The fear of the largely unknown consequences of being exposed to coronavirus should have brought a more dynamic interplay of beliefs and opinions for those who in the footsteps of J.S. Mill believe that the limits of power, which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual, is to prevent harm to others. It is surprising that not much debate or critical interaction has taken place on the choice of locking down most of the populace in 185 countries after (...) the outbreak of COVID-19. The general lockdown, instead of testing and isolating the sick, can be seen as ‘a gross usurpation upon the liberty of private life.’ The axiological and ethical question confronting philosophers relates to the type and degree of authority needed during this period. As Mill claims, no general basic liberties can be respected overall without some previous and gradual evolution, that is, before other more specific liberties have met sustainable social practice. This essay reviews some of the problematic situations highlighting that no society is free or can achieve the objective of a fairly pluralistic set of values without a given social practice of these values, and shows how this logic of spreading of values unfolds in the context of the Coronavirus crisis. (shrink)

In the course of history, many individuals have the dubious honor of being remembered primarily for an eponym of which they would disapprove. How many are aware that Joseph-Ignace Guillotin actually opposed the death penalty? Another notable case is that of Maria Agnesi, an Italian woman of privileged, but not noble, birth who excelled at mathematics and philosophy during the eighteenth century. In her treatise of 1748, Instituzioni Analitiche, she provided a comprehensive summary of the current state of knowledge (...) concerning both integral calculus and differential equations. Later in life she was elected to the Bologna Academy of Sciences and, in 1762, was consulted by the University of Turin for an opinion on the work of an up-and-coming mathematician named Joseph-Louis Lagrange. (shrink)

Reconnaissant que la foi en Dieu Créateur est un mystère qui transcende notre pouvoir de compréhension humaine et de mise en concepts, l'auteur met en oeuvre divers modèles théologiques pour jeter quelque lumière sur la richesse de cette croyance. En ce qui concerne le modèle ontologique, il a recours à la théologie de Karl Rahner pour explorer le sens de l'être-créature. De par sa constitution ontologique l'être humain est à la fois différent et dépendant de Dieu en tout acte. Le (...) modèle «fiduciaire» favorisé par les Réformateurs, insiste sur le fait que la foi en Dieu Créateur est réellement un acte de confiance en l'attention que Dieu nous porte. Le modèle eschatologique, proposé par des penseurs tels Moltmann et Pannenberg, met l'accent sur Dieu comme notre futur absolu et l'objet de nos plus profonds désirs. L'article examine également certains modèles écologiques courants ainsi que l'«ecoféminisme» qui soulignent le besoin d'une intendance de la création plutôt que d'une domination. Un modèle de domination conduit à la violation de la terre comme à l'exploitation de la femme. L'article se préoccupe principalement de montrer que la foi en Dieu Créateur dans le Nouveau Testament est toujours liée au Christ comme Nouvelle Création. L'intention divine en créant était de conduire les créatures à partager la filiation du Christ. Les créatures deviennent imago Dei en vivant la relation filiale du Christ vis-à-vis du Père. Ignace de. (shrink)

This work, the most comprehensive treatment of alienation ever published, deals with the philosophical, sociological, psychological, religious, political, and literary aspects of the problem. Among the topics discussed are the lost self, the fragmented self, alienated leisure, measurements of social alienation, counterculture, anti-intellectualism, and cures for alienation.

Over 115 000 people are waiting for life-saving organ transplants, of whom a small fraction will receive transplants and many others will die while waiting. Existing efforts to expand the number of available organs, including increasing the number of registered donors and procuring organs in uncontrolled environments, are crucial but unlikely to address the shortage in the near future and will not improve donor/recipient compatibility or organ quality. If successful, organ bioengineering can solve the shortage and improve functional outcomes. Studying (...) manufactured organs in animal models has produced valuable data, but is not sufficient to understand viability in humans. Before risking manufactured organ experimentation in living humans, study of bioengineered organs in recently deceased humans would facilitate evaluation of the function of engineered tissues and the complex interactions between the host and the transplanted tissue. Although such studies do not pose risk to human subjects, they pose unique ethical challenges concerning the previous wishes of the deceased, rights of surviving family members, effective operation and fair distribution of medical services, and public transparency. This article investigates the ethical, legal and social considerations in performing engineered organ research on the recently deceased. (shrink)

