With emotional motivation the organism prepares the body to obtain a goal. There is an anticipatory sensitization of the sensory systems in the body and the brain. Presynaptic facilitation of the sensory afference in the spinal cord is probably involved. In a second stage the higher centers develop an action image/plan to realize the goal, modifying the initial preparations in the body. The subject experiences the changes in the body as a feeling. Three empirical studies supporting (...) this description are summarized. This description of how feelings develop from emotion circuits is discussed from a phenomenological viewpoint. (shrink)

When subjects view stimulation of a rubber hand while feeling congruent stimulation of their own hand, they may come to feel that the rubber hand is part of their own body. This illusion of body ownership is termed ‘Rubber Hand Illusion’ . We investigated sensitivity of RHI to spatial mismatches between visual and somatic experience. We compared the effects of spatial mismatch between the stimulation of the two hands, and equivalent mismatches between the postures of the two hands. (...) We created the mismatch either by adjusting stimulation or posture of the subject’s hand, or, in a separate group of subjects, by adjusting stimulation or posture of the rubber hand. The matching processes underlying body ownership were asymmetrical. The illusion survived small changes in the subject’s hand posture, but disappeared when the same posture transformations were applied to the rubber hand. Mismatch between the stimulation delivered to the subject’s hand and the rubber hand abolished the illusion. The combination of these two situations is of particular interest. When the subject’s hand posture was slightly different from the rubber hand posture, the RHI remained as long as stimulation of the two hands was congruent in a hand-centred spatial reference frame, even though the altered posture of the subject’s hand meant that stimulation was incongruent in external space. Conversely, the RHI was reduced when the stimulation was incongruent in hand-centred space but congruent in external space. We conclude that the visual–tactile correlation that causes the RHI is computed within a hand-centred frame of reference, which is updated with changes in body posture. Current sensory evidence about what is ‘me’ is interpreted with respect to a prior mental body representation. (shrink)

What happens to artist and to viewer when painting or sculpture emancipates itself from all physical mediums? What happens to art-world experts and to museum goers and amateurs when the piece of art turns immaterial, becoming indiscernible within its surrounding empty space and within the parergonal apparatus of the exposition site? What type of verbal depiction, of critical understanding and specific knowledge is attempted under these programmed and fabricated conditions? What kind of aesthetic experience–namely embodied and sensitive–is expected when (...) a performative utterance of the artist about his art takes the place of a real piece of artwork seen or perceived, or that may be seen or perceived? For Andy Warhol, «wasted space is any space that has art in it.» In the spring of 1958, in Paris, an artist already well-known among the neo-avantgardes and accredited by the international art-world, shows up empty-handed and presents himself as a painter without paintings in a empty space. In a singular never-wasted space, Yves Klein displays himself as a snob, with an extraordinary showbiz glamour and literally sine-nobilitate, without the traditional marks of artistic manual skills. Against the modernist issues, he writes: «Credit was given to me. The gesture alone was enough. The public had accepted the abstract intention.» What’s the matter with this powerful prestige and its influence on the critic and public? How to understand the public trust in the artist as a producer of an institutional “make-believe” without any objecthood, devoid of any individual artwork presented to the sight or to any other sense? For Modernism and Minimalism, the work of art seems to have an internal coherence, whether formal or expressive, and is thus autonomous from the surrounding world, existing with only the clear opposition to the living space and set as a specialized and situated objection to the enclosing field. Instead, now the object melts into the air and becomes undetectable, confused with the atmosphere of the theory of art and with the stylish and snobbish life of the artist. What type of interpretation is put on regarding this unclassifiable and ambiguous field, simultaneously an-aesthetic and existential, theoretical and sensitive, charismatic and motionless, at same time without a specialized position in the world made by the artist himself? And what kind of embodied experience is performed by the spectatorship? What type of phenomenology and pragmatics of aesthetic relationship is necessary to describe how the body of the beholder absorbs this vacated and boring space via a direct and immediate perception-assimilation? What kind of artistic rhetoric, what kind ontology of art? Until this day, after more than 50 years, Yves Klein’s The Void has not ceased asking these and other questions on aesthetics, philosophy and the history of art. (shrink)

Descartes set for himself the ambitious program of accounting for the functions of the Aristotelian vegetative and sensitive souls without invoking souls or the faculties or powers of souls in his explanations. He rejects the notion that the soul is hylomorphically present in the organs of the body so as to carry out vital and sensory functions. Rather, the body’s organs operate in a purely mechanical fashion. That is what is involved in “mechanizing” these phenomena. The role (...) of the soul is restricted to properly mental functions: to the conscious aspects of sensations and other mental operations; to intellectual acts; and to acts of volition. In effect, soul becomes mind. In order to understand the extent of Descartes’ ambition, this chapter first considers more fully the functions attributed to the soul or to the vital faculties in the Aristotelian and Galenic traditions, and especially the functions of the sensitive soul or power. It draws attention to the cognitive aspects of these functions, beyond the mere operation of the external senses. Then it turns to Descartes’ mechanistic explanations for these cognitive functions. Finally, it situates Descartes’ new mechanistic psychology within the larger context of his novel anthropology, or theory of the human being. (shrink)

