Les Burwood, Carol Brady; Changing and Explaining Behaviour by Reward, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 109–113, https.

ABSTRACT John Wilson argued, in a recent paper, that equality of opportunity is neither coherent nor reasonable. It seems that we can better understand Wilson's points If we distinguish between what one might call perfect equality of opportunity and greater equality of opportunity. Further, the familiar notions of formal opportunity and substantive opportunity still seem crucial to an understanding of the issues.

How should state schools respond to the plurality of values in a multicultural society? The liberal response has been that it is unacceptable to promote only the traditional, mainstream values of dominant groups and impose them on others. During the 1980s this response gradually evolved into an ideology of extreme subjectivism, commonly referred to as cultural relativism. This ideology is rejected and it is argued that the school must make crucial judgements about which values should be promoted, tolerated or condemned.

In public debate over agricultural biotechnology, at issue hasbeen its self-proclaimed aim of further industrializingagriculture. Using languages of ’risk‘, critics and proponentshave engaged in an implicit ethics debate on the direction oftechnoscientific development. Critics have challenged thebiotechnological R&D agenda for attributing socio-agronomicproblems to genetic deficiencies, while perpetuating the hazardsof intensive monoculture. They diagnosed ominous links betweentechnological dependency and tangible harm from biotechnologyproducts.In response to scientific and public concerns, theEuropean Community enacted precautionary legislation for theintentional release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). (...) Inits implementation, choices for managing and investigatingbiotechnological risk involve an implicit environmental ethics.Yet the official policy language downplays the inherent valuejudgments, by portraying risk regulation as a matter of’objective‘ science.In parallel with safety regulation, thestate has devised an official bioethics that judges where to’draw the line‘ in applying biotechnological knowledge, as ifthe science itself were value-free. Bioethics may also judge howto ’balance‘ risks and benefits, as if their definition were notan issue. This form of ethics serves to compensate for theunacknowledged value-choices and institutional commitmentsalready embedded in R&D priorities.Thus the state separates’risk‘ and ’ethics‘, while assigning both realms to specialists.The risk/ethics boundary encourages public deference to theexpert assessments of both safety regulators and professionalethicists. Biotechnology embodies a contentious model of controlover nature and society, yet this issue becomes displaced andfragmented into various administrative controls. At stake arethe prospects for democratizing the problem-definitions thatguide R&D priorities. (shrink)

Reproduit quatre conférences faites en 1946 et 1947 sous ce titre au Collège de philosophie, et interroge la notion de temps comme limitation même de l'être fini ou comme relation de l'être fini à Dieu (Electre).

In a sample of 522 police officers and staff in an English police force, we investigated the role of authoritarian leadership in reducing the levels of employee ethical voice. Drawing upon uncertainty management theory, we found that authoritarian leadership was negatively related to employee ethical voice through increased levels of felt uncertainty, when the effects of a motivational-based mechanism suggested by previous studies were controlled. In addition, we found that the negative relationship between authoritarian leadership and employee ethical voice via (...) felt uncertainty is mitigated by higher levels of benevolent leadership. That is, when authoritarian leaders simultaneously exhibit benevolence, they are less likely to cause feelings of uncertainty in their followers who are then more likely to speak up about unethical issues. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of the findings. (shrink)

John Rawls's A Theory of Justice is an extremely long and elaborate work. But despite the length and the elaboration there is at the heart of the work a crucial set of unargued assumptions which need to be challenged. When this is done we are in a position to provide additional support for the critical conclusions of several other commentators who concentrate on other features of Rawls's system.

