BackgroundHeavy media use has been linked to sleep problems in children, which may also extend to the infancy period. While international parent-advisory agencies, such as the American Academy of Pediatrics, advise no screen time before 18 months, parents often do not follow this recommendation. Research on Italian infants’ early access to media is sparse, and only very few studies have investigated links with sleeping habits.MethodTo address this gap, we examined concurrent associations between parent-reported surveys of child technology use and sleeping (...) patterns. The Italian version of the 60 item Comprehensive Assessment of Family Media Exposure Survey, developed as part of a larger international study,, the Brief Screening Questionnaire for Infant Sleep Problems Sadeh, 2004) were completed online by 264 Italian parents of 8- to 36-month-olds and a subset completed the Parenting Stress Index Abidin, 1995) between April 2017 and April 2018.ResultsMore devices located in the child’s room and the more time spent watching TV or using an iPad were associated with less hours of sleep at night. Furthermore, more time spent watching TV or using a smartphone, as well as the number of devices in the room was associated with going to sleep later at night. Instrumental media use was associated with less sleep.ConclusionLike other countries, Italian infants have high levels of exposure to media, and differences in media patterns were associated with sleep patterns. Cultural factors influence both instrumental reasons for media use and sleep practices. Further research should explore how media use may serve to regulate emotion as a function of both contextual factors and individual differences. (shrink)

Research question and aimClinical Ethics Committees (CECs) aim to support healthcare professionals (HPs) and healthcare organizations to deal with the ethical issues of clinical practice. In 2020,...

We believe with the publication of our Lexicon Spinozanum, that we are meeting a need in Spinoza historiography which has been pointed out by scholars, but has never before been satisfied. In the intro duction of his Spinozas philosophische Terminologie (Leipzig, 1913), G. T. Richter promised "a Spinozistic Lexicon in which the meaning of each term is set out on an historical basis in alphabetical order". In 1924, in the Report, i.e., Nachbericht, of his four volume edition of the complete (...) works of Spinoza (Heidelberg), C. Gebhardt promised a complementary volume comprising, among other things, a general index. However, neither the one nor the other were ever published. The hope of seeing this gap quickly filled has been reiterated recently by Di Vona: "The compilation of a Spinozistic index is a task of the history of philosophy, the execution of which would gratify all scholars". (Di V on a, Studi suIt' ontologia di Spinoza, Florence, 1960). We do not know how closely our Lexicon Spinozanum corresponds to what Richter and Gebhardt projected. We believe, however, that there are common requirements at the basis of works of this sort. In our procedure and in the delimitation of our scope, we have set for ourselves two main criteria: that of clarity and that of completeness. We hope we hav:e not deviated from them too much. (shrink)

Le note marginali latine nelle versioni olandesi di opere di Descrates di J. H. Glazemaker, di G. Crapulli.--Sul concetto spinoziano di mens, di E. Giancotti Boscherini.

Numerose sono le figure – narrative, simboliche, storiche – nelle pagine di Borges, tratte dalla tradizione di una Germania intesa, alla maniera di Tacito, come l’antico nord del mondo. La passione per la germanistica percorre tutta l’opera di Borges per farsi, nell’ultima parte della sua vita, scoperta del mito e ripensamento della poesia, capace di conferire alla sua immagine della letteratura un colore perdutamente romantico.

Numerose sono le figure – narrative, simboliche, storiche – nelle pagine di Borges, tratte dalla tradizione di una Germania intesa, alla maniera di Tacito, come l’antico nord del mondo. La passione per la germanistica percorre tutta l’opera di Borges per farsi, nell’ultima parte della sua vita, scoperta del mito e ripensamento della poesia, capace di conferire alla sua immagine della letteratura un colore perdutamente romantico.

Even if Plato never claimed to be a ‘historian of philosophy’, there are in his dialogues many references to previous philosophers. Apart from his works on the Sophists, which do not claim to faithfully expose the ‘philosophy’ of their authors, we find in Plato’s dialogues comments and sometimes quotations from the Presocratics, from Thales to Philolaos. In some cases, Plato adds the name of the quoted philosopher, but sometimes he leaves to the reader the task of finding out who the (...) commented or quoted author is. This is the case with Melissos in a passage of the Sophist (244b), where his name is not quoted, but an anonymous monistic philosopher expounds a literal quotation of the philosopher: ἓν μόνον ἔστιν (fr. B 8.1 DK). (shrink)

Il Parmenide _phusikos_ e il meccanismo di Antikitera: Risposta alle osservazioni di N.-L. Cordero.

