Writings on al-Shāṭibī have focused on his views on maṣlaḥah and Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah. His approach to the interpretation of the Qurʾān and the implications of such an approach have only rarely been heeded. This study addresses this aspect of al-Shāṭibī’s work. It essentially asserts that in restructuring Islamic legal theory around the idea of Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah, al-Shāṭibī brought jurists and Qurʾān commentators closer to one another. It further argues that his contribution went beyond the interest of jurists centred on legal (...) reasoning by holding a comprehensive hermeneutical view of the Qurʾān informed by belief in the thematic unity of its sūrahs and verses. Taking such unity as the cornerstone of a sound understanding of the Qurʾān capable of grasping its eternal values and universal principles, he developed a methodology that has inspired a few eminent contemporary Muslim scholars who have developed what has come to be known as thematic interpretation of the Qurʾān. This article discusses al-Shāṭibī’s hermeneutics of the Qurʾān by delineating his epistemic and methodological propositions. Thus, the author aims to show the existence of semantic unity and epistemic interconnectedness among different disciplines in Islamic scholarship. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam by Larry Benjamin MillerKhaled El-RouayhebLarry Benjamin Miller. Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam. Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning 21. Cham: Springer 2020. Pp. xviii + 143. Hardback, €77.99.Very few unpublished PhD dissertations have had a formative influence on a field. One of the precious few is Larry Miller's Princeton dissertation from (...) 1984 on Islamic disputation theory. It proposed an original and compelling account of the development of the discipline, from the earliest extant Arabic works in the tenth century to the composition of classic madrasa handbooks in the late thirteenth century. It has been cited regularly in the past decades and has served as the starting point for all later studies of Arabic/Islamic dialectics in European languages. The fact that it has finally been published is a fitting tribute to a study that is even more admirable for having been written when many of the primary sources were still only available as manuscripts.Part of the explanation for why the dissertation was not published sooner may be that its author did not pursue an academic career. And as he states in a short preface, he has not kept abreast of all relevant studies and editions that have appeared since his dissertation. A thorough revision and update has therefore not been possible. Though some minor corrections and revisions have been made, the book is still by and large the influential 1984 dissertation, now made available with a short introduction by Walter Young, one of the leading younger scholars in the field, along with helpful indices of proper names and subjects.Miller's narrative begins with Arabic works on disputation (jadal) by a number of theologians from the late ninth and tenth centuries, such as Ibn al-Rāwandī (d. 911), [End Page 518] al-Ash'arī (d. 935), and the Karaite Jewish scholar al-Qirqisānī (d. ca. 960). The basic assumption was that a questioner (sā'il) would ask a claimant (mu'allil) (i) what his view is; (ii) what the ground or reason ('illa) for that view is; (iii) the appropriateness of the ground/reason for the view; and (iv) to verify the ground/reason by showing it to be commensurate with the view. The ground/reason for the theological dialecticians was standardly an entity or property, not a premise. The reasoning tended to be informal and analogical, as opposed to explicitly making syllogistic deductions from quantified premises.Parallel to this theological tradition of jadal, there was an Arabic Aristotelian tradition that took its point of departure from Aristotle's Topics, translated into Arabic more than once in the period from the late eighth to the early tenth centuries. Though also often referred to as jadal, this tradition, represented by the writings of al-Farabi (d. 950), Avicenna (d. 1037), and Averroes (d. 1198), retained distinct features. It tended to deny any epistemic value to dialectics, instead seeing it as useful only insofar as it provided logical training. For the Aristotelian/Neoplatonic philosophers, the pursuit of truth was the preserve of demonstrative syllogism (burhān). Whereas the theological dialecticians envisaged a claimant (mu'allil) and a questioner (sā'il), with the burden of proof on the former, the philosophical tradition had a questioner (sā'il) seek, in the manner of Socratic elenchus, to elicit from a respondent (mujῑb) a series of answers that would allow the construction of a syllogism whose conclusion contradicted the respondent's initial position.From the time of al-Ghazali (d. 1111), Islamic theologians tended to take over the syllogistic ideal of reasoning from the philosophers, perhaps explaining why theological writings on jadal trail off after the eleventh century. The informal, analogical jadal tradition continued, however, in the writings of Islamic jurists. From the eleventh century, scholars such as Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083) and al-Juwaynī (d. 1085) wrote works on jadal in which the examples are disputes about questions of Islamic law and the disputants are partisans of the various legal schools. This tradition of what Miller calls "juristic dialectics" (74, 95) later adopted some... (shrink)

