Although James Gustafson's use of the Christian Bible and tradition is not fully displayed in the essays published here, Bible and tradition are a crucial part of a composite rationale, which includes experience and the sciences, for his theocentric ethics. Gustafson's theocentric ethics employs the sciences to back, inform, and correct the Christian tradition and offers grounds for respecting the natural piety and morality of “nonreligious” persons while explaining and justifying why Christians draw on major themes (...) and metaphors from their tradition that should penetrate their piety and morality. His proposal should reorient the thinking of theological ethics more than it has thus far. (shrink)

Modern ethics has been shaped by two dominant philosophical assumptions: (1) that there can be no theoretical knowledge of God, i.e., denial of metaphysics, and (2) that moral claims can be redeemed independently of theistic affirmations, i.e., morality does not require theism. These assumptions have influenced much of modern theological ethics. Yet, insofar as theological ethics accepts that morality does not require any explicit or implicit religious beliefs, it affirms that a secularistic morality is possible. But this (...) affirmation is directly at odds with the essence of theism, namely, that God is the source and end of all things, including the moral life. By accepting the dominant consensus, therefore, theological ethics undermines its fundamental theistic claim. Focusing on James Gustafson's theocentric ethics, I seek to show the price that theological ethics pays for subscribing to the dominant consensus. I argue that: (1) Gustafson embraces an inconsistent self-understanding, which undermines his theocentric claim, (2) this is due to his dismissal of metaphysics, and (3) his theocentric ethic would be more compelling if formulated in terms of Whitehead's process metaphysics. (shrink)

"Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective will surprise some, shock others, and unleash a flood of speculation about what has happened to James Gustafson. The answer quite simply is nothing has happened to Gustafson except that he has now turned his attention to developing his constructive theological position, and we should all be very glad.... In this, the first of two volumes, Gustafson displays his colors as a constructive theologian, and they are indeed brilliant and splendid.... Though Gustafson is (...) a theologian who works in the Christian tradition, he reminds us that the God Christians worship is not merely the Christian God. For Gustafson the kind of God who is the object of the theologians's reflection eludes or surpasses the inevitably confessional activity of Christian theological reflection. Thus Gustafson, the constructive theologian, is also Gustafson the revisionist theologian who takes as his task nothing less than challenging the anthropocentrism that he alleges characterizes mainstream Western Christian theology."—Stanley Hauerwas, Journal of Religion. (shrink)

"_Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective_ will surprise some, shock others, and unleash a flood of speculation about what has happened to James Gustafson. The answer quite simply is nothing has happened to Gustafson except that he has now turned his attention to developing his constructive theological position, and we should all be very glad.... In this, the first of two volumes, Gustafson displays his colors as a constructive theologian, and they are indeed brilliant and splendid.... Though Gustafson is a (...) theologian who works in the Christian tradition, he reminds us that the God Christians worship is not merely the Christian God. For Gustafson the kind of God who is the object of the theologians's reflection eludes or surpasses the inevitably confessional activity of Christian theological reflection. Thus Gustafson, the constructive theologian, is also Gustafson the revisionist theologian who takes as his task nothing less than challenging the anthropocentrism that he alleges characterizes mainstream Western Christian theology."—Stanley Hauerwas, _Journal of Religion_. (shrink)

James Gustafson's "Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective" has been criticized very sharply by reviewers from both the theological and scholarly communities. This article examines the reception of this work, and analyzes two aspects of it that are responsible for the critical reaction: 1) its prophetic message and the strategies used to deliver that message; and 2) the understanding of tradition presented and embodied in the text. In conclusion I point to a radical implication of his theory of tradition (...) not pursued by Gustafson in ETP. (shrink)

Examining James M. Gustafson's views on the relationships between the sciences, theology, and ethics from a scientifically based naturalistic philosophical perspective, I concur with his rejection of separatist and antagonistic interactionist positions and his adherence to a mutually supportive interactionist position with both descriptive and normative features. I next explore three aspects of this interactionism: religious empiricism, the connections between facts and values, and the centering of objective values in the divine. Here I find much accord between Gustafson's theocentrism (...) and a scientifically based naturalistic philosophical account of the relationships between the sciences, theology, and ethics. (shrink)

Colin Grant ranges widely in his attempt to retrieve Anders Nygren 's depiction of agape, but the claims I examine here are that agape is distinctive, we should offer a theocentric account of it, Nygren 's altruism should be endorsed, and secular defenses of impartiality are not other-regarding enough. I accept and, reject, and deny that is our only alternative to. Neighbor-love and self-love are like and unlike each other, and the unlikenesses are of more than one kind.

Jesus' teaching that there are two love commandments, that the commandment to love God is the "first and great" one, but that the second commandment to love one's neighbor as oneself is "like" the first, suggest that we should neither blend their features wholly together nor separate their features entirely. This paper supports the suggestion. It considers three central emphases in the Augustinian legacy that specify normative differences, normative ranking, and normative links between the commandments. The emphases are: "God-intoxication," "The (...) Predominance of the Double Love Commandment," and "A Good World Gone Wrong." Such consideration explains and defends the claim that a faithful life honors both differences and points of correspondence between God's action and our own. This study indicates that we can go wrong in distinctive ways, and that we should distinguish "relationality" and "reciprocity". The conclusions reached may inform exchanges with other religious traditions, above all "God-intoxicated" ones. This article was the Presidential Address, given at the annual meeting of the SCE in Vancouver, British Columbia on January 11, 2002. (shrink)

