The article concerns the metaphysical dimension of Jan Srzednicki’s epistemology. It is claimed that the metaphysical perspective of cognitive “normatives” (e. g. norm, form and presence) does not remove paradoxes of self-reference. It is especially difficult to separate the ontic and the cognitive dimensions.

In the text, I analyze Grobler᾽s strategy of countering skepticism. It boils down to two arguments, i.e. a performative contradiction and the use of the ceteris paribus clause. Another point is the concept of truth adopted by Grobler. Grobler is leaning towards the adjustment theory and aletic pluralism. I formulate critical remarks about truth as identity, the markup theory, super-conclusiveness, and finally truth as a regulative idea. I am also considering two additional requirements of Grobler, namely that the truth should (...) be interesting and knowledge should have rich applications. I argue that the application requirement is always fulfilled. (shrink)

This paper considers Adam Grobler's fallibilism as an attractive alternative for both epistemological fundationalism and nihilism. Fallibilism claims that science is only a collection of temporary opinions, which entails rejecting of the idea of justification in aid of establishing critical preferences. In Grobler's thought that role is played by the conclusion to the best explanation (abductionism). Grobler's ideas dismantle the belief that relativity implies relativism. This paper deals with several Grobler's problems, such as theory-ladeness thesis (interpretation of observation), problems of (...) facts, litigation of absolutism with relativism. I claim that problem of epistemic interests should be viewed as theoretical, e.g. considered as an element of our background knowledge, or wider philosophical framework (for example metaphysics). Some formulations of local internal realism are subject to paradox of self-referentiality. (shrink)