L'A. si occupa delle questioni teologiche di Wylton, conservate in tre mss.: Vat. Borgh. lat. 36; Tortosa, Archivo Capitular, 88; New Haven, CT, Yale Univ. Libr., Beinecke General 470. Lo studio verte sul contenuto di Beinecke 470 e Tortosa 88. Il primo contiene una serie di questioni teologiche e di fisica di Wylton, finora non notate. L'A. si sofferma sulle questioni teologiche, che in parte derivano da un prologo al Commento alle Sentenze, sulla questione relativa al problema della relazione , (...) sulla questione relativa al tempo . Quanto al ms. di Tortosa, l'A. esamina quattro questioni non attribuite, dimostrandone la paternità wyltoniana. Rispetto all'ultima delle questioni, sulla conoscenza scientifica di Dio, l'A. si sofferma sul prologo alle Sentenze di Prospero da Reggio Emilia dove la questione di Wylton è utilizzata per riferire l'opinione di Enrico di Harclay . In appendice sono elencati gli incipit delle questioni esaminate. (shrink)

Ethics Without Intention tackles the questions raised by difficult moral dilemmas by providing a critical analysis of double effect and its most common ethical and political applications. The book discusses the philosophical distinction between intended harm and foreseen but unintended harm. This distinction, which, according to the doctrine of double effect, makes a difference to the moral justification of actions, is widely applied to some of the most controversial ethical and political questions of our time: collateral damages in wars and (...) acts of terrorism; palliative care, euthanasia, abortion, and embryo research; self-defence, suicide, and self-sacrifice. It is also crucial to the now notorious theoretical cases of the trolley problem and the knobe effect. -/- Di Nucci approaches the doctrine of double effect from four key directions: its historical origins, which can be traced further back than the classic attribution to Aquinas; its theoretical coherence, which is the subject of a lively contemporary debate in philosophy; its moral intuitiveness, which has always been taken for granted but has recently begun to be questioned; and finally its relevance to the difficult moral and political decisions of our time. An engaging and comprehensive introduction to the doctrine of double effect. (shrink)

Thinking is overrated: golfers perform best when distracted and under pressure; firefighters make the right calls without a clue as to why; and you are yourself ill advised to look at your steps as you go down the stairs, or to try and remember your pin number before typing it in. Just do it, mindlessly. Both empirical psychologists and the common man have long worked out that thinking is often a bad idea, but philosophers still hang on to an intellectualist (...) picture of human action. This book challenges that picture and calls on philosophers to wake up to the power of mindlessness: it is our habits, skills and conventions that help us cope with a world way too diverse for us to hope to always reinterpret it. The book presents the empirical evidence that has been accumulating over the last few decades and offers a philosophical analysis of mindless phenomena such as habits, skilled activity, automatic actions, emotional and spontaneous reactions and social conventions, arguing that traditional philosophical theories of action should be revised to do justice to this forgotten but important part of our lives: when we act mindlessly, we are free and fully rational even though we neither deliberate nor are aware of what we are doing. (shrink)

Judith Jarvis Thomson has recently proposed a new argument for the thesis that killing the one in the Trolley Problem is not permissible. Her argument relies on the introduction of a new scenario, in which the bystander may also sacrifice herself to save the five. Thomson argues that those not willing to sacrifice themselves if they could may not kill the one to save the five. Bryce Huebner and Marc Hauser have recently put Thomson's argument to empirical test by asking (...) people what they should do in the new trilemma case, in which they may also sacrifice themselves. They found that the majority judge that they should either kill the one or sacrifice themselves; Huebner and Hauser argue that those numbers speak against Thomson's argument. But Thomson's argument was about the dialectical effect of the new trilemma on the traditional dilemma, rather than about the trilemma itself. Here I present the results of a study in which I asked subjects first what they should do in the trilemma and then what they should do in the traditional Trolley Problem. I found that, if asked first about the trilemma, subjects then have the intuition that killing the one in the traditional Bystander at the Switch is not permissible?exactly what Thomson's argument had predicted. (shrink)