Introduction: to the student -- Ethics and Christian ethics -- An overview of ethics -- Definitions -- Subject matter -- Assumptions -- Cautions -- Alternatives to Christian ethics -- Religious systems -- Judaism -- Islam -- Hinduism -- Buddhism -- Humanism -- Objectivism -- Behaviorism -- Alternatives within Christian ethics -- Obedience to external authority -- In Roman Catholicism -- In Protestantism -- Responsibility for personal decisions -- What am I to do? -- What am (...) I to be? -- Transforming society -- Reinhold Neibuhr's "impossible possibility" -- Paul Ramsey's "obedient love" -- James Gustafson's "theocentric ethics" -- Liberation theology -- Ethics and the Christian faith -- Sources of guidance -- The Bible -- The Christian community -- The nature of the church -- The function of the church -- The Christian in the church -- Personal experience -- The use of the mind -- The prompting of the conscience -- The leadership of the spirit -- Biblical ethics -- The Hebrew Scripture -- General characteristics of Hebrew morality -- The law, the prophets, and the writings -- Jesus and the Gospels -- Jesus and Judaism -- Characteristics of Jesus's ethical teachings -- Basic concepts in Jesus's ethical teachings -- The example of Jesus -- The ethical teachings of Paul -- Theology and ethics -- An ethic of responsible freedom -- An ethic of love -- An ethic of a new life -- Faith working through love -- Theological premises -- Beliefs about God -- Beliefs about humankind -- Beliefs about history -- Faith -- Faith and salvation -- Life in the Christian community -- The instruction of Scripture -- Worship and morality -- Love (agape) -- The nature of love -- The source of love -- The demands of love -- The relationship between love and justice -- Decision -- Christian ethics and contemporary issues -- Human sexuality and the marriage relationship -- The current scene -- A Christian interpretation of sexuality -- A theological perspective -- Questions about the relationship -- A Christian interpretation of marriage -- Homosexuality and the Christian faith -- Contemporary social perspective -- A biblical perspective -- Varying Christian interpretations -- Homosexuality and the Christian way of live. (shrink)

In his 1994 A Sense of the Divine: The Natural Environment from a Theocentric Perspective, James M. Gustafson offered a long-awaited application of his theocentric ethics. In Intersections Gustafson continues to insist that theology and theological ethics must overlap with other, diverse fields of study -- particularly the hard sciences -- if they are to remain rich, vital, and relevant in the years ahead. With trademark clarity, he relentlessly pursues the fundamental questions of theological ethics: (...) the nature of being human, what distinguishes us from other species, how our self-interest conflicts with our sympathy and concern for others, and the role of religious faith. After contrasting two interpretations of human nature -- one from theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, the other from biologist Melvin Konner -- Gustafson suggests four modes of moral discourse about medicine, then examines styles of religious reflection in medical ethics. Briefly sharpening his focus on genetic therapy, he moves to larger questions of human viability, concluding with a stirring call to scholars, clergy, and laypersons alike to engage in these intellectual intersections -- intersections that have, above all, supreme practical importance in our daily lives. (shrink)

Teilhard’s cosmological speculation is a valuable basis for an environmental ethics that perceives individual natural objects as good in themselves and the world as good in itself. Teilhard perceives man as fundamentally part of a cosmic environmental whole that is greater than mankind taken individually or collectively. His holistic views on human biological and psychological and social evolution are, I argue,compatible with a biocentric environmental ethics. I discuss some similarities and differences with the views of the deep ecology (...) movement. I show that Teilhard’s hierarchical system is not humanistically oriented in a way that need be interpreted by Teilhardians as contrary to environmental well-being. I argue that Teilhard’s sympathies toward transportation technology, including the automobile, can be interpreted in his holistic manner. I conclude that Teilhard’s theocentric views are also a basis for supporting an environmental ethics which is both optimistic and not anthropocentric. (shrink)

This book focuses on under-explored and often neglected issues in contemporary African environmental philosophy and ethics. Critical issues such as the moral status of nature, African conceptions of animal moral status and rights, African conceptions of environmental justice, African relational Environmentalism, ubuntu, African theocentric and teleological environmentalism are addressed in this book. It is unique in so far as it goes beyond the generalized focus on African metaphysics and African ethics by exploring how these views might be (...) understood differently in order to conceptualize African environmental ethics. Against the background where environmental problems such as pollution, climate change, extinction of flora and fauna, and global warming are plain to see, it becomes useful to examine how African conceptions of environmental ethics could be understood in order to confront some of these problems facing the whole world. This book will be of value to undergraduate students, graduate students and academics working in the area of African Philosophy, African Environmental Ethics and Global Ethics in general. (shrink)

Three figures in the American Reformed tradition—the novelist Marilynne Robinson, the theocentric ethicist James Gustafson, and the biocentric poet Robinson Jeffers—treat the perception of beauty as the framework of moral discernment in ways that seem particularly significant for ecological ethics. Their work makes vividly concrete dimensions of Calvin's theology of creation that have been the subject of increasing theological attention over the past twenty-five years. By focusing on receptivity to natural beauty, their approach suggests a reorientation of the (...) Christian ecological conversation that would root responsibility in grateful awe rather than stewardship, and would substitute graced responsiveness for obligation. This shift away from duty, sacrifice, and self-denial has the prophetic potential to inspire life-way changes that have been hard to effect through caustic critiques of wasteful materialism or exhortations to just regard for generations as yet unborn. (shrink)

The article explores biblical sources of ethics principles of business. It demonstrates that in the contemporary pluralistic world, principles of biblical business ethics can be valuable in the communication and interaction among representatives of different countries and cultures, as they encompass fundamental foundations for building business relationships. Due to the influence of Christian morality on the culture of many nations, biblical values have the potential to significantly impact individuals and their economic behavior, contributing to the dissemination of important (...) economic categories in society. The study reveals that important anthropological foundations for fruitful economic relations have been formed within the framework of biblical theocentrism, including considerations of human dignity, honesty, diligence, responsibility, and charity. The biblical perspective on property as a temporary stewardship has significant implications for awareness and education about responsibility not only towards other people but also towards the environment, holding crucial relevance in the context of corporate social responsibility in the modern world. (shrink)

