Este artículo desarrolla la idea que subyace a la obra filosófica de Wittgenstein, por lo menos desde las Investigaciones, del lenguaje como “algo animal” y de nuestras palabras como principalmente expresivas. A partir de esta idea, se propone empezar a mostrar cómo los problemas filosóficos son para él, en última instancia, producto de una desconexión de la dimensión sensible de la cual derivan su sentido nuestras palabras. Se sugiere que el propósito de Wittgenstein es, por lo tanto, propiciar una reconexión (...) del lenguaje con el deseo, lo cual lleva a cabo ejemplificando en sus textos –y así obligándonos como lectores a asumir– una relación distinta con las palabras de aquella que define el pensamiento filosófico convencional. De esta manera, reivindica para la reflexión filosófica modos de saber y de conciencia radicalmente opuestos al tipo de conocimiento científico con el que aún se identifica la disciplina. (shrink)

Prestándole especial atención a sus reflexiones en tomo a la estética, en este artículo se sostiene que Wittgenstein, en su última obra, lejos de rechazar la cuestión de lo trascendente de su discurso filosólico como usualmente se lo lee, intenta más bien recuperar y darle un nuevo sentido a esa problemática, respondiendo así a una necesidad real de la filosofía que se sigue definiendo, aún en nuestro siglo, por criterios de conocimiento que no le pertenecen. En particular, se arguye que (...) el recurso wittgensteiniano a la invención de "casos intermedios" e "historias naturales" ficticias logra este objetivo al activar mediante su introducción de la imaginación modos diferentes de conciencia, que permiten reubicar lo trascendente en el pensar filosófico sin necesidad de recurrir a un ámbito sobrenatural ni a un conocimiento místico. (shrink)

Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is the first collection to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remarks on the concept of aspect-seeing. These essays show that aspect-seeing was not simply one more topic of investigation in Wittgenstein’s later writings, but, rather, that it was a pervasive and guiding concept in his efforts to turn philosophy’s attention to the actual conditions of our common life in language. Arranged in sections that highlight the pertinence of the aspect-seeing remarks to aesthetic and moral perception, self-knowledge, mind and consciousness, (...) linguistic agreement, philosophical therapy, and “seeing connections,” the sixteen essays, which were specially commissioned for this volume, demonstrate the unity of not only Philosophical Investigations but also Wittgenstein’s later thought as a whole. They open up novel paths across familiar fields of thought: the objectivity of interpretation, the fixity of the past, the acquisition of language, and the nature of human consciousness. Significantly, they exemplify how continuing consideration of the interrelated phenomena and concepts surrounding aspect-seeing might produce a fruitful way of doing philosophy. The volume includes a concordance for the unnumbered remarks in the various editions of Philosophical Investigations, including the latest (4th) edition. (The front matter is posted here. The introduction - "Seeing Aspects in Wittgenstein" - appears below under "Published articles."). (shrink)

I intend to motivate discussion on the ways of thought in art and philosophy in terms of a problem characteristic of contemporary culture diagnosed by Plato as the "loss of memory." He referred to the impoverishment of knowledge caused by an exclusive and excessive interest in information as well as by the loss of value in reflection. I examine the problem more closely by referring to a passage in the Phaedrus that shows what Plato meant by "a forgetfulness of the (...) soul" is tantamount to the disconnection of intellectual knowledge from emotion and the body. I reflect on the relation between art and philosophy as well as on the character of philosophical thought as regards the need to "cultivate memory" in our time. (shrink)

This is the introduction to Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, eds. William Day & Victor J. Krebs (Cambridge UP, 2010), a collection of essays on Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-seeing. Section 1: Why Seeing Aspects Now?; Section 2: The Importance of Seeing Aspects; Section 3: The Essays. (The front matter to Seeing Wittgenstein Anew appears above under "Books.").