Les Cyniques grecs ne nous ont pas l gu de savants trait s. Leur philosophie, plut t pragmatique, s'exprimait par l'observance d'une vie asc tique franchement marginale. Le lecteur d couvrira dans ces fragments qui leur sont attribu s, dans ces t moignages de contemporains, pr sent s ici dans leur version fran aise, l'univers et l'id al des Cyniques. Le texte de cette nouvelle dition a t enti rement revu par l'auteur. Les recherches effectu es depuis la premi re (...) publication (1975) ont permis de compl ter plusieurs sections et d'y inclure des fragments nouveaux et des traductions r centes. Une bibliographie enti rement r vis e et deux nouveaux index viennent compl ter l'ouvrage. (shrink)

In this article, I present the argument that educational theory has specific character, which distinguishes it from most scientific disciplines. It requires the application of not only strictly scientific methods, which essentially consist of descriptions and explanations, but also normative ones, which indicate how it is related to philosophy and ethics. Its essential connections with philosophy and ethics cause that clear and final thesis are actually impossible to claim, but from the other hand, it is the only discipline which, according (...) to its definition, tries to answer practical-moral questions.The crucial elements of this analysis are the presentation of the justification of a thesis on the specific character of educational theory, which will be accomplished with the concept of “research potential”, formulated for its purposes, and showing the consequences of this particular characteristic of the discipline being discussed. (shrink)

The aim of the current study was to explore the process of self-transformation as a result of coping with a major life event, and to address the role, if any, that spirituality plays within the coping and transformational process. Using grounded theory methodology, six participants were interviewed over a period of 6 months. The findings, supportive of previous research, produced a preliminary model illustrating transformation as a gradual process. The core category was identified as “openness,” in that by being open (...) to others or to the “Transcendent,” the participants were able to let go and transform. It was theorized that openness, in this sense, enables acceptance of material deriving from a realm of self beyond the everyday ego. Indeed, such a journey of transformation crucially seems to entail expanding the conception of self beyond customary limits. Understood in this way, transformation may be conceptualized as a process of continual movement into the unconscious, where the totality of the self is awakened, resulting in a reinterpretation of life purpose. The consequences of the transformation for participants were positive in nature. The role that spirituality plays within the coping and transformation process was seen to manifest as being subtle and unfolding and/or supportive. (shrink)

This engaging and thought-provoking introduction to philosophy of mind covers all the central questions regarding the mind. Taking a novel approach for an introductory text, authors Paul Gilbert, Kathleen Lennon, and Steve Burwood argue that the dominant theories are based on flawed Cartesian assumptions and presuppositions about the nature of mind and body. Beginning with an examination of the Cartesian roots of contemporary philosophy of mind and rationality, the authors show that, despite rejecting mind-body dualism in favour of materialism, (...) most recent philosophies of mind are still Cartesian -- they share a Cartesian conception of the body while adopting a reductionist approach to the mind. Providing a welcome alternative to texts such as Churchland's Matter and Consciousness, the authors develop an alternative position called "perspectivalism," which is based on a metaphysics of the body characterized intentionally and combines elements of both Anglo-American and Continental traditions. (shrink)

This article addresses the issue of the disciplinary status of Educational Studies, which both in the theoretical discourse and in the practice of this area is far from unambiguous. The issue is relevant not only for theoretical reasons but also for practical and social ones. This is because the status of Educational Studies, by having a decisive impact on the very understanding and nature of studies in education, at least in part may impact changes in educational practice. Two main models (...) of Educational Studies can be differentiated, with additional variation within these models. Among the terms most commonly used in discussion of the disciplinary status of Educational Studies, frequent mention is made of the autonomy that exists in various versions and of interdisciplinarity. This article proposes a new way of understanding this status, which I call the autonomy of Educational Studies as a second-level discipline, which includes aspects of both of the previously mentioned models, yet also adds certain modifications. In the course of my argumentation, I will conduct a comparative analysis of both traditions, and subsequently justify the proposed thesis, and finally briefly indicate potential problems which may be generated by this model. (shrink)