This article modestly anticipates the still-unfolding reception of the laudable document For the Life of the World: Toward a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church by two broadly-envisioned communities—those of non-Orthodox Christians and Coptic Orthodox Christians. There is much to be commended by the former, especially regarding the document's balanced assessment amidst complicated issues uncharted in the Orthodox world. This balance is possible through the effective coalescence of a theocentric worldview, a comfort with mystery, and a loosely-defined Orthodox anthropology. (...) Regarding the latter community, the document serves as a pioneering and bold example that does not neglect social relevance at the behest of theological commitments. At the same time, Coptic Orthodox Christians, in their insistence on the centrality of desert spirituality, are likely to question the document's sometimes tepid allusions to spiritual transformation, since the principal means out of which come social change, right action and good conscience for Orthodox Christians is through a life entrenched in Godward ascetic spirituality. (shrink)

This critical reader addresses African environmental ethics in a unique way by drawing from a variety of authors with diverse perspectives on underexplored and often neglected issues in African philosophy and ethics. Central issues in contemporary African environmental ethics are addressed such as: The moral status of nature, Ubuntu and the Environment, African conceptions of animal moral status and rights, African conceptions of environmental justice, African relationalism, theocentric and teleological environmentalism. The book goes beyond the generalised (...) focus on African metaphysics and African ethics by exploring further how these views might be understood differently in order to conceptualise plausible African environmental ethical perspectives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Cosmic Common Good: Religious Grounds for Ecological Ethics by Daniel P. ScheidJohn J. FitzgeraldThe Cosmic Common Good: Religious Grounds for Ecological Ethics Daniel P. Scheid new york: oxford university press, 2016. 264 pp. $31.95Published shortly after the first encyclical to focus on the environment (Pope Francis's Laudato Si'), Daniel Scheid's first book is a significant advance in Christian ethics and religious ecology. Scheid argues (...) that resources in Catholic social thought and other religious traditions can move one to an appreciation of a common good that includes the "more than human world" (xiv). In particular, he "aim[s] (1) to extend Catholic social thought ecologically, and (2) to extend Catholic ecological ethics comparatively" (8).The argument begins by broadening the notion of the common good into a "Catholic cosmic common good," which "emphasizes the centrality of God, the goodness of creation, and humanity's dignified and privileged but contextualized role within the story of creation" (32). This vision is then informed by Augustine, Aquinas, and Thomas Berry. Next, Scheid widens solidarity, a virtue that (per John Paul II) involves "commit[ting] oneself to the common good" (86), into "Earth solidarity," which attends to all ecosystems and species, particularly those most impacted by environmental damage. Solidarity cannot be exercised without respecting others' rights, and Scheid contends that these include "Earth rights" of biota, abiota, and ecosystems. Finally, in order to really "test the potential for the cosmic common good as a ground for interreligious ecological ethics" (124–25), he turns to three non-Abrahamic traditions that each support, augment, and challenge elements of his vision. A Hindu dharmic ecology is theocentric and blurs the line between humans and nonhumans, Buddhist traditions are nontheistic and highlight how all are [End Page 197] interrelated, and American Indians (specifically the Lakota) condemn individualism and demonstrate certain advantages of a more spatial (rather than simply temporal) perspective.The Cosmic Common Good covers an impressive range of thought in under two hundred pages of main text. While the argumentation is intricate, the logical ordering of chapters, the repetition of important points, and some vivid examples assist the reader in following along. The case for Earth rights is especially bold and well argued; Scheid considers objections to them and shows that they can be intelligibly grounded (as prima facie and proportionately weighted) in self-governance and creaturely dignity. This is a very promising development in Catholic social thought, as recent key magisterial teachings do not explicitly affirm that animals have dignity (or rights) but limit themselves to the notion that harming animals is "contrary to human dignity" (see Laudato Si', §§ 92, 130, quoting Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 2418).While the book is generally comprehensive, there are a few surprising lacunae. First, although Scheid himself recognizes that "a properly Catholic ecological ethics would certainly not dismiss the centrality of the Bible" (198n16), there is very little reference to it. The author briefly alludes to the Psalms' portrayal of the natural world (47, 181), but more integration of the Old and New Testaments would have been illuminating. And while The Cosmic Common Good makes a commendable last-minute effort to incorporate insights from Laudato Si', Francis's predecessor Benedict XVI (often dubbed "the Green Pope") receives too-short shrift. Benedict's ecological views are referenced only on one page, perhaps because they are somewhat more anthropocentric than the "Earth-centered or cosmos-centered" ethic developed by Scheid (24). Regardless, the former pope's frequent calls for environmental responsibility to the poor, future generations, and animals would surely lend some healthy support to the cosmic common good. But these omissions do not detract much from the merits of this book, which should be read "not as a definitive conclusion but as an invitation to generate greater interreligious dialogue and cooperation on an issue that demands extensive and immediate action" (11). Professional academics, graduate students, and others who are somewhat versed in the sophisticated issues Scheid raises would do well to take up his invitation. [End Page 198]John J. FitzgeraldSt. John's University (New York)Copyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Friends and Other Strangers: Studies in Religion, Ethics, and Culture by Richard B. MillerBill BarbieriFriends and Other Strangers: Studies in Religion, Ethics, and Culture Richard B. Miller new york: columbia university press, 2016. 