Simple mindedness: in defense of naive naturalism in the philosophy of mind

Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1997)
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Abstract

Jennifer Hornsby offers here detailed discussions of ontology, human agency, and everyday psychological explanation. In her distinctive view of questions about the mind's place in nature she argues for a particular position in philosophy of mind: naive naturalism.

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Jennifer Hornsby
Birkbeck College

Citations of this work

Representation in Cognitive Science.Nicholas Shea - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
Acts and Embodiment.Kit Fine - 2022 - Metaphysics 5 (1):14–28.
Naturalising Representational Content.Nicholas Shea - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):496-509.
Introduction: Varieties of disjunctivism.Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.

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