This book provides an accessible introduction to spiritually-sensitive psychoanalysis, an analytic tradition characterized by sensitivity to the spiritual and religious dimensions of human life and oriented toward spiritual growth. Psychoanalysis has historically evinced severe suspicion to all ideas and ideals of religion and spirit. However, in recent years a new analytic approach is emerging, which recognizes faith and spirituality as crucial parts of a full, satisfying psychic life. This book explores the unique ways in which this approach refers to (...) and understands core analytic issues such as transference, interpretation, psychopathology, and psychic development. It goes on to expound the approach's understanding of the analytic relationship and the way it influences the spiritual person. It also discusses the tensions arising between this emerging school of thought and the existing body of psychoanalytic knowledge. Discussing freely and deeply its spiritual aspects and aspirations will enlighten analysts new to the emerging spiritually-sensitive tradition, as well as those who are more familiar with it, and who are looking for a comprehensive description of this fresh approach to analysis. (shrink)

A novel theoretical framework for an embodied, non-representational approach to language that extends and deepens enactive theory, bridging the gap between sensorimotor skills and language. -/- Linguistic Bodies offers a fully embodied and fully social treatment of human language without positing mental representations. The authors present the first coherent, overarching theory that connects dynamical explanations of action and perception with language. Arguing from the assumption of a deep continuity between life and mind, they show that this continuity extends to language. (...) Expanding and deepening enactive theory, they offer a constitutive account of language and the co-emergent phenomena of personhood, reflexivity, social normativity, and ideality. Language, they argue, is not something we add to a range of existing cognitive capacities but a new way of being embodied. Each of us is a linguistic body in a community of other linguistic bodies. The book describes three distinct yet entangled kinds of human embodiment, organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective; it traces the emergence of linguistic sensitivities and introduces the novel concept of linguistic bodies; and it explores the implications of living as linguistic bodies in perpetual becoming, applying the concept of linguistic bodies to questions of language acquisition, parenting, autism, grammar, symbol, narrative, and gesture, and to such ethical concerns as microaggression, institutional speech, and pedagogy. (shrink)

Background In an increasingly globalized world, legal protocols related to health care that are both effective and culturally sensitive are paramount in providing excellent quality of care as well as protection for physicians tasked with decision making. Here, we analyze the current medicolegal status of brain death diagnosis with regard to end-of-life care in Japan, China, and South Korea from the perspectives of front-line health care workers. Main body Japan has legally wrestled with the concept of brain death (...) for decades. An inability to declare brain death without consent from family coupled with cultural expectations of family involvement in medical care is mirrored in other Confucian-based cultures and may complicate care for patients from these countries when traveling or working overseas. Within Japan, China, and South Korea, medicolegal shortcomings in the diagnosis of brain death act as a great source of stress for physicians and expose them to potential public and legal scorn. Here, we detail the medicolegal status of brain death diagnosis within Japan and compare it to China and South Korea to find common ground and elucidate the impact of legal ambiguity on health care workers. Conclusion The Confucian cultural foundation of multiple Asian countries raises common issues of family involvement with diagnosis and cultural considerations that must be met. Leveraging public education systems may increase awareness of brain death issues and lead to evolving laws that clarify such end-of-life issues while protecting physicians from sociocultural backlash. (shrink)

In this article I will discuss the dancer’s physical potential and the sensitive knowledge (‘la connaissance sensible’) that emerges from dance practice. For this, I take Lévi-Strauss’ (2010) theory of the ‘savage mind’ as a reference. This theory is important to understand how the discipline of dance does not need to be justified through modern science (Lévi-Strauss 2010). It is understood that dance operates from sensitive knowledge, while modern science is expressed through the intelligible. I will point out (...) how the dancer operates the sensitive, or dancing, thought, stressing that this type of knowledge is created through interest in how to use it and not through interest in how it serves, or what it means. I will then explain how, through sensitive knowledge, dancers propose new challenges during their aesthetic training in order to develop new body technologies, thereby increasing their expressive potential. For this, dancers need to develop body acuity. In other words, I will discuss the processes that dancers use to transform the perception of the self and of the world through danced gestures. In this process, the dancer is always looking for new challenges; he/she constantly deals with new risks in order to discover new knowledge. I will also discuss the problem that dance faces in traditional academia, which disregards sensitive knowledge and values scientific knowledge. (shrink)

How are the contemporary conceptions of the living body and health related to numerical systems? Addressing the contemporary practice of quantification of bodies and health, such a question is bound to arise. As a discipline historically positioned amidst natural sciences, technology, and art, medicine has always been sensitive to theories and apparatuses able to quantify and reshape the living body, as well as to the practical possibility of operating on it. This is why, in the era where (...) telecommunication, algorithmic information technology, and data-driven decision making are reaching their apex, new forms of medical practice, and new alliances between medicine and technology are emerging as a direct consequence of the evolution of technology. This is what was particularly aimed at by the International Congress "The Quantification of Bodies. Organism, Health, and Representation", which took place at the University of Coimbra on 28-29 November 2019, organized by the IEF - Institute for Philosophical Studies. The present book collects some of the papers presented there, selected according to their interdisciplinary approach and/or to their more informative nature, suitable even for non-specialist readers. A collection that reflects, in a fragment, many of the potentialities opened by this new field of studies. (shrink)

After more than 15 years of study, the 1/f noise or complex-systems approach to cognitive science has delivered promises of progress, colorful verbiage, and statistical analyses of phenomena whose relevance for cognition remains unclear. What the complex-systems approach has arguably failed to deliver are concrete insights about how people perceive, think, decide, and act. Without formal models that implement the proposed abstract concepts, the complex-systems approach to cognitive science runs the danger of becoming a philosophical exercise in futility. The complex-systems (...) approach can be informative and innovative, but only if it is implemented as a formal model that allows concrete prediction, falsification, and comparison against more traditional approaches. (shrink)