416 pp. $60.00In his studies on casuistry, war and peace, pediatric ethics, and other occasional topics Richard B. Miller has for some time been a leading source of creative impulses in the (...) field of religious ethics, so it is a welcome event to have this volume organizing past essays of his into a thematically cohesive presentation. His book sets out a vision of the character and concerns of religious ethics that helps counter critics, such as Stanley Hauerwas, who have expressed skepticism about the field.The governing conception of Friends and Other Strangers is that the study of religious ethics is properly shaped by attending to how "our lives ineluctably oscillate between experiences of intimacy and otherness" (5). Accordingly, Miller seeks to guide the field beyond either a one-sided focus on matters of friendship and special relations or a preoccupation with alterity and heterology. To grasp how the dialectic of intimacy and alterity shapes the normative character of personal and public life, he recommends religious ethicists should employ "the category of culture as an organizing rubric" (6).In the book's initial section Miller elaborates on his view of the enterprise of religious ethics and its place in the broader intellectual landscape. In a discussion drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein, Stanley Cavell, and James Gustafson, Miller first offers his account of the characteristic concerns and history of the field. He then presents the case for a "cultural turn" in religious ethics, arguing not only that practitioners would benefit from incorporating anthropology and cultural studies into their work but that they should extend their ambit to normative questions throughout the academy. Responding to the problems of ethnocentrism and the moral authority of outsiders in criticizing cultural practices, Miller rounds out the section by proposing constructive norms for nonchauvinistic social criticism in multicultural contexts.Among the remaining essays are several that showcase Miller's appreciation of Augustine as a principal source of ethical insight. In a chapter scrutinizing the case for replacing disembodied patterns of moral reasoning with an "ethics of empathy," he proposes that Augustine's ethics of love can sharpen our grasp of both the possibilities and pitfalls of empathy as a moral value. Writing on friendship and evil, Miller invokes the Augustinian "theocentric imaginary" as a guide to how intimacy and alterity are balanced in friendship. And taking [End Page 194] up the ethics and social psychology of war, he presents Augustine's writings on the morality of killing as a source for just war standards that can be applied in cross-cultural normative criticism. That Augustine's seminal reflections on time and memory do not appear in a further chapter on "the moral and political burdens of memory" is a slight disappointment, no doubt attributable to the chapter's origins as a review essay.Other topics tellingly subjected to Miller's characteristically nuanced and sharp analysis include indignation and solidarity, responsibilities to children, and democracy and public reason. A bonus chapter collects six lengthy reviews of recent books—five on topics related to Islam—touted by Miller as exemplary in their embodiment of a cultural turn in religious ethics.Given its endorsement of a "cultural turn" in ethics, the book would have benefited from deeper reflection on discrete meanings of "culture," "cultures," and their various cognates. In addition, the individual chapters, originating in diverse settings, are not all equally well integrated into the book's governing themes. Overall, however, Miller's book amply succeeds in its Geertzian task of presenting both a model of and a model for the field of religious ethics. A fine distillation of the thought of a leading figure in the guild, it is essential reading for serious students of ethics.Bill BarbieriCatholic UniversityCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Love Commandments: Essays in Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy. Edited by EDMUND SANTURRI AND WILLIAM WERPE· HOWSKI. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992. Pp. xxii + 307. $35.00 (paper). The essays in this volume address numerous philosophic and theological issues surrounding the two commandments of love of God and love of neighbor. A brief review cannot do justice to the careful argumentatation contained in the (...) essays. Forced to make an unhappy choice, I have decided to provide some sense of the main line of argument in each piece and to add a few general comments about the dominant approaches to Christian charity in the volume. Gene Outka's "Universal Love and Impartiality," which sets the stage for many of the other pieces, asks: Should there be " no disparity between our consideration of others and our consideration of ourselves? " (3). On the basis of a sustained comparison of Christian universal love with impartiality, Outka concludes that, " while universal love allies itself with impartiality at certain junctures, it represents an advance over impartiality because it more readily accommodates differences between neighbor-love and self-love" (79-80). Christianity's normative emphasis on regard for others goes beyond impartiality toward altruism. Christian ethics is not, however, identical with altruism if the latter means that the " self does not matter." This would be contrary to the theocentric framework of the commandments, which refer directly to the "self's well-being" (82). In contrast to both impartiality and altruism, universal love accents " inclusiveness " over " comparative measurement." On a descriptive level, impartialists " fall to take seriously enough the power of self-preoccupation." The simple assertions of equal regard do not meet the need for ameliorative strategies to correct our tendencies toward selfishness and pride. There are other disparities between self- and neighbor-love and thus between universal love and impartiality. In contrast to impartiality, universal love includes "legitimate, normative self-regarding considerations." This provides a response to the criticism that Christian love involves selfannihilation. A complete passivity to others can result in a loss of a determinate sense of self; but, as Outka argues, such passivity is not 313 314 BOOK REVIEWS to be confused with Christian humility. Rather, it can be rooted in the sin of sloth, disguised as humility. The theocentric concern with the self avoids both pride and sloth through obedient willing. Finally, there are legitimate and ineradicable self-regarding considerations at the descriptive level: I cannot "promote and protect" the well-being of neighbor and self in " exactly the same way" (87). In "Who is My Neighbor? Love, Equality, and Profoundly Retarded Humans,'' Edmund Santurri contrasts the humanist and inclusive view of equal worth with the rationalist view, which identifies being a person with having a rational capacity to desire, choose, evaluate, and so forth. As a way of clarifying the Christian-humanist view, Santurri considers various interpretations of the scriptural language concerning man as an image of God. He argues that in the biblical narrative all beings born of humankind are created in God's image. He then addresses two rival construals of personhood. The first limits personhood to those who have the capacity to value their existence, while the second accords equal standing to those who can participate in communal deliberation. Both views abstract from historical and social con· nections embedded in species life (124). The argument for inclusion of the severely retarded rests not on reductionist biological principles, hut upon social phenomena: " the retarded are born of us, look like us, and interact with us in a wide assortment of highly distinctive social settings " (126). In "'Agape' and Special Relations," William Werpehowski begins by engaging Gewirth's attempt to justify ethical particularism on the basis of ethical universalism. While his view is not as susceptible to criticism as some have thought, Werpehowski is nonetheless sympathetic with the concerns of Amelie Rorty, who worries that a view like that of Gewirth " locates the focus of moral theory and moral action in the processes and rules for justification " which thus " underdescribe and underdetermine the detailed thoughtfulness required for appropriate action" (146-147). As a corrective, Werpehowski appeals to Christian moral discernment or prudence. In a number of... (shrink)

