PREFACEProf. Göran Sundholm of Leiden University inspired the group of Logic at Lille and Valparaíso to start a fundamental review of the dialogical conception of logic by linking it to constructive type logic. One of Sundholm's insights was that inference can be seen as involving an implicit interlocutor. This led to several investigations aimed at exploring the consequences of joining winning strategies to the proof-theoretical conception of meaning. The leading idea is, roughly, that while introduction rules lay down the conditions (...) under which a winning strategy for the Proponent may be built, the elimination rules lay down those elements of the Opponent's assertions that the Proponent has the right to use for building winning strategy. It is the pragmatic and ethical features of obligations and rights that naturally lead to the dialogical interpretation of natural deduction.During the Visiting Professorship of Prof. Sundholm at Lille in (2012) the group of Lille started delving into the ways of implementing Per Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory with the dialogical perspective. In particular, Aarne Ranta's (1988) paper, the first publication on the subject, was read and discussed during Sundholm’s seminar. The discussions strongly suggested that the game-theoretical conception of quantifiers as deploying interdependent moves provide a natural link between CTT and dialogical logic. This idea triggered several publications by the group of Lille in collaboration with Nicolas Clerbout and Juan Redmond at the University of Valparaíso, including the publication of the book (2015) by Clerbout / Rahman that provides a systematic development of this way of linking CTT and the dialogical conception of logic. However the Clerbout / Rahman book was written from the CTT perspective on dialogical logic, rather than the other way round. The present book should provide the perspective from the other side of the dialogue between the Dialogical Framework and Constructive Type Theory. The main idea of our present study is that Sundholm's (1997) notion of epistemic assumption is closely linked to the Copy-Cat Rule or Socratic Rule that distinguishes the dialogical framework from other game-theoretical approaches. One way to read the present book is as a further development of Sundholm’s extension of Austin's (1946, p. 171) remark on acts of assertion to inference. Indeed, Sundholm (2013, p. 17) gave the following forceful formulation: When I say therefore, I give others my authority for asserting the conclusion, given theirs for asserting the premisses.Per Martin-Löf, in recent lectures, have utilized the dialogical perspective on epistemic assumptions to get out of a certain circle that threatens the explanation of the notions of inference and demonstration. A demonstration may be explained as a chain of (immediate) inferences starting from no premisses. That an inference J1... Jn—————Jis valid means that the conclusion J can be made evident on the assumption that J1, …, Jn are known. The notion of epistemic assumption thus enters in the explanation of valid inference. We cannot, however, in this explanation understand 'known' in the sense of demonstrated, for then we are explaining the notion of inference in terms of demonstration, whereas demonstration has been explained in terms of inference. Martin-Löf suggests that we here understand 'known' in the sense of asserted, so that epistemic assumptions are judgements others have made, judgements for which others have taken the responsibility; that the inference is valid then means that, given that others have taken responsbility for the premisses, I can take responsibility for the conclusion:The circularity problem is this: if you define a demonstration to be a chain of immediate inferences, then you are defining demonstration in terms of inference. Now we are considering an immediate inference and we are trying to give a proper explanation of that; but, if that begins by saying: Assume that J1, …, Jn have been demonstrated – then you are clearly in trouble, because you are about to explain demonstration in terms of the notion of immediate inference, hence when you are giving an account of the notion of immediate inference, the notion of demonstration is not yet at your disposal. So, to say: Assume that J1, …, Jn have already been demonstrated, makes you accusable of trying to explain things in a circle. The solution to this circularity problem, it seems to me now, comes naturally out of this dialogical analysis. […]The solution is that the premisses here should not be assumed to be known in the qualified sense, that is, to be demonstrated, but we should simply assume that they have been asserted, which is to say that others have taken responsibility for them, and then the question for me is whether I can take responsibility for the conclusion. So, the assumption is merely that they have been asserted, not that they have been demonstrated. That seems to me to be the appropriate definition of epistemic assumption in Sundholm's sense. One of the main tenets of the present study is that the further move of relating the Socratic Rule rule with judgemental equality provides both a simpler and more direct way to implement the constructive type theoretical approach within the dialogical framework. Such a reconsideration of the Socratic Rule, roughly speaking, amounts to the following. 1.A move from P that brings-forward a play-object in order to defend an elementary proposition A can be challenged by O. 2.The answer to such a challenge, involves P bringing forward a definitional equality that expresses the fact that the play-object chosen by P copies the one O has chosen while positing A. For short, the equality expresses at the object-languaje level that the defence of P relies on the authority given to O to be able to produce the play-objects she brings forward. More generally, according to this view, a definitional equality established by P and brought forward while defending the proposition A, expresses the equality between a play-object (introduced by O) and the instruction for building a play-object deployed by O while affirming A. So it can be read as a computation rule that indicates how to compute O's instructions. Let us recall that from the strategic point of view, O's moves correspond to elimination rules of demonstrations. Thus, the dialogical rules that prescribe how to introduce a definitional equality – correspond – at the strategic level – to the definitional equality rules for CTT as applied to the selector-functions involved in the elimination rules. So, what we are doing here is extending the dialogical interpretation of Sundholm's epistemic assumption to the rules that set up the definitional equality of a type.The present work is structured in the following way:•In the Introduction we state the main tenets that guide our book•Chapter II contains a brief overview of Constructive Type Theory penned by Ansten Klev with exercises and their solutions. •Chapter III offers a novel presentation of the dialogical conception of logic. In fact, the first two sections of the chapter provide an overview of standard dialogical logic – including solved exercises, slightly adapted to the content of the present volume. The rest of the sections develop a new dialogical approach to Constructive Type Theory. •Chapters IV and V contain the main body of our study, namely the relation between the Socratic Rule, epistemic assumptions, and equality. The chapter provides the reader with thoroughly worked out examples with comments. •After the Final Remarks the book containsa.An appendix containing a an overview of all the rules for the new formulation of dialogical approach to constructive type theory developed in the book; b.a brief outline of Per Martin-Löf's informal presentation of the demonstration of the axiom of choice.c.two examples of a tree-shaped graph of an extensive strategy. Acknowledgments: Many thanks to Mark van Atten (Paris1), Giuliano Bacigalupo (Zürich), Charles Zacharie Bowao (Univ. Ma Ngouabi de Brazzaville, Congo), Christian Berner (Lille3), Michel Crubellier (Lille3), Pierre Cardascia (Lille3), Oumar Dia (Dakar), Marcel Nguimbi ((Univ. Marien Ngouabi de Brazzaville, Congo), Adjoua Bernadette Dango (Lille3 / Alassane Ouattara de Bouaké, Côte d'Ivoire), Steephen Rossy Eckoubili (Lille3), Johan Georg Granström (Zürich), Gerhard Heinzmann (Nancy2), Muhammad Iqbal (Lille3), Matthieu Fontaine (Lille3), Radmila Jovanovic (Belgrad), Hanna Karpenko (Lille3), Laurent Keiff (Lille3), Sébastien Magnier (Saint Dennis, Réunion), Clément Lion (Lille3), Gildas Nzokou (Libreville), Fachrur Rozie (Lille3), Helge Rückert (Mannheim), Mohammad Shafiei (Paris1), and Hassan Tahiri (Lisbon), for rich interchanges, suggestions on the main claims of the present study and proof-reading of specific sections of the text. Special thanks to Gildas Nzokou (Libreville), Steephen Rossy Eckoubili (Lille3) and Clément Lion (Lille3), with whom a Pre-Graduate Textbook in French on dialogical logic and CTT is in the process of being worked out – during the visiting-professorship in 2016 of the former. Eckoubili is the author of the sections on exercises for dialogical logic, Nzokou cared of those involving the development of CTT-demonstrations out of winning-strategies. Special thanks also to Ansten Klev (Prague) for helping with technical details and conceptual issues on CTT, particularly so as author of the chapter introducing CTT. (shrink)

