuppositions accepted implicitly by economists. The strengths and limitations of each method of causal inference are also considered in the context of using the results as evidence for policymaking. This book is essential reading to those interested in literature on the philosophy of economics, as well as the philosophy of causality and economic methodology in general. (shrink)

Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For it (...) is possible that what is currently advocated as unconscious perception of the stimulus is in fact momentaneous perceptual awareness (or residual perceptual awareness) of the stimulus making the subject prone to judge in some way rather than another, or to act in some way rather than another. As to the apodosis, I show that neither the core of naïve realism nor any of its main motivations is undermined if SFK is assumed. On the contrary, certain incentives for endorsing naïve realism become more tempting on this assumption. Since the main motivations for naïve realism retain force under SFK, intentionalism is neither compulsory nor the best available explanation of unconscious perception. (shrink)

In this paper two concepts of psychologism in logic are outlined: the one which Frege and Husserl fought against and the new psychologism, or cognitivism, which underlies a cognitive turn in contemporary logic. Four issues such cognitively oriented logic should be interested in are indicated. They concern: new fields opened for logical analysis, new methods and tools needed to address these fields, neural basis of logical reasoning, and an educational problem: how to teach such logic? Several challenging questions, which arise (...) in the context of these issues, are listed. (shrink)

A survey of the main approaches in a mind study -oriented part of Artificial Intelligence is made focusing on controversial issues and extreme hypotheses. Various meanings of terms: "intelligence" and "artificial intelligence" are discussed. Limitations for constructing intelligent systems resulting from the lack of formalized models of cognitive activity are shown. The approaches surveyed are then recapitulated in the light of these limitations.

The ongoing debate on the Christian philosophical and theological approach to the theory of biological evolution is multifaceted. It refers to the biblical notion of creation, as well as to some strictly philosophical issues such as the difficulty in defining species and units of evolutionary transitions, the nature of chance, and the classical principle of proportionate causation. Moving toward theology, it refers to the distinction between creation and production, and to the notion of secondary causation of creatures in the origin (...) of new forms of organisms – contrasted with the classical assertion that creatures cannot create. (shrink)

W ostatnich latach mamy do czynienia z dynamicznym rozwojem neuroetyki, tj. subdyscypliny nauk o mózgu badającej rozmaite zagadnienia etyczne w kontekście funkcjonowania ludzkiego umysłu i mózgu. Centralnym przedmiotem tych badań jest specyficznie ludzka zdolność do wydawania sądów moralnych oraz jej mechanizmy. Tymczasem twierdzenia neuroetyki mają znacznie szerszy wymiar; wykracza on bowiem poza kwestie czysto opisowe i obejmuje swym zasięgiem zagadnienia teoretyczne etyki. W niniejszym artykule rozważam znaczenie badań neuroetycznych dla analiz przeprowadzanych w obszarze etyki normatywnej oraz metaetyki.

In the text, I analyze Grobler᾽s strategy of countering skepticism. It boils down to two arguments, i.e. a performative contradiction and the use of the ceteris paribus clause. Another point is the concept of truth adopted by Grobler. Grobler is leaning towards the adjustment theory and aletic pluralism. I formulate critical remarks about truth as identity, the markup theory, super-conclusiveness, and finally truth as a regulative idea. I am also considering two additional requirements of Grobler, namely that the truth should (...) be interesting and knowledge should have rich applications. I argue that the application requirement is always fulfilled. (shrink)

Artykuł składa się z dwóch części. W części pierwszej rekonstruuję filozoficzne poglądy polskiego filozofującego fizyka Czesława Białobrzeskiego, a w drugiej części przedstawiam jego biografię oraz wkład w rozwój fizyki. Filozoficzne rozważania Białobrzeskiego kształtowały się na bazie wiodących problemów w fizyce końca XIX i przede wszystkim XX wieku; Białobrzeski prowadził te rozważania w ścisłym związku ze swoją praktyką naukową. Działalność polskiego uczonego przypada na okres powstawania i rozwoju mechaniki kwantowej. Białobrzeski – jak wielu innych ówczesnych fizyków – był świadomy konieczności spójnego (...) wyjaśniania fundamentalnie nowych zjawisk świata atomowego. Jego wyjaśnienie jest oryginalne – odwołał się mianowicie w nim do klasycznej, filozoficznej teorii kategorii i zaproponował jej własną ontologiczną interpretację. (shrink)

