In his article “The State At Dusk” David MacGregor provides, in this writer’s view, a somewhat odd rendering of the significance of Minerva’s Owl as it relates to Hegel’s view of philosophy, and in particular to his philosophy of civil society. I am especially puzzled by MacGregor’s choosing to see dusk as the hour of prophecy at which Hegel the theorist is taken “to discern in the shape of the present the promise of a different way of life”. Is (...) this what Hegel intends in the preface to the Philosophy of Right where he says “that only in the ripeness of actuality does the ideal appear over against the real, and that only then does this ideal comprehend this same real world in its substance and build it up for itself into the configuration of an intellectual realm”? (shrink)

The basic argument of this paper is that Feuerbach’s “materialist critique” of Hegel’s speculative philosophy was misguided, and that the source of some of Feuerbach’s confusions about Hegel lie in the former’s early discipleship of the latter. In particular, I examine certain purported Hegelian themes in Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel and argue that they are distortions of Hegel’s views. Next I explore two stages in Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel, the first dealing largely with the issue of presuppositions and starting points (...) in philosophy, and the second concerning the transformative method by which Feuerbach “inverts” Hegel’s philosophy. In the first case I argue that Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel is really only a self-critique, and in the second that his subject-predicate analysis of the relation of thought and being is incoherent. Finally, I offer an interpretation of Hegel’s speculative logic which views it as non-mystifying. (shrink)

Top scholars address Hegel’s History of Philosophy.

This essay examines and criticizes G. A. Cohen's interpretation of Marx's materialistic conception of history as presented in Cohen's book Karl Marx's Theory of History. In particular, the author attacks Cohen's Primacy Thesis, the claim that (for Marx) human technology is the primary explanatory factor for economic and social change and for historical development generally. The focus of the attack is Cohen's way of distinguishing between the material and social characteristics, or the content and form, of a system of production. (...) The argument is that Cohen's distinctions are defective and therefore fail to provide adequate support for the Primacy Thesis and that, moreover, the position that Cohen defends is not Marx's. (shrink)

The thesis of this study is that the methodology in Marx that is appropriate for viewing socio-historical development in a structured framework, and also for capturing the dynamic role of practice in history, is one which goes beyond the ordinary traditional methods of empirical science and which has its roots in Hegel’s system of philosophy. In my view, the mistake of the traditional Marxist handling of Hegel lies in the attempt to divorce his method from his system, with the aim (...) of salvaging a dialectics that could be wedded to a philosophical materialism. However, Marx’s own statement of his opposition to Hegel did not imply the rejection of a systematically controlled form of explanation but instead was aimed at Hegel’s method in order to criticize its particular systematic standpoint as expressed in the self-legitimating “Idea.” Properly understood, the inversion of Hegel, this placing of Hegel “on his feet,” leads not to a “dialectical materialism,” which ostensibly substitutes the material for the ideal as the concern of dialectics, but rather results in the grounding of the ideal in the critical endeavor of political economy, as opposed to what Marx saw as Hegel’s uncritical enterprise of a cultural ideology. (shrink)

While Hegel scholars overall have acknowledged that the concept of Geist (Spirit or Mind) is central to Hegel’s comprehension of history, there is some degree of controversy among commentators concerning the interpretation of this concept. Lack of clarity about whether the principles Hegel presents fall on the speculative or on the historical level can result in charges of mystification. In this essay I attempt to clarify the concept of Geist by 1) defining the speculative transcendental meaning of Geist , which (...) will involve articulating the principles that structure Geist ’s essential features, especially as presented in Hegel’s Logic; 2) explicating the historical and existential dimension of Geist , which will focus on the nature of its action and embodiment, specifically attending to the nation state as the true historical individual, and 3) explaining the essential connection between the speculative and the historical in such a way as to address their dialectical unity in difference, and thus to alleviate the problem of ontology overcoming Geist ’s temporality. (shrink)

This book attempts to articulate the role of Hegelian dialectical logic in Marx’s Capital and to defend Marx against certain Hegelian critics, most notably Klaus Hartmann, who has systematically criticized Marx’s theory of capitalism, and Richard Winfield. According to Smith, the role of dialectical logic in Marx’s Capital has been underappreciated and little explored, which deals throughout with Marx’s use of Hegel’s dialectical logic in the critique of political economy). Moreover, Smith is concerned with establishing why Marx “needed” to employ (...) dialectical logic and the full extent of the Hegelian legacy here. We are told, initially, that dialectical logic was important for Marx in order to establish his categories of reflection, to develop his theory of fetishism, to present strong claims of necessity, and to ground revolutionary politics. These issues are addressed at various places in the book. (shrink)

Any book which brings Hegel into discussions of contemporary political and social theory is welcome, and Pinkard’s book does just that. This is not to say that the book is primarily about Hegel, for actually Hegel is rarely mentioned. What this book does is to bring the spirit of Hegel’s social and political philosophy into current debates about liberalism, democracy, and community. In particular, Pinkard makes the Hegelian distinction between civil society and the political state the cornerstone of his treatment (...) of liberalism and democracy. This distinction apparently has been either overlooked or confused by writers such as Nozick and Rawls, who in any case tend to underemphasize the role of the political state in their writings. (shrink)

