In this book, Wilfrid Harrington ventures an answer to the question, "What is God?" through a close reading of the Old and New Testaments.

The Initiation Biblique of Robert-Tricot was first published in 1939, with an enlarged edition in 1948, and was made available to a wider public in 1951 when it appeared in English translation as Guide to the Bible. The third French edition was a thorough-going revision—some chapters were entirely re-written. The most important change was, beyond all question, the chapter on Inspiration by Father P. Benoit. As an exegete and a theologian, keenly aware both of the doctrinal principles involved and of (...) the real difficulties in the Bible, his approach to the question of inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture is truly illuminating; it disposes beforehand of a host of false problems which inevitably bedevil a notion of inspiration that is too rigid and, in fact, ‘unscriptural’. A thorough understanding of Benoit’s theory of Inspiration will rid one of a certain vague uneasiness and will leave one free to savour to the full the beauty and the riches, human as well as divine, of the Bible. The second edition of Guide to the Bible, Vol. I gives us the first nine chapters of the new Initiation Biblique. True to the spirit of the original it is not a mere translation. The bibliography has been consistently brought up to date and the translators have added very many footnotes. Besides, there are appendices which cover the idea of inspiration in Protestantism and Islam, and which give a detailed analysis of the books of the Pentateuch and an extended treatment of the Dead Sea Scrolls. It would be superfluous to emphasise the excellent qualities of the work. The appearance of this new edition should be a reminder to Catholics of our incalculable debt to French biblical scholarship. (shrink)

I will explore the paradoxical nature of epistemic access. By critiquing the traditional conception of mental states that are labelled as ’knowledge’, I demonstrate the susceptibility of these states to an infinite regress, thus, challenging their existence and validity. I scrutinise the assumption that an epistemic agent can have complete epistemic access to all facts about a given object while simultaneously being ignorant of certain truths that impact the very knowledge claims about the object. I further analyse the implications of (...) this paradox when attempting to fine-grain the parameters of epistemic access, which happens to reveal the vacuity of such definitions and the inevitability of the regress. (shrink)

We introduce a new theorem in social choice theory built on a path integral approach which will show that, under some reasonable conditions, there is a unique way to aggregate individual preferences based on fuzzy sets into a social preference based on probabilities, and that this way is invariant under any permutation of alternatives. We then apply this theorem to the case of democratic decision making with data of the behaviour and voting preferences of voting agents and show that there (...) is a tradeoff between fairness and efficiency and that no voting system can achieve both simultaneously. (shrink)

I defend J. L. Austin's direct realism against the colour delusion argument by employing epistemic logic to demonstrate that perceiving colours does not necessitate an intermediary such as sense-data, thus preserving the directness of perception.

Excerpt from The Political Writings of James Harrington: Representative Selections Finally, I should like to express my deep gratitude to three scholars who have generously helped me in the preparation of this volume: Carl J. Friedrich, of Harvard University, under whose kind and expert guidance I first undertook the study of James Harrington's political thought; Cecil Driver, of Yale University, who tried (with scant success, I fear) to give my prose style something of the grace and elegance that (...) distinguish his own; and Harry Hubbell, of Yale, whose erudi tion made the identification of even the most obscure classical passages seem easy. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Constitutional Charters or Bill of Rights have been applauded because of the protection they provide to minorities and also in ensuring and protecting fundamental rights, however, Charters have been criticized for being considered morally and politically objectionable. The author responds to Charter critics most serious objections and offers some reasons for adopting an alternative framework.

v. 1. A noetic prelude to a united world.--v. 2. An ethical prelude to a united world.

This collection focuses on the 19th and early 20th centuries and the impact of the industrial revolution. Complete works, extracts and articles from journals illustrate the beginnings of management as we know it today.

A collection of some of Sellars' lectures and articles from 1951 to 1962.

