According to Scotus, abstractive cognition is independent of the actual existence of its object, and must therefore rely on the intentional species. Scotus presents several arguments in favour of the necessity of the species intelligibilis for abstractive universal cognition. After discussing opinions that ascribed exclusive causality in the process of cognition either to the intellect or to the object, Scotus arrives at the conclusion that both the object and the intellect act as essentially ordered partial causes of cognition: the intelligible (...) species is caused both by the phantasm and the active intellect. Thus results a new order of representation, in which the common nature is represented as universal. The process of cognition is described by Scotus as a dynamic succession of active and passive phases. On the basis of these and other characteristic features, Scotus’s epistemology can be described as departing from the Aristotelian tradition, and as the locus of the first appearance of the motives of modern epistemology. (shrink)

W artykule przedstawiono twórczość jako integralny składnik procesu poznania. Podział pola percepcyjnego na figurę i tło jest przejawem obecności twórczości w procesie poznania, podobnie jak jej efektem jest konstrukcja spostrzeżenia składającego się z: czucia i informacji (teoria J.Gibsona), czy z informacji przetwarzanych „od góry” i „od dołu” (teorie poznawcze). Konsekwencją ścisłego związku twórczości z poznaniem są odstępstwa twórców (in plus lub in minus ) od tzw. normy psychicznej.

Cílem tohoto textu je vyložit teorii poznání u prvorepublikového národohospodáře Jana Loevensteina. Hlavním zájmem Loevensteinova studia noetiky bylo odstranění rozporů v originálním přístupu k ekonomické metodologii u Karla Engliše. Předkládaná noetická koncepce je proto nezáměrným důsledkem kritiky některých aspektů Schopenhaurovy filosofie a Englišovy teleologie. Nejvýraznějším přínosem pro teleologii a metodologický apriorismus je objektivní platnost soudů při využití Loevensteinových noetických základů.

In relation to material reality only direct perception as sensual perception gives unbiased, reliable cognisance. Therefore, this cognisance is irremovably receptive. A subject does not add anything of himself to the object. Thinking does not play any role in such a cognisance, because object is before any thinking. According to Jacobi sensual cognisance consists of this what is given, a certain perceived content, and of a feeling assuring the existence of what is given, e.g. a belief. These two elements are (...) inseparable. A foundation of this approach has been prepared for Jacobi by Thomas Reid, however, it was finalised thanks to critical reference to David Hume concerning that second, not perceptive element of cognisance. (shrink)

Embodied cognition: assumptions, theses and challenges: The paper aims at providing a concise presentation of the concept of embodied cognition that emerged in the cognitive sciences a few decades ago and has gained great popularity among empirically and philosophically informed researchers. The term “embodied cognition” is used by the author in two senses. The narrow sense implies that the body plays an important role in the process of cognition. In the broad sense “embodied cognition” is to characterize the general tendency (...) within cognitive science which finds its articulation in the 4E perspective on cognition. The working hypothesis of the 4E perspective is that cognition depends on the characteristics of the agent’s body and its interaction with the physical and social environment. It emphasizes that cognition is: embodied, embedded, enacted, extended. After reconstructing the key concepts and basic assumptions the author offers a brief appraisal of the views under discussion. He claims that the characteristics of such a trend are incomplete and not homogeneity since the perspective encompasses at least a few related and partly overlapping views on cognition. The author concludes that “embodied cognition” serves as a label for a variety of research programs within cognitive science rather than a strictly defined and well-established research tradition or a new paradigm. (shrink)

The essay presents some gnoseological themes with reference to the intellect of the separated soul according to John Duns Scotus. Four questions of the Ordinatio IV, d. 45 deal with these themes. In this concret cognitive situation is possible, according to Doctor Subtilis, to get to know the new quiddities of things, in spite of a lack of the empiric cognition. It means leaving behind the conception of generic empiricism and moving to the recognition of more cognitive abilities, as in (...) Aristoteles’s conception. In a post death state intellect continues to have the memory of the quiddities of things known while still connected with the body and can remember concret things and events known by the senses during earthly life. Such a gnoseological notion evidences the cognitive continuity of the human intellect after death, its incorruptibility and cognitive ability at least as such as one had during earthly life. We can see here the connection of philosophic and theological questions, which mutually condition and penetrate each other. According to Scotus it is possible for the intellect of the separated soul to remember the past and to acquire new cognition. Moreover, it is also possible for such an intellect to know the prayers we refer to the blessed in heaven. Such an intellectual approach evidences a strong Augustinian influence on John Duns Scotus’ epistemic conception. (shrink)

The affective knowledge of God is this kind of knowledge that follows human affection. This knowledge comes about on two levels: on the natural human inclination to God and on the religious level of man’s orientation towards God. What is the nature of the affective knowledge of God? What does the passage of ex affectu circa divina in intellectum consist in? It seems that there are three matters: – firstly, since there is a natural inclination towards God in man (desiderium (...) naturale vivendi Deum), man will be “restless” as long as he does not recognise or find God, – secondly, who loves God gains a new and more profound knowledge of Divine matters through con-naturalness and inclination, – thirdly, as a result of meeting with God and unification with Him, man experiences certain subjective states that cannot be expressed in words. (shrink)