The traditional divisions in the methodology of educational research include two types of methods: quantitative and qualitative. These comprise e.g. quasi-experiment, comparative research, observat...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Carmen MirandaJessica LesCarmen Miranda, she called herself today. She suffered from decades of schizoaffective disorder and now more recently, end–stage renal disease from uncontrolled diabetes. I first met Carmen two weeks prior when she had been brought to the hospital on a 72 hour psychiatric hold for self–harm. She failed to go to dialysis for a week, an act that would kill her if allowed to continue. Now she (...) was here again, for the same reason.Everyone of competent mind has the right to refuse medical treatment. Unfortunately, Carmen’s mind was not currently grounded in reality. So against her will, our family medicine team admitted her to the hospital and arranged for dialysis early the next morning. None of us liked doing this. Fortunately, when the time came for the dialysis tech to insert the dialysis catheter into her shunt, Carmen agreed peacefully. After her dialysis, we had no right to keep her in the hospital because her life was no longer in danger, at least until the next week. We discharged her to home. However the question remained, what about next time?To navigate this ethical gray zone, we called an ethics committee meeting. An ethicist, nurses, hospital social workers, the inpatient family medicine resident team, and most importantly, two people who knew her very well—her caseworker and long–term psychiatrist—discussed her case for an [End Page 103] hour. Our medicine team learned that in her last period of clarity two months prior, Carmen made contradictory statements regarding her wishes. Carmen told her caseworker she was tired of dialysis and being sick and stated it was time to let herself go. During the same lucid week she told her psychiatrist that she was grateful she had been forced to complete dialysis against her wishes after a run of non–adherence while suffering psychosis a couple of months prior. Now months later she was in a downward spiral, exacerbated by the deterioration of her mentally ill husband. If she missed a dialysis treatment here and there, it was okay, but when she went on a run missing several treatments, it was slow suicide.The ethics meeting concluded that Carmen needed to complete an advanced directive and select a power of attorney other than her gravely incompetent husband as soon as she was deemed competent. If she did not become lucid again, her psychiatric team should apply for conservatorship, a legally appointed person who serves as guardian for a gravely disabled mentally ill person. However, conservatorship would take months. In the interim, the ethics committee ruled that our medicine team would continue to provide lifesaving treatment for her, against her wishes if necessary.The ethics meeting adjourned but our medicine team remained in a gray area. To what length should we go to treat her? If she continued to refuse dialysis would we hold her in the hospital until she became sufficiently docile by inevitable uremia that we could peacefully dialyze her? Possibly. Would we go so far as to put her under anesthesia to complete her dialysis? Personally, I hoped not.Just three days after the ethics committee meeting, her caseworker found Carmen yelling nonsensical phrases through the front door of her home while her husband held the door shut with his beer belly and good shoulder. After gaining entry later in the day, Carmen’s caseworker found their mutual medication collection strewn in the bathtub and no food in the house. He placed Carmen on a psychiatric hold and transported her to the hospital. The emergency department paged me when Carmen arrived. I braced myself for the possibilities that lay ahead. When I reached Carmen, she was sitting in a room reserved for psychiatric patients and under watch by a friendly police officer accustomed to these situations.“Hi, Carmen,” I said, one step into her room. She sat on the edge of the gurney, wrapped in three blankets.“Cold,” she said.The police officer spoke from behind my shoulder, “She has been requesting cup after cup of ice water, she won’t take anything else.”“Let’s get you more comfortable.” I returned with a warm blanket and draped it over her... (shrink)

Karl Jaspers argued that academics must be prepared to accept, perhaps even to welcome, the fact that most students ‘will learn next to nothing’ from a university education. In this paper I shall argue that, while Jaspers’ model is unpersuasive as an ideal and inaccurate as a description, there is an uncomfortable truth lurking behind his forthright but gloomy conclusion; viz., that university teaching pays little direct attention to the needs of the student in the wider world (i.e. to the (...) needs of the student qua employee or qua citizen or even qua rounded human being) and pays even less attention, or perhaps none at all, to the needs and expectations of third parties such as employers. In terms of the political context universities now find themselves in, this is an uncomfortable and embarrassing truth for faculty to admit, for it appears to epitomise a self-regarding and inward looking academy. Yet, despite this, perhaps it is a truth that academics should be prepared to accept, even to welcome. At least, in starting any serious discussion on the nature of a university education, it should be a truth we are prepared to admit. (shrink)