[Wilfrid Hodges] During the last forty or so years it has become popular to offer explanations of logical notions in terms of games. There is no doubt that many people find games helpful for understanding various logical phenomena. But we ask whether anything is really 'explained' by these accounts, and we analyse Paul Lorenzen's dialogue foundations for constructive logic as an example. The conclusion is that the value of games lies in their ability to provide helpful metaphors and representations, (...) rather than in any true conceptual analysis. In fact some of the standard explanations of logical notions in terms of competitive games simply don't work. /// [Erik C. W. Krabbe] In an attempt to redeem the Lorenzen-type dialogues from their detractors, it is perhaps best first to provide a survey of the various benefits these dialogues have been supposed to yield. This will be done in Section I. It will not be possible, within the confines of this paper, to scrutinize them all, but in Section II we shall delve deeper into the capacity of this type of dialogue to yield a model for the immanent criticism of philosophical positions. Section III will extend the concept of a dialogue in such a way as to conform better with our intuitive conceptions of what a rational discussion of a position should contain. This will be followed up by a concept of 'winning a dialogue' that takes position midway between the old conception of 'winning one play' and that of the full-fledged presentation of a winning strategy. Concepts of 'rational discussion' are thus shown to be, plausibly, more fundamental than those of proof. In Section IV, I shall discuss the specific problems about dialogical foundations put forward by Wilfrid Hodges. (shrink)

In this paper I defend constitutional review against the charge that it neces- sarily runs afoul of democratic principle. In so doing, I draw both on Dworkin’s theory of constructive interpretation as well as Raz’s theory of detached normative statements and reasoning from a point of view. After arguing that constructive interpretation can be undertaken from a point of view other than that of the interpreter, I go on to argue for the following claims: (1) Constitutional interpretation and review can (...) be undertaken from the point of view of the democratic community and its constitutional morality; (2) This process can be undertaken by a judge without the deliberate intrusion of her own personal moral convictions; (3) When undertaken from this point of view, constitutional interpretation and review can be rendered consistent with democracy; and (4) This is so even when these activities require a good deal of substantive moral reasoning and argument on the part of judges. (shrink)

The author's primary objective is to show that versions of legal positivism, according to which legal validity sometimes depends on moral validity (Inclusive Legal Positivism), are theoretically preferable to those forms of positivism (Exclusive Legal Positivism) which deny this possibility. The author attempts to substantiate this conclusion by demonstrating that Inclusive Legal Positivism provides a better theoretical account of challenges to legal validity based on a document like the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. His secondary aim is to show (...) that the choice between Inclusive and Exclusive Legal Positivism can have important consequences for legal practice. (shrink)

The laws of distribution follow at once from Lyndon's interpolation theorem and the fact that the fallacy of many terms is a fallacy.

The University of Greenwich Generator is setting sail on a thrilling new journey of knowledge exchange with the launch of its first-ever podcast the Navigator. Crafted in collaboration with Lucien von Schomberg, Senior Lecturer in Creativity and Innovation at Greenwich Business School it promises to be an exciting platform for innovation, entrepreneurship, and thought-provoking conversation. The podcast aims to bridge the gap between academic insights and real-world issues in an easily digestible way. Through engaging conversations, listeners can expect to gain (...) valuable knowledge from industry leaders and academic experts alike. Operating on three key principles—knowledge communication, knowledge exchange, and knowledge creation—this podcast embodies the essence of the Generator's mission, inspiring, educating and fostering collaboration. The first episode explores the limitless potential of AI in today's world, unravelling its impact on business, education, and society. Guests share their profound insights, experiences, and practical advice, shedding light on how AI is shaping our future. The episode delved deep into the ethical implications but also vast potential of using AI in the future and how it will affect both education and the wider world. The episode boasts an impressive lineup of inaugural guests, including Jane Harrington, the Vice-Chancellor of The University of Greenwich, Carl Thomas, Enterprise Advisor, and founder of Audiowings, Ghislaine Boddington, Professor in Digital Immersion, and Neil Saunders, Senior Lecturer in Mathematical Sciences. Together, these guests provide diverse perspectives on the future of AI at the university and beyond. (shrink)

