Drawing on philosophy, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, Simple Minds explores the construction of the mind from the matter of the brain.

This paper offers a solution to Laura Valentini’s paradox of ideal theory. A reason for idealizing assumptions is because otherwise the theory would be too complicated to be action guiding.

Why should anybody care about theoretical simplicity? It is pretty clear that simpler theories don't stand a better chance of being true, just because they are simpler than their competitors. Of course, simpler theories are easier to use in technological applications, and they are more tractable. But that is something engineers should be concerned about. Why should the theoretical scientist be interested in simple theories? ;The principal virtue of simple theories is their facilitation of scientific understanding in virtue (...) of their greater explanatory power. Simple theories are more unified, and they allow important kinds of reasoning about the world. If a theory yields a unified but structure-rich picture of the world, and thereby a high degree of understanding, we can design relevant experiments, form rational expectations, and in general are in a better position to gather relevant data than when we confront the world without any understanding whatsoever. Simple theories are therefore, in virtue of increasing our understanding, epistemically advantageous. That's why the theoretical scientist should be interested in simple theories. ;Of course, since the choice of simple theories does not guarantee getting closer to the truth, the claim that such a choice is epistemically advantageous presupposes that we draw a distinction between the explanatory power of theories and their accuracy. This distinction has not received sufficient attention in the existing literature, and that's why it was so difficult to say exactly what the virtue of simple theories is. Recognizing that explanatory power and accuracy are orthogonal aspects of scientific theories allows us to assign simplicity the role of facilitating understanding and thereby guiding controlled experimentation. (shrink)

Bayesian decision theory provides a simple formal elucidation of some of the ways that representation and representational abstraction are involved with, and exploit, both prediction and its rather distant cousin, predictive coding. Both model-free and model-based methods are involved.

This paper explores the idea that many “simple minded” invertebrates are “natural zombies” in that they utilize their senses in intelligent ways, but without phenomenal awareness. The discussion considers how “first-order” representationalist theories of consciousness meet the explanatory challenge posed by blindsight. It would be an advantage of first-order representationalism, over higher-order versions, if it does not rule out consciousness in most non-human animals. However, it is argued that a first-order representationalism which adequately accounts for blindsight also implies that (...) most non-mammals are not conscious. The example of the honey bee is used to illuminate these claims. Although there is some reason to think that bees have simple beliefs and desires, nevertheless, their visually-mediated cognizing is comparable to that of an animal with blindsight. There is also reason to think that the study of blindsight can also help determine how consciousness is distributed in the animal world. (shrink)

Mr. Bartley's remark that Goodman's puzzle is “an interesting variant of the possibility... that the next instance may be different” rather badly misrepresents matters. One might say that the “new riddle” arises just because no matter what the nature of the next instance, it will be as much like all previously examined cases as any other instance. Suppose “Hester” is the name of the first emerald examined after time t. If Hester is green, then Hester is like previously examined emeralds (...) with respect to their green-ness. But should Hester be blue, then Hester has its grue-ness in common with previously examined emeralds. The difficulty here is that likenesses abound; the evidence presents us with more likenesses than we could consistently expect of or project to subsequent cases. And the question that Goodman's puzzle poses is, by what criteria do we select one from among all of these likenesses to project to subsequent cases? (shrink)

Hamaker's conjecture κομâ at Lysias 16.18 was adopted by Rauchenstein in his influential edition of 1869 and soon given powerful endorsement by Jebb and by Shuckburgh. Successive later editors and commentators have seen no reason to demur: Thalheim, Adams, Hude, Gernet and Bizos, Lamb, and finally Edwards and Usher all adopt κομâ, and, where they comment, unanimously cite Aristophanic parallels in support of a connection between longhaired affectation and ‘oligarchic’ affiliations; some also adduce the expression ảπ’Ψεως in justification. But this (...) is an egregious instance of unwarranted tampering with a sound text. τóλμα is a quality conspicuously displayed by Mantitheus, on his own account of his character, words, and actions. (shrink)

Hamaker's conjecture κομâ (for τολμâ,sic) at Lysias 16.18 was adopted by Rauchenstein in his influential edition of 1869 and soon given powerful endorsement by Jebb and by Shuckburgh. Successive later editors and commentators have seen no reason to demur: Thalheim, Adams, Hude, Gernet and Bizos, Lamb, and finally Edwards and Usher all adopt κομâ, and, where they comment, unanimously cite Aristophanic parallels (especiallyEq.580) in support of a connection between longhaired affectation and ‘oligarchic’ affiliations; some also adduce the expression ảπ’ὂΨεως in (...) justification. But this is an egregious instance of unwarranted tampering with a sound text. τóλμα is a quality conspicuously displayed by Mantitheus, on his own account of his character, words, and actions. (shrink)

Hornsby is a defender of a position in the philosophy of mind she calls “naïve naturalism”. She argues that current discussions of the mind-body problem have been informed by an overly scientistic view of nature and a futile attempt by scientific naturalists to see mental processes as part of the physical universe. In her view, if naïve naturalism were adopted, the mind-body problem would disappear. I argue that her brand of anti-physicalist naturalism runs into difficulties with the problem of mental (...) causation and the completeness of physics. (shrink)

Jennifer Hornsby offers here detailed discussions of ontology, human agency, and everyday psychological explanation. In her distinctive view of questions about the mind's place in nature she argues for a particular position in philosophy of mind: naive naturalism.