The term takyīf fiqhī stands for one crucial concept in Islamic jurisprudence and refers to one of the important steps in the process of formulating fatwā. It basically revolves around the categorization of particular issues under the appropriate rules and precedents established in Islamic juristic thought. The present article attempts to examine the concept of takyīf fiqhī in a comprehensive manner in terms of its meaning, authority, types, importance, and governing criteria as can be gleaned from the works of Sharī‘ah (...) scholars. This is then followed by an exploration of its application to modern contracts, taking as a case study the Central Provident Fund Nomination in Singapore. The article concludes with the view that the Central Provident Fund Nomination, in terms of its essential characteristics and objective, resembles the Islamic will contract as discussed in books of Islamic Jurisprudence. (shrink)

A growing discourse in Europe and North America focuses on questions of the religious and political status of Muslim minorities. This essay tries to bring some historical perspective to current discussions, surveying the ways premodern Muslim jurists approached issues pertaining to Muslims living in non-Muslim territories. As the historical material indicates, Muslim juridical opinion on these matters is very diverse. Individual jurists, while working within one or another of the broad traditions of Islamic jurisprudence (Shafi'i, Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, or Shi'i), (...) have felt free to craft opinions designed to fit specific situations. Given such variety, I conclude by echoing the judgment given by Rashid Rida earlier in this century: In the final analysis, specific Muslim minorities are the best judges of their own particular situations. (shrink)

Los estudios modernos sobre derecho islámico han puesto de relieve la necesidad de estudiar los procedimientos jurídicos en el Islam y el papel desempeñado por la práctica judicial en su formación. Se considera en general que, en el período temprano, los cadíes disponían de mayor libertad en lo relativo a testigos y métodos para establecer pruebas. Posteriormente y de forma gradual el sistema se volvió más rígido y restrictivo. En relación a este desarrollo, los investigadores han propuesto distintas fechas, que (...) van desde la segunda mitad del siglo VII hasta el siglo VIII e incluso hasta el siglo XI. Estos investigadores han tratado la doctrina de al-yamīn ma‛ al-šàhid como una excepción dentro del procedimiento establecido por la šarī‛a que, según ellos, se basaba estricta y mecánicamente en la doctrina de los dos testigos. Para dichos investigadores, la doctrina de al-yamīn ma‛ al-šàhid surgió bajo la influencia de determinadas locadidades o bien por influencia judía. Este artículo propone que esa doctrina debió de surgir en el contexto del período de la guerra civil, cuando las cuestiones sobre qiṣāṣ, qawad, qasāma y ḥakam fueron discutidas con frecuencia en relación con el Corán y la sunna común y cuando se sintió la necesidad de reformar la institución del ḥakam. Sobre la base de afirmaciones dispersas de ulemas que vivieron en fechas cercanas a ese período, afirmaciones que se ven confirmadas por los comentarios de Wakī‛, se concluye que Mu‛āwiya fue quien introdujo ese método para reformar la institución del ḥakam. La práctica judicial de esta doctrina también confirma que estaba demasiado difundida como para poder considerarla una práctica medinense o una práctica local, tal y como pretenden algunos juristas clásicos, los tradicionistas y algunos investigadores modernos. (shrink)

La pena natural es una situación paradójica que se puede presentar cuando el autor de un delito, al cometerlo o a causa de éste, ha sufrido un daño igual o mayor al que padecería si el juez de la causa le aplicara la pena estatal prevista para tal conducta. Se da con frecuencia al juzgar ciertos accidentes viales, cuando el acusado ya carga el peso de ser quien, por imprudencia, mató a su pareja o familiar cercano, por ejemplo. Pero ¿en (...) qué situaciones y cómo cabe recurrir a la pena natural? En esta investigación, Manuel Serrano explora las diversas aristas y posturas en pugna que atraviesan este tema, donde se cruzan cuestiones como la idea de la “culpa compensada”, la prohibición de aplicar castigo doble por un mismo hecho (non bis in idem) y la clemencia judicial. El autor desmonta la estructura conceptual de la pena natural, estudia jurisprudencia argentina y recorre producciones teóricas de juristas que se han preocupado por este asunto complejo, profundo y poco abordado del derecho penal. (shrink)