I argue against Appel's recent proposal – in this JOURNAL – that there is a fundamental human right to sexual pleasure, and that therefore the sexual pleasure of severely disabled people should be publicly funded – by thereby partially legalizing prostitution. I propose an alternative that does not need to pose a new positive human right; does not need public funding; does not need the legalization of prostitution; and that would offer a better experience to the severely disabled: charitable non-profit (...) organizations whose members would voluntarily and freely provide sexual pleasure to the severely disabled. (shrink)

We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of intentional action can't explain the whole of agency. Causalist accounts such as Davidson's and Bratman's, according to which an action can be intentional only if it is caused by a particular mental state of the agent, don't work for every kind of action. So-called automatic actions, effortless performances over which the agent doesn't deliberate, and to which she doesn't need to pay attention, (...) constitute exceptions to the causalist framework, or so I argue in this thesis. Not all actions are the result of a mental struggle, painful hesitation, or the weighting of evidence. Through practice, many performances become second nature. Think of familiar cases such as one's morning routines and habits: turning on the radio, brushing your teeth. Think of the highly skilled performances involved in sport and music: Jarrett's improvised piano playing, the footballer's touch. Think of agents' spontaneous reactions to their environment: ducking a blow, smiling. Psychological research has long acknowledged the distinctiveness and importance of automatic actions, while philosophy has so far explained them together with the rest of agency. Intuition tells us that automatic actions are intentional actions of ours all the same (I have run a survey which shows that this intuition is widely shared): not only our own autonomous deeds for which we are held responsible, but also necessary components in the execution and satisfaction of our general plans and goals. But do standard causal accounts deliver on the intentionality of automatic actions? I think not. Because, in automatic cases, standard appeals to intentions, beliefs, desires, and psychological states in general ring hollow. We just act: we don't think, either consciously or unconsciously. On the reductive side, Davidson's view can't but appeal to, at best, unconscious psychological states, the presence and causal role of which is, I argue, inferred from the needs of a theory, rather than from evidence in the world. On the non-reductive side, Bratman agrees, with his refutation of the Simple View, that we can't just attach an intention to every action that we want to explain. But Bratman’s own Single Phenomenon View, appealing to the mysterious notion of 'motivational potential', merely acknowledges the need for refinement without actually providing one. So I propose my own account of intentional action, the 'guidance view', according to which automatic actions are intentional: differently from Davidson and Bratman, who only offer necessary conditions in order to avoid the problem of causal deviance, I offer a full-blown account: E's phi-ing is intentional if and only If phi-ing is under E's guidance. This account resembles one developed by Frankfurt, with the crucial difference that Frankfurt – taking 'acting with an intention' and 'acting intentionally' to be synonymous – thinks that guidance is sufficient only for some movement being an action, but not for some movement being an intentional action. I argue that, on the other hand, Frankfurt's concept of guidance can be developed so that it is sufficient for intentional action too. In Chapter One I present and defend my definition of ‘automatic action’. In Chapter Two I show that such understanding of automatic actions finds confirmation in empirical psychology. In Chapter Three I show that Davidson's reductive account of intentional action does not work for automatic actions. In Chapter Four I show that the two most influential non-reductive accounts of intentional action, the Simple View and Bratman's Single Phenomenon View, don't work either. And in Chapter Five I put forward and defend my positive thesis, the 'guidance view'. Also, in the Appendix I present the findings of my survey on the intentionality of automatic actions. (shrink)

I argue that the empirical literature on priming effects does not warrant nor suggest the conclusion, drawn by prominent psychologists such as J. A. Bargh, that we have no free will or less free will than we might think. I focus on a particular experiment by Bargh – the ‘elderly’ stereotype case in which subjects that have been primed with words that remind them of the stereotype of the elderly walk on average slower out of the experiment’s room than control (...) subjects – and I show that we cannot say that subjects cannot help walking slower or that they are not free in doing do. I then illustrate how these cases can be reconciled and normalized within a Davidsonian theory of action to show that, in walking slower, subjects are acting intentionally. My argument applies across various experiments, including those of goal priming. In the final section I argue that the only cases in which priming effects are efficacious are so-called Buridan cases. (shrink)

Lists the practical problems found in the manuscript of Book III of the Algebra which were not included in the printed text. The author believes that their omission reflects the influence of Bombelli's discovery of Diophantus.