Cet article propose un modèle additionnel pour l’interprétation des changements qui, dans les sciences, ne résultent pas d’une rupture irréversible avec le passé, mais du recyclage opportuniste de vieilles théories, destiné soit à en enrichir les théories émergentes, soit à provoquer le retour contre-révolutionnaire des théories défaites. Il soutient que, quand la science crée ainsi du neuf à partir du vieux, elle procède suivant un modèle proche du « bricolage évolutif », par lequel François Jacob explique l’évolution par le jeu (...) des réaménagements opportunistes qui surviennent dans la structure du noyau cellulaire. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

Our paper contributes to Science, Technology and Society scholarship on the practices and technologies of containment. We build on existing work in STS that has analyzed containment as a performative sociotechnical system that generates and sustains new realities, new systems, and new relationships. Our contribution draws from the problem of containment in salmon aquaculture. The stakes for containing salmon are very high. Farmed salmon escapes are environmentally damaging to ecosystems and wild salmon populations, and they put additional pressure on an (...) industry that has a very poor environmental record. We consider in detail Newfoundland and Labrador’s “Code of Containment” that works to keep farmed salmon in cages and prevent them from escaping into the wild. Through our analysis of the Code, we argue that containment is not only about holding inside. It is also about holding together, an obsolete meaning of the term “to contain.” We add to STS scholarship by arguing that containment and its associated Code in Newfoundland holds together a large scale, industrial aquaculture sector that tolerates persistent farmed salmon escapes into the wild from ocean-based cages. We conclude by examining the broader implications of our analysis for STS scholarship on the practices and technologies of containment. (shrink)

This publication articulated in three parts, and twelve chapters endeavours to engage with the complex negative emotions and consequent phenomenon of self-deceit, radicalisation and extremism. First part: Emotions as Lines of Demarcation or Guidelines to Our Self. The Psychodynamic Surrounding of our Intentional Self; second part: Case Studies of Some Concrete Societal Encapsulations of the Negative Passions; and third part: Resisting the Colonisation of Tyrannical Affections. Possible Paths of Mitigating Radicalisation and Extremism. What kind of educational responses can be given (...) to extremist claims of territory, identity, resources, power, and interpretations? How can a dialogue on unifying ethical principles and values aid in developing common grounds for preventing radical and extremist excesses? With authors from three continents, this publication endeavours to not only ask the uncomfortable questions with regard to the exteriorisation of human emotive predispositions and inclinations to ostracize, stigmatise and discriminate. The exit door from the extreme is also clearly presented, through four contributions, notably the interplay of Charvaka philosophy, Sikh wisdom on balanced forms of engagement with strong emotions. (shrink)

Should we regard Jennifer Lackey’s ‘Creationist Teacher’ as understanding evolution, even though she does not, given her religious convictions, believe its central claims? We think this question raises a range of important and unexplored questions about the relationship between understanding, factivity and belief. Our aim will be to diagnose this case in a principled way, and in doing so, to make some progress toward appreciating what objectual understanding—i.e., understanding a subject matter or body of information—demands of us. Here is the (...) plan. After some ground clearing in §1, §2 outlines and motivates a plausible working model—moderate factivity—for characterising the sense in which objectual understanding should be regarded as factive. §3 shows how the datum that we can understand false theories can, despite initial suggestions to the contrary, be assimilated straightforwardly within the moderate factivity model. §4 highlights how the inverse kind of case to that explored in §3—viz., a variant of Lackey’s creationist teacher case—poses special problems for moderate factivity. With reference to recent work on moral understanding by Hills, §5 proposes a solution to the problem, and §6 attempts to diagnose why it is that we might originally have been led to draw the wrong conclusion. (shrink)

In the commentaries on Wittgenstein's Tractatus, due attention has always been paid to the philosophy of logic contained in this work. In particular the statement that a picture and reality must have their form in common has attracted the attention of the commentators. This statement has been explained now in an extreme realistic way, now in the sense of a linguistic kantianism. Both of the interpretations have this in common that they tend to give a kind of metaphysical status to (...) this 'logical form', considered either as THE form of reality on its own or as THE objective form of language as such. In our article, we try to show that there is no place for this kind of 'hypostases' or reifications in the philosophy of the Tractatus. We point out some important arguments available in the text, to show that Wittgenstein didn't found logic on what can be termed as the objective and given structural form either of language or of reality. The point of his philosophy of logic, we argue, was not a metaphysical, but rather a pragmatical and operational one. Our argumentation is built upon what we consider to be the two basic texts of Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic, namely that we can „postulate” the truths of logic in so far as we can postulate an „adequate notation”(6.1233), and that the so called „logical constants” are not representatives : that there can be no „representatives” (in German : „vertreten”) of the logic of facts (4.0312). We first try to show that logic is not really distinct from the grammar (syntax, form) of a language which is capable to express reality in a complete and determinate way (4.123; 3.14; 3.251; 4.023; 4A66 ; 6.124; 4.002a). And to the extent that there is no meaningfull language without a signified reality related with it, there is no logic either which is not apriori and at the same time a logic applied to reality, i.e. the logic of the world. Consequently, we try to develop an interpretation of 2.16-2.18 of the Tractatus which can account for its a-metaphysical, operational conception of logic. Finally, we attempt a clarification of 5.552, a text which we consider as basic for Wittgenstein's philosophy of the „mystical”. (shrink)