This book attempts to articulate the role of Hegelian dialectical logic in Marx’s Capital and to defend Marx against certain Hegelian critics, most notably Klaus Hartmann, who has systematically criticized Marx’s theory of capitalism, and Richard Winfield. According to Smith, the role of dialectical logic in Marx’s Capital has been underappreciated and little explored, which deals throughout with Marx’s use of Hegel’s dialectical logic in the critique of political economy). Moreover, Smith is concerned with establishing why Marx “needed” to employ (...) dialectical logic and the full extent of the Hegelian legacy here. We are told, initially, that dialectical logic was important for Marx in order to establish his categories of reflection, to develop his theory of fetishism, to present strong claims of necessity, and to ground revolutionary politics. These issues are addressed at various places in the book. (shrink)

Universal Human Rights brings new clarity to the important and highly contested concept of universal human rights. This collection of essays explores the foundations of universal human rights in four sections devoted to their nature, application, enforcement, and limits, concluding that shared rights help to constitute a universal human community, which supports local customs and separate state sovereignty. The eleven contributors to this volume demonstrate from their very different perspectives how human rights can help to bring moral order to an (...) otherwise divided world. (shrink)

Although this conference, held at Oxford on September 6–7, 1993, did not completely fulfil the ambitions of its subtitle, it nonetheless provided a stimulating forum for the presentation and exchange of ideas on various topics arising from Hegel’s Phenomenology. In the first paper, “Rupture, Closure, and Dialectic,” Joseph Flay dealt with the Phenomenology in its role as an introduction or beginning to the system. David Duquette then discussed the master/slave dialectic and the political significance of Hegel’s concept of (...) recognition in the Phenomenology. Following this, Jay Bernstein focussed on Hegel’s treatment of conscience and guilt, and related this to his views of ethical action, arguing that Hegel leaves room for moral autonomy and hence tragic suffering even within his conception of Sittlichkeit. In the fourth paper, “The Presence of Aristotle in Hegel’s Phenomenology,” Nicholas Walker analyzed the relation between Hegel and Aristotle, and the complexities of the latter’s influence on the Phenomenology. H.S. Harris then offered a sketch of his own view of the Phenomenology in “Let’s Not ‘Leave out the Ethical’: A ‘Conscientious’ Response to S.K.”, starting from a discussion of Hegel’s theory of truth and how this shapes the structure of this work. Finally, in “The ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ and Conscious Unhappiness,” Simon Jarvis examined Adorno’s critique of Hegel, and emphasized the continuing importance and value of this critique for any truly living contemporary Hegelianism. (shrink)

Although this conference, held at Oxford on September 6–7, 1993, did not completely fulfil the ambitions of its subtitle, it nonetheless provided a stimulating forum for the presentation and exchange of ideas on various topics arising from Hegel’s Phenomenology. In the first paper, “Rupture, Closure, and Dialectic,” Joseph Flay dealt with the Phenomenology in its role as an introduction or beginning to the system. David Duquette then discussed the master/slave dialectic and the political significance of Hegel’s concept of (...) recognition in the Phenomenology. Following this, Jay Bernstein focussed on Hegel’s treatment of conscience and guilt, and related this to his views of ethical action, arguing that Hegel leaves room for moral autonomy and hence tragic suffering even within his conception of Sittlichkeit. In the fourth paper, “The Presence of Aristotle in Hegel’s Phenomenology,” Nicholas Walker analyzed the relation between Hegel and Aristotle, and the complexities of the latter’s influence on the Phenomenology. H.S. Harris then offered a sketch of his own view of the Phenomenology in “Let’s Not ‘Leave out the Ethical’: A ‘Conscientious’ Response to S.K.”, starting from a discussion of Hegel’s theory of truth and how this shapes the structure of this work. Finally, in “The ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ and Conscious Unhappiness,” Simon Jarvis examined Adorno’s critique of Hegel, and emphasized the continuing importance and value of this critique for any truly living contemporary Hegelianism. (shrink)

This is a masterly introduction to the modern, and rigorous, theory of probability. The author emphasises martingales and develops all the necessary measure theory.

Since the introduction and widespread adoption of chemical herbicides, “weed management” has become almost synonymous with “herbicide management.” Over-reliance on herbicides and herbicide-resistant crops has given rise to herbicide resistant weeds. Integrated weed management (IWM) identifies three strategies for weed management— biological-cultural, chemical-technological, mechanical-physical—and recommends combining all three to mitigate herbicide resistance. However, adoption of IWM has stalled, and research to understand the adoption of IWM practices has focused on single stakeholder groups, especially farmers. In contrast, decisions about weed management (...) often occur within a social ecosystem where multiple stakeholder groups co-create knowledge and practices. To more holistically investigate perceptions and decision-making related to herbicide resistant weed management, we conducted 23 in-depth interviews in combination with Q methodology with farmers and public-/private-sector agricultural professionals in the state of Georgia (U.S.). Our investigation focused on the management of an increasingly herbicide resistant weed, Palmer amaranth, which enabled broader conversations about agricultural systems, farmer livelihoods, and sustainability. Factor and thematic analyses allowed us to identify and characterize two distinct typologies: one primarily valued agronomic efficiency and relied upon chemical-technological management practices, while the other valued diversifying weed management strategies as the pathway to agronomic and economic success. Typologies diverged substantially in attitudes toward the three weed management strategies, the role of technology, and systems management generally. These two viewpoints have implications for how we understand underlying stakeholder motivations and choices around weed management strategies, both of which are crucial in promoting and supporting farmer use of diverse, ecologically-sound, weed management strategies. (shrink)

