El análisis fenomenológico caracteriza a la dignidad humana mediante tres notas: elevación, intimidad y autonomía. La filosofía la describe como la su-perior bondad de lo absoluto. Y la ontología hace residir esa nobleza en la peculiar subsistencia del sujeto humano, que recibe en el alma espiritual, in-mortal y necesaria, el propio actus essendi.

RESUMENEl autor resume la situación del os estudios relativos a la unidad de la Metafísica aristotélica, desde Jaeger a Düring; expone los motivos por los que le parece superada la fragmentación del pensamiento del filósofo griego defendida durante decenios, y propone una solución especulativa al problema, con base en la consideración de la metafísica como una realidad viva y dinámica.PALABRAS CLAVEARISTÓTELES-METAFÍSICAABSTRACTThe author offers a summary of the studies on the unity of Aristotle's Methaphysics from Jaegger to Düring; he defends the (...) thesis that the treaty is not completely fragmented, but offers a certain degree of cohesion. Finally, he proposes a theoretical solution for the question bases on the consideration of metaphysics as something alive and dynamic.KEYWORDSARISTOTLE-METHAPHYSICS. (shrink)

Este ensayo plantea el estudio de la libertad desde una perspectiva metafísica; más en concreto, a la luz del acto personal de ser. Se subraya la elección concreta del Fin Último como momento constitutivo de la libertad humana y, desde semejante punto de vista, como su fundamento. La libertad no es estática, sino un poder susceptible de desarrollarse constantemente hasta desembocar en la plena adhesión, fácil y gozosa, a lo que es bueno y en la proporción en que lo es; (...) en este sentido, la plenitud de la libertad humana puede considerarse como necesidad conquistada o necesidad por exceso. (shrink)

The comparative study between Kant and Thomas Aquinas regarding the limitations of metaphysical knowledge, yields notable coincidences, despite the clear differences between the systematic approach of each thinker. This makes it possible to appreciate in a better way the core of the question, and perhaps provides some help in the clarification of matters concerning the value of metaphysical knowledge. Despite appearances, our approach is not primarily historical, but systematic-philosophical. The cited authors will be used to the study a philosophical problem, (...) and not as authority arguments. For that reason, we will confine ourselves to primary sources, without resorting to historical studies save for dispelling exegetical doubts or confirming the author’s assertions. (shrink)

Para Suárez la ley es el acto de voluntad con el que el legislador obliga a sus súbditos a actuar como es debido ordenándoles hacerlo. Algunos intérpretes sostienen que según el jesuita la ley añadiría a una obligación preexistente una obligación adicional y específica, mientras que otros creen que para Suárez no existe obligación que no tenga en la ley su propia fuente y que, por consiguiente, antes de la ley no puede haber obligaciones, sino sólo deberes. En todo caso, (...) Suárez no parece capaz de explicar por qué el súbdito debería obedecer al legislador, ni tampoco por qué en efecto debería actuar como es debido. Por lo tanto, parece que se puedan compartir en su mayor parte las conclusiones bien conocidas de quien sostuvo que, una vez agotados los presupuestos metafísicos y antropológicos de la doctrina ética y jurídica de Tomás de Aquino, el intento suareciano de refundación de la obligación moral, jurídica y política no pudo, en última instancia, conseguir su objetivo. (shrink)

In this paper, I return to the well-known apparent inconsistencies in Hume’s treatment of personal identity in the three books of A Treatise of Human Nature, and try to defend a Humean narrative interpretation of the self. I argue that in Book 1 of the Treatise Hume is answering (to use Marya Schechtman’s expressions in The Constitution of Selves) a “reidentification” question concerning personal identity, which is different from the “characterization” question of Books 2 and 3. That is, I maintain (...) that whereas in Book 1 Hume is using his philosophical empiricism to provide his own version of the problem of how to recognize persons as the same at different times, in Books 2 and 3 he is presenting selves from a different, both sentimental and ethical standpoint, as the focus of people’s concerns. I start by discussing Hume’s notion of personal identity as presented in Book 1 and in the “Appendix.” I then specify the narrative conception of the self Hume relies on when dealing with passions and morality as the self-consciousness persons develop as bearers of characters of or about which they can be morally proud or humble. I finally conclude by distinguishing Hume’s narrative self from the idea of “the unity of human life” that Alasdair MacIntyre puts forward in After Virtue. (shrink)

In this paper, I hope to solve a problem that’s as old as the hills: the problem of contingency for religious belief. Paradigmatic examples of this argument begin with a counterfactual premise: had we been born at a different time or in a difference place, we easily could have held different beliefs on religious topics. Ultimately, and perhaps by additional steps, we’re meant to reach the skeptical conclusion that very many of our religious beliefs do not amount to knowledge. I (...) survey some historical examples of this argument, and I try to fill the gap between the counterfactual premise and the skeptical conclusion as forcefully as possible. I consider the following possibilities: there are no additional steps in the argument; or there are and they concern the alleged safety condition on knowledge, or the alleged non-accidentality condition on knowledge, or the unclarity produced by disagreement. On every possibility, the argument from the counterfactual premise to the conclusion of widespread skepticism is invalid. It seems, then, that there is no serious problem of contingency for religious belief. (shrink)