Teilhard’s cosmological speculation is a valuable basis for an environmental ethics that perceives individual natural objects as good in themselves and the world as good in itself. Teilhard perceives man as fundamentally part of a cosmic environmental whole that is greater than mankind taken individually or collectively. His holistic views on human biological and psychological and social evolution are, I argue, compatible with a biocentric environmental ethics. I discuss some similarities and differences with the views of the deep (...) ecology movement. I show that Teilhard’s hierarchical system is not humanistically oriented in a way that need be interpreted by Teilhardians as contrary to environmental well-being. I argue that Teilhard’s sympathies toward transportation technology, including the automobile, can be interpreted in his holistic manner. I conclude that Teilhard’s theocentric views are also a basis for supporting an environmental ethics which is both optimistic and not anthropocentric. (shrink)

This essay explores James Gustafson’s theocentric ethics for the work of constructing an adequate Protestant Christian ethic of the wild. Two critical questions arise in conversation with his ethics: When the category of natural evil is rendered incoherent, what are the significant consequences for piety in Christian ecological ethics? How does Gustafson’s theocentric ethics, which emphasizes experience, help us to refigure gratitude in ecological ethics? The essay explores these questions in the context of (...) the debate over the reintroduction and conservation of wolves in the American West. (shrink)

Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 50, Issue 1, Page 7-19, March 2022.

Robert Adams has written a most impressive book. To say that it is the major philosophical contribution to theocentric ethics in recent years, given moral philosophers’ general avoidance of religious topics, would be grossly inadequate praise. Nor would that judgment adequately convey the book’s fresh and subtle contributions to many more familiar topics in philosophical ethics, from the nature of ethical language to the virtues to the role of civil liberties in a pluralistic society. Most impressive, as (...) well, are the fairness and precision, as well as the erudition, displayed in Adams’s discussions of other philosophers and religious thinkers, past and present. (shrink)

Francesco Piccolomini (1523–1607) interprets Aristotle’s theory of friendship from a Christian-Neoplatonic perspective. This paper focuses on the various (ancient, medieval, and Renaissance) sources of Piccolomini’s interpretation and shows that he succeeds in expounding a coherent doctrine in which the Aristotelian ideal of civic friendship is integrated into a theocentric ethics of spiritual love.

Francesco Piccolomini interprets Aristotle’s theory of friendship from a Christian-Neoplatonic perspective. This paper focuses on the various sources of Piccolomini’s interpretation and shows that he succeeds in expounding a coherent doctrine in which the Aristotelian ideal of civic friendship is integrated into a theocentric ethics of spiritual love.

Robert Adams has written a most impressive book. To say that it is the major philosophical contribution to theocentric ethics in recent years, given moral philosophers’ general avoidance of religious topics, would be grossly inadequate praise. Nor would that judgment adequately convey the book’s fresh and subtle contributions to many more familiar topics in philosophical ethics, from the nature of ethical language to the virtues to the role of civil liberties in a pluralistic society. Most impressive, as (...) well, are the fairness and precision, as well as the erudition, displayed in Adams’s discussions of other philosophers and religious thinkers, past and present. (shrink)

In the virtue ethics of Diadochus Photice, the notion of self-rule (αὐτεξούσιον) is of paramount importance for the creative progress in one’s moral perfection. With the proper use of self-rule man can escape sin and turn himself to love. In addition, Diadochus also uses the notion of apatheia (ἀπάθεια) to indicate the way for a successful cleansing (κάθαρσις) of the soul, so that with this cleansing man can grasp the logoi (λόγοι) of beings. According to Diadochus Photice, virtue (...) class='Hi'>ethics must not be conceived in an anthropocentric way, but in a theocentric one, and so virtue does not depend only on the ethical achievements of man, but on divine grace and on the personal relation of man to God. (shrink)

This article provides a review and critique of Andrew Linzey’s article "C. S. Lewis’s Theology of Animals". In his article, Linzey, modern-day father of the Christian animal advocacy movement and director of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, evaluates fellow Anglican C. S. Lewis’s contributions to a theology of animals. The article considers Lewis’s perspective on animals and Linzey’s evaluation of the same within four general categories: animal pain, animal resurrection, human superiority, and human cruelty. The contributions of both (...) authors to a theology of animals are acknowledged, but the lack of theocentric focus in their mutual thought is questioned. (shrink)

