"Comment faites-vous pour défendre l'assassin d'un enfant?" C'est souvent cette question que les avocats pénalistes entendent à propos de leur métier. L'avocat est représenté, dans la fiction, sous les traits d'un être ambigu, sans cesse sur le fil... La réalité est sans doute tout autre. C'est elle que ce livre tente d'approcher en comblant un manque dans les réflexions contemporaines de l'avocature. Rares sont, en effet, les travaux qui abordent l'éthique de l'avocat pénaliste. Quelles sont ses interrogations, ses incertitudes lorsqu'il (...) est confronté à des choix de défense? A travers une enquête menée auprès d'avocats, l'auteur s'intéresse aux intentions, aux pratiques quotidiennes effectives et aux enjeux de responsabilité du pénaliste. Comment les mutations juridiques et politiques de la défense pénale orientent-elles les valeurs de l'avocat et sa manière d'agir? Par-delà la dimension déontologique de son métier, quelles relations d'ordre éthique l'avocat entretient-il avec lui-même mais aussi avec l'autre : son client, qu'il soit prévenu, accusé ou victime, les jurés, les magistrats? Peut-on parler du rapport de l'avocat à la vérité? Cette vérité est-elle spécifique? Plurielle? Le procès équitable permet-il d'affirmer une égalité des armes devant la justice? Comment l'avocat peut-il construire des lignes de défense tout en restant partenaire de justice? En définitive, est-il possible de comprendre l'acte même de défense des actes extrêmes, des crimes monstrueux sans prendre conscience de la complexité d'une réflexion éthique? Avocats, magistrats, policiers, journalistes, bâtonniers, et bien sûr tous ceux qui se destinent à ces professions, et puis encore les citoyens qui s'intéressent à la justice et les citoyens qui la découvrent en tant que jurés, tous ceux-là, pour des raisons très diverses, tireront profit de la lecture de cet ouvrage. (shrink)

L’auteur présente le statut juridique de l’animal, les normes juridiques visant la protection de l’animal domestique, l’animal de compagnie et plus particulièrement les décisions de justice concernant le chien « dangereux ».

As bibliographical classification of published journal items affects the denominator in this equation, we investigated how the numerator and denominator of the impact factor equation were generated for representative journals in two categories of the Journal Citation Reports. We performed a full text search of the 1st-ranked journal in 2004 JCR category “Medicine, General and Internal” and 61st-ranked journal, 1st-ranked journal in category “Multidisciplinary Sciences” and journal with a relative rank of CMJ. Large journals published more items categorized by Web (...) of Science as non-research items : 63% out of total 5,193 items in Nature and 81% out of 3,540 items in NEJM, compared with 31% out of 283 items in CMJ and only 2 out of 126 items in AABC. Some items classified by WoS as non-original contained original research data. These items received a significant number of citations: 6.9% of total citations in Nature, 14.7% in NEJM and 18.5% in CMJ. IF decreased for all journals when only items presenting original research and citations to them were used for IF calculation. Regardless of the journal’s size or discipline, publication of non-original research and its classification by the bibliographical database have an effect on both numerator and denominator of the IF equation. (shrink)

Should philosophers be more polite to one another? The topic of good manners—or, more grandly, civility—has enjoyed a recent renaissance in philosophical circles, but little of the formal discussion has been self-directed: that is, it has not examined the virtues and vices of polite and impolite philosophizing, in particular. This is an oversight; practices of rudeness do rather a lot of work in enacting distinctly philosophical modes of engagement, in ways that both shape and detract from the aims of (...) our discipline. If we fail to recognize practices of rudeness, we become vulnerable to some of... (shrink)

Being rude is often more gratifying and enjoyable than being polite. Likewise, rudeness can be a more accurate and powerful reflection of how I feel and think. This is especially true in a political environment that can make being polite seem foolish or naive. Civility and ordinary politeness are linked both to big values, such as respect and consideration, and to the fundamentally social nature of human beings. This book explores the powerful temptations to incivility and rudeness, but (...) argues that they should generally be resisted. Drawing on early Chinese philosophers who lived during great political turmoil but nonetheless sought to “mind their manners,” it articulates a way of thinking about politeness that is distinctively social. It takes as a given that we can feel profoundly alienated from others, and that other people can sometimes be truly terrible. Yet because we are social neglecting the social and political courtesies comes at great cost. The book considers not simply why civility and politeness are important, but how. It addresses how small insults can damage social relations, how separation of people into tribes undermines our better interests, and explores how bodily and facial expressions can influence how life with other people goes. It is especially geared toward anyone who feels the temptation of being rude and wishes it were easier to feel otherwise. It seeks to answer a question of great contemporary urgency: When so much of public and social life with others is painful and fractious, why should I be polite? (shrink)

