In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.3 (2002) 371-397 [Access article in PDF] How the "New Science" of Cannons Shook up the Aristotelian Cosmos Mary J. Henninger-Voss [Figures]Approximately halfway through the "Second Day" of Galileo's Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems Galileo's mouthpiece, the mathematician Salviati, scoffs at his Aristotelian colleague Simplicio: "I see that you have hitherto been of that herd who, in order to learn how (...) matters such as this [motion] take place, and in order to acquire a knowledge of natural effects, do not betake themselves to ships or crossbows or cannons, but retire to their studies... to see whether Aristotle has said anything about them."1 Silly, simple Simplicio! He has been searching for natural philosophical wisdom in the books of natural philosophers rather than in the world of docks and arsenals. Indeed this quotation appears near the outset of Day Two wherein Salviati offers cannonshot as proof for the opposing Aristotelian position that the experience of projectiles proves the motionless state of the earth. Obviously, if the earth rotates toward the east, cannonballs shot point-blank to the west ought to travel much further than to the east. And clearly this is not so. Simplicio agrees that the new arguments offered by the cannon are excellent, "and now I see with how many elegant experiments nature graciously wishes to aid us in coming to the recognition of the truth," Simplicio enthusiastically enjoins. "What a shame there were no cannons in Aristotle's time!" exclaims the third interlocutor, Sagredo. "With them he would indeed have battered down ignorance, and spoken without [End Page 371] [Begin Page 373] the least hesitation concerning the universe."2 The irony here is not only that Aristotle might have used cannons in order to explain the workings of the universe but also that Galileo does so in the following pages. His demonstrations with reference to artillery demolish the Aristotelian position, but he has had Simplicio open the door for him by recognizing this most violent of artifices as an elegant experiment provided by nature.3The cannon provides a primary referent for Galileo's new mathematical physics of motion from his very first dialogue to his very last. The early De Motu culminated in a series of questions about the shot of cannons, while the conversation in his final masterwork, Discourses Concerning Two New Sciences, was set in the Venetian arsenal, and to it Galileo appended a table of the parabolic paths that could be expected from cannons shot at various elevations.4 In some sense Galileo turned inside-out a much older problem, one that had haunted military engineers of sixteenth-century Italy—and Galileo had been trained, and trained others, in military engineering.5 State organizers of war and captain generals were less interested in the implications the arts of fortifications and artillery held for the existing science of natural motion than in the necessity to reduce to a science, that is, a coherent body of knowledge, the rules for manufacturing cannons, planting artillery battery, aiming guns, and fortifying camps, cities, and castles.What Galileo gives us is recognizable as early physics, as a sophisticated mechanical science, a neat triumph of mathematical method in natural philosophy. But the ways and means by which mathematics came together with natural philosophy to address problems of both technology and nature are by no means neat. My claim is that attention to the military sphere will help us sort out some of those ways and means. The curious thing about the historiography on the relationship between early modern science and warfare is that the fact of a connection seems to have been taken for granted, while the implications have seldom been investigated.6 This essay is an attempt to trace those implications by [End Page 373] looking at a mathematician who specifically tried to reduce to a mathematical science the military arts, Niccolò Tartaglia.7 Tartaglia's story shows how the minutia of Aristotelian philosophy was transmuted in early attempts to understand cannonshot... (shrink)

What role does “discursive consciousness” play in decision-making? How does it interact with “practical consciousness?” These two questions constitute two important gaps in strong practice theory that extend from Pierre Bourdieu's habitus to Stephen Vaisey's sociological dual-process model and beyond. The goal of this paper is to provide an empirical framework that expands the sociological dual-process model in order to fill these gaps using models from cognitive neuroscience. In particular, I use models of memory and moral judgment that highlight the (...) importance of executive functions and semantic memory. I outline each model as it pertains to the aforementioned gaps in strong practice theory. I then use the models from cognitive neuroscience to create an expanded dual-process model that addresses how and when conscious mental systems override and interact with subconscious mental systems in the use of cultural ends for decision-making. Finally, using this expanded model I address the sociological debate over the use of interview and survey data. My analysis reveals that surveys and interviews both elicit information encoded in declarative memory and differ primarily in the process of information retrieval that is required of respondents. (shrink)