A common perception of Spinoza casts him as one of the precursors, perhaps even founders, of modern humanism and Enlightenment thought. Given that in the twentieth century, humanism was commonly associated with the ideology of secularism and the politics of liberal democracies, and that Spinoza has been taken as voicing a “message of secularity” and as having provided “the psychology and ethics of a democratic soul” and “the decisive impulse to… modern republicanism which takes it bearings by the dignity (...) of every man,” it is easy to understand how this humanistic image developed. Spinoza’s deep interest in, and extensive discussion of, human nature may have contributed to the emergence of this image as well. In this paper, I will argue that this common perception of Spinoza is mistaken and that Spinoza was in fact the most radical anti-humanist among modern philosophers. Arguably, Spinoza rejects any notion of human dignity. He conceives of God’s - and not man’s - point of view as the only objective perspective through which one can know things adequately, and it is at least highly questionable whether he allows for any genuine notions of human autonomy or morality. The notions of ‘humanism’ and ‘anti-humanism’ have been discussed extensively -mainly among continental philosophers - since the end of World War II. Because these notions carry a variety of historical, ideological, and philosophical meanings, it is important to provide at the outset at least a rudimentary clarification of my use of these two terms. By ‘humanism’ I mean a view which (1) assigns a unique value to human beings among other things in nature, (2) stresses the primacy of the human perspective in understanding the nature of things, and (3) attempts to point out an essential property of humanity which justifies its elevated and unique status. This definition of philosophical humanism has only little in common with the historical notion of Renaissance humanism, and seems to match quite well the common understanding of philosophical humanism suggested by current philosophical dictionaries and encyclopedias. This notion of humanism should be understood in contrast to two competing positions. On the one hand, in contrast to the theocentric position that considers humanity to be radically dependent upon God, humanism affirms at least some degree of human independence. On the other hand, in contrast to the naturalist position which endorses the scientific examination of human beings just like any other objects in nature, humanists affirm the existence of a metaphysical and moral gulf between humanity and nature. This gulf assigns a special value to humanity and does not allow us to treat human beings like any other things in nature. For many humanists the nature/humanity gulf does not allow the application of the methods of natural sciences to the disciplines of the humanities. Humanism does not begin with modernity. In order to see how far back we can trace this position, we may recall Protagoras’ saying: “Man is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not.” In modern philosophy, the humanistic position had regained dominant status since the Renaissance, and variants of this position were vigorously argued for by prominent thinkers such as Pico della Mirandola, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, and finally, Hegel. In this paper, I will argue that Spinoza was a foe, and not a friend, of this tradition. I suggest that, in contrast to these humanist philosophers, Spinoza considers man as a marginal and limited being in nature, a being whose claims and presumptions far exceed its abilities. “To what length will the folly of the multitude not carry them?.... [T]hey imagine Nature to be so limited that they believe man to be his chief part.” Arguably, Spinoza locates the origin of our most fundamental metaphysical and ethical errors in a human hubris which not only tries to secure humanity an exceptional place in nature but also attempts to cast both God and nature in its own human image. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 21.1 (2001) 161-164 [Access article in PDF] Book Review "Was Uns Unbedingt Angeht": Studien Zur Theologie Und Philosophie Paul Tillich "Was Uns Unbedingt Angeht":studien Zur Theologie Und Philosophie Paul Tillich. By Werner Schüssler. Münster, Germany: LIT Verlag, 1999. 271 pp. In this book we are introduced to central themes of Paul Tillich's theological and philosophical thinking. Several essays deal with the problems of secularism; Tillich's concept of (...) faith, religion, and theology; his understanding of authority, revelation, and prayer; his theology of culture and religion; his concept of "God above God"; his work on symbols; his relation to natural theology and metaphysics; and his thoughts on the danger of power and the ambivalence of progress. It becomes quite clear that Tillich--who, contrary to Karl Barth, explicitly searched for ways and methods of dialogue with culture, philosophy, and non-Christian religions--still offers much for human beings living in the Third Millennium to reflect upon.In the introductory notes we learn that Paul Tillich (1886-1965) was a thinker who was not bound by any borders between disciplines. The only discipline he explicitly referred to was philosophical theology, which had no place in the academic tradition [End Page 161] of German Protestantism at that time. If we follow his Main Works(Berlin/ New York, 1987-1998), we can differentiate between philosophical, cultural-philosophical, sociophilosophical-ethical, religious, and theological writings. Tillich's writings are the testimonies of a thinker who tried to understand his time--especially the religious, cultural, and political situation in Germany from 1918-1933 (including the problem and idea of totality, as in his three-volume Systematic Theology)--and later, after he had to emigrate, the problems of a civilization shaped by science, technology, the disintegration of traditional systems of meaning, the loss of the religious dimension in daily human life and, following this, the radical experience of nothingness, and finally the encounter with Far Eastern spirituality and religion. Always he wanted to correlate questions arising from the human situation with answers from the Christian message. Therefore, Schüssler argues, we cannot just casually review Tillich's thinking, but we have to dare it anew with honesty, realism, and passion and allow it to inform our ongoing interdisciplinary and intercultural conversations.The essays come in two parts: theology and philosophy. Theology The first part consists of eight contributions: Tillich and the problem of secularization, Tillich's dynamic concept of faith, Tillich's understanding of religion and theology, the relation between authority and revelation found in the writings of Tillich and Jasper, Tillich's theonomous theology of prayer, Tillich's contribution to interreligious dialogue from the viewpoint of philosophy of religion, the continuing effect of the christological paradox in Tillich's philosophy of religion and theology of religion, and Tillich's and Barth's first encounter in the 1920s.Schüssler's essay on interreligious dialogue makes clear that, like Barth, Tillich at the end of his life regretted not having included non-Christian religions into his systematic outlines. Although Tillich worked with history of religion and the question of other religions within his study of Schelling rather early, this aspect became relevant thematically only late (aside from a relatively short comment in his Philosophy of Religion from 1925 and in his Dogmatics from the same year). It was stimulated by two important encounters: a journey to Japan from May until July 1960, and contact with his colleague Mircea Eliade in Chicago. And although his Systematic Theologydeals primarily with the encounter with secular culture, in its chapter on "Manifestation of the Divine Spirit within Historical Humanity," Tillich speaks of the "spiritual community in its latent and manifest states" and in so doing represents the inclusivist model in interreligious dialogue. The author sees many different aspects in Tillich's thought as useful within the theology of religion, particularly the theocentric aspect in his concept of "God above God," the revelatory aspect in his discussion of primary revelation or fundamental revelation, the epistemological aspect in his definition of faith as "that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 21.1 (2001) 130-132 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Faith Among Faiths: Christian Theology and Non-Christian Religions Faith Among Faiths: Christian Theology and Non-Christian Religions. By James L. Fredericks. Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1999. 188 pp. "The time has come to recognize that the debate between exclusivists, inclusivists, and pluralists has reached an impasse."This is the starting point and refrain of Faith Among Faiths. While James (...) Fredericks discerns questions and problems relating to all three models for Christian theological attitudes toward religious pluralism, it is predominantly the pluralist approach that he takes to task. In the first part of this slender volume, he offers a summary of some of the main proponents of the pluralist theology of religion. The ideas of John Hick and Paul Knitter are given separate treatment in a chapter on each, with two "other pluralist voices"--Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Stanley Samartha--also discussed at some length. In order to assess the adequacy of these theologies, Fredericks tests them against two important criteria: [End Page 130] responsibility to the Christian tradition as it has articulated itself, and ability to respond creatively to the challenges and opportunities posed by religious plurality today. Regarding the first criterion, most pluralist theologies are shown to fall short of recognizing the full humanity and divinity of Jesus Christ and hence in some measure to break from continuity with Christian faith. In a useful reminder, Fredericks rightly points to the similarities between pluralist Christologies and the nineteenth-century liberal Protestant views of Jesus, and then joins Pannenberg in criticizing this theocentric understanding of Jesus as unbiblical. At the same time, Fredericks attempts to head off the possible charge that he moves toward biblicism or traditionalism by stating that "the traditional teaching about the divinity and the humanity of Jesus is traditional because of the spiritual and ethical implications that flow from it" (p. 124). The evident importance of this assertion makes it regrettable that he does not elaborate or explain it further.Most of Fredericks's criticism of the pluralist approach is based on his second criterion, i.e., the need to take seriously the manifest similarities and differences between religions and, in turn, promote a genuinely fruitful dialogue. From this perspective, the problem with pluralism would be its "domestication of differences" between the religions. When a pluralist such as John Hick proposes that all religions are reflections of the same ultimate reality and that all religious paths lead to the same ultimate goal, Fredericks thus sees a tendency to undermine the importance of religious differences and of the self-understanding of other religions. While this may indeed be a danger lurking in an abstract conception of the pluralist position, I do not believe that it is a necessary or inherent consequence of it. The basic distinction that most pluralists make between the "ultimate reality" itself, which is absolutely transcendent, and the historical manifestations of this "ultimate reality" does not necessarily reduce the different religions to equally adequate or inadequate manifestations of that ultimate reality. On the plane of phenomenal reality, there is still room for a hierarchy of truths and, inter alia, the possibility of growing in one's understanding of truth through dialogue with other religions. There is, moreover, ample evidence of this in the fact that some of the aforementioned pluralists have also written very detailed works on other religions (e.g., Cantwell Smith on Islam) or on particular aspects of other religions (Hick on conceptions of death and the afterlife in world religions). As we have seen in the case with the Buddhist notion of upaya,he recognition of the relative nature of all conditioned reality does not necessarily lead to a relativism in which all differences become insignificant.After criticizing the different pluralist approaches to the theology of religions, Fredericks proposes a shift to comparative theology. He seems to see comparative theology not so much as a new paradigm or orientation within the theology of religions but as a radical alternative to the whole enterprise of the theology of religions... (shrink)

