Resolving empirical controversies with mechanistic evidence

Synthese 199 (3-4):9957-9978 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The results of econometric modeling are fragile in the sense that minor changes in estimation techniques or sample can lead to statistical models that support inconsistent causal hypotheses. The fragility of econometric results undermines making conclusive inferences from the empirical literature. I argue that the program of evidential pluralism, which originated in the context of medicine and encapsulates to the normative reading of the Russo-Williamson Thesis that causal claims need the support of both difference-making and mechanistic evidence, offers a ground for resolving empirical disagreements. I analyze a recent econometric controversy regarding the tax elasticity of cigarette consumption and smoking intensity. Both studies apply plausible estimation techniques but report inconsistent results. I show that mechanistic evidence allows for discriminating econometric models representing genuine causal relations from accidental dependencies in data. Furthermore, I discuss the differences between biological and social mechanisms and mechanistic evidence across the disciplines. I show that economists mainly rely on mathematical models to represent possible mechanisms. Still, claiming the actuality of the represented mechanisms requires establishing that crucial assumptions of these models are descriptively adequate. I exemplify my approach to assessing the quality of mechanistic evidence in economics with an analysis of two models of rational addiction.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mechanistic Evidence: Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson Thesis.Phyllis McKay Illari - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):139-157.
Evidence, illness, and causation: An epidemiological perspective on the Russo–Williamson Thesis.Alexander R. Fiorentino & Olaf Dammann - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 54:1-9.
Understanding mechanisms in the health sciences.Raffaella Campaner - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 32 (1):5-17.
What is mechanistic evidence, and why do we need it for evidence-based policy?Caterina Marchionni & Samuli Reijula - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 73:54-63.
How Probabilistic Causation Can Account for the Use of Mechanistic Evidence.Erik Weber - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):277-295.
Causal models and evidential pluralism in econometrics.Alessio Moneta & Federica Russo - 2014 - Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (1):54-76.
The Russo–Williamson Theses in the social sciences: Causal inference drawing on two types of evidence.François Claveau - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (4):806-813.
Mechanisms: what are they evidence for in evidence-based medicine?Holly Andersen - 2012 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):992-999.
Negative mechanistic reasoning in medical intervention assessment.Jesper Jerkert - 2015 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 36 (6):425-437.
Mechanistic Information as Evidence in Decision-Oriented Science.José Luis Luján, Oliver Todt & Juan Bautista Bengoetxea - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (2):293-306.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-06-12

Downloads
22 (#688,104)

6 months
12 (#203,353)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
The New Mechanical Philosophy.Stuart Glennan - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
What is a mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms across the sciences.Phyllis Illari & Jon Williamson - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):119-135.
Interpreting causality in the health sciences.Federica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2007 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (2):157 – 170.

View all 32 references / Add more references