El Naturalismo Trascendental del Ultimo Wittgenstein The present article considers an internal tension in Wittgenstein's late philosophy. In what I call his 'naturalism', Wittgenstein circumscribes philosophical reflection to natural objects, to «making natural history». In his 'transcendentalism' he focuses on the «possibility of phenomena» and distinguishes philosophical method from the method of the natural sciences. I show that his 'transcendentalism' is present in his discussion of rules and prívate language, arguing for an interpretation in terms of a kantian type of (...) transcendental synthesis. But far from contradicting his 'naturalism', both tendencies are inseparable and essential to the main purpose of his Philosophical Investigations. (shrink)

“¿Principio de caridad o hybris?” La intuición de Wittgenstein, de que el significado lingüístico se constituye dentro de la trama de vida pareciera hacer posible un acercamiento entre la tradición hermenéutica continental y la filosofía analítica del lenguaje. En el presente artículo se sostiene que esta intuición debe ir acompañada de una revisión de la concepción del sujeto implícita en el “principio de caridad” de Donald Davidson. Sin esa reconcepción, el principio de caridad se convierte en una forma encubierta de (...) imperialismo conceptual incompatible con el espíritu de la hermenéutica continental. Se concluye el artículo con algunas observaciones sobre el relativismo a la luz de las consideraciones anteriores. (shrink)

“Wittgenstein’s Ghosts. Between Deleuze and Derrida”. Both Derrida and Deleuze agree that with the advent of the moving image and the art of film, we need to articulate a new ontology or –in Wittgenstein’s terms–, a new grammar. Derrida suggests this much when he reflects on what he calls the return of ghosts, which he attributes to the advent of film and the communications media; Deleuze does the same in his studies of film, and in particular in what he calls (...) the time-image. They both carve a grammatical space where room is opened for us to talk about an experience that fuses, paradoxically, problematically, the real and the virtual. Wittgenstein is tracing this grammar in his discussions on inner experience and in his observations about the phenomenon of aspect-seeing. Articulating a new grammar requires also a new way of seeing and this new seeing is the purpose of his methods; “clairvoyant” methods we can call them, following Deleuze’s term for what the time image propitiates in the viewer, in that they allow us to see beyond things to their aspects, beyond substances to processes; in other words, they train us to think in moving time. Philosophy is thus always a work of mourning and a commerce with ghosts. What this means is that Wittgenstein is –as Derrida and Deleuze are too–, what we might call a philosopher of becoming. (shrink)

This article explores the fate in Wittgenstein's mature work, of the issue of the unsayable, heart of the Tractatus project. According to the traditional interpretation of his work, he left behind that concern as a product of his early mistakes, later refuted in the Investigations. This article attempts to show that, in a certain sense, it is obvious that the problem of ineffability is still behind all his efforts. That it is constitutive not only of Wittgenstein's conception of language, but (...) is also the point of what he calls the vision of aspects, on which his latest writings focus. (shrink)

I show that the latter Wittgenstein's treatment of language and the mind results in a conception of the human subject that goes against the exclusive emphasis on the cognitive that characterizes our modern conception of knowledge and the self. For Wittgenstein, our identification with the cognitive ego is tantamount to a blindness to our own nature — blindness that is entrenched in our present culture. The task of philosophy is thus transformed into a form of cultural therapy that seeks to (...) awaken in us a sensitivity to different modes of awareness than the merely intellectual. Its substance of reflection becomes not only the field of conscious rational thought, but the tension in our nature between reason and vital feeling, that is, between culture and life. (shrink)

The Digital Revolution is transforming the way in which we interact with one another and relate to experience. The superabundance and superfluity of the virtual world, the fleeting moment and instantaneous pleasure it provides, begin to prevail as a cultural value and determine an attitude of detachment and indifference that extends to all aspects of our life. For Søren Kierkegaard this is a “demoniacal temptation” that leads to a life devoid of spiritual depth. In the midst of the undeniable bounties (...) of technology, reflection on this paradoxical nature of the technological in our lives becomes an urgent task. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's later philosophy is usually characterized as pragmatist, his account of linguistic meaning as conventionalist, and his methodology as naturalistic. Wittgenstein is said to have renounced in the later work his early concern with the Unsayable, and to have relocated philosophy within the realm of discourse. I argue against that picture of Wittgenstein's later philosophy in this dissertation. ;The central insight of Wittgenstein's discussion of rules and language in the Investigations is that meaning is not the result of a cognitive (...) achievement, but that it is grounded in precognitive natural reactions common to all human beings. I show that the appeal to the precognitive is transcendental, for it involves reference to a synthesis that is prior to discursive articulation and presupposed as a necessary condition of meaning. ;I argue against the conventionalist reading of Wittgenstein that the transcendental appeal to precognitive reactions in the discussion of rules is distinct from the appeal to a social context in the Private Language Argument, and that the relation between those two discussions is analogous to that between Kant's Transcendental Deduction and the Refutation of Idealism. ;The parallel with Kant helps to show how the failure to distinguish the empirical and transcendental levels in Wittgenstein's discussion leads to the conventionalist readings of his account of language . . It also shows that Wittgenstein is not subject to the charge of relativism commonly levelled against him . ;The distinction between empirical and transcendental levels, as it appears in the pivotal notion of Form of Life, reveals that Wittgenstein's methodology is not naturalistic but instead depends on a non-discursive mode of awareness. . I argue on this basis that Wittgenstein is closer to intuitive-realists than to pragmatists . ;Wittgenstein's Transcendentalism thus shows a deep continuity between the motivations behind his early and his later thought. In fact, the Unsayable plays a central role in the later work, for it is through non-discursive insight into the Unsayable that philosophy fulfills the therapeutic task that Wittgenstein assigns to it in the Investigations. (shrink)