A pocket-sized collection of mindfulness practices anyone can do anytime--from the author of Mindful Eating. Mindfulness can reduce stress, improve physical health and quality of life, and give you deep insight. Meditation practice is one way to do it, but not the only way. In fact, there are easy ways to fit it into your everyday life. Jan Chozen Bays provides here 25 practices that can be used on the go to cultivate mindfulness. The three-breath practice, the mindfulness of entering (...) rooms, offering compliments, tasting your food one careful bite at a time--these deceptively simple practices can have a cumulative effect for the better. The book is an abridgment of Bays's longer collection How to Train a Wild Elephant: And Other Adventures in Mindfulness. (shrink)

These questions provide the impetus for the detailed discussions of ontology, human agency, and everyday psychological explanation presented in this book.

Introduces the use of Lego Robots for use in research and teaching in philosophy. Potential uses include using the machines as pedagogical tools for teaching introductory ideas in cognitive robotics, philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of Artificial Intelligence. Describes the strength and potential pitfalls of introducing this technology to the classroom.

Neuroelectrical panpsychism (NP) offers a clear, simple, testable mind–body solution. It says that everything is at least minimally conscious, and electrical activity across separate neurons creates a unified, intelligent mind. NP draws on recent experimental evidence to address the easy problem of specifying the mind's neural correlates. These correlates are neuroelectrical activities that, for example, generate our different qualia, unite them to form perceptions and emotions, and help guide brain operations. NP also addresses the hard problem of why (...) class='Hi'>minds accompany these neural correlates. Here, the real nature of matter-energy (beyond how it appears to sense organs) is consciousness that occupies space, exerts forces, and unites neuroelectrically to form minds. This doesn't reduce consciousness to observable neural activities, nor posit any radically different entities. NP also deals with panpsychism's combination problem by explaining how the mind's subject and experiences arise by electrically combining simple experiences in brains. (shrink)

Even simple geometric shapes are seen as animate and goal-directed when they move in certain ways. Previous research has revealed a great deal about the cues that elicit such percepts, but much less about the consequences for other aspects of perception and cognition. Here we explored whether simple shapes that are perceived as animate and goal-directed are prioritized in memory. We investigated this by asking whether subjects better remember the locations of displays that are seen as animate vs. (...) inanimate, con- trolling for lower-level factors. We exploited the ‘Wolfpack effect’: moving darts (or discs with ‘eyes’) that stay oriented toward a particular target are seen to be actively pursuing that target, even when they actually move randomly. (In contrast, shapes that stay oriented perpendicular to a target are correctly perceived to be drifting randomly.) Subjects played a ‘matching game’ – clicking on pairs of panels to reveal animations with moving shapes. Across four experiments, the locations of Wolfpack animations (compared to control animations equated on lower-level visual factors) were better remembered, in terms of more efficient matching. Thus perceiving animacy influences subsequent visual memory, perhaps due to the adaptive significance of such stimuli. (shrink)

"The brightened mind is one that is able to make better choices," says Sumano Bhikkhu--choices appropriate to our true being that will lead to meaningful happiness and a fulfilled life. Having left the hectic world of Chicago real estate decades ago to become a Thai Buddhist monk, he knows what he's talking about. This simple, short introduction to meditation, particularly well suited to young people, can help anyone rattled with the stresses of living in today's society rife with financial (...) uncertainty, war, crime, and the psychological assaults of bosses, teachers, and the media. In plain language, Sumano explains techniques to sharpen alertness and quiet the mind. His methods increase awareness, strengthen positive mental states, and develop insight. Eventually, the feeling of being overwhelmed becomes replaced with a sense of innate brilliance and trust in one's natural abilities. Moreover, the meditation Sumano teaches opens access to the infinite wisdom of the Universal Mind. "We have the means to accomplish much more than we ever dreamed of," he says. "This connection to the divine realm is our birthright as human beings." An appendix on lovingkindness is an added benefit, providing the tools needed to face all challenges with a poised, cool, and compassionate heart. (shrink)

An at-home mindful movement practice-identify where you physically hold emotions, interpret your body's unique language, cultivate resilience, dispel emotional blockages, and improve your life with the power of movement.