This study investigates whether the host personality and the primary alterpersonality of a woman with multiple personality disorder are controlled by the left and right hemispheres, respectively. Results support the hypothesis. Behavioral and preference measures indicate that Pe is strongly right handed and Pa is left handed. Verbal and musical dichotic tests show significantly greater accuracy for stimuli presented to the left ear for Pa and to the right ear for Pe. It is concluded that shifts in hemisphericity involve redistribution (...) of attentional resources and callosal suppression. “Conditional handedness” is proposed as a handedness subtype, characterizing persons who alternate personalities and consistently display alternate hand preferences linked to specific personality characteristics. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

An argument for an updated definition of 'human being'.

This is the first complete edition of the later work of the medieval philosopher and theologian Henry of Harclay. In colloboration with Raymond Edwards, an English translation is printed on facing pages, making this work available to a much wider audience. The twenty-nine Quaestiones Ordinariae cover a range of topics in metaphysics, theology, physical science, philosophical anthropology and ethics, which were among the most important of those debated in the early fourteenth century. The articles provide a window to this era, (...) as Harclay discusses many of the main questions of his day: whether and why we choose what is evil, how God can know the future and we can still be free, what a virtue is, whether the human soul survives death, whether all things are made up of atoms. This edition enables us to evaluate Harclay, not only in relation to other notable thinkers of his time but to appreciate the inner coherence of his own thought. An extensive introduction to Harclay's life, works and doctrine is provided. The volumes will also benefit scholars following the debates among lesser-studied thinkers such as William of Alnwick, Thomas of Sutton, Nicholas Trivet, and Robert Walsingham, whom this edition shows to have been in dialogue with Harclay during the years of the composition of his Quaestiones, 1310-1317. Because of the clarity of Harclay's thought and style, now mirrored in the English translation, the Quaestiones Ordinariae are an ideal way to introduce students to key problems in medieval philosophy, as well as to enable scholars to deepen their knowledge of the debates of this period. A further volume will publish Questions XV-XXIX. (shrink)

This volume completes the first full edition of the later work of the medieval philosopher and theologian Henry of Harclay. In colloboration with Raymond Edwards, an English translation is printed on facing pages, making this work available to a much wider audience. The twenty-nine Quaestiones Ordinariae cover a range of topics in metaphysics, theology, physical science, philosophical anthropology and ethics, which were among the most important of those debated in the early fourteenth century. The articles provide a window to this (...) era, as Harclay discusses many of the main questions of his day: whether and why we choose what is evil, how God can know the future and we can still be free, what a virtue is, whether the human soul survives death, whether all things are made up of atoms. This edition enables us to evaluate Harclay, not only in relation to other notable thinkers of his time but to appreciate the inner coherence of his own thought. An extensive introduction to Harclay's life, works and doctrine is provided. The volumes will also benefit scholars following the debates among lesser-studied thinkers such as William of Alnwick, Thomas of Sutton, Nicholas Trivet, and Robert Walsingham, whom this edition shows to have been in dialogue with Harclay during the years of the composition of his Quaestiones, 1310-1317. Because of the clarity of Harclay's thought and style, now mirrored in the English translation, the Quaestiones Ordinariae are an ideal way to introduce students to key problems in medieval philosophy, as well as to enable scholars to deepen their knowledge of the debates of this period. Questions 1-14, together with an extensive introduction, were published as volume XVII in the Auctores series. (shrink)

Should we regard Jennifer Lackey’s ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does not, given her religious convictions, believe its central claims? We think this question raises a range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating what objectual understanding—i.e., understanding a subject matter or body of information—demands of us. Here is the (...) plan. After some ground clearing in §1, §2 outlines and motivates a plausible working model—moderate factivity—for characterising the sense in which objectual understanding should be regarded as factive. §3 shows how the datum that we can understand false theories can, despite initial suggestions to the contrary, be assimilated straightforwardly within the moderate factivity model. §4 highlights how the inverse kind of case to that explored in §3—viz., a variant of Lackey’s creationist teacher case—poses special problems for moderate factivity. With reference to recent work on moral understanding by Hills, §5 proposes a solution to the problem, and §6 attempts to diagnose why it is that we might originally have been led to draw the wrong conclusion. (shrink)

Scholars have known that a variety of medieval theories on relation existed, but no full-length systematic study has been attempted until now. With this book Henninger fills an important gap in our knowledge of medieval philosophy. Dealing with such varied thinkers as Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Richard of Mediavilla, John Duns Scotus, Henry of Harclay, William of Ockham, and Peter Aureoli, the book will interest anyone concerned with late medieval philosophy and the transition to the early modern period.