In some areas of cognitive science we are confronted with ultrafast cognition, exquisite context sensitivity, and scale-free variation in measured cognitive activities. To move forward, we suggest a need to embrace this complexity, equipping cognitive science with tools and concepts used in the study of complex dynamical systems. The science of movement coordination has benefited already from this change, successfully circumventing analogous paradoxes by treating human activities as phenomena of self-organization. Therein, action and cognition are seen to be emergent in (...) ultrafast symmetry breaking across the brain and body; exquisitely constituted of the otherwise trivial details of history, context, and environment; and exhibiting the characteristic scale-free signature of self-organization. (shrink)

The success of the London 2012 Paralympic Games not only revealed new public possibilities for the disabled, but also thrust the debates on the relationship between elite Paralympians and advanced prosthetic technology into the spotlight. One of the Paralympic stars, Oscar Pistorius, in particular became celebrated as ‘the Paralympian cyborg’. Also prominent has been Aimee Mullins, a former Paralympian, who became a globally successful fashion model by seeking to establish a new bodily aesthetic utilizing non-organic body parts. This article (...) examines how the modern discourse of prostheses has shifted from the made-up and camouflaged body to the empowered and exhibited body to create a new cultural sensitivity in terms of body image – prosthetic aesthetics. Prosthetic aesthetics oscillates between two polarized sensitivities: attractiveness/‘coolness’, which derive from the image of a perfect human-machine synthetic body, and from abjection/the uncanny, which is evoked by the actual materiality of the lived body incorporating a lifeless human-made body part. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The current article deals with the correlation between virtual and physical reality as they concern the body. The thesis of this article is that the lived body transposed into virtual reality becomes a body without organs in Deleuze’s terms, i.e. the lived body, a sensitive field of sensorial events immersed in a lived space, becomes a virtual body made up of intensities, of pure forces or magnitudes within a vector space, thereby losing its (...) affective qualities. Furthermore, lived and virtual bodies build up a correlation bridged not by intentionality, as phenomenology would maintain, but by sensation. Virtuality is thus characterised by both the loss of corporeality and the simulation of the lifeworld. But how can the split between the real and the virtual body be bridged? On the one hand, in Deleuze’s conception of sensation, real and virtual collapse into one another so that the real world ‘resonates’ with its virtual double. On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of form relates both realities in terms of a correlation of signification between the physical and the existential realms. With recourse to the notion of structure or form, I will argue that the phenomenal and the virtual do not represent different modes of being, but are bound by a correlation ruled by sensation as a system of intensive forces. (shrink)

In the late nineteenth century, Jagadish Chandra Bose devised millimeter- and micro-wave experiments to record responses of plants to electromagnetic stimuli. Based on these experiments, Bose conceptualized his thesis of the unity of living and nonliving entities through their different sensitivities to electromagnetic vibrations. By relating Bose’s thesis of the unity of life based on electromagnetic vibrations to Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy and N. Katherine Hayles’s work on the cognitive nonconscious, I argue for a processual media theory that connects (...) both human and plant intelligence to electromagnetic signaling. In doing so, I examine how discourses about different living bodies (plants, animals, humans) variously sensing their environments are formulated into claims about which species have what degree of cognitive capability and intelligence. I trace the influence of Bose’s work on the ecological thinking of the 1970s espoused by cyberneticists and countercultural environmentalists and on contemporary plant neurobiologists who are closely working with Internet of Things designers and researchers. This enables me to emerge with an understanding of electrosensitivity that acknowledges that there is more to the intensities and energies of signals than mere data and that such infra-informatic signals can create both capacities and incapacities, capabilities and debilities, in bodies. (shrink)

Alexithymia is a dimensional trait characterized by difficulties identifying and describing feelings and an externally oriented thinking (EOT) style. Here, we explored interrelationships between alexithymia and measures assessing how individuals process and regulate their responses to environmental and body-based cues. Young adults (N= 201) completed self-report questionnaires assessing alexithymia, sensory processing sensitivity (SPS), interoceptive accuracy (IA), sensory processing styles, and current levels of depression, anxiety, and stress. Whereas EOT was related to low orienting sensitivity, problems with emotional appraisal (difficulties (...) identifying feelings/difficulties describing feelings) were related to heightened sensory sensitivity. In addition, features of SPS improved the prediction of alexithymia above and beyond that accounted for by IA. We suggest that EOT is linked to problems maintaining a representation of one’s emotions in working memory and that low IA and problems with emotional appraisal are linked to atypicalities in sensory processing that may impact embodiment. A latent profile analysis revealed five classes of individuals distinguished by the relative strength of different alexithymic traits and by differences in IA and sensory processing styles. The classes identified included two lexithymic, one modal, and two alexithymic groups, showing different susceptibilities to SPS. Overall, our findings lend support to the view that alexithymia is associated with atypicalities in both bottom–up and top–down processes that impact emotion processing and regulation. They also raise the possibility that individuals with different alexithymia subtypes may differ with regard to a range of factors, including not only SPS but also early life experiences, mental health outcomes, and susceptibility to various personality disorders. (shrink)

This paper will interpret Judith Butler’s theory of performativity and materialization as a theory of identity, and so put it into dialogue with a phenomenological account of habit formation. The goal is to argue that identity is developed already at a bodily level and that this takes place via the processes of habit formation. The constitution of subjectivity, in other words, requires at the most basic level some kind of bodily performativity. What follows intends to draw out the concept of (...) ‘the body’ in Butler’s work, the role of which is surprisingly meagre given her clear favour of language signification in the elaboration of her theory of performativity. Alternatively, this paper will provide a phenomenology of habit formation that re-introduces the body not as thematic materiality, but as lived materiality. The body will therefore be conceived as something which is already skilful and creative, sensitive and vulnerable, and ultimately, as Butler anticipates, responsive to the intertwinement of individual and social aspects of identity formation. In this regard, I will argue for a performative theory of (bodily) habitual identity. (shrink)

This essay defends duty-sensitive self-ownership, a view about the special authority people have over their bodies that is designed to capture what is attractive about self-ownership theories without the implausible stringency usually associated with them.