In this inspiring and practical book, Andrew Seaton guides us to our true nature, the peace-filled observing awareness beyond the mind. The book explains how, beginning in our infancy, we experience a spiritual forgetting. The mind creates abstract interpretations of the world and who we are. These conditioned interpretations become self-fulfilling and create our life experience, our karma. Learn how to see the world as it is in reality, rather than through the distorting filters of the conditioned mind. Discover how (...) simple it is to clear away the mist of the conditioned mind and instantly drop into the awareness Self, which is who you really are. Importantly, this book shows the reader how to avoid some of the common frustrations and traps in spiritual awakening. Perhaps best of all, it offers a simple strategy for holding in focus the ways of experiencing everyday life as the awareness Self: a simple strategy for spiritual awakening. Spiritual Awakening Made Simple offers a concise, unified and practical formulation that will help you to awaken to your own true nature as peace, contentment and connectedness with all life. (shrink)

In Simple Minds, Dan Lloyd presents a reductive account of naturally representing machines. The theory entails that a system represents an event by virtue of potentially misrepresenting it whenever the machine satisfies a multiple information channel, convergence, and uptake condition. I argue that Lloyd's conditions are insufficient for systems intrinsically naturally to misrepresent, and hence insufficient for them intrinsically naturally to represent. The appearance of potential misrepresentation in such machines is achieved only by reference to the extrinsic design (...) or extrinsic interpretation or attribution of an intrinsically nonexistent or underdetermined purpose, end, or goal to such devices in identifying an intended object of representation in the system's salient behavior under the uptake condition. The implication is that Lloyd-representation is not intrinsic natural representation in a cognitively relevant sense, and Lloyd's simple ‘minds’ are not minds but mere machines. (shrink)

Draws upon ancient wisdom and contemporary mind/body techniques to present a series of empowering meditations, actions, rituals, and visualizations.

Against Mitchell et al.'s assertions, we argue that (1) the concordance between learning and awareness does not support any particular learning theory, (2) their propositional approach is at odds with examples of learned behaviours that contradict beliefs about causation, and (3) the relative virtues of the two approaches in terms of parsimony is more ambiguous than Mitchell et al. suggest.

Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..

This chapter investigates the extent to which claims of massive modular organization of the mind (espoused by some members of the evolutionary psychology research program) are consistent with the main elements of the simple heuristics research program. A number of potential sources of conflict between the two programs are investigated and defused. However, the simple heuristics program turns out to undermine one of the main arguments offered in support of massive modularity, at least as the latter is generally (...) understood by philosophers. So one result of the argument will be to force us to re-examine the way in which the notion of modularity in cognitive science should best be characterized, if the thesis of massive modularity isn’t to be abandoned altogether. What is at stake in this discussion, is whether there is a well-motivated notion of ‘module’ such that we have good reason to think that the human mind must be massively modular in its organization. I shall be arguing (in the end) that there is. (shrink)

I argue that extended simples are possible. The argument given here parallels an argument given elsewhere for the claim that the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, not intrinsic as is commonly supposed. In the final section of the paper, I show that if the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, the most popular argument against extended simples fails.

Leibniz's claim that a substance which is simple perceives is examined in terms of the cartesian model of mind which leibniz adopted. This examination helps to explain some of leibniz's claims about perception. Although leibniz can account for perception while maintaining that the substance which perceives is simple, He cannot adapt the cartesian model to encompass his broadened understanding of perception which includes unconscious perceptions in monads which apperceive nothing.

Here is a question about mereological simples that I raised in a recent paper.

One of the criteria to a strong principle in natural sciences is simplicity. This paper claims that the Free Energy Principle (FEP), by virtue of unifying particles with mind, is the simplest. Motivated by Hilbert’s 24th problem of simplicity, the argument is made that the FEP takes a seemingly mathematical complex domain and reduces it to something simple. More specifically, it is attempted to show that every ‘thing’, from particles to mind, can be partitioned into systemic states by virtue (...) of self-organising symmetry break, i.e. self-entropy in terms of the balance between risk and ambiguity to achieve epistemic gain. By virtue of its explanatory reach, the FEP becomes the simplest principle under quantum, statistical and classical mechanics conditions. (shrink)

Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..

I argue that the assumptions that physically basic things are either mereologically atomic, or that they are continuous and there are no atoms, both face difficult conceptual problems. Both views tend to presuppose a largely unquestioned assumption, that things have parts corresponding to the geometric parts of the regions they occupy. To avoid these problems I propose a third view, that physically simple things occupy a finite volume without themselves having parts. This view is examined enough to tease out (...) some of its consequences and show that it withstands the obvious questions it faces. I conclude by mentioning some precedents for this view in Democritus, Kant, and Whitehead, with close variants in Boscovich, Harré, and Markosian. (shrink)

I argue that the assumptions that physically basic things are either mereologically atomic, or that they are continuous and there are no atoms, both face difficult conceptual problems. Both views tend to presuppose a largely unquestioned assumption, that things have parts corresponding to the geometric parts of the regions they occupy. To avoid these problems I propose a third view, that physically simple things occupy a finite volume without themselves having parts. This view is examined enough to tease out (...) some of its consequences and show that it withstands the obvious questions it faces. I conclude by mentioning some precedents for this view in Democritus, Kant, and Whitehead, with close variants in Boscovich, Harré, and Markosian. (shrink)