This book is a psychoanalytic and philosophical exploration of how the digital is transforming our perception of the world and our understanding of ourselves. Drawing on examples from everyday life, myth, and popular culture, this book argues that virtual reality is only the latest instantiation of the phenomenon of the virtual, which is intrinsic to human being. It illuminates what is at stake in our understanding of the relationship between the virtual and the real, showing how our present technologies both (...) enhance and diminish our psychological lives. The authors claim that technology is a pharmakon --at the same time both a remedy and a poison-- and in their writing exemplify a method that overcomes the polarization that compels us to regard it either as a liberating force or a dangerous threat in human life. The digital revolution challenges us to reckon with the implications of what is being called our posthuman condition, leaving behind our modern conception of the world as constituted by atemporal essences and reconceiving it instead as one of processes and change. The book's postscript considers the sudden plunge into the virtual effected by the 2020 global pandemic. Accessible and wide-reaching, this book will appeal not only to psychotherapists, psychoanalysts, and philosophers, but anyone interested in the ways virtuality and the digital are transforming our contemporary lives. (shrink)

Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is a collection which examines Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on the concept of aspect-seeing, showing that it was not simply one more topic of investigation in Wittgenstein's later writings but rather a pervasive and guiding concept in his efforts to turn philosophy's attention to the actual conditions of our common life in language. The essays in this 2010 volume open up novel paths across familiar fields of thought: the objectivity of interpretation, the fixity of the past, the acquisition (...) of language, and the nature of human consciousness. Significantly, they exemplify how continuing consideration of the interrelated phenomena of aspect-seeing might produce a fruitful way of doing philosophy in a new century. (shrink)

O objetivo desta publicação é incentivar a produção filosófica de excelência por parte de pesquisadores notadamente influenciados pela filosofia de Wittgenstein e cujos temas possam suscitar um debate aprofundado. Além de desafiar o empreendimento filosófico contemporâneo, os temas aqui apresentados abordam questões que muitas vezes estão além daquelas consideradas por Wittgenstein em seu tempo. O leitor encontrará neste volume questões relacionadas ao ceticismo semântico e epistêmico, ao relativismo ético, às leituras literárias de Wittgenstein, ao problema das outras mentes e percepção (...) de aspectos, a intersubjetividade e o caráter contrassensual do Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, e, também, relacionadas ao Paradoxo de Moore. (shrink)

Parsa-Parsi et al systematically discuss and elucidate contentious and non-controversial ethical issues that emerged during the ICoME (International Code of Medical Ethics) revision process and the consensus they achieved. The ethical issues discussed include the physician’s duty to act in the best interests of patients and to ensure they are protected from the unjustifiable risk of harm, respect for patient autonomy and the duties of physicians during emergencies, among others. This paper examines paragraph 26, which requires doctors to provide only (...) medically justified remote treatment, ensure patients offer informed consent and adequately protect their confidentiality.1 At the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries in Europe and America implemented remote-by-default healthcare policies. At that time, the policy aimed to ensure that patients enjoyed continued access to care while protecting healthcare professionals’ health and well-being. After the COVID-19 pandemic, this policy remained in place. Regardless of the nature of their ailment, patients have consistently preferred in-person care out of concern that their health issues might not be accurately diagnosed and that they may not receive quality care …. (shrink)