This research is motivated by the criticism levelled at the academic community for its failure to incorporate sufficient ethics education into the accounting curriculum :53–71, 2004; Madison and Schmidt 2006). The inclusion of ethics decision-making frameworks by professional bodies in their codes of conduct or as a standalone tool and the encouragement of their use as a part of ethics education to help students to identify and think through ethical issues in a business context has been subject to very limited (...) research to date. The aim of this study is to provide evidence of the impact of providing a framework on its own and providing a framework as part of a comprehensive integrated ethics education component of a first-year unit of study, on accounting students’ ethical sensitivity and judgment. Results indicate that providing students with a framework only does not increase students’ ethical sensitivity but does support their ethical judgment. In contrast, the integrated ethics component does increase student’s ethical sensitivity, however, an unexpected finding of this study is that increases in students’ ethical judgement are greater if they have not been previously exposed to the framework. Taken together, our findings suggest that it is the framework that has a significant impact on students’ ethical judgment, while an integrated ethics education can expose students to a range of ethical issues and thereby improve their ethical sensitivity, a critical component which initiates the ethical decision-making process. (shrink)

The increased influence of neoliberalism in education has allowed the trend of evidence-based teaching to dominate professional development in many Western countries. Despite increased and persistent neoliberal measures in education, education critics argue that neoliberal reforms have a naive view of teaching. This narrowed neoliberal view both ignores the complexities involved in the everyday interaction between teacher and student and constrains the teacher’s judgement thereby limiting their contribution in the educational process. Many educators will note the significance of reflection in (...) learning as essential and often emotional. However, the emotional experiences embedded in teacher reflections are often ignored, even discounted, in the discussion of teachers’ professional development. Investigating this phenomenon of emotions in teacher reflections, analysed by drawing on lifeworld theory, revealed how emotional experiences can be a resource in teachers’ professional development. To acknowledge teachers’ emotional experiences means recognizing that the teacher’s subjective and lived body is involved in the reflective and learning process of becoming professional. (shrink)

We have previously found that attention to internal somatic sensations during a heart beat perception task increases the misperception of external touch on a somatic signal detection task , during which healthy participants erroneously report feeling near-threshold vibrations presented to their fingertip in the absence of a stimulus. However, it has been suggested that mindful interoceptive attention should result in more accurate somatic perception, due to its non-evaluative and controlled nature. To investigate this possibility, 62 participants completed the SSDT before (...) and after a period of brief body-scan mindfulness meditation training, or a control intervention . The meditation intervention reduced tactile misperception and increased sensitivity during the SSDT. This finding suggests that the perceptual effects of interoceptive attention depend on its particular nature, and raises the possibility that body-scan meditation could reduce the misperception of physical symptoms in individuals with medically unexplained symptoms. (shrink)

The Body Image Questionnaire-20 (FKB-20) is one of the most applied self-report measures in the context of body image assessment in German-speaking regions. A version of the FKB-20 capturing an ideal concept of body image is also available. A special property of the scale is its high sensitivity for individuals suffering from anorexia nervosa. The present research provided a short version of this scale (for both variants) and examined its validity in a representative sample (N= 2,347) of (...) the German population. We utilized factor analysis methods to identify the optimal short scale of the measure, finding excellent model fit and reliability for a two-factor model (FKB-6) for both real and ideal body image. Both versions of the FKB-6 can be considered invariant across sex and age groups. Good reliability indices were shown for both versions of the FKB-6. The reliability indices were similar to those mentioned in previous studies. Our study also revealed, that large discrepancies between the real and an ideal body image are correlated with somatic and body dysmorphic symptoms. Finally, we provided norm values for comparisons of individual scores with the general population. The FKB-6 is a valid and a reliable measure that economizes assessments by clinicians and researchers. (shrink)

There is no problem more paradigmatically philosophical than the mind-body problem. Nevertheless, I will argue that the problem is empirical. I am not even suggesting that conceptual analysis of the various mind-body theories be abandoned – just as I could not suggest it be abandoned for theories in physics or biology. But unlike the question, ‘Is every even number greater than 2 equal to the sum of two primes?’ the mind-body problem cannot be solved a priori, by (...) analysis alone; though I will not argue this thesis here, it is nearly obvious, since purported solutions must make matter of fact claims, heavy with existential import, about the real world. By contrast, an investigation of the sensitivity of the mind-body problem to empirical evidence will show that purported solutions to the problem are empirically testable, to a degree consistent with philosophy giving a clarified mind-body problem to the sciences. I offer the bold outlines of such an investigation here. (shrink)