Imāmiyya holds that the theory of imāmate must rely on scriptural evidence and designation and that the Imām, the successor to Muḥammad, is in charge of all political and religious issues. The authority of the Imām includes some religious and social duties such as executing the legal punishments, collecting almsgiving, sustaining social order and declaring holy war. The fulfillment of these duties requires actual leadership of the Imām or his deputy. With the beginning of the great occultation in 329/941, there (...) was an uncertainty among the Imāmiyya followers about who would uphold these responsibilities. In this period, Shīʿī ʿulamā began to undertake the duties of the Imām in order to overcome this uncertainty and to avoid the possible schism. In the beginning, this delegation of authority was limited to the religious sphere; but, later, its scope gradually became wider. This process of delegation of power, which covers a long process, needs to be examined in its various periods. In this study, this subject will be considered with special reference to the scholars of the fifth century of hijra (hijrī). An effort is made in this article to reveal how the issues of the Imām’s powers are discussed in the context of the problem of expanding or narrowing the authority of the scholars who played significant roles in systemization of Uṣūlī (rationalist) thought in the period after Shaykh al-Mufīd.Summary: In the issues of Imām/Caliphate which led to political division among Muslims after the Prophet Muḥammad, Imāmī Shīʿa opines that the Imāmate theory relies on scriptural evidence and designation. According to this theory, apart from scriptural evidence and designation, personal qualities such as immaculacy, knowledge, bravery, and vantage are found in Ali, Ḥasan, Ḥusayn and nine people from the lineage of Ḥusayn. The Imām as a successor to the Prophet Muḥammad is a person who has both religious and political power which includes implementation of punishments, collecting alms, ensuring justice, declaring holy war. For the Imāmī Shīʿa, there is a need for imām or his deputy who has absolute power to fulfill these duties.Imāmī Shīʿa, who held that the disappeared twelfth Imām would return back to restore justice in the world, had to confront various problems in finding solutions to some issues related to the existence of Imām himself, as well as theological issues during the period of great occultation. Particularly, the period of great occultation (329/941), in which the link with the Imām was severed completely, the Shīʿī community were uncertain on how to fulfill the responsibilities of the Imām probably due to the lack of religious sources. Shaykh al-Mufīd draws attention to the issue of khums (a one-fifth share of the spoils of war and of other specified forms of income). In this period of uncertainty, the Shiite scholars came into prominence in order to fill the gap and to prevent the social disorder. Referring to a tawqī‘ (rescript) from the Twelfth Imām, they claimed that they would take responsibility for the Twelfth Imām on his behalf. In the beginning, the delegation of the power was limited to the religious sphere. It was gradually extended to other spheres by the contribution of some scholars. It reached the largest dimension with the implementation of “wilāyat al-faqīh” theory.From that period until our times, the era when Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples lived can be considered as the beginning of this period. In the fifth century when Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples lived the delegation of power was limited to the religious sphere. In this article, how the scholars who played a role in the systematization of Uṣūlī thought dealt with the issue of the limits of the authority of Imām and how they defined the role of the Imāmī jurists (faqīh) will be examined.Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples were sometimes cautious on the issue of the delegation of the power of Imām. They, however, pointed out the role of the faqīh in the occultation period in order to overcome the uncertainty. As a matter of fact, Shaykh al-Ṭūsī and al-Qādī Ibn al-Barrāj made significant contributions to the issues of collection and distribution of khums. However, Sallār al-Daylamī’s contribution to the subject is more crucial. He considered khums as the grace of God and believed that it can be allocated by taking into account the share of the Imām. They put forward the views that explained in details the role of the faqīh in the collection and distribution of alms. Even Ibn al-Barrāj opined that in the absence of Imām and his deputy alms are to be allocated to the Faqihs on the ground that they know better how to distribute it. Therefore, in the absence of Imām and his deputy, by suggesting that faqīh must be in charge of collecting and distributing alms, they proposed a remedy in an early period.On the issue of leading the Friday prayer (ṣalāt al-jum‘a), which is one of the social duties of Imām, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples considered the presence of the Imām or his deputy as a condition for a valid Friday prayer. In addition to this condition, Al-Ḥalabī, also added that a person who meets the necessary conditions can be also considered in leading Friday prayer. This addition by Ḥalabī was an important contribution to the solution of the problems encountered during the period of great occultation on both Friday prayer and delegation of Imām religious and political authorities to faqīh. On the other hand, Sallār, another disciple of Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, opposed the idea of the faqīh leading the Friday prayer in the absence of the Imām even when the necessary conditions are met. It can be said that this approach of Sallār led to the opinion of some Imāmis which considered Friday prayer unlawful in the absence of Imām. In the occultation period, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples showed a cautious attitude about the implementation of the punishments. They argued that only Imām could implement the punishments. However, the major step was taken by Shaykh Ṭūsī on the issue of who implements the punishments in the occultation period. He argued that the Imām’s designated the faqihs to implement the punishments. In addition to this subject, Shiite scholars discussed the issue of whether a Shiite officer under the reigning rule in the occultation period implemented the punishments. On this issue, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā compiled a treaty untitled Mas’ala fi’l-‘amal ma‘a’al-sulṭan. For him, the main criteria are whether such person has necessary responsibilities and qualifications. Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples also continued their master’s conciliatory attitude. In the final analysis, the contribution of Sharīf al-Murtaḍā and his disciples on the issue of who will undertake the duties and responsibilities of the Imām is crucial in the systematization of the idea of transferal of the power of the Imām to faqīh including political one. In fact, Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s advice to take part in the existing administrations has been considered a way out for the scholars who want to establish relations with the authorities in the later periods. (shrink)

Natural Law is considered by many jurists an ambiguous concept. In this article we offer a concise history of ancient and mediaeval Natural Law as well as how it is present in the modern Bills of Human Rights. In the Natural Law it is convenient to distinguish what is caducous from that still valid.