In the social sciences we hardly can create laboratory conditions, we only can try to find out which kinds of experiments Nature has carried out. Knowledge about Nature's designs can be used to infer conditions for reliable predictions. This problem was explicitly dealt with in Haavelmo's (1944) discussion of autonomous relationships, Friedman's (1953) as-if methodology, and Simon's (1961) discussions of nearly-decomposable systems. All three accounts take Marshallian partitioning as starting point, however not with a sharp ceteris paribus razor but with (...) the blunt knife of negligibility assumptions. As will be shown, in each account reflection on which influences are negligible, for what phenomena and for how long, played a central role. (shrink)

Glenn Harrison [Journal of Economic Methodology, 2013, 20, 103–117] discusses four related forms of methodological intolerance with respect to field experiments: field experiments should rely on some form of randomization, should be disconnected from theory, the concept of causality should only be defined in terms of observables, and the role of laboratory experiments is dismissed. As is often the case, the cause of intolerance is ignorance, as it is here. To acquire knowledge about potential influences, which we need for both (...) the evaluation of internal and external validity of experimental results, we cannot do without theory. A purely empiricist methodology will be unable to give us sufficient understanding of the validity of these results. An account of causality only based on directly observed things, is an account based on factual influences only. This account will be too restricted, because it will not deal with the unobserved potential influences, which we need – again – for the evaluat... (shrink)