In this paper it is analyzed from the informational perspective the relation between mind and body, an ancient philosophic issue defined as a problem, which still did not receive up to date an adequate solution. By introducing/using the concept of information, it is shown that this concept includes two facets, one of them referring to the common communications and another one referring to a hidden/structuring matter-related information, effectively acting in the human body and in the living systems, which (...) determines the dynamic inter-change of information between specific structures of the organism by electric/electronic/chemical agents and genetic/epigenetic processes. It is shown that the maintenance of body, permanently and obligatory depending on the external matter (foods, air, water) resources, needed to provide both the structuring/restructuring basic material and energy, determines the necessary existence of an info-managing system, administrating the internal mechano-chemical/physical processes. As a natural consequence, such a system should organize and assure own survival by an effective informational operability to detect the external food resources, to select the appropriate interest information and to decide as a function of circumstances. One important component in such an informational system is memory, allowing to dispose of the reference informational data for analysis/comparison and the selection between good and bad binary possible decisions. The memory receives and stores therefore signals from external reality and from the body itself, referring to the emotional reaction, digestion status, creation, and inherited predilections, within specific info-neural communication circuits between the brain and body execution/sensitive organs, the human body appearing as an integrated info-matter self-managed dynamic system. The specific body components memorize information with different degrees of info-integration: short/long-term integration, emotive/action reaction, info-abilities, culminating with the integration in the chromosomal structures by epigenetic processes. The new acquired information is transgenerationally transmissible, and is manifested as new traits, showing the adaptation capability of the human and close relation between mind and body. Analyzing the results of such a mind-body informational model in comparison with the earlier assumed/proposed/asserted archaic, Greek and Occidental philosophies, which represent only partial aspects of this relation, it is shown that this informational model, elaborated in terms of information on the basis of scientific reasons and arguments, constitutes a general, realist, and coherent model of the mind-body relation, able to integrate and/or explain most of the others. (shrink)

At first sight, pain seems to be an unhistorical phenomenon: in its intrusive nagging presence, nothing refers to the past, and to remember one’s pain is only possible in an abstract sense. However, one’s individual sensitivity as well as one’s relation to pain are shaped biographically, even though we usually are not aware of this: pains are inscribed into body memory and thus unfold a lasting impact. The memory of the subject may thus also be conceived as a history (...) of painful confrontations with the world, in the course of which the borders of self and non-self are constituted and accentuated. These interrelations are the topic of the paper. (shrink)

This article empirically analyzes how victims’ remains were recovered, identified, repatriated, and retained after the World Trade Center terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It does so by asking the question whose body is it. This question brings to the fore issues related to personhood and ownership: how are anonymous and unrecognizable bodily remains given back an identity; and who has ownership of or custody over identified and unidentified human remains? It is in this respect that the article engages (...) with technoscientific and legal, or “technolegal,” trajectories of human remains in the wake of the WTC tragedy. By using the metaphor of “materialization,” it becomes possible to trace how remains are forensically identified and implicated in legal regimes. “Technolegal materialization” as a concept and methodological sensitivity contributes to the current “actor-network theory” -inspired legal scholarship, which tends to focus on legal practices in courtrooms but not those beyond them. In this article, 9/11 victims’ remains are followed from “Ground Zero” to the forensic laboratory and beyond and articulates five instances of technolegal materialization of bodily remains and their past and contemporary existences. (shrink)

Within many animal taxa there is a trend for the species of larger body size to eat food of lower caloric value. For example, most large extant lizards are herbivorous. Reasonable arguments based on energetic considerations are often invoked to explain this trend, yet, while these factors set limits to feasible body size, they do not in themselves mathematically produce optimum body sizes. A simple optimization model is developed here which considers food search, capture, and eating rates (...) and the metabolic cost of these activities for animals of different sizes. The optimization criterion is defined as the net caloric gain a consumer accrues per day. This model does produce an optimum intermediate body size which increases with food quality - not the reverse. This discrepancy is accounted for, however, because the model also predicts that body size should be even more sensitive to increases in food abundance. In nature, many poor quality foods are also relatively abundant foods, hence the consumers eating them may maximize their daily energetic profit by evolving a relatively large body size. Optimum consumer body size also decreases with increases in consumer metabolic rate and prey speed. (shrink)

Resumen: En el teatro posdramático la función mimética del cuerpo suele desplazarse hacia los recursos transmediales propiciando así la emergencia de una metateatralidad. El trabajo de Lola Arias se destaca sobre todo por tensionar el rol del cuerpo actoral en escena produciendo, por medio de recursos transmediales, una crisis representacional que cuestiona las formas tradicionales del drama. El presente artículo tiene como objetivo establecer las estrategias estéticas que utiliza la dramaturga y directora para problematizar el lugar del cuerpo en su (...) obra Campo Minado y su documental Teatro de Guerra.: Into the postdramatic theater the mimetic funtion of the body tends to be displaced towards transmedial resources thus favoring the producction of a metatheatre. The Lola Arias’s work stands out precisely because of putting in tension the role of the acting body on stage producing, through transmedial resources, a representational crisis that questions traditional forms of drama. The present article aims to establish the aesthetic strategies used by this playwright and director to problematize the place of the body in her theatral work Campo Minado and her documentary Teatro de Guerra. (shrink)

What follows is but the attempt to draw the lessons from the mystical and visionary text of Teresa of Ávila in order to consider today issues that concern us, questions that are asked of Aesthetics, and not only as theoretical discipline that theorises on the arts and considers the beautiful, but as a reflection on aísthesis, of sensitivity, of the sensitive edge exposed by a constituent relationship which installs the human in a world. Consideration, then, of the happening, of (...) entering the world, creative experience. This essay seeks to consider the relationship between the image and the body via the visionary discourse of the mystics, because their writings question and lend shape to a large number of formulae of thought that can help us better understand the questions facing us today. Let us imagine that the mystics made of their body a frontier or a support where what by definition has no place could take place. Place: part of space occupied by a body, the boundary of a containing object. This then is what is addressed here, a question of boundaries. (shrink)