Latin American integration, and particularly Caribbean integration is an urgent matter in both practice and theory, one that concerns not only economists, but jurist and historians. It requires a debate around themes of culture, identity and diversity. In this essay, the idea that culture identity ..

In this paper I will examine the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy as the alleged tensions between them appear in diagnoses about the crisis of liberal democracy. The issue is approached through the arguments of the German jurist Martin Kriele, who holds the thesis that there can be no sovereign in the constitutional State. I will begin by explaining this thesis as well as the justification offered by Kriele. According to him, the guarantee of rights and freedoms is only (...) possible within the framework of the constitutional State. Hence, he advances a second related thesis, that democracy can only be developed in the constitutional State, that is, as constitutional democracy. However, this second thesis seems in contradiction with the first if the democratic principle implies popular sovereignty. To resolve this apparent antinomy, I will distinguish with Kriele two rival conceptions of democracy in order to point out the danger of misinterpreting the meaning of constitutional democracy. -/- En este trabajo examino la relación entre constitucionalismo y democracia, puesto que las supuestas tensiones entre ambos aparecen en los diagnósticos sobre la crisis de la democracia liberal. La cuestión se aborda a través de los argumentos del jurista alemán Martin Kriele, quien defiende la tesis de que no puede haber soberano en el Estado constitucional. Empezaré por explicar dicha tesis así como la justificación de ella que ofrece Kriele, para quien la garantía de los derechos y libertades sólo es posible en el marco del Estado constitucional. De ahí que avance una segunda tesis relacionada, cuando sostiene que la democracia sólo puede desarrollarse en dicho Estado constitucional, esto es, como democracia constitucional. Sin embargo, esta segunda tesis parece contradictoria con la primera si identificamos el principio democrático con la soberanía popular. Para resolver esa aparente antinomia, se distinguiré con Kriele dos concepciones rivales de la democracia, a fin de señalar el peligro de malinterpretar el sentido de la democracia constitucional. (shrink)

This article covers the critical edition, translation and analysis of the epistle on creed, al- Muʿtamad min al-muʿtaqad, written by the famous Hanafī jurist ʿAlāʾ al-dīn Abū Bakr b. Masʿūd al-Kāsānī. In his work, which can be evaluated in the literature of creed, al-Kāsānī explains the basics of Hanafī-Māturīdī belief in a brief and concise manner without any discussion. This study consists of three main parts: examination, critical edition and translation. In the examination part of the study, the life (...) of the author is handled with various aspects, and at the same time information is given about the relation of the work to the author, its position in the literature, its method and content as well as its manuscripts. Then, based on the six manuscript copies of the work which are available in various manuscript libraries, the critical edition and the translation of the work is given. It is aimed that this work, which is discussed in Turkish for the first time in an academic article, will contribute to the studies on Hanafī-Māturīdī creed literature to some extent. (shrink)

The philosophical past, once a thing of the past, is with us again. I examine three recent positions about how to understand the philosophical past: the presentism of Richard Rorty, the traditionalism of Alasdair MacIntyre, and the interpretism of Charles Taylor. Rorty, MacIntyre, and Taylor all acknowledge a Hegelian influence upon their views; thus, I also explore Hegel's own view of the history of philosophy. Finally, I offer my own view that our relation to the past ought to be guided (...) by "recognizing" it. Although the concept of recognition is found in Hegel, I argue that Hegel as well as Rorty and MacIntyre end up conceiving of our relation to the past as one of appropriation. Recognition as I define it eschews such appropriation; rather, it consists in a "working through" of the past in a sense the paper specifies. (shrink)