Protagoras, of all the ancient philosophers, has perhaps attracted the most interest in modern times. His saying ‘Man is the measure of all things’ caused Schiller to adopt him as the patron of the Oxford pragmatists, and has generally earned him the title of the first humanist. Yet the exact delineation of his philosophcal position remains a baffling task. Neumann, writing on Die Problematik des ‘Homo-mensura’ Satzes in 1938,2 concludes that no certainty whatever can be reached on the meaning of (...) the dictum, since ‘man’, ‘measure’, and ‘things’ are all ambiguous, nor can we tell which of the three is the predicate. The time is past when it was believed that a man's philosophy could be understood apart from the events of his life and the circumstances of his age: yet in the case of Protagoras the historical method of approach has hardly been attempted, although the impact of environment was perhaps more decisive in the formation of philosophical concepts in the Greek world than anywhere else. The reality about which the Greek philosopher spoke had three aspects: it was either the one universe of physics, or the political unity, or God. For example, the book of Heracleitus Περ φσεως was divided into three chapters or logoi, About the Whole, a political, and a theological. Neither physics nor theology supplies from its own subject-matter the form in which this reality was described. (shrink)

The achievements of the textile industry in Roman Britain are often underestimated as a result of the meagreness of our available evidence. The Edict on maximum prices issued by Diocletian in A.D. 301 shows that British capes commanded high prices on the markets of the Empire, and that in the late third century A.D. British rugs were the best in the world. In view of the competition from the traditional centres of rug manufacture in the East, this is an astonishing (...) achievement. (shrink)

The received translation and interpretation of many of the technical terms current in the textile industry of the Roman Empire are inaccurate, because lexicographers have either fought shy of being precise, or have thought that they recognized in the ancient world technical processes which originated at a much later date. The evidence is often equivocal or insufficient, but may still yield details that have been overlooked. The textile expression scutulatus, to take an example, deserves more attention than Blümner has devoted (...) to it. When it refers to the appearance of a garment, Lewis and Short, s.v. scutulatus, translate ‘diamond or lozenge-shaped, checkered’. It seems worth while to attempt a more precise translation, and, if possible, to estimate the significance in context of the goods so designated. (shrink)

Traditional scientific views of the conscious self and world we live in are challenged by an unprecedented outburst of emerging new paradigms, theories of consciousness, perceptions of reality, new sciences, new philosophies, epistemologies, and a host of other transformative approaches. This still expanding outburst can be traced, on both logical and chronologic grounds, not to chaos theory, ecology, the new physics, or dozens of other currently ascribed sources, but rather to the cognitive (consciousness) revolution that immediately preceded. These new approaches (...) all share one key feature in common, namely, they all depend, directly or indirectly, upon a refutation and successful overthrow of the long dominant materialist paradigm. This is what was required to shift consciousness from an acausal or "eliminable" status to a functionally indispensable role. Traditional "bottom‐up" micro‐determinism had to be supplemented by a reciprocal, "top‐down" control exerted by mental emergents over lower‐level components. This does not dispose of behaviorism or reductionism, as methodology, but simply incorporates these within a more comprehensive explanatory framework. With the long reign of materialist constraints finally broken, other antireductive views have proliferated but with little regard for what the new paradigm allows. (shrink)

If the world itself is metaphysically indeterminate in a specified respect, what follows? In this paper, we develop a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy answering this question.