The ability of using a large variety of tools is important in our daily life. Behind human tool-use abilities lays the brain capacity to incorporate tools into the body representation for action (Body Schema, BS), thought to rely mainly on proprioceptive information. Here we tested whether tool incorporation is possible in absence of proprioception by studying a patient with right upper-limb deafferentation. We adopted a paradigm sensitive to changes of the Body Schema and analysed the kinematics (...) of free-hand movements before and after tool-use, in three sessions over a period of two years. In the first session, before tool-use, the kinematics of the deafferented hand was disrupted. Similarly, the first movements with the tool (a mechanical grabber elongating the arm by ∼40cm) showed an abnormal profile that tended to normalize at the end of the session. Subsequent free-hand movements were also normalised. At session 2, 6 months later, the patient exhibited normal free-hand kinematic profiles, additionally showing changes in grasping kinematics after tool-use, but no sign of tool incorporation. A follow-up two years later, further confirmed the normalized kinematic profile but the absence of tool incorporation. This first description of tool-use in absence of proprioception shows the fundamental role of proprioception in the update of the Body Schema. These results provide an important further step in understanding human motor control and have implications for future development of rehabilitation programs for patients with sensory deficits. (shrink)

The body and bodily experience make little appearance in analytic moral philosophy. This is true even of analytic sexual ethics—the one area of ethical inquiry we might have expected to give a starring role to bodily experience. I take a small step toward remedying that by identifying one way in which the bodily experience of sex is ethically significant: some of the physical actions of sex have a default expressive significance, conveying trust, affection, care, sensitivity, enjoyment, and pleasure. When (...) people having sex don't in fact have these feelings, the sex can be misleading, even if they've antecedently communicated that they don't have these feelings. This account of how sex can mislead is inspired by a perhaps surprising source, Catholic sexual morality. Analytic sexual ethicists could benefit from emulating Catholic sexual morality's attentiveness to the bodily nature of sex and its ethical significance. (shrink)

Warren Montag’s book is a fine analysis of the ways in which Spinoza’s materialism, as it was formulated in The Ethics, affects his political theory. Even though Montag’s analysis is historical, and sensitive to the theoretical and political context of Spinoza’s thinking, it also takes decisively into account contemporary political theories and so works to frame the context within which Montag himself thinks. Constantly referring to Louis Althusser’s remarks about the connection between Spinoza’s philosophy and the former’s theory of (...) ideology, as well as to Antonio Negri’s, Etienne Balibar’s, and Pierre Macherey’s readings of Spinoza, Montag formulates the core problem of his analysis by means of the following theses: “There can be no liberation of the mind without a liberation of the body”; and “There can be no liberation of the individual without collective liberation”. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the ways in which human bodies, payback, and comestibility become inescapably entangled in cultures in which honor is the prevailing virtue. Shakespeare was deeply sensitive to the social and psychological processes through which these concepts become entwined when honor is at stake—to the ways in which, as a means of corrective response, men who transgress a code of honor can be rightly reduced to their bodies, similar to how those who are not allowed to (...) be full participants in an honor culture (most particularly women) always already are. I begin by examining Shakespeare’s earliest depictions of honor cultures in Titus Andronicus and The Rape of Lucrece, and then briefly discusses how the ideas they trade in are further developed and complicated later in his career, focusing specifically on Othello. -/- . (shrink)

The main notion of this article is that the blurring of the limits between offline and online dimensions of knowledge and experience, in addition to the manipulation of genes, neurons, atoms and bits, is dissolving the distinction between subjectivism (i.e. idealism) and materialism (i.e. objectivism and realism). As a consequence, in the moistmedia (from Ascott) ecology in which we are increasingly immersed, a radical kind of experience of matter, time, space and self is emerging. In this form of experience, the (...) blending of subjectivist and materialist approaches help in overcoming the classical Cartesian polarity: we feel part of an extended reality, and we feel this extended reality in ourselves by combining bodies, points of view and multiple senses with digital layers of everything. The article proposes these research questions: Which are the main factors that shape the change toward a moistmedia ecology resulting from the impact of the manipulation of genes, neurons, bits and atoms? Which transformation is being shaped in relation to the previous model of experience? What are the features of the new forms of materiality, sensitivity and action? How artists are putting themselves at risk in the moistmedia ecology? The hypothesis is that a hybrid kind of interval is opening between different layers of reality: analogue versus digital; nature versus culture; here versus there; past versus future; I versus others; and human versus non-human. In this recombination process, a third dimension of reality – that I call ‘radical reality’ – emerges in the moistmedia ecology. This article will analyse the radical experience (Wilson) in moistmedia environments by crossing the five dimensions (matter, space, time, identity and action) with the practices of manipulation of genes, atoms and bits using examples from art and design. This crossing shows the basic dimensions and sub-dimensions of the ‘Model of Radical Experience’ to reveal the nature of this third dimension between subjectivism and materialism, which is explored by artists who put themselves at risk in the turbulent zone between the physical and the digital. (shrink)