Desde la separación estricta de ética y derecho, la Rechtslehre kantiana sostiene que es la ética la que exige al sujeto que haga suya la máxima de actuar conforme al derecho. En la misma línea defiende J. F. Kervégan que los sujetos habríamos de reconocer como un deber ético el respeto a las normas jurídicas, sin que esto quiera decir que el derecho dependa de la ética, pues en estricto derecho no podría tenerse a la intención de conciencia como móvil (...) de la acción justa. Lo que el derecho regula y juzga son las acciones exteriores, y también el móvil tiene que es el poder coercitivo, que el derecho, a diferencia de la ética, tiene la facultad de imponer a la sociedad a fin de que cada miembro de ella en su acción externa evite por su propio interés perjudicar la libertad de cualquier otro. Por esta unicidad del móvil sostiene Kant que derecho y facultad de coaccionar significan una y la misma cosa. El formalismo de su planteamiento impide a Kant entrar en la complejidad del entramado de derechos y deberes, de bienes y cargas, que hace de la justicia distributiva el verdadero objeto del arte jurídico. Y por su externalización estricta del derecho reduce al jurista a la observancia de los textos, ignora el procedimiento de la controversia judicial, excluye la equidad como ajena al derecho, y convierte al derecho en el gendarme de la moral . En cuanto a la intención interior, una cosa es que las leyes no puedan motivar el albedrío por la conciencia de la obligación, y otra que si derecho y coacción significaran lo mismo no habría diferencia entre cumplir la ley para evitar el castigo o eludir el castigo burlando la ley -opción ésta que a muchos resultaría más provechosa, dado que el poder del Estado es incapaz de vigilar en cada momento a cada sujeto, y que los vigilantes mismos necesitan ser vigilados, ad infinitum. Tras una breve alusión a los conocidos argumentos de Platón, Hobbes y Montesquieu sobre la obediencia voluntaria como el otro móvil del derecho, no menos necesario que la coerción, se recuerda que también el profesor Kervégan ha defendido en otro contexto que un orden jurídico cualquiera tiene dos componentes irreductibles entre sí: el sistema de normas que define lo que debe ser y la decisión que conforma el ser al deber-ser. Finalmente, en el derecho interestatal no puede Kant invocar la facultad de coaccionar, que deja de significar lo mismo que "derecho" porque, al no haber ninguna fuerza superior a la soberanía de los Estados, el pacto durará hasta que alguno de ellos lo incumpla por su libre y soberana decisión. From a firm distinction between ethics and right, the Kantian Rechtslehre holds that the demand to adopt the maxim to act according to the right is an ethical demand. Also J.F. Kervégan defends that individuals should recognize the ethical obligation to respect juridical rules, but this does not mean that right depends on ethics, because, in strict right, internal disposition or intention could not be considered as motive for the rightful action. Law regulates and judges the external actions and also the motive has to be external as it is external the coercion that right -but not ethics- can impose on society so that each member of it, for his own interest, does not damage in his external agency any other member's freedom. Because of this only one motive, Kant declares that right and coercion's capacity signify the same thing. His formalist position stops him to go into the complex network of rights and duties, of advantages and burdens, which makes distributive justice the true subject of juridical art. Moreover, because of the strict externals of the law Kant is unaware of the juridical controversy, reduces the jurist to the observance of texts, ejects the equity as not right's own, and risks to transform the right in the gendarme of morals . With regard to intention, one thing is that in strict law the internal disposition can not be deemed as the motive, and other thing is that if law and coercion's capacity signify the same thing, there is no difference between obeing the law to avoide the punishment, or avoiding the punishment in breaking the law; then, the last option would be profitable for too many people, since the coercion power is not able to survey in every moment each individual, and the watchmen themselves need to be watched over and so on. After a short mention of the well known Plato, Hobbes and Montesquieu's arguments about the voluntary obedience as the other motive of the strict right, not less necessary than coercion, we remember that J. F. Kervégan also defended in another context that any juridical order has two irreducible le système des normes générales qui définissent ce qui doit être, et la décision qui conforme l'être au devoir-être. Finally, in the interstates right, Kant can not maintain that right and capacity of coercion mean the same thing, because there is not any force over the sovereignty of the States, and therefore the contract will last till one of them breaks it by its free and sovereign decision. (shrink)

This study aimed to identify the learning and business incubation processes and their impact on developing the performance of business incubators in Gaza Strip, and the study relied on the descriptive analytical approach, and the study population consisted of all employees working in business incubators in Gaza Strip in addition to experts and consultants in incubators where their total number reached (62) individuals, and the researchers used the questionnaire as a main tool to collect data through the comprehensive survey method, (...) where (55) questionnaires were retrieved with a recovery rate of (88.7%). The results of the study showed that there is a high approval of the variables of the study, where the dimension of incubation operations came with a relative weight (84.89%), followed by the learning dimension which got a relative weight (82.50%), while the performance level of the incubators got a relative weight (80.12%) and as the study results showed There is a positive relationship statistically between the two dimensions of learning and business incubation processes and performance development in business incubators, and the linear regression analysis model showed that the main effect in improving the performance of business incubators is "after business incubation operations" while it showed weak effect after learning. The study came out with several recommendations, the most important of which is that business incubators seek to reinforce the learning process and incubation processes for business, and the need to periodically evaluate their performance, and that a more effective mechanism be designed to follow up with companies after the end of the incubation period and monitor the progress of these companies. (shrink)

The concept of recognition has been thrust into the center of Hegel scholarship in the last fifty years for two main reasons. First, the publication of the Jena manuscripts showed recognition to be a fundamental and pervasive theme in Hegel’s early systematic efforts. It is in fact possible to distinguish and evaluate these works according to the role that recognition plays within them. Second, the master-slave section of the Phenomenology of Spirit, in which the concept of recognition is introduced, has (...) been often treated as the most crucial part of the PhG. (shrink)