Laurent Henninger intervenant sur les « révolutions militaires » (notion située au carrefour du débat historique lancé dans les années 1980 par Geoffrey Parker – en polémique avec Jeremy Black – et du débat stratégique américain dans les années 1990) souligne que les avancées dans l’art de la guerre ont été depuis cinq siècles une des composantes majeures de la barbarisation et du totalitarisme. La notion de « révolution militaire » est aujourd’hui contestée par ceux qui y voient un outil (...) interprétatif de trop longue durée et lui préfèrent l’idée de « mutations militaires » (selon laquelle l’accumulation de changements millimétriques sur la longue durée débouche sur des ruptures). Après avoir passé en revue la première révolution militaire – XVe-XVIIe siècles – fondée sur la mise à distance de la cavalerie grâce à l’infanterie nouvelle, à l’artillerie du champ de bataille, Henninger s’interroge sur le critère discriminant pour qualifier les nouvelles guerres de la Renaissance (l’hyperviolence n’en est pas un à ses yeux) et voit dans les armes à feu la vraie rupture car elles influent de façon radicale sur la peur et le courage des combattants et sont source d’une véritable « inhumanité » dans la mesure où leur feu est « imparable ». Il insiste sur l’émergence d’un nouveau type de courage guerrier non archaïque et plus « stoïcien » marqué par l’acceptation de la mort. Dans cette perspective, l’« inhumanisation » technique porterait en elle la possibilité de la barbarisation. L. Henninger développe ensuite cette thèse à partir de l’examen des guerres mécanisées de la période 1860-1950 en s’attardant sur la guerre de Sécession puis sur la Grande Guerre. Il relie aussi la question du totalitarisme à la réflexion sur les « bombardements stratégiques massifs » et les débuts de la dissuasion nucléaire (terme qui ne s’impose que vers 1960). Il conclut en insistant sur le fait que, selon lui, la brutalisation des conflits naît toujours d’un retard de la pensée de la guerre et sur le paradoxe d’une culture occidentale qui produit en même temps barbarie de la guerre et codes qui tentent de l’enrayer. (shrink)

Living out of silence, out of a fully functioning, lovingly attentive mind, and not just out of thought, out of a partially functioning mind, is requisite for depth or profundity in living or relating. A fully attentive, truly silent or meditative mind sees that there is real dualism of time and the timeless and that time and the timeless each has its own unique value. The timeless, or real silence, that which alone can make for depth in one's living and (...) relating, can be there only when, in one's awareness, time and all that is related to time, have come to an end. An examination of a wide variety of statements made by writers, both past and present, shows that these understandings are seldom there in contemporary writings, just as they were not there in writings that have come down to us from the past. 'Living beyond the One and the Many' invites readers to consider the possibility that what is presented in it can bring deep meaning to one's way of living in the world"--Publisher's description, back cover. (shrink)

We develop and apply a multi-dimensional conception of explanatory depth towards a comparative analysis of inflationary and bouncing paradigms in primordial cosmology. Our analysis builds on earlier work due to Azhar and Loeb (2021) that establishes initial condition fine-tuning as a dimension of explanatory depth relevant to debates in contemporary cosmology. We propose dynamical fine-tuning and autonomy as two further dimensions of depth in the context of problems with instability and trans-Planckian modes that afflict bouncing and inflationary approaches respectively. In (...) the context of the latter issue, we argue that the recently formulated trans-Planckian censorship conjecture leads to a trade-off for inflationary models between dynamical fine-tuning and autonomy. We conclude with the suggestion that explanatory preference with regard to the different dimensions of depth is best understood in terms of differing attitudes towards heuristics for future model building. (shrink)

Telling a patient that the outcome of his illness is not good, or even hopeless, requires sensitivity and the ability to communicate with him in the setting of a hospital which is an unnatural environment divorced from family and friends. It is a task which must be taught and learned by doctors and nurses.

This volume completes the first full critical edition of the later work of the medieval philosopher and theologian Henry of Harclay, together with an English translation prepared in collaboration with Raymond Edwards. Questions 1-14 were published as volume XVII in the Auctores series.

This chapter contains sections titled: Ontology: universals and relations Morality: the virtues and the will Conclusion.

A complete critical edition of the later work of the medieval philosopher and theologian Henry of Harclay is here published for the first time, together with an English translation prepared in collaboration with Raymond Edwards. The Quaestiones Ordinariae introduce students to the key problems of medieval philosophy, as well as enabling scholars to deepen their knowledge of the debates of this period. A further volume will publish Questions 15-29.