A considerable group of contemporary philosophers and theologians—including those engaged in the science-theology dialogue, such as Barbour, Clayton, Davies, and Peacocke—supports panentheism, i.e., a theistic position which assumes that the world is in God, who is yet greater than everything he created. They see it as a balanced middle ground between the positions of classical theism and pantheism. In this article, I offer a presentation and a critical evaluation of the most fundamental principles of panentheism from the point of view (...) of classical theism. First, I list six main species of panentheism and the motivations of those who support it. In the second part, I analyze the three main difficulties concerning its ontological and theological principles, i.e., (1) the meaning of the preposition ‘in’ (_en_) in ‘pan_en_theism’; (2) the accuracy of panentheistic definition of divine immanence, and (3) the question of whether panentheism is successful in protecting God’s transcendence. I conclude that panentheism fails as a Christian theistic position. Nevertheless, it might still be valuable and play an important role in addressing the cognitive drama of the modern human beings, often seduced by secular (scientific) or spiritual naturalism, or pantheism. (shrink)

Pritchard calls his epistemological disjunctivism ‘the holy grail of epistemology’. What this metaphor means is that the acceptance of this thesis puts the internalism-externalism debate to an end, thanks to satisfaction of intuitions standing behind both competing views. Simultaneously, Pritchard strongly emphasizes that the endorsement of epistemological disjunctivism does not commit one to metaphysical disjunctivism. In this paper I analyze the formulations and motivations of epistemological disjunctivism presented by Pritchard and McDowell. Then I consider the most common argument for the (...) claim that epistemological disjunctivism can be held without the support of metaphysical disjunctivism. I conclude that the plausibility of epistemological disjunctivism depends on the plausibility of metaphysical disjunctivism. If the latter is false, the former postulates a set of conditions for epistemic justification that are impossible to be fulfilled. (shrink)

This paper controverts the ability of intentionalism about perception to account for unique epistemic significance of phenomenal consciousness. More specifically, the intentionalist cannot explain the latter without denying two well-founded claims: the transparency of experience, and the possibility of unconscious perception. If they are true, intentionality of perception entails that phenomenal consciousness has no special epistemic role to play. Although some intentionalists are ready to bite this bullet, by doing so they effectively undermine one of the standard motivations of their (...) view, i.e. the claim that perceptual experiences justify beliefs. Consequently, whatever reason might there be to think that phenomenal consciousness has unique epistemic import, it is also a reason to reject intentionalism. I recommend replacing the latter with an unorthodox formulation of relationalism about perception. (shrink)

Dialectical contradictions influence organizational processes in distinct ways and create a unique dynamics in terms of leadership process in entrepreneurialorganizations. We integrate research from charismatic, transformational, and organizational literature, as well as entrepreneurship literature, to create a generalized model of entrepreneurial leadership that is descriptively robust and conceptually distinct from existing concepts. We focus specifically on visionary, transformational, and motivational contradictions of entrepreneurial leadership and conclude by discussing the implications of organizational reconciliation of these three contradictions for leadership research and (...) practice. (shrink)

Peter Singer is one of the most famous bioethicists in the world. His controversial opinions disseminated in his countless publications and his undoubtedly good erudition made him very popular. Using logical arguments he always tries to prove that only a conscious being, a person, has the right to live. No wonder that his opponents call him "the famous death messenger". Australian philosopher is an ethic relativist in the way that he resigns from objective values in his conception. Moreover, he doesn't (...) approve unchangeable moral principles. According to him such moral values as 'good' and 'bad' are relative, depending on consequences which decide what is right in particular situation. He is polemical to traditional ethic adherents who value every human life. There is no objective life category in his conception. Life can be only considered according to its quality and, therefore, only beings possessing feelings and consciousness are subjects of morality. They only have the right to live. (shrink)

It is consistent that for every function there is an uncountable set and two continuous functions such that f {f0, f1} for every A2,α≠β.

As formulated by Duncan Pritchard and John McDowell, epistemological disjunctivism is the claim that perceptual experience can provide the subject with epistemic justification that is reflectively accessible and externally grounded at the same time. Pritchard calls this thesis ‘the holy grail of epistemology’, since it reconciles two traditionally rival theories of justification, namely epistemic internalism and epistemic externalism. The main objection against epistemological disjunctivism thus understood is that it does not do justice to the well-known internalist intuitions expressed in The (...) New Evil Demon and Brain-in-a-Vat scenarios. I defend epistemological disjunctivism from this objection by indicating that those who apply to such scenarios commit themselves to implausible views in the philosophy of mind. I conclude that epistemological disjunctivism accurately expresses the epistemological attitude of a non-reductive materialist regarding the body-mind problem. (shrink)

It has been objected recently that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported hypothesis that unconscious perception is possible. Because epistemological disjunctivism is plausible only in conjunction with naïve realism (for a reason I provide), the objection reaches it too. In response, I show that the unconscious perception hypothesis can be changed from a problem into an advantage of epistemological disjunctivism. I do this by suggesting that: (i) naïve realism is consistent with the hypothesis; (ii) the contrast between epistemological (...) disjunctivism and epistemic externalism explains the difference in epistemic import between conscious and unconscious perception. (shrink)