Generally, rational decision-making is conceived as arriving at a decision by a correct application of the rules of logic and statistics. If not, the conclusions are called biased. After an impressive series of experiments and tests carried out in the last few decades, the view arose that rationality is tough for all, skilled field experts not excluded. A new type of planner's counsellor is called for: the normative statistician, the expert in reasoning with uncertainty par excellence. To unravel this view, (...) the paper explores a specific practice of clinical decision-making, namely Evidence-Based Medicine. This practice is chosen, because it is very explicit about how to rationalize practice. The paper shows that whether a decision-making process is rational cannot be assessed without taking into account the environment in which the decisions have to be taken. To be more specific, the decision to call for new evidence should be rational too. This decision and the way in which this evidence is obtained are crucial to validate the base rates. Rationality should be model-based, which means that not only the isolated decision-making process should take a Bayesian updating process as its norm, but should also model the acquisition of evidence (priors and tests results) as a rational process. (shrink)

La singularité de la démarche philosophique de Gabriel Marcel vient de ce qu'elle renoue avec ses origines socratiques ; elle se fonde résolument sur le concret, c'est-à-dire le corps-propre (par oposition au corps-objet ou instrument), la sensation traitée comme manière d'être au monde plutôt que comme message, la mémoire, la volonté.

In de economische wetenschap worden vragen beantwoord met behulp van modellen. Voor ieder type vraag bestaat een eigen klasse van modellen. Het type vraag bepaalt de eisen waaraan het model moet voldoen en geeft daarbij aan hoe de modellen gemaakt dienen te worden. Dit artikel behandelt de vraag die gesteld wordt om tot begrip te komen: de ‘hoezo-vraag’. Om duidelijk te maken welke modellen hoezo-vragen impliceren zal dit type vraag vergeleken worden met ‘waarom-vragen’ en ‘hoeveelvragen’. Het antwoord op een waarom-vraag (...) is een verklaring. Het antwoord op een hoeveel-vraag is een meetresultaat. (shrink)

When observing or measuring phenomena, errors are inevitable, one can only aspire to reduce these errors as much as possible. An obvious strategy to achieve this reduction is by using more precise instruments. Another strategy was to develop a theory of these errors that could indicate how to take them into account. One of the greatest achievements of statistics in the beginning of the 19th century was such a theory of error. This theory told the practitioners that the best thing (...) they could do is taking the arithmetical mean of their observations. This average would give them the most accurate estimate of the value they were searching for. Soon after its invention, this method made a triumphal march across various sciences. However, not in all sciences one stood waving aside. This method, namely, only worked well when the various observations were made under similar circumstances and when there were very many of them. And this was not the case for e.g. meteorology and actuarial science, the two sciences discussed in this paper. (shrink)

An ambitious, interdisciplinary exploration of the emergence of the urban phenomenon and its social, political and cultural dynamic.

1. Philosophie anthropologique--2. Philosophie du savoir scientifique.

Depuis le 29 juin 2006, le Conseil des droits de l’homme a adopté la « Déclaration sur les droits des peuples autochtones » ; elle doit être débattue par l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU, à New York. Les citoyens d’Athènes, familiers des oraisons funèbres, annuellement prononcées chez eux sur le thème de l’Autochtonie, se sont dits..

Bergier, un des rares polémistes catholiques de talent face aux « Lumières », publie en 1788 un important Dictionnaire de théologie. Son article « Femme » est un des premiers, dans un dictionnaire « catholique », à prendre la « Femme » comme sujet et non comme simple partenaire de l'« Homme ». Avec esprit critique et logique, il y développe lieux communs (souvent proches des philosophes), points d'apologétique (« ce que le christianisme a fait pour les femmes ») ou (...) de controverse. Vingt autres articles, abordant les questions féminines, manifestent que si Bergier considère la femme comme l'égale de l'homme devant Dieu, il conserve sur sa place dans la société des préjugés de son temps, telle la nécessaire « dépendance ». Cet « inégalitarisme » ne va pourtant pas sans remises en question (paradoxales et rares à l'époque), et il prend souvent la défense des femmes face au sort qui leur est fait. (shrink)

L'homme problématique. Les questions fondamentales sur l'essence ou sur la destinée de l'homme, auxquelles la science ne peut apporter aucune réponse, seraient-elles insolubles, ou même dénuées de sens? Il appartient à la liberté humaine de se libérer en quelque sorte d'elle-même, c'est-à-dire de sa disposition perverse à affirmer sa propre autosuffisance. L'inquiétude humaine : chez St Augustin, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre, Goethe. Angoisse - paralysie ; inquiétude - aiguillon, principe de dépassement, chemin que nous avons à gravir pour accéder à (...) la paix véritable. Position et approches concrètes du mystère ontologique. Le texte fondamental, le " discours de la méthode " de Gabriel Marcel. (shrink)