In addition to thin concepts like the good, the bad and the ugly, our evaluative thought and talk appeals to thick concepts like the lewd and the rude, the selfish and the cruel, the courageous and the kind -- concepts that somehow combine evaluation and non-evaluative description. Thick concepts are almost universally assumed to be inherently evaluative in content, and many philosophers claimed them to have deep and distinctive significance in ethics and metaethics. In this first book-length treatment of thick (...) concepts, Pekka Väyrynen argues that all this is mistaken. Through detailed attention to the language of thick concepts, he defends a novel theory on which the relationship between thick words and evaluation is best explained by general conversational and pragmatic norms. Drawing on general principles in philosophy of language, he argues that many prominent features of thick words and concepts can be explained by general factors that have nothing in particular to do with being evaluative. If evaluation is not essential to the sort of thinking we do with thick concepts, claims for the deep and distinctive significance of the thick are undermined. The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty is a fresh and innovative treatment of an important topic in moral philosophy and sets a new agenda for future work. It will be essential reading to anyone interested in the analysis and the broader philosophical significance of evaluative and normative language. (shrink)

We have a responsibility to obey COVID-19 rules, in order to minimize risk. Yet it is still seen as rude to challenge people who do not respect those rules, when in fact the opposite is true; it is rude to increase risk to others. In this paper I analyse the relationship between risk, responsibility, and rudeness by analysing the evolution of the main governmental slogans and rules and explore the complex relationship between simplicity, safety, and perceived fairness of these (...) rules, and how these features in turn influence the extent to which we act responsibly. I begin by exploring the relationship between rudeness and risk in our interactions about coronavirus, before going on to analyse the importance of clear rules in minimizing tension between us, illustrating the argument with various slogans including “stay at home,” “stay alert,” and the now infamous “rule of six,” which is actually at least three different rules. Ultimately, we are faced with a paradox: people annoyed about complex/unfair rules are less likely to obey them, even if that means rules will apply for longer and even though it was noncompliance with earlier simpler rules that means new rules are necessary. And if rules make less or no sense it is harder to try to get people to follow them in your own capacity as a citizen; it is hard to police rules that are seen as arbitrary or unfair. (shrink)

Zen Buddhist Attitudes to War HIRATA Seiko IN ORDER FULLY TO UNDERSTAND the standpoint of Zen on the question of nationalism, one must first consider the ...

Amy Olberding's book The Wrong of Rudeness is eye-opening and informative, while at the same time difficult to read, especially the first three chapters. To be clear, the difficulty does not lie in the prose or the concepts. The prose is accessible, examples relevant, and argument clear and cogent. My students recently made the comment that the women philosophers we read are clearer writers and provide more relatable examples than the male philosophers. These students would appreciate Olberding's book.Nevertheless, the (...) book is difficult for me personally because of the extreme discomfort experienced upon discovering that people in the United States actually wish death upon each other or purposely take out their... (shrink)

Consider the following exchanges: 1. Gerda: So you believe that all belief is the product of custom and circumstance (or: childhood buffets, class struggle...). Isn't that position self-limiting? Mustn't you see yourself as reflecting only a single complex of circumstances? Grobian: Your objection is inapplicable, for it is merely the product of blind forces. Moreover, your childhood buffets were pernicious and regrettable, for they have set you against this truth.

Book reviewed in this article: Follies and Fallacies in Medicine. By Petr Skrabanek and James McCormick.

The book contains chapters on rudeness, gossiping, snobbery, humour, and respect for beliefs.

Amy Olberding, The Wrong of Rudeness: Learning Modern Civility from Ancient Chinese Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 2019, 183pp., $29.95 (hbk), ISBN 9780190880965. Reviewed byAndrew Lambert, City University of New York, College of Staten Island.

DHHS's rule on the care of imperiled newborns has a symbolic significance for the groups that struggled for compromise, but it will have a minimal impact on medical and moral decision making.

Rudeness is normally viewed as a moral failing, but there are times when it is excusable or even justified. In this article I propose a definition of the concept that helps us ascertain whether, why, and to what extent a rude action is blameworthy or excusable. I consider the most common sorts of circumstance in which rudeness is morally acceptable, and I argue that the perceived increase in rudeness is, in large part, a consequence of our living (...) in a dynamic society where egalitarian attitudes challenge established hierarchies. (shrink)

The nearly omnipotent character known only as “Q” dramatically enters the Star Trek universe when he puts all humanity in the person of Captain Jean‐Luc Picard, on trial in the first episode of TNG. Acting as self‐professed prosecutor, judge, and jury, Q promises Picard an “absolutely equitable” trial, only to coerce Picard into pleading “guilty” by threatening to kill his crew. Q could be like the “Leviathan” of Thomas Hobbes (1588‐1679), an absolute sovereign who has the power to keep people (...) from warring with each other, but who can't be held accountable or subject to any civil law in the use of that power. Enlisting Hobbes and Locke, this chapter examines the motives behind Q's enigmatic actions and sees what Q, deep down, might believe about justice. Hobbes begins with a basic right of nature that all people possess: our liberty to ensure the preservation of our own life. (shrink)

In response to Amy Olberding's fascinating and thoughtful book—a book that I wholeheartedly recommend to anyone—I will explore a specific kind of problem regarding manners and morality. It is a question that arises at the intersection of good manners, moral self-cultivation, and oppressive social systems: how do we practice good manners in non-ideal, unjust contexts as members of socially disadvantaged groups? Before I begin to address this question, I want to note that I am convinced by Amy's arguments for the (...) significance of civility and mannerliness in moral and social life (her main argument being, roughly, that civility shows our commitment to the big values of shared life together, the regular expression of... (shrink)