This essay approaches Gustafson's work through his two-volume "Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective." It puts questions to Gustafson in four areas of concern in religious ethics: anthropocentrism, christology, revelation-inspiration, and practical ethics. The essay suggests that in Gustafson's "magnum opus", both far more and far less is known about God than is warranted, and it concludes by questioning the truly Christian character of such theocentrism.

For centuries, philosophers, political scientists, and jurists have struggled to understand the possibilities for justice and peace among a multiplicity of sovereign states. Like Dante, who sought to organize the world under the authority of the Holy Roman Empire, many theorists have tried to explain how sovereign states should be governed to ensure stability and peace in the absence of any established higher authority. Theories of World Governance traces the various conceptual approaches to world harmony from the close of the (...) Middle Ages to today. Considering the immediate problems of order in a decentralized world community, Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., outlines what he believes are the essential long-term conditions for world peace. Covering a wide range of disciplines -- from theology and philosophy to jurisprudence, ethics, and sociology -- Murphy explores how theorists have reflected upon the necessary components of an effective global order. At the outset, the thought of Christian Europe was shaped by a belief in a natural order established by the Creator of the universe. However, with the advent of the Enlightenment, the connections between the human and the transcendent were severed. There was a movement from a theocentric understanding of the powers of the human mind to an intellectual outlook that blurred the distinctions between the divine and human. This study in the history of ideas examines the profound effects of the fundamental shift from transcendence to immanence upon the development of international theory. Murphy discusses the thought of Leibniz, Wolff, Kant, Hegel, and Phillip Allott, among others. The study concludes with an extended reflection on the importanceof a sound political philosophy to the future well-being of the global community. Possible improvements in the existing arrangements, such as reform of the United Nations, are discussed. Murphy suggests that in order for a society of sovereign states to be transformed into a world political community, human rights and self-governance within states must first be strengthened and, at the same time, individuals of all states must begin to realize their responsibilities toward the whole human family. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Happiness in Premodern Judaism: Virtue, Knowledge, and Well-BeingDaniel H. FrankHava Tirosh-Samuelson. Happiness in Premodern Judaism: Virtue, Knowledge, and Well-Being. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 2003. Pp. xi + 596. Cloth, $50.00.Franz Rosenzweig tried hard to convince the neoKantian Hermann Cohen of the merits of Zionism and the normalization it would bring to Jews and Jewish life. His attempt met with this response from Cohen: "Oho! So the gang (...) now wants to be happy, does it?" For those ignorant of the history of Jewish philosophy, one might imagine that Jewish philosophers, no less than their non-philosophical kinsmen, were so weighed down by the burdens of history and persecution that happiness could play no role in their theorizing. But happiness plays a key role in the history of Jewish moral and political philosophy, especially in the premodern period. Even Spinoza, the last of the medievals and the first of the moderns, the great critic of the rabbinic tradition and of Maimonides in particular, is concerned in his Ethics with identifying those activities that together constitute human well-being and the good life. Only lately, since the Enlightenment and Kant, has non-eudaimonism been a live option for Jewish thinkers. Only with the rise of (modern) Orthodoxy, and its predilection for construing goodness as rectitude and rule-following, has eudaimonism fallen out of favor. But with Tirosh-Samuelson's weighty volume on happiness in premodern Judaism, there can be no excuse in the future to imagine that all Jews are, or must be, closet Kantians, strict deontologists. To think otherwise seems to come close to taking on the classical (anti-Semitic) dichotomy of legalistic Judaism vs. spiritual Christianity. In it own way, Happiness in Premodern Judaism is a critique of such a one-sided, monochromatic view of Judaism, whether from the Christian or even from the Jewish side.Tirosh-Samuelson writes explicitly as an intellectual historian, rather than as a philosopher. She understands herself and her project as one that presents just the facts, without evaluating them. While one may cavil at a lost opportunity, in the present case this would be churlish, given the enormous erudition on display. After an introductory chapter outlining the foundational moral theories of Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic philosophers, the text presents the (Greek-inspired) areteic wisdom literature of the Second Temple period, the teleological theocentrism of the rabbis, the Greco-Arabic Islamicate culture that nurtured Jewish philosophers from Saadia in the tenth century to Maimonides in the twelfth, the rabbinic and kabbalistic critiques of the philosophical ideal of happiness commencing [End Page 338] with the translation (into Hebrew) of Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and finally, very important and the focus of much recent scholarly work, the transformation of Jewish eudaimonism through direct contact with Christian Scholasticism and later with the humanist Renaissance. All in all, a millennium and a half of Jewish intellectual history is presented in a sober and scholarly way.Not surprisingly Maimonides plays a pivotal role in the story that Tirosh-Samuelson relates. A Janus-like figure, he represents the culmination and height of accommodation with Greek and Greco-Arabic philosophical culture. However, with the gradual worsening of the socio-economic condition of European Jewry in the thirteenth century, his accommodationism seemed traitorous, and as a result generations of thinkers, mystics and philosophers alike, strove to critically distance themselves from Maimonidean Aristotelianism. Tirosh-Samuelson is admirably clear in pointing out that such anti-Maimonidean tendencies are ill-characterized as anti-philosophical. Hasdai Crescas in the late-fourteenth and early-fifteenth centuries launched a massive critique of Maimonides' physics, metaphysics, and moral philosophy, but did so in as rigorous a manner as any philosopher would. The picture that enfolds over the course of the text is one of vigorous dialectic between partisans of 'alien' (Greek) wisdom and those who viewed such wisdom with considerable suspicion. Such a dialectic parallels, not surprisingly, developments in Christian philosophy.The trajectory of the story of premodern Jewish musings on happiness is from the centrality of reason and intellect, and the contemplative activity that is reason's preeminent actuality, to the primacy... (shrink)