Recently, Hosmer (1994a) proposed a model linking right, just, and fair treatment of extended stakeholders with trust and innovation in organizations. The current study tests this model by using Victor and Cullen''s (1988) ethical work climate instrument to measure the perceptions of the right, just, and fair treatment of employee stakeholders.In addition, this study extends Hosmer''s model to include the effect of right, just, and fair treatment on employee communication, also believed to be an underlying dynamic of trust.More specifically, the (...) current study used a survey of 111 managers to test (1) whether right, just, and fair treatment influences trust, both directly as well as indirectly via communication, and (2) whether trust influences perceptions of commitment and innovation. Strong support for the study''s hypotheses and Hosmer''s (1994a) model was found. Such findings support those who argue that moral management may be good management. (shrink)

1. The lever in question is, of course, that with which, provided that an appropriate fulcrum could be found, Archimedes could move the world. In the analogy I have in mind, the fulcrum is the given, by virtue of which the mind gets leverage on the world of knowledge.

-/- In his rich and thoughtful paper, Richard Bellamy sketches a theory of individual rights that ascribes to them an inherently democratic character that “is best captured by a republican view of liberty as non-domination, rather than the standard liberal account of liberty as non-interference.” According to this view, “rights involve an implicit appeal to democratic forms of reasoning.” That is, the only justifiable “foundation of rights must be some form of ongoing democratic decision making that allows rights to be (...) claimed under conditions of political equality.” Bellamy uses this particular model of rights to defend a somewhat unique thesis concerning the legitimacy of judicial review under a constitutional charter or bill of rights (henceforth constitutional review). Many legal theorists question whether constitutional review can ever be rendered consistent with the theoretical and practical demands of democracy. According to these theorists, democracy embodies a form of self-rule whereby the members of a society establish and exercise legitimate authority over themselves. But self-rule seems seriously compromised once constitutional review enters the picture. Instead of having the people and their elected representatives setting the basic terms of social cooperation, we have instead a small group of elite, unelected, and unaccountable judges performing this vital task. Constitutional review empowers these individuals, in constitutional review cases, to substitute their own contestable views and preferences with respect to the basic terms of social cooperation for the duly considered views and preferences of the people and those whom they have duly elected to represent them. This is something one simply cannot tolerate in a democracy. (shrink)

The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term. Under 'things in the broadest possible sense' I include such radically different items as not only 'cabbages and kings', but numbers and duties, possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic experience and death. To achieve success in philosophy would be, to use a contemporary turn of phrase, to 'know one's way around' with respect (...) to all these things, not in that unreflective way in which the centipede of the story knew its way around before it faced the question, 'how do I walk?', but in that reflective way which means that no intellectual holds are barred. (shrink)

Wilfrid Hodges; VIII*—Truth in a Structure, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 135–152, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.

We consider two formalisations of the notion of a compositionalsemantics for a language, and find some equivalent statements in termsof substitutions. We prove a theorem stating necessary and sufficientconditions for the existence of a canonical compositional semanticsextending a given partial semantics, after discussing what features onewould want such an extension to have. The theorem involves someassumptions about semantical categories in the spirit of Husserl andTarski.

In this paper, I defend H. L. A. Hart against two prevalent criticisms of his views on social rules and the obligations with which these rules are often associated. These criticisms, I argue, rely on misunderstandings ormischaracterizations of what Hart actually intended. These misunderstandings are plausibly explained by a failure on the part of his critics to appreciate fully two of the valuable lessons Hart sought to communicate in his inaugural lecture. First, words like ‘rule’ and ‘obligation’ should not be (...) removed from their various contexts of use and subjected to abstract philosophical definition and analysis. Second, when analyzing assertions in which such words figure in both legal practice and theory, it is crucial to bear in mind the different functions these assertions can be made to serve and the different purposes to which they can be put. -/- . (shrink)