In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...) end, our prima facie justification for dualism remains undefeated. I close with one objection concerning the dialectical role of rebutting defeaters, and I argue that the prospects for a successful rebutting defeater for our dualist intuitions are dim. Since dualism emerges undefeated, we ought to believe it. (shrink)

What is kitsch? What is behind its appeal? More important, what is wrong with kitsch? Though central to our modern and postmodern culture, kitsch has not been seriously and comprehensively analyzed; its aesthetic worthlessness has been generally assumed but seldom explained. _Kitsch and Art _seeks to give this phenomenon its due by exploring the basis of artistic evaluation and aesthetic value judgments. Tomas Kulka examines kitsch in the visual arts, literature, music, and architecture. To distinguish kitsch from art, Kulka proposes (...) that kitsch depicts instantly identifiable, emotionally charged objects or themes, but that it does not substantially enrich our associations relating to the depicted objects or themes. He then addresses the deceptive nature of kitsch by examining the makeup of its artistic and aesthetic worthlessness. Ultimately Kulka argues that the mass appeal of kitsch cannot be regarded as aesthetic appeal, but that its analysis can illuminate the nature of art appreciation. (shrink)

In this article, I maintain that the anti-theoretical spirit which pervades Williams's ethics is close to the Humean project of developing and defending an ethics based on sentiments which has its main focus in the virtues. In particular, I argue that there are similar underlying themes which run through the philosophies of Hume and Williams, such as the view that a correct ethical perspective cannot avoid dealing with a broader theory of human nature; the conviction that this inquiry cannot be (...) developed in abstraction from the contingencies which are distinctive of the lives of flesh-and-blood human beings driven by passions; and the belief that the notion of character plays a key role in identifying and morally evaluating such lives. Finally, Williams' account of the psychological mechanism of shame in explaining character formation bears a strong resemblance to Hume's treatment of the passion of humility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Utilitas is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to alls.). (shrink)

In an essay recently published in this journal (“Is Safety in Danger?”), Fernando Broncano-Berrocal defends the safety condition on knowledge from a counterexample proposed by Tomas Bogardus (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012). In this paper, we will define the safety condition, briefly explain the proposed counterexample, and outline Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety condition. We will then raise four objections to Broncano-Berrocal’s defense, four implausible implications of his central claim. In the end, we conclude that Broncano-Berrocal’s defense of the safety (...) condition is unsuccessful, and that the safety condition on knowledge should be rejected. (shrink)

Leibniz’s Noveaux Essays are the exercise of a systems dialogue. It is in the first book, when he speaks about innate ideas, where its bases are set, and there Leibniz propounds the basic ideas of his controversy against Locke. Leibniz is convinced that his system is more perfect than Locke’s one and that, if Locke solved his contradictions, he would approach his own system. The hidden aim of the Noveaux Essays redaction is placed beyond a system dialogue, and it can (...) be seen in it the existence of a vast political dialogue whose purpose is the European unity. (shrink)

In The Economics of Good and Evil, Sedlacek challenges widely-held beliefs about economics and culture by tracing the study and themes of economics throughout history.

David Hume is famous for developing a ‘science of man’ based on a thorough investigation of passions and sentiments. What is most surprising is that, in his sentimental geography, shame appears to play a rather marginal role. In this essay, I shall maintain that it is nonetheless possible to find room for shame in Hume, and that the most promising way to do so is to consider it in the light of a different passion on which Hume dwells at length, (...) the passion of humility. I shall thus examine where Hume explicitly refers to shame and how it relates to humility. By comparing Hume’s reflections with those of some more recent philosophers such as Gabriele Taylor, Bernard Williams, and Richard Wollheim, I shall argue that, as in the case of humility, so with shame Hume considers it to be a negative and vicious passion. That is because, like humility, shame as well produces a distorted and repressed conception of the self, with the consequence of leading to an oppressive and suffocating ethical perspective that is ultimately immoral. On the contrary, ‘a due degree of pride’ is the passion that, for Hume, allows us to give stability to our practical self, enabling us to establish ourselves as proper moral agents. (shrink)

This volume is based on the papers presented at the international conference Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology (MBR09_BRAZIL), held at the University of Campinas (UNICAMP), Campinas, Brazil, December 2009. The presentations given at the conference explored how scientific cognition, but several other kinds as well, use models, abduction, and explanatory reasoning to produce important or creative changes in theories and concepts. Some speakers addressed the problem of model-based reasoning in technology, and stressed the issue of science and technological innovation. (...) The various contributions of the book are written by interdisciplinary researchers who are active in the area of creative reasoning in logic, science, and technology: the most recent results and achievements about the topics above are illustrated in detail in the papers. The book is divided in three parts, which cover the following main areas: part I, abduction, problem solving, and practical reasoning; part II: formal and computational aspects of model based reasoning; part III, models, mental models, representations. (shrink)