This article explores the diminished role of the superego in contemporary psychoanalysis, and it focuses on Loewald’s perspective on the superego as original and as a possible way to rethink the meaning of the concept. Loewald saw the superego as representing the modality of the future; so, it beckons us forward and ought not be construed as merely critical. I also argue that Loewald’s perspective on the superego anticipates the emerging literatures on mentalization (especially mentalized affectivity) and autobiographical memory. (PsycINFO (...) Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Are Hegel and Nietzsche philosophical opposites? Can twentieth-century Continental philosophers be categorized as either Hegelians or Nietzscheans? In this book Elliot Jurist places Hegel and Nietzsche in conversation with each other, reassessing their relationship in a way that affirms its complexity. Jurist examines Hegel's and Nietzsche's claim that philosophy and culture are linked and explicates the various meanings of "culture" in their work--in particular, the contrast both thinkers draw between ancient and modern culture. He evaluates their positions on (...) the failure of modern culture and on the need to develop conceptions of satisfied agency. It is Jurist's original contribution to focus on the psychological sensibility that informs the project of both philosophers. Writing in an admirably clear style, he traces the ongoing legacy of Hegel's and Nietzsche's thought in Adorno, Habermas, Honneth, Jessica Benjamin, Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, and Butler. (shrink)

Are Hegel and Nietzsche philosophical opposites? Can twentieth-century Continental philosophers be categorized as either Hegelians or Nietzscheans? In this book Elliot Jurist places Hegel and Nietzsche in conversation with each other, reassessing their relationship in a way that affirms its complexity. Jurist examines Hegel's and Nietzsche's claim that philosophy and culture are linked and explicates the various meanings of "culture" in their work--in particular, the contrast both thinkers draw between ancient and modern culture. He evaluates their positions on (...) the failure of modern culture and on the need to develop conceptions of satisfied agency. It is Jurist's original contribution to focus on the psychological sensibility that informs the project of both philosophers. Writing in an admirably clear style, he traces the ongoing legacy of Hegel's and Nietzsche's thought in Adorno, Habermas, Honneth, Jessica Benjamin, Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, and Butler. (shrink)

Hegel scholars will be pleased to discover Miller’s new translation of Hegel’s Philosophical Propaedeutic, which is a revised and completed version of W.T. Harris’ partial translation which appeared in the 1860s. PPr, discovered by Karl Rosenkranz in 1838 and published in 1840, is based upon lectures given when Hegel was Rector of the Gymnasium in Nuremberg between 1808 and 1811. Rosenkranz’s ordering of the lectures according to age levels has been preserved by the editors of the new translation, Michael George (...) and Andrew Vincent. In their introduction, they explain that the Rosenkranz ordering was unfortunately disregarded in the Theorie Werkausgabe, edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, brought out in the 1970s by the Suhrkamp Verlag of Frankfurt. In the fourth volume of this edition, the lectures were ordered according to chronology. It will be interesting, no doubt, to see how the Hegel-Archiv scholars will handle this when their edition of PPr is published. The Hegel-Archiv edition will not be finished for years or possibly decades. Helmut Schneider is the editor. (shrink)

There is currently a burgeoning interest in affects across a number of disciplines--philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and psychoanalysis. Yet, it remains unclear to what extent one can infer that a common set of problems and concerns exists. In this project, therefore, I undertake an interdisciplinary inquiry with the aim of providing conceptual clarity about the meaning and function of affects. In particular, I begin with the history of philosophy; then I turn to focus upon psychology--exploring the notion of "basic emotions" as (...) well as the question of whether affects can exist without cognition. This leads to an examination of recent work in neuroscience. My conclusion is that the perspectives of psychologists and neuroscientists are a necessary, but insufficient way to conceive of affects, and that to understand affects fully, one must consider the theme of agency. ;The capacity for regulation is a rich area in which to investigate how affects and agency are connected. I synthesize literature about regulation from developmental psychology, infant research and psychoanalysis, delineating three stages of development: pre-agency, agency proper, and self-conscious agency. More specifically, I propose that agency comes into being through "affect regulation." In enabling an infant to identify and modulate his/her affect states, affect regulation fosters the unfolding of a sense of agency. Affects are not simply found states in the mind; it is possible for them to be crafted and refined. Thus, I suggest that a new term, "affectivity," is required to characterize the ability that adults have to self-regulate affects. Clinical material is introduced to illustrate the concept of affectivity. ;My view supports the psychoanalytic assumption that affects contribute to the emergence of a sense of agency and that a sense of agency allows us to experience new and more differentiated affects. The claim that there is an integral relation between affects and agency depends upon a range of perspectives--about the brain and behavior, but also about subjective experience, which is both influenced by culture and is radically unique. In my conclusion, I stress the importance of preserving the scientific and hermeneutic aspects of psychoanalysis. (shrink)

