The strangeness caused by the cynic gesture and verb is well known since ancient times regarding philosophical praxis. This paper will challenge, in cynical terms and according to his way of living and thinking, the notions of culture and beauty, but from a modern reading of such school, producing a critical thinking exercise. As a result, a current and lively mode of artistic philosophizing will be revealed, at least as written verb in a literary and philosophical way. This challenge can (...) be ironically understood in two ways: the one that the cynics apply when valuing corporal ascesis in its ponos in contrast to institutionalized philosophy schooling; and the one that we apply when the cynicism becomes a subject of the critical proof of our thinking. (shrink)

Without access to Michel Foucault’s courses, it was extremely difficult to understand his reorientation from an analysis of the strategies and tactics of power immanent in the modern discourse on sexuality (1976) to an analysis of the ancient forms and modalities of relation to oneself by which one constituted oneself as a moral subject of sexual conduct (1984). In short, Foucault’s passage from the political to the ethical dimension of sexuality seemed sudden and inexplicable. Moreover, it was clear from his (...) published essays and interviews that this displacement of focus had consequences far beyond the specific domain of the history of sexuality. Security, Territory, Population (Foucault, 2007) contains a conceptual hinge, a key concept, that allows us to link together the political and ethical axes of Foucault’s thought. Indeed, it is Foucault’s analysis of the notions of conduct and counter-conduct in his lecture of 1 March 1978 that seems to me to constitute one of the richest and most brilliant moments in the entire course. It is astonishing, and of profound significance, that the autonomous sphere of conduct has been more or less invisible in the history of modern (as opposed to ancient) moral and political philosophy. This article argues that a new attention should be given to this notion, both in Foucault’s work and more generally. (shrink)

Comme de nombreux penseurs antiques avant et après eux et contrairement à Socrate, Calliclès et Diogène ont déclaré avoir fondé leur éthique sur l’observation de la nature. Et pourtant, les deux discours normatifs qui sont tirés d’une nature que l’on pourrait a priori croire être la même sont on ne peut plus opposés. Calliclès croit que l’homme est appelé à dominer autrui ; Diogène pense plutôt qu’il doit se dominer lui-même ; le premier est un hédoniste débridé, le second croit (...) que le bonheur ne s’achète qu’au prix du sacrifice des désirs artificiels. Comment expliquer cette dichotomie ? Nous empruntons deux routes explicatives. D’abord, nous montrons que pour Calliclès et Diogène, la notion de nature non seulement diffère, mais est observée sous un angle différent. La première est celle des tyrans et de dieux anthropomorphes, la seconde, celle de petits animaux et de dieux autarciques. La première concerne la relation des hommes entre eux ; la seconde, celle de l’homme avec lui-même. Ensuite, nous exposons la différence des présupposés normatifs qui précèdent ou accompagnent l’observation de la nature ; nous contrastons, pour ce faire, les formes d’anticonventionnalisme et d’anti-intellectualisme défendues par Calliclès et Diogène. -/- SUMMARY. Like many ancient thinkers before and after them and contra Socrates, Callicles and Diogenes said they based their ethics on the observation of nature. And yet, the two normative discourses that are derived from nature that we might a priori believe to be the same could not be more opposed. Callicles believes that people are called to dominate others, Diogenes rather thinks people must dominate themselves. The first is an unbridled hedonist, the second believes that happiness can be bought only at the price of sacrificing artificial desires. How to explain this dichotomy? We take two explanatory routes. First, we show that for Callicles and Diogenes, the notion of nature not only differs but is observed from a different angle. The first one is the nature of tyrants and anthropomorphic gods, the second that of small animals and autarkic gods. The first focuses on the relationship between people, the second focuses on the relationship of a person with themselves. Secondly, we expose the difference in normative assumptions that precede or accompany the observation of nature; in order to do so, we contrast anticonventionalism and anti-intellectualism forms proper to both Callicles and Diogenes. (shrink)

This article contrasts Epicurus's and Diogenes the Cynic's respective views on acceptable desires. I emphasize their appeals to nature to legitimize or de-legitimize certain types of desires.

Resumen Es bien conocida esa extrañeza que desde la Antigüedad provocan, en relación con el quehacer filosófico, el gesto y el verbo cínicos; además de convocar intelectualmente en un modo moderno a esa escuela o esa manera de vivir filosóficamente, se cuestionará la noción de cultura y la de lo bello, para así provocar un ejercicio crítico del pensamiento y revelar la figuración viva y actual de un modo de filosofar artísticamente, por lo menos desde el verbo escrito en su (...) modalidad literaria y filosófica. Esa provocación se entenderá irónicamente en una doble figuración: la que opera, ciertamente, el cinismo al valorar una ascesis del cuerpo en su ponos frente a la institucionalización escolar de la filosofía, y la que operamos en tanto que el cinismo se vuelve un sujeto de la prueba crítica de nuestro pensamiento.The strangeness caused by the cynic gesture and verb is well known since ancient times regarding philosophical praxis. This paper will challenge, in cynical terms and according to his way ofliving and thinking, the notions of culture and beauty, but from a modern reading of such school, producing a critical thinking exercise. As a result, a current and lively mode of artistic philosophizing will be revealed, at least as written verb in a literary and philosophical way. This challenge can be ironically understood in two ways: the one that the cynics apply when valuing corporal ascesis in its ponos in contrast to institutionalized philosophy schooling; and the one that we apply when the cynicism becomes a subject of the critical proof of our thinking. (shrink)