Actualmente existe un debate en torno a la naturaleza del sistema nobi a lo largo de la historia de Corea. Podemos encontrar historiadores que definen el sistema nobi como un sistema de esclavitud y a los nobi como esclavos, y a historiadores que prefieren definirlo como un sistema de servidumbre y a los nobi como siervos. En este artículo se expone la interpretación que el historiador estadounidense James B. Palais ofreció sobre el sistema nobi en la dinastía Joseon de Corea (...) a partir de su producción intelectual, poniendo un mayor énfasis en la interpretación ofrecida en su obra Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyongwon and the Late Choson Dynasty, además de exponer las influencias intelectuales que motivaron esta interpretación por parte de Palais. La interpretación de Palais sobre el sistema nobi reviviría el debate en torno a la naturaleza del sistema nobi y sentaría las bases de la interpretación del sistema nobi para los futuros historiadores de Corea. (shrink)

El propósito de este texto es abordar la problemática de las inteligencias artificiales y su incidencia en la sociedad contemporánea. Para ello, se realizan lecturas paralelas de las sociedades distópicas creadas por Isaac Asimov y Philip K. Dick. A partir de estas, se identifican algunos rasgos existentes en nuestro contexto inmediato, enfocándonos en tres ejes principales: la sociedad de vigilancia y control tecnológico, el problema de lo natural en los ciber-seres, y la visión del siglo XXI en la ciencia ficción (...) para analizar si esta es ilusoria o, por el contrario, forma parte de nuestra realidad inmediata. Todo esto con el fin de definir al género como un espejo de nuestro futuro, basándonos en la lectura de nuestro presente para interpretar los mundos posibles y el futuro como fuente de reflexión filosófica y tecnológica. En este artículo, analizaremos a grandes rasgos los elementos de la ciencia ficción de Isaac Asimov y Philip K. Dick, enfocándonos en aspectos como la naturalidad de los individuos, las sociedades de control y las líneas que separan lo humano de lo artificial como bases para la reflexión filosófica. A través de este ejercicio, examinaremos diversas obras de ambos autores, tales como El hombre bicentenario (Asimov 2019b), Satisfacción Garantizada (Asimov 2019a), La última pregunta (Asimov 2019a), ¿Sueñan los androides con ovejas eléctricas? (Dick 2017) y El hombre en el castillo (Dick 2021). El objetivo es identificar elementos que nos permitan interpretar el siglo XXI como una obra de ciencia ficción en constante desarrollo. (shrink)

Infectious diseases figure prominently as (counter)examples in debates on how to conceptualize “disease.” But crucial epidemiological distinctions are often not heeded in the debate, and pathological and clinical perspectives focusing on individual patients are favored at the expense of perspectives from epidemiology focusing on populations. In clarifying epidemiological concepts, this paper highlights the distinct contributions infectious disease epidemiology can make to the conception of “disease,” and the fact that this is at least tacitly recognized by medical personnel and philosophers. Crucially, (...) infectious disease epidemiology can help elucidate how carrying and transmitting infectious, communicable entities is a disease, even if the carriers themselves are not directly affected by symptoms detrimental to them. (shrink)

An analysis of the sources of Wittgenstein’s picture theory — which include not only his moment of insight on reading a magazine story about the use of models in a traffic court, but also the work of Russell, Hertz, and Boltzmann — provides the basis for an exploration of Wittgenstein’s articulation of a pictorial conception of representation in his wartime notebooks and its crystallization in the Tractatus. A discussion of Wittgenstein’s later criticism of the picture theory and his notion of (...) a “philosophical picture” illustrates the fundamental reversal in his transition to his later conception of philosophy: instead of taking literal pictures as a guide to the nature of meaning, he came to regard philosophical theories as akin to expressing an aesthetic preference for a certain style of representation. Wittgenstein’s treatment of factual language in the picture theory is related to his Tractarian approach to logical form, and the role of the show/say distinction in his early conception of logic and language. Particular attention is given to the difficulties generated by the idea that the conditions for the possibility of a given domain of discourse cannot be described in language, but must be shown by the form of words in question. (shrink)

Aquinas employs formal abstraction to secure the possibility of mathematics conceived as a theoretical Aristotelian science. Mathematics is a science that investigates real quantity and it grasps its necessary, universal, and changeless properties by means of formal abstraction. In accord with it the paper is divided into two parts. In the first part Aquinas’s conception of (formal) abstraction is explicated against the background of the Aristotelian theory of science and mathematics. In the second part the problems associated with formal abstraction (...) in mathematics are critically assessed. (shrink)