Permissivism about rationality is the view that there is sometimes more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. In this paper I discuss the relationship between permissivism, deference to rationality, and peer disagreement. I begin by arguing that—contrary to popular opinion—permissivism supports at least a moderate version of conciliationism. I then formulate a worry for permissivism. I show that, given a plausible principle of rational deference, permissive rationality seems to become unstable and to collapse into unique (...) rationality. I conclude with a formulation of a way out of this problem on behalf of the permissivist. (shrink)

According to models of objectification, viewing someone as a body induces de-mentalization, stripping away their psychological traits. Here evidence is presented for an alternative account, where a body focus does not diminish the attribution of all mental capacities but, instead, leads perceivers to infer a different kind of mind. Drawing on the distinction in mind perception between agency and experience, it is found that focusing on someone's body reduces perceptions of agency but increases perceptions of experience. These (...) effects were found when comparing targets represented by both revealing versus nonrevealing pictures or by simply directing attention toward physical characteristics. The effect of a body focus on mind perception also influenced moral intuitions, with those represented as a body seen to be less morally responsible but more sensitive to harm. These effects suggest that a body focus does not cause objectification per se but, instead, leads to a redistribution of perceived mind. (shrink)

This study explores the relation between pain sensitivity and the cognitive processing of words. 130 participants evaluated the pain-relatedness of a total of 600 two-syllabic nouns, and subsequently reported on their own pain sensitivity. The results demonstrate that pain-sensitive people (based on their self-report) associate words more strongly with pain than less sensitive people. In particular, concrete nouns like syringe, wound, knife, and cactus, are considered to be more pain-related for those who are more pain-sensitive. We discuss (...) our results in the light of three theoretical frameworks – cognitive bias, prototype theory, embodied account. We argue that the latter is best suited to explain the results of this study in the sense in which it implies the principle of body specificity, according to which different bodily characteristics lead to corresponding differences in the way in which people construct concepts and word meanings. (shrink)

Promyelocytic leukaemia nuclear bodies (PML NBs) are generally present in all mammalian cells, and their integrity correlates with normal differentiation of promyelocytes. Mice that lack PML NBs have impaired immune function, exhibit chromosome instability and are sensitive to carcinogens. Although their direct role in nuclear activity is unclear, PML NBs are implicated in the regulation of transcription, apoptosis, tumour suppression and the anti‐viral response. An emerging view is that they represent sites where multi‐subunit complexes form and where post‐translational modification (...) of regulatory factors, such as p53, occurs in response to cellular stress. Following DNA damage, several repair factors transit through PML NBs in a temporally regulated manner implicating these bodies in DNA repair. We propose that PML NBs are dynamic sensors of cellular stress, which rapidly disassemble following DNA damage into large supramolecular complexes, dispersing associated repair factors to sites of damage. The dramatically increased total surface area available would enhance interactions between PML‐associated factors regulating DNA repair and apoptosis. BioEssays 26:963–977, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

A dialectically rather than chronologically ordered survey: it moves first through the outright dualism of Descartes, to the primacy-of-soul position of Plato, and then to the extremes of Feuerbachian materialism and Berkeleyean immaterialism. Then, returning to pre-philosophical foundations in an attempt to recapture the lived phenomenon of body-soul unity that each of the above philosophers acknowledged, but lost in a welter of reductive abstractions, Van Peursen considers the non-dualistic and non-reductivist conceptions of primitive man, Homeric man, and Biblical man. (...) Coming back to the philosophers, this time to those of a more hylomorphic stamp, Van Peursen critically discusses Aristotle, and the corps vécu analyses of Gehlen, Plessner, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. Finally, Van Peursen treats the variegated positions of Wittgenstein, Hampshire, and Ryle; the former two coming in for guarded endorsement while Ryle is set forth sympathetically, but attacked for his doctrine of the merely indexical "I." In the last chapter, Van Peursen's own phenomenological version of an "I" which is simultaneously embodied and transcendent—the latter owing to its structure as an "oriented" embodiment—is presented in a suggestive but sketchy fashion. The book is valuable as an introduction, and if, in the end, one is prepared to agree with the spirit, if not the letter, of Van Peursen's embodiment theory, then the metaphilosophical lesson he has tried to drum in throughout the book, namely, the danger inherent in philosophers hypostatizing philosophical or scientific abstractions to the detriment of the integral reality which is man, will make this something more than simply a sensitive survey.—E. A R. (shrink)

In recent intervention campaigns sensitizing about harmful practices in eastern Africa, the beliefs and institutions of rural populations are marked out: culture is the culprit. This article concentrates on the most targeted region, Sukuma-speaking communities in Tanzania, to verify the stigmatizing impact of institutions: whether bridewealth treats women as commodities, whether children with nsebu disorder are stigmatized, and why children living with albinism are stigmatized. Complementing the situational analysis of power relations, cultural analysis approaches institutions as established practices in a (...) group and as generated from the palette of experiential frames constituting the cultural system prevailing in that group. The method’s sensitivity to intracultural diversity highlights the local capacity of applying cultural logics, ethically framing situations and creating new institutions, for instance by female healers protecting their clients against stigmatization. The method permits to conclude, for the cases studied, that institutions categorizing people prevent rather than cause the discreditable social status known as stigma. (shrink)