After the 'death of God', it would be a mistake to continue to think of eros in terms of a longing for possession ofthat which one is lacking, especially in matters of religion. Alongside Plato's Diotima, Kierkegaard, Levinas and even Heidegger, an alternative view of eros is proposed in which eros is gradually letting go of its possessive cravings in order to open itself for the other. In this way, eros is bent in the directionof the unselfish service of the (...) other. The question is then asked which kind of understanding of being is implied by this redirection of eros. The answer is taken from a thinking of the meaning of being in terms of self-givenness and self-outpooring in beings, for beings to be 'there'. Our being at the service of the other can therefore be seen as a following of the call of being in us to become adequate to the meaning of being itself. (shrink)

The issue of philosophy’s contribution to theology is an old and much disputed one. This article posits philosophy as the 'conscience' of theology. It takes 'conscience' in the heideggerian sense of existential 'being-aware-of' and applies this to our finitude and the ultimate meaning of being. A living theology has therefore to be based on a successful encounter between our understanding of the issue of our existence and the Word of 'revelation' — as Western tradition calls it —, spoken to us (...) 'from elsewhere'. This position is considered with reference to the theological thinking of Thomas Aquinas, and more specifically to his doctrine of human happiness and bliss, and the natural desire to see God. Attention is drawn to the fact that Thomas’ view on the supernatural is based on both a philosophical and a theological component. To further illustrate the point, three statements are developed. The first concerns a possible abuse of Heidegger’s deconstruction of metaphysics in order to support a 'pluralistic' approach of religious truth. Here the objection is raised that this conception disowns the proper nature of religious and theological truth as distinguished from metaphysical truth. The second statement is about any possible coalescence of philosophyand theology: whereas metaphysical truths show a 'representative' character, the properof religious and biblical truth appears to be 'a way of liberation'. Between both a 'mediation' needs to be found. The author claims that such may surface in man's inner belonging to 'another dimension', i.e., in an 'immanent transcendence'. The third statementproposes to update the synthesis of philosophy and theology as presented by Aquinas. A dialectical elucidation of man's craving for infinity still points to a possible way byrevealing an essential aspect of human 'conscienceawareness'. (shrink)

Today, we can notice a renewed interest in spirituality, often as an alternative for established religions. Does this also mean that after centuries of growing apart and mutual diffidence, our time would offer a new opportunity for a meeting between spirituality and philosophy? At first glance this seems rather improbable. The origin of the term 'spirituality' is not philosophical, but Christian. There, it means a life under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Today, the content of a spirituality can be (...) religious as well as atheist, as some contemporary examples show. Thus it mostly expresses a craving for inner unity and universal reconciliation for human beings and for the universe. Such a spirituality testifies to a transcendency in the human and promotes a practical wisdom based on a corresponding metaphysical worldview. But it is not immediately clear what such a worldview could afford to the self-understanding of rational philosophy. Yet, the idea of human transcendency is not unknown to contemporary philosophy. In Heidegger's Being and Time, it bears the name of 'existence'. Moreover, Heidegger agrees that his philosophy of authentic existence as finite being-until-death is inspired by a 'factical ideal'. He presents his philosophy as being that lifeview in its reflexively understood meaning. Building on such a hermeneutic idea of philosophy, this article defends the view that spiritualities in general can be seen as carriers of valuable elements for an ontological understanding of the meaning of being. The article develops an understanding of being in which being is seen as a commonly shared perfection in the context of a general ontology of finite participation in being in which the world appears as the place of a lacking. This perfection comes toward us as an appeal to our freedom. That ontological awareness gives way to a reflexive assumption of spiritual attitudes such like generosity and fidelity in the context of an ontological philosophy of the meaning of human existence. (shrink)