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren damit den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

Implications of algorithmic mediation can be studied through the artefact itself, peoples’ practices, and the social/political/economical arrangements that affect and are affected by such interactions. Most studies in Academic social media (ASM) focus on one of these elements at a time, either examining design elements or the users’ behaviour on and perceptions of such platforms. We take a multi-faceted approach using affordances as a lens to analyze practices and arrangements traversed by algorithmic mediation. Following our earlier studies that examined the (...) artefact, this study’s aim is to understand how algorithmic mediation in ASM may shape researchers’ perceptions. We conducted online in-depth interviews with show and tell (n = 11) with ASM users from four countries, about their use of ASM. Data were analyzed using thematic analysis, and the codes were clustered in themes and validated via peer debriefing process. Four themes—related to exposure to content, visibility, ethical or legal infringements, and engagement—are discussed considering implications of datafication and findability. We conclude that algorithmic mediation constructs a narration of the relevant other in ASM, configuring the other as participatory and productive. (shrink)

Krebs (philosophy, U. of Frankfurt, Germany) provides a systematic study of whether nature has intrinsic value or is only valuable for human beings, with an ...

I INTRODUCTION: RESPECT, EQUALITY AND THE AUTONOMY OF MORALITY We often invoke a notion of respect to express our sense of human equality. ...

The National Library of Finland and the Von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Helsinki keep the collected correspondence of Georg Henrik von Wright, Wittgenstein’s friend and successor at Cambridge and one of the three literary executors of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. Among von Wright’s correspondence partners, Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees are of special interest to Wittgenstein scholars as the two other trustees of the Wittgenstein papers. Thus, von Wright’s collections held in Finland promise to shed light on the (...) context of decades of editorial work that made Wittgenstein’s later philosophy available to all interested readers. In this text, we present the letters which von Wright received from Anscombe and Rhees during the first nine months after Wittgenstein’s death. This correspondence provides a vivid picture of the literary executors as persons and of their developing relationships. The presented letters are beautiful examples of what the correspondence as a whole has to offer; it depicts – besides facts of editing – the story of three philosophers, whose conversing voices unfold the human aspects of inheriting Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. Their story does not only deal with editing the papers of an eminent philosopher, but with the attempt to do justice to the man they knew, to his philosophy and to his wishes for publication. (shrink)