The purpose of this thesis is to explain the moral content of the Confessions of St. Augustine. Accordingly, other works of the Saint, as well as commentators on the Confessions will be used solely to clarify the main moral tenets of this work. Since moral principles, moreover, are found not merely in the expressed ideas of St. Augustine, but are also embodied in his actions, moral principles will be gleaned and illustrated from both sources. When, moreover, the Confessions consider man, (...) they view him in the same theocentric fashion, in his relationship to God, and so reaffirm frequently that the happiness of man is inseparably linked with the knowledge and worship of God, the supreme Good and the cause of all moral good. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Just Sustainability: Technology, Ecology, and Resource Extraction eds. by Christiana Z. Peppard and Andrea ViciniTallessyn Zawn Grenfell-LeeJust Sustainability: Technology, Ecology, and Resource Extraction Edited by Christiana Z. Peppard and Andrea Vicini maryknoll, ny: orbis, 2015. 304 pp. $42.00Just Sustainability offers a detailed journey through various Catholic contextual understandings of what ecological sustainability means today in light of the demands of justice. In the first section of the book, (...) called "Locations" (11–53), the contributors put concepts of sustainability into dialog with concerns of socioeconomic, gender, and racial justice from contexts as diverse as Europe, East Asia, India, Africa, and North America. The various locations share common themes, such as the importance of deep meanings of the term "sustainability," the priority of education and advocacy, the resource and energy challenges behind structures of injustice, and the primary role of economics. Yet distinctive emphases emerge from the diverse contexts as well. Examples include the [End Page 200] need for humility instead of the ironic arrogance of nuclear energy in Japan, the widespread challenges of corruption in Africa and Mexico, and the problem of the agriculture lobby in the United States.The second section, "Structures" (57–156), steps back from specific cultural contexts and explores various systemic approaches to the challenge of just sustainability. Using Catholic social teachings, the authors again often speak from diverse global contexts, but with reference specifically to economic and societal systems such as politics, measurements of well-being, urban planning, food and agriculture, and health care. In this section the authors speak of which structures have worked and which have failed to build just and sustainable societies. For example, in the Philippines, more accountability through transparency and regular reporting helped impact energy efficiency. In Kenya and Chad, the authors highlight the need for reliable social systems of access, communication, collaboration, and government in order to counter corruption and build sustainable programs to address HIV, hunger, employment, and food sovereignty. Several authors also describe the positive impact of more democratic and egalitarian participatory structures that involve the people most affected by ecological decisions and policies.The last section, "Theological Stances and Sustainable Relations" (159–268), delves more deeply into Catholic theological resources to provide both a foundation as well as specific practices of just sustainability. The authors wrestle with theocentric, biocentric, and anthropocentric concepts of humanity and the imago Dei, the Eucharist as a potentially powerful way to connect ideas of inequity, the promise of ecofeminist theologies in elevating the wisdom of local peoples to build just sustainability practices, and virtue ethics and Catholic social teachings to foster ecological conversion and build solidarity, hope, and efficacy.The book sets itself a challenging task, to provide a coherent picture of Catholic approaches to building just sustainability while presenting a spectrum of not only diverse cultural and geographical contexts but also diverse theologies. In the end, the book reveals the ways in which Catholic laity and leaders are creatively responding to the challenge of just sustainability across much of the globe by using a combination of ecclesial, theological, and social scientific resources. The book would have benefited from a concluding essay to tie together some of the salient themes from the numerous, somewhat disparate essays, and a chapter from South America would have strengthened the global orientation of the collection. Nonetheless, the reader is left with a more holistic understanding of the difficult task of just sustainability as well as the wealth of work toward this goal from many parts of the Earth. [End Page 201]Tallessyn Zawn Grenfell-LeeBoston University School of TheologyCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)