The fundamental aim of this study will be to offer a precise account of the meaning of Hegel's concept of recognition as it is found in the early Jena-Schriften and the Phenomenology of Spirit . However, in locating the origins of the concept in Greek tragedy, we will also be led beyond the meaning of the concept to its significance. Its significance is established most clearly insofar as the concept can be used to form the basis of an overall interpretation (...) of the PhG as resembling a tragedy. The contemporary influence and relevance of the concept is presented in the Introduction. ;Part I traces the emergence of the concept of recognition out of the concept of love in the Frankfurt-Schriften; it then treats the subsequent development of the concept in the early systematic efforts of the Jena era. Part II focuses upon the distinctive and detailed treatment of the concept as it is portrayed in the PhG. Part III locates the origins of Hegel's concept in Greek tragedy, i.e., tragic recognition, and moves on to consider recognition within the structure of the wholes in the PhG and Greek tragedy. ;The concept of recognition has been seen as Hegel's attempt to come to terms with the individual's lack of integration in modern society. It is employed as a critique of social contract theory in the sense that recognition demands more from individuals in a society than the "merely external bonding" of a contract. The self-knowledge sense of recognition, as opposed to the social and interpersonal senses, has not been given sufficient attention. This can be explained somewhat by the fact that this sense is not featured in the early Jena-Schriften. The relation between knowledge and recognition becomes a pressing issue in the PhG. The self-knowledge sense does not supplant the other senses; rather, it supplements them and thus enriches the concept. The self-knowledge sense of recognition, and even the relation between the different senses is best explicated by reference to tragic recognition. (shrink)

Public and academic medical ethics debates surrounding justice and age discrimination often proceed from a problematic understanding of old age that ignores the diversity of older people. This article introduces the feminist perspective of intersectionality to medical ethical debates on aging and old age in order to analyze the structural discrimination of older people in medicine and health care. While current intersectional approaches in this field focus on race, gender, and sexuality, we thus set out to introduce aging and old (...) age as an additional category that is becoming more relevant in the context of longer life expectancies and increasing population aging. We analyze three exemplary cases on the individual, institutional, and public health level, and argue that considering the intersections of old age with other social categories helps to accommodate the diverse identities of older people and detect inequality and structural discrimination. (shrink)

Despite being a collection of holistic assessment tools, the comprehensive geriatric assessment primarily focuses on the social category of age during the assessment and disregards for example gender. This article critically reviews the standardized testing process of the comprehensive geriatric assessment in regard to diversity-sensitivity. I show that the focus on age as social category during the assessment process might potentially hinder positive outcomes for people with diverse backgrounds of older patients in relation to other social categories, such as race, (...) gender or socio-economic background and their influence on the health of the patient as well as the assessment and its outcomes. I suggest that the feminist perspective of intersectionality with its multicategorical approach can enhance the diversity-sensitivity of the comprehensive geriatric assessment, and thus improve the treatment of older patients and their quality of life. By suggesting an intersectional-based approach, this article contributes to debates about justice and diversity in medical philosophy and advocates for the normative value of diversity in geriatric medicine. (shrink)

Avineri’s book offers a genuinely integrated portrait of Hess. It departs from Isaiah Berlin’s influential reading of Hess as a youthful socialist who, owing to the failure of revolution in 1848, matured as a Zionist. Rather, Avineri highlights both the proto-Zionist elements in Hess’ earliest works and the enduring socialist element in his most important book, Rome and Jerusalem. Hess’ distinctive contribution as a thinker is located in his resolute interest in both socialism and nationalism.

Avineri’s book offers a genuinely integrated portrait of Hess. It departs from Isaiah Berlin’s influential reading of Hess as a youthful socialist who, owing to the failure of revolution in 1848, matured as a Zionist. Rather, Avineri highlights both the proto-Zionist elements in Hess’ earliest works and the enduring socialist element in his most important book, Rome and Jerusalem. Hess’ distinctive contribution as a thinker is located in his resolute interest in both socialism and nationalism.