Everyone, even when asserting unchallengeable authority from God or Science, thinks in language, in words and phrases, in expressions of moral, social and political impact, fighting words and words with and over which we fight. However, debates among the educated can be irrelevant elsewhere, ineffective against the highly motivated whose dogma instructs and guides them, their voting and their arming. The degeneration of “democracy” to “tyranny” such as Plato’s Republic postulated threatens in some lands “of the free,” while in others (...) it seems inexorably in progress. Today “democracy,” republic,” “liberty/freedom,” “justice,” “law and order” are adduced by their actual enemies to complement “nationalism,” “patriotism,” and frightening “empire.” Extremists on both sides decry “Tyranny!” each in fact seeking authoritarian power. All of which have instructive ancient precedents: in the History of the Peloponnesian War Thucydides offers horrific accounts of ancient nation-states “long ago and far away,” more or less democratic, that abandoned common sense, moral sense, and with them regard for value words and truth itself. In the early 2020s CE many persons and governments have done little better during the still lingering pandemic. A second horror is prompted by Thucydides’ report of civil war on Corcyra, telling how faction spawned riots, coups d’état, and outright civil war. The twenty-first-century media are uniquely potent, yet mechanics of seduction are timeless. Likewise techniques for winning true believers and votes, as illustrated by passages in Mein Kampf on the language of propaganda, its production and reception. Our hope is therefore Education for a New Era to help students to discover pitfalls of media(ted) “information,” to achieve independent critical thinking at levels of basic language use and foundations of argument. Besides recognizing mis- and disinformation as harmful, they must learn themselves to judge thoughtless use, cynical abuse, or, worse yet, brazen disdain of vocabulary indicating moral/ethical value. Scientists have key roles in this drama; humanists larger ones yet. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Rhetoric of Philosophical Politics in Plato's Seventh LetterV. Bradley LewisThe name Syracuse has come to stand as an emblem of the problematic relationship between philosophy and politics. While the sources1 differ on specifics, we can be confident that Plato visited there at least three times between 387 and 362 B.C. On his first trip, during the reign of Dionysius I, he became acquainted with Dion, the tyrant's brother-in-law. (...) When the elder Dionysius died, Dion, a devotee of philosophy, apparently contrived for the old man's son, namesake, and successor to invite Plato back, believing that the young tyrant could be philosophically educated and convinced to lay down tyranny in favor of a new regime based on the rule of law. The plan was defeated, however, by a combination of Dionysius's dissolute life and opposition by Dion's enemies at court. Dion was exiled, and Plato returned to the Academy. Dion implored Plato to return to Syracuse on the basis of reports of Dionysius II's renewed resolution to take up philosophy and by the tyrant himself (who seems to have made some thinly veiled threats against the still-exiled Dion). Plato's second visit to Dionysius was no more successful than the first, however, and he considered himself fortunate to have escaped with his life. After a meeting at which Plato recounted the events of his final trip, Dion marshaled an expeditionary force, which included volunteers from the Academy, and set out to expel Dionysius II by violence. The effort succeeded, but the new regime was itself riven by faction, and Dion was assassinated in 353.2The principal legacy of this ill-starred episode is contained in the letters that have come down to us under the name of Plato, particularly those numbered seven and eight. Scholarly discussion of Plato's Seventh Letter has usually focused on three questions: the doctrinal content of the letter and its relationship to the doctrinal content of the dialogues; the character of the letter as an apologia for Plato's Syracusan activities; and the general authenticity of the letter. While the second of these questions focuses correctly [End Page 23] on the rhetorical character of the letter, it ignores the most obvious aspect, namely, the letter's explicit addressees: the friends and comrades of Dion, and their request for political advice. If we take this rhetorical element with sufficient seriousness, we will see that the content of the letter is fully consistent with the teachings of the political dialogues, a point that tells in favor of the authenticity of the letter. Specifically, a focus on the rhetorical character of the letter reveals that its content is determined mostly by what emerges as an effort by Plato to influence his correspondents by moderating their understandable desire for vengeance and thus to forestall further bloodshed and disorder in Syracuse. What is most important about the letter, then, is not so much its account of Plato's actions in Syracuse, but its unveiling of his intentions with respect to Dion's followers. It is not the philosophical-political blueprint, sketched vaguely in the Seventh Letter, that is most important,3 but the concrete effort to mitigate the passions of his correspondents. Read in this light, the letter becomes even more important, since it contradicts the popular image of Plato as a proponent of dangerous political utopianism and portrays a more subtle relationship between philosophy and politics.1. Dion's intentions, Plato's apologyTo the extent that the rhetoric of the letter has been treated, commentators have usually focused on Plato's (or whoever the author) defense of his own actions in Sicily.4 While there is certainly warrant for this approach, the most important fact about the letter concerns its intended audience, the "relatives and comrades of Dion."5 As Plato explains in the opening of the letter, these are the men who have sought not only his advice, but his cooperation in completing the political project halted by Dion's death at the hands of several of his other purported "allies."The most striking feature of the rhetorical structure is that, while the letter... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Rhetoric of Philosophical Politics in Plato's Seventh LetterV. Bradley LewisThe name Syracuse has come to stand as an emblem of the problematic relationship between philosophy and politics. While the sources1 differ on specifics, we can be confident that Plato visited there at least three times between 387 and 362 B.C. On his first trip, during the reign of Dionysius I, he became acquainted with Dion, the tyrant's brother-in-law. (...) When the elder Dionysius died, Dion, a devotee of philosophy, apparently contrived for the old man's son, namesake, and successor to invite Plato back, believing that the young tyrant could be philosophically educated and convinced to lay down tyranny in favor of a new regime based on the rule of law. The plan was defeated, however, by a combination of Dionysius's dissolute life and opposition by Dion's enemies at court. Dion was exiled, and Plato returned to the Academy. Dion implored Plato to return to Syracuse on the basis of reports of Dionysius II's renewed resolution to take up philosophy and by the tyrant himself (who seems to have made some thinly veiled threats against the still-exiled Dion). Plato's second visit to Dionysius was no more successful than the first, however, and he considered himself fortunate to have escaped with his life. After a meeting at which Plato recounted the events of his final trip, Dion marshaled an expeditionary force, which included volunteers from the Academy, and set out to expel Dionysius II by violence. The effort succeeded, but the new regime was itself riven by faction, and Dion was assassinated in 353.2The principal legacy of this ill-starred episode is contained in the letters that have come down to us under the name of Plato, particularly those numbered seven and eight. Scholarly discussion of Plato's Seventh Letter has usually focused on three questions: the doctrinal content of the letter and its relationship to the doctrinal content of the dialogues; the character of the letter as an apologia for Plato's Syracusan activities; and the general authenticity of the letter. While the second of these questions focuses correctly [End Page 23] on the rhetorical character of the letter, it ignores the most obvious aspect, namely, the letter's explicit addressees: the friends and comrades of Dion, and their request for political advice. If we take this rhetorical element with sufficient seriousness, we will see that the content of the letter is fully consistent with the teachings of the political dialogues, a point that tells in favor of the authenticity of the letter. Specifically, a focus on the rhetorical character of the letter reveals that its content is determined mostly by what emerges as an effort by Plato to influence his correspondents by moderating their understandable desire for vengeance and thus to forestall further bloodshed and disorder in Syracuse. What is most important about the letter, then, is not so much its account of Plato's actions in Syracuse, but its unveiling of his intentions with respect to Dion's followers. It is not the philosophical-political blueprint, sketched vaguely in the Seventh Letter, that is most important,3 but the concrete effort to mitigate the passions of his correspondents. Read in this light, the letter becomes even more important, since it contradicts the popular image of Plato as a proponent of dangerous political utopianism and portrays a more subtle relationship between philosophy and politics.1. Dion's intentions, Plato's apologyTo the extent that the rhetoric of the letter has been treated, commentators have usually focused on Plato's (or whoever the author) defense of his own actions in Sicily.4 While there is certainly warrant for this approach, the most important fact about the letter concerns its intended audience, the "relatives and comrades of Dion."5 As Plato explains in the opening of the letter, these are the men who have sought not only his advice, but his cooperation in completing the political project halted by Dion's death at the hands of several of his other purported "allies."The most striking feature of the rhetorical structure is that, while the letter... (shrink)