Over the years, the Austrian School of Economics has created the image of a thinker associated with ideas of liberalism. The views of members of this school are often considered controversial. However, the concept of freedom clearly displayed by the Austrians is very popular among economists. Carl Menger is said to be the founder and a leading member of the Austrian School of Economics, and his works are mostly devoted to methodology and economic theory. Nevertheless, you can also find his (...) views on the sphere of economic liberalism and freedom. Almost 150 years after the publication of Menger’s main works, it emerged that he had created not only the timeless foundations of the theory and methodology of economics, but his theory of subjective value had become the bedrock which is used to this day in deliberations on economic liberalism. The economy pursued by Menger (based primarily on the ideas of subjectivism and individualism) continues to be an important and timeless foundation for the development of the doctrine of economic liberalism. This article is a review based on an analysis of the literature on the subject. (shrink)

Volume 27, Issue 3, September 2020, Page 266-268.

Awareness of mortality is one of the key aspects of human existence. Death goes beyond the boundary of knowledge, mortality. However, it is actually experienced by man as something inevitable. Death is a fact – the end of life, and the experience of mortality is one of the borderline situations. In the essay, the author puts forward the thesis that the experience of mortality has a significant impact on the human understanding of values. Attitudes towards death be it fear, resignation, (...) indifference, fascination, mourning, sadness, despair after the loss of a loved one, or the desire for death, indicate the wealth of the world of value of axiological experience. The attitude of the person towards death, in some sense, is a test of our humanity, the principal value to which we refer most often. The author of the essay adopts the position of axiological relationalism, it implies that values are independent of the subject, they form a network of relational connections, but they are in a significant way connected with culture. The study of these connections: 1) with the world of people, 2) world of things, 3) internal relations that take place between values, allows us to get to know the complex structure of the world of values. In the article, the author analyzes in what sense mortality influences human understanding of values. (shrink)

The methodological nonreductionism of contemporary biology opens an interesting discussion on the level of ontology and the philosophy of nature. The theory of emergence (EM), and downward causation (DC) in particular, bring a new set of arguments challenging not only methodological, but also ontological and causal reductionism. This argumentation provides a crucial philosophical foundation for the science/theology dialogue. However, a closer examination shows that proponents of EM do not present a unified and consistent definition of DC. Moreover, they find it (...) difficult to prove that higher-order properties can be causally significant without violating the causal laws that operate at lower physical levels. They also face the problem of circularity and incoherence in their explanation. In our article we show that these problems can be overcome only if DC is understood in terms of formal rather than physical (efficient) causality. This breakdown of causal monism in science opens a way to the retrieval of the fourfold Aristotelian notion of causality. (shrink)

Pod pewnymi względami niezaawansowany stan badań wirtualności w naukach informatycznych wskazuje na konieczność zgłębienia podstawowych kwestii jej dotyczących, tj. kwestii ontologicznych. Dopiero ich rozstrzygnięcie pozwoli rozwiązać zagadkę tworzenia i istnienia obiektów wirtualnych. Rozpatrzenie tych kwestii utrudnia fakt usuwania z dziedziny zainteresowań współczesnej filozofii metafizyki, a wraz z nią ontologii. Dlatego z powodów merytorycznej trafności odwołuję się do koncepcji ontologicznych oraz epistemologicznych, które mogą być wykorzystane do konstrukcji ontologicznych, wypracowanych dawniej w filozofii, które przez analogie lub inspiracje – jak wykazuję – (...) są obiecującymi kandydatami do zgłębienia zagadnień powstawania i istnienia obiektów wirtualnych. W artykule przedstawiam w skrótowej ekspozycji alternatywne rozstrzygnięcia tych dwóch problemów oraz status istnienia obiektów wirtualnych. Ujęcia te są inspirowane głównie przez relewantne poglądy Platona, Arystotelesa, Franza Brentano i Karla Poppera oraz zbiór koncepcji reprezentacji. (shrink)

In the first part of our article we will refer the penetration of scientific terms into colloquial language, focusing on the sense in which the concept of an algorithm currently functions outside its original scope. The given examples will refer mostly to disciplines not directly related to computer science and to the colloquial language. In the next part we will also discuss the modifications made to the meaning of the term algorithm and how this concept is now understood in computer (...) science. Finally, we will discuss the problem of algorithmicity of evolutionary algorithms, i.e. we will try to answer the question whether – and to what extent – they are still algorithms in the classical sense. (shrink)