A good argument can be made for the view that the single most crucial concept in all continental philosophy is “recognition.” To defend such a view, first of all, would be one way to emphasize how indifferent analytic philosophy has been to the web of issues which recognition denotes - such as self-knowledge, alterity, intersubjectivity, and communitarianism. Indeed, the comparable analytic issues like “personal identity” and “other minds” hardly begin to address the complexity of what is at stake in recognition. (...) More significantly, recognition is important because it divides continental philosophy between those who believe that a unified self exists, and that human relations can achieve mutuality and equality, and those who are inclined to doubt the possibility of both of these things. Philosophers of the latter variety challenge the plausibility of the Hegelian subject and argue that human relations are defined by the master/slave paradigm or at least by persistent struggles for power. (shrink)

A good argument can be made for the view that the single most crucial concept in all continental philosophy is “recognition.” To defend such a view, first of all, would be one way to emphasize how indifferent analytic philosophy has been to the web of issues which recognition denotes - such as self-knowledge, alterity, intersubjectivity, and communitarianism. Indeed, the comparable analytic issues like “personal identity” and “other minds” hardly begin to address the complexity of what is at stake in recognition. (...) More significantly, recognition is important because it divides continental philosophy between those who believe that a unified self exists, and that human relations can achieve mutuality and equality, and those who are inclined to doubt the possibility of both of these things. Philosophers of the latter variety challenge the plausibility of the Hegelian subject and argue that human relations are defined by the master/slave paradigm or at least by persistent struggles for power. (shrink)

BackgroundThe concept of ‘successful ageing’ has been a prominent focus within the field of gerontology for several decades. However, despite the widespread attention paid to this concept, its intersectional implications have not been fully explored yet. This paper aims to address this gap by analyzing the potential ageist and ableist biases in the discourse of successful ageing through an intersectional lens.MethodA critical feminist perspective is taken to examine the sensitivity of the discourse of successful ageing to diversity in societies. The (...) paper analyzes how ageist and ableist biases can manifest in the ways we conceptualize ageing, drawing on examples in the context of mental health.ResultsWe argue that the conventional approach to successful ageing is limited in its ability to account for the experiences of people who have faced intersectional discrimination throughout their lives. Drawing on examples in the context of mental health, we explore among others the link between depression and disabilities. Furthermore, we shed light on the negative impact of ageist and ableist attitudes concerning the diagnosis and treatment of dementia.DiscussionWe demonstrate how diversity is often overlooked in discussions of ageing well, and how ageist and ableist biases can manifest in the ways we conceptualize ageing. We argue that focusing solely on the health status as a means of achieving success fails to adequately counter ageism for all people. We further emphasize the role of structural factors, such as ageist attitudes, in shaping the experience of ageing and exacerbating health inequalities.ConclusionOverall, our findings emphasize the need for a more nuanced and inclusive understanding of ageing and therefore an intersectional approach to conceptions of ageing well that recognizes and addresses the biases and limitations of current discourses. Thereby, this paper offers valuable insights into the complex intersections between age and disabilities from a bioethical perspective, highlighting the need for a more inclusive and intersectional approach to ageing. (shrink)

Diabetes is one of the most common diseases worldwide where a cure is not found for it yet. Annually it cost a lot of money to care for people with diabetes. Thus the most important issue is the prediction to be very accurate and to use a reliable method for that. One of these methods is using artificial intelligence systems and in particular is the use of Artificial Neural Networks (ANN). So in this paper, we used artificial neural networks to (...) predict whether a person is diabetic or not. The criterion was to minimize the error function in neural network training using a neural network model. After training the ANN model, the average error function of the neural network was equal to 0.01 and the accuracy of the prediction of whether a person is diabetics or not was 87.3%. (shrink)

Social categorizations regarding gender or age have proven to be relevant in human-robot interaction. Their stereotypical application in the development and implementation of robotics in eldercare is even discussed as a strategy to enhance the acceptance, well-being, and quality of life of older people. This raises serious ethical concerns, e.g., regarding autonomy of and discrimination against users. In this paper, we examine how relevant professional stakeholders perceive and evaluate the use of social categorizations and stereotypes regarding gender and age in (...) robotics for eldercare. Based on 16 semi-structured interviews with representatives from technology development, industry, and nursing science as well as practice, we explore the subjects’ awareness, evaluations, and lines of argument regarding the corresponding moral challenges. Six different approaches of dealing with categorizations and stereotypes regarding gender and age in care robotics for older people are identified: negation, functionalistic relativization, explanation, neutralization, stereotyping, and queering. We discuss the ethical implications of these approaches with regard to professional responsibility and draw conclusions for responsible age tech in pluralistic societies. (shrink)

Tbe struggle for the liberalization of the law on abortion began in Belgium in 1970 when the taboo was breached in an initial bill. However, support by pressure groups failed and this led to a long period of nondecision, which may be explained by the disunity in the camp of the supporters on the one hand and the blocking tactics of the Flemish Christian Democrats on the other. In 1986 a compromise between supporters finally emerged, and via a majority which (...) cut right through the governmental coalition an abortion law was approved at the end of March 1990, which closely corresponds to British, French and Dutch legislation. The catholic monarch's refusal to ratify the bill caused a political crisis which was solved by the unanimous signing by the assembled ministers. (shrink)