This debate, I shall argue, has everything to do with Aristotle. Aristotle raises the charge of epiphenomenalism himself against a theory that seems to have close affinities to his own, and he offers what has the makings of an emergentist response. This leads to controversy within his own school. We find opponents ranged on both sides, starting with his own pupils, several of whom are stout defenders of epiphenomenalism, and culminating in the developed emergentism of later commentators. Aristotle’s theory and (...) the debate that ensued are thus quite relevant to contemporary discussions. But first we need to get clear on terms. (shrink)

Aristotle not only formulates the problem of intentionality explicitly, he makes a solution to it a requirement for any adequate theory of mind. His own solution, however, is not to be found in his theory of sensation, as Brentano and others have thought. In fact, it is precisely because Aristotle regards this theory as inadequate that he goes on to argue for a distinct new ability he calls "phantasia." The theory of content he develops on this basis (unlike Brentano's) is (...) profoundly naturalistic: it is a representational theory, formulated in terms of the causal powers and physical magnitudes of the body. (shrink)

Aristotle not only fonnulates the problem of intentionality explicitly, he makes a solution to it a requirement for any adequate theory of mind. His own solution, however, is not to be found in his theory of sensation, as Brentano and others have thought. In fact, it is precisely because Aristotle regards this theory as inadequate that he goes on to argue for a distinct new ability he calls “phantasia.” The theory of content he develops on this basis (unlike Brentano’s) is (...) profoundly naturalistic: it is a representational theory, formulated in tenns of the causal powers and physical magnitudes of the body. (shrink)

This debate, I shall argue, has everything to do with Aristotle. Aristotle raises the charge of epiphenomenalism himself against a theory that seems to have close affinities to his own, and he offers what has the makings of an emergentist response. This leads to controversy within his own school. We find opponents ranged on both sides, starting with his own pupils, several of whom are stout defenders of epiphenomenalism, and culminating in the developed emergentism of later commentators. Aristotle’s theory and (...) the debate that ensued are thus quite relevant to contemporary discussions. But first we need to get clear on terms. (shrink)