Harvard University Press (1996)
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Book synopsis: How is our conception of what there is affected by our counting ourselves as inhabitants of the natural world? How do our actions fit into a world that is altered through our agency? And how do we accommodate our understanding of one another as fellow subjects of experience—as beings with thoughts and wants and hopes and fears? These questions provide the impetus for the detailed discussions of ontology, human agency, and everyday psychological explanation presented in this book. The answers offer a distinctive view of questions about “the mind’s place in nature,” and they argue for a particular position in philosophy of mind: naive naturalism. This position opposes the whole drift of the last thirty or forty years’ philosophy of mind in the English-speaking world. Jennifer Hornsby sets naive naturalism against dualism, but without advancing the claims of “materialism,” “physicalism,” or “naturalism” as these have come to be known. She shows how we can, and why we should, abandon the view that thoughts and actions, to be seen as real, must be subject to scientific explanation.
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Keywords | Mind Action Mental Causation |
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Reprint years | 1997, 1998, 2001 |
Buy this book | $54.50 new Amazon page |
ISBN(s) | 0674005635 0674808185 9780674005631 |
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Citations of this work BETA
Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism.Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Working From Within: The Nature and Development of Quine's Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Personal and Sub‐Personal; A Defence of Dennett's Early Distinction.Jennifer Hornsby - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24.
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