Grand specialiste de Ficin, Raymond Marcel expose ainsi les principes de son ambitieux programme: 1) resoudre un probleme dans l'evolution de la pensee europeenne, a savoir les relations entre les theologiens medievaux et les philosophes du XVIIe siecle. Ficin l'interesse en sa qualite de " point de repere " entre la philosophie medievale et moderne. Cette biographie est ainsi le travail d'un historien de la philosophie, historien au point de vue religieux, plus precisement thomiste. 2) livrer une introduction essentielle (...) a une serie de textes. Nous pouvons distinguer 2 grandes parties: 1) une introduction d'une centaine de pages " Renaissance et Platonisme " qui rappelle le probleme complexe et meconnu du platonisme dans la pensee occidentale de la Renaissance carolingienne a la moitie du XVe siecle. 2) La seconde partie, qui constitue le cur de l'ouvrage et s'appuie essentiellement sur la correspondance de Ficin, etudie plus specifiquement l'evolution intellectuelle de Ficin et la reception de ses ouvrages dans le contexte du platonisme du XVe siecle: les consequences du concile de Florence sur la pensee florentine, les rapports de Ficin avec Come de Medicis. (shrink)

Esta conferencia de 1951, impartida por Gabriel Marcel en Marruecos, Brasil y otros países latinoamericanos, tiene dos pilares sobre los que está construida: la muerte y la intersubjetividad. Ambos corresponden a la inquietud que llevó a este autor a la filosofía: “¿Dónde están los muertos?”. O, en otras palabras: ¿Es posible sobrevivir a la muerte? Estas preguntas son producidas por la turbación que ge-nera el separarse de los seres amados, pues la unión intersubjetiva que se alcanza con ellos y (...) que se experimenta como plenitud, se ve allí comprometida. De hecho, este vínculo particular hace que Marcel distinga el plano de lo intersubjetivo de lo objetivo. Con base en ello, rechaza comprender la muerte del ser amado como si fuera éste un objeto para tratarlo como un sujeto –un tú–, abriendo así un camino diferente de reflexión sobre la inmortalidad. (shrink)

L'expression « jeune fille » n'est pas très fréquente avant le XIXe siècle, tout au moins dans son sens actuel désignant spécifiquement une « fille nubile » ou une « femme jeune non mariée » (Robert). Mais ces définitions elles-mêmes restent approximatives : va-t-on prendre en compte la « nubilité » biologique liée à la menstruation, si variable selon les peuples, les climats, les personnes, et qui semble avoir été nettement plus tardive qu'aujourd'hui? Ou une nubilité juridique, par...

Aujourd’hui, à une époque où la sexualité est omniprésente et semble triomphante, et où ses rapports avec l’Église catholique romaine restent difficiles et parfois conflictuels, ce recueil de 120 lettres d’il y a deux générations à peine présente un immense intérêt. Elles ont été écrites principalement par des laïcs (107), hommes (55) et femmes (62), riches ou pauvres, cultivés ou non, de toutes les régions de France, mais généralement catholiques pratiquants (plusieurs communiaient quotidien...

Les femmes, à l’époque moderne, admettent, en règle générale, la soumission requise par le clergé masculin. Mais il en est qui résistent. Ce sont des chrétiennes aux fortes personnalités – Thérèse d’Avila, au xvie siècle, ou Gabrielle Suchon, au xviie siècle – mais aussi des communautés religieuses féminines, comme celle de Port-Royal, au xviie siècle et d’autres, moins connues. Ces manifestations d’indépendance, plutôt que de rébellion ouverte, sont particulièrement visibles lorsque ces femmes se sentent investies d’une mission divine, c’est le (...) cas, par exemple, des mystiques. (shrink)

25 medical historians born between 1800 and 1900 have been selected, mainly by citation frequency, for a study in comparative biography. They originated in Germany, U.S.A., U.K. France, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria. A number of them were active in two countries due to emigration from fascist Europe in the 1930s. All were MDs except for one historian. Most of them showed an interest in the history of medicine early in life, some only between age 40–50. Their motivations were quite varied. (...) Most of them made their living with clinical practice, at least initially. Those ten who attained a chair in the history of medicine did so usually between age 41 and 56. Our selection of medical historians active between 1825 and 1975 is very heterogeneous, much more so than in the final decades of the 20th century. (shrink)