The purpose of this article is to invigorate debate concerning the nature of analogy, and to broaden the scope of current conceptions of analogy. We argue that analogizing is not a single or even a fundamental cognitive process. The argument relies on an analysis of the history of the concept of analogy, case studies on the use of analogy in scientific problem solving, cognitive research on analogy comprehension and problem solving, and a survey of computational mechanisms of analogy comprehension. Analogizing (...) is regarded as a macrocognitive phenomenon having a number of supporting processes. These include the apperception of resemblances and distinctions, metaphor, and the balancing of semantic flexibility and inference constraint. Psychological theories and computational models have generally relied on (a) a sparse set of ontological concepts (a property called “similarity” and a structuralist categorization of types of semantic relations), (b) a single form category (i.e., the classic four-term analogy), and (c) a single set of morphological distinctions (e.g., verbal vs. pictorial analogies). This article presents a classification based on a “naturalistic” exploration of the variety of uses of analogical reasoning in pragmatically distinct contexts. The resultant taxonomy distinguishes pre-hoc, ad-hoc, post-hoc, pro-hoc, contra-hoc, and trans-hoc analogy. Each will require its own macrocognitive modeling, and each presents an opportunity for research on phenomena of reasoning that have been neglected. (shrink)

Against these are set pieces that argue anarchisms impossibility and estimate its relevance to social change.The debate format of Anarchism introduces the ...

This book is a collection of essays that examine various subjects in which unreasonableness or low standards of rationality substitute sentimentality for sober thought and thereby restrict action. The essays defend the interconnected values of reasonableness and freedom.

It will be assumed that the questions are legitimate.

This paper points out a recent error that has been occurring in logic and critical thinking textbooks concerning the definition of a deductively valid argument. Namely, a number of authors define a deductively valid argument as one where the conclusion must be true if the premises are true. This definition is mistaken as it attaches necessity to a statement (the conclusion) rather than to the relationship between premises and the conclusion. In addition to detailing this mistake in a number of (...) textbooks, the paper provides three correct definitions of a valid argument. (shrink)

This paper points out a recent error that has been occurring in logic and critical thinking textbooks concerning the definition of a deductively valid argument. Namely, a number of authors define a deductively valid argument as one where the conclusion must be true if the premises are true. This definition is mistaken as it attaches necessity to a statement (the conclusion) rather than to the relationship between premises and the conclusion. In addition to detailing this mistake in a number of (...) textbooks, the paper provides three correct definitions of a valid argument. (shrink)

In ‘Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory’ Malcolm argues that Smart's brain-mind identity theory is not even false, but is unintelligible. I want to comment on his arguments.

It is proposed that the perturbation of the differentiated state in cancer is related to alterations in DNA methylation as well as to alterations in methylation of other cellular molecules, leading to an imbalance in global cellular methylation. It is hypothesized that the global imbalance in methylation is reflected in the enhanced levels of transmethylation seen in many cancer cell types as well as in a number of undermethylated molecules.

KNOWLEDGE IS NOT ENOUGH. By Samuel B. Gould.