The thesis of the dissertation is that Husserl's phenomenological analyses of the human body are important in assessing the claim that phenomenology provides the basis for a "transcendental idealism". The central role of these analyses is to reconcile the sense of consciousness as a world-creating transcendental synthesis and as an empirical self: if successful, Husserl's idealism could boast a sensitivity to the empirical that would significantly augment its plausibility. ;The argument begins by setting up the problem vis-a-vis the experience (...) of the other person. The issue at hand is how the body of the other person expresses the presence of a consciousness. Yet the question that guides the analysis is: if "consciousness" means a world-creating, transcendental synthesis , then in what sense can we speak of an empirical consciousness that belongs to the world, thus of a person standing before us ? Part of the answer, it is asserted, lies in the expressive nature of a person's body: that is, the human body is a concrete thing in the world that yet expresses the sense of consciousness as world-creating, thereby providing for it a "worldly", empirical manifestation. ;The main part of the dissertation is a presentation of Husserl's analyses of the human body, which is described as a threefold unity of extension, materiality, and time. An understanding of each of these dimensions provides a piece of the puzzle as to how the body of the other is expressive of consciousness. ;The study ends with the problem of phenomenology as a transcendental idealism. The conclusion is that, for Husserl, consciousness is the condition for the manifestation of the "world" only as an empirical, bodily consciousness. I believe the tenability of this position can be demonstrated through Husserl's phenomenology of the human body, where the body is understood as a special mode of the expression of consciousness. For these analyses, taken as a whole, lend to his idealism a subtlety that significantly boosts both its plausibility and the force of its presentation. (shrink)

There is no problem more paradigmatically philosophical than the mind-body problem. Nevertheless, I will argue that the problem is empirical. I am not even suggesting that conceptual analysis of the various mind-body theories be abandoned – just as I could not suggest it be abandoned for theories in physics or biology. But unlike the question, ‘Is every even number greater than 2 equal to the sum of two primes?’ the mind-body problem cannot be solved a priori, by (...) analysis alone; though I will not argue this thesis here, it is nearly obvious, since purported solutions must make matter of fact claims, heavy with existential import, about the real world. By contrast, an investigation of the sensitivity of the mind-body problem to empirical evidence will show that purported solutions to the problem are empirically testable, to a degree consistent with philosophy giving a clarified mind-body problem to the sciences. I offer the bold outlines of such an investigation here. (shrink)

In this article, I explore difficult and sensitive questions regarding the nature of transgender identity claims and the appropriate medical treatment for those suffering from gender dysphoria. I first analyze conceptions of transgender identity, highlighting the prominence of the wrong-body narrative and its dualist presuppositions. I then briefly argue that dualism is false because our bodily identity is essential and intrinsic to our overall personal identity and explain why a sound, nondualist anthropology implies that gender identity cannot be (...) entirely divorced from sexual identity. Finally, I make the case that arguments in favor of hormonal and surgical treatments for gender dysphoria rest on this mistaken dualist anthropology, and that these treatments therefore give false hope to those suffering from gender dysphoria, while causing irreversible bodily harm and diverting attention from underlying psychological problems that often need to be addressed. I also briefly discuss how these philosophical claims relate to empirical studies on the outcomes of hormonal and surgical treatments for gender dysphoria and to testimonies of transgender individuals who regret having undergone these treatments. (shrink)

Growth of different body parts in humans is sensitive to different resource constraints that are mediated by parental investment. Parental investment can involve the expenditure of material, cognitive, and emotional resources on offspring. Cranial volume, an important predictor of cognitive ability, appears understudied in this context. We asked whether there are associations between growth and family structure, self-reported estimates for resource availability, and sibling number; and whether these constraints relate to head and body growth in a similar (...) manner. We assessed the associations between parental investment, height, and cranial volume in a cross-sectional study of Estonian children. Height correlated negatively with the number of siblings but this association became negligible in a model controlling for birthweight, parental heights, and mother’s age at birth. Unlike height, cranial volume was unrelated to sibling number, but it was negatively associated with self-reported meat and general resource shortage. Cranial volume was related to family structure and paternal education. Children living with both birth-parents had larger heads than those living in families containing a step-parent. Since these family types did not differ with respect to meat or general resource shortage, our findings suggest that families including both genetic parents provide non-material benefits that stimulate predominantly cranial growth. For the studied developmental period, cranial volume appeared a more sensitive marker of growth constraints than height. The potential of using cranial volume for quantifying physical impact of non-material parental investment deserves further attention. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to focus on the body as instrument or means in performance-art. Since the body is no monolithic given, the body is approached in terms of its constitutive layers, and this may enable us to conceive of the mechanisms that make performances possible and operational, i.e. those bodily mechanisms that are implicitly or explicitly controlled or manipulated in performance. Of course, the exploitation of these bodily layers is not solely responsible for the (...) generation of meaning in performance. Yet, it is that what fundamentally /enables/ the generation of sense and signification in performance-art. To approach the body in terms of its layers, from body image and body schema to in-depth body, may partly answer the complexity at work in art performances, since these concepts enable us to consider, on a theoretical level, the body as represented object, as subject, as motor means for being-in-the-world, as origin of subjectivity and emotions, as hidden but most intimate place of impersonal life processes, as possibly distant image, as sensitive, fragile and plastic entity, as something we own and are owned by, as our most personal and yet extremely strange body. (shrink)

We can make very sensitive machines and may arrange for them to distinguish themselves from other objects. The programs that are designed toward specific goals, such as the identification of external objects, can also be imagined as action programs relating to the manipulation of these objects. These programs can be designed to retain data in order of receipt, picking patterns and anticipated appearance of perspective based on the success of their past performances. In this way, could be designed to (...) allow the machine to identify their own “here” and “now”, but would It has a self a machine capable of doing this? If so, where would it be? The purpose of this article is to address philosophical questions, revising extensively the question of the self in artificial intelligence. (shrink)