Individual questions of the institutional reforms of the representative-democratic parliamentary system, such as issues of electoral law, party law, and parliamentary law, are frequently discussed. But all these reflections - and this is the principal thesis of this article - must eventually remain without success, if they do not address the preceding basic problem concerning the democratically indispensable conditions of the mental constitution of the active citizen, the „civis“. There, a key role, consciously experienced like a paradox, falls upon the (...) renunciation of the claim to absolute truth of one’s own political convictions with regard to equally „relative-absolute“ claims for validity of others. On this base the psychological presuppositions of a modern pluralistic democracy are discussed, which thereupon are to be institutionalized: e. g. the capacity to compromise, the obligation of state neutrality in religious matters, the renunciation of hate speech, the rejection of „denial of reality“, and of allegedly „finalizing“ ideologies of history. (shrink)

Es spricht einiges dafür, daß sich die Zukunftsfähigkeit auch westlicher Gesellschaften an ihrer Fähigkeit zur demokratischen Selbsttransformation, z.B. durch eine Ausweitung der Mitwirkungsrechte der Bürgerinnen und Bürger, erweisen wird.Vor diesem Hintergrund wird hier der Versuch unternommen, die Bedingungen und Chancen einer partizipatorischen Reform parlamentarischer Demokratien zu sondieren. Dabei führt der Verfasser zunächst im Durchgang durch die neuere staats- und demokratietheoretische Diskussion die Idee einer deliberativen Politik ein, die er dann in ein Modell reflexiver Demokratie übersetzt und so eine Perspektive (...) auf die grundlegende Reform politischer Institutionen eröffnet. Der Schlußabschnitt konzentriert sich auf neue Formen der politischen Willensbildung in Verhandlungssystemen, politischen Netzwerken o.ä., um vor allem am Beispiel der Umwelt- und Technologiepolitik zu prüfen, unter welchen Voraussetzungen sich diese Entwicklungen für Zwecke einer durchgreifenden Strukturreform aufgreifen und weiterführen lassen. (shrink)

This paper is a reply to Anton Leist’s criticisms of the view I develop in my book, Morality, Normativity, and Society. Leist claims that my “standard-based” account of the truth conditions of moral propositions is incoherent. I argue that he is mistaken about this. Leist claims that my “society-centered” account of the justification of moral standards has “nasty” implications. In the course of answering this worry, I develop the idea of a “moral necessity”. My theory implies that although moral propositions (...) are metaphysically contingent, they are most likely morally necessary. I also explain that, despite its relativism, the society-centered view is quite compatible with the idea that there are certain “moral universals”. Finally, Leist claims that the arguments I have given in favor of my view are unsuccessful. But it is a mistake to think that decisive arguments can be expected in this area. The most we can expect is a clear statement of the costs and benefits of a theory. I claim that my account of the nature and grounding of morality has important advantages over familiar alternatives. (shrink)

Warren Samuels has suggested that the Pareto Principle, when being used in policy analysis, is (1) limited, (2) selective, and (3) displays a conservative bias. In contrast to this view, in this note it is argued that the Pareto Principle is much less limited than was initially perceived (e.g. by Pareto himself) or is generally believed to be the case, that it tends to emphasize inclusiveness instead of selectivity, and that it is more likely to have an innovative instead of (...) a conservative bias. (shrink)

This note on my exchange with G. Kirchgässner points to a possible misunderstanding and one serious difference of opinion. On the empirical side I tried to make visible social values and norms which cannot be reduced to economic preferences. On the normative side I tried to criticise the rational-choice-approach for being either obviously wrong or empirically empty.

Rorty’s profound and challenging critique of contemporary philosophy is in several ways somewhat unfair. Analytic philosophy can contribute towards ‘wisdom’ in a reasonable sense of the term, though not in Rorty’s narrow sense; and his contrast between ‘sophist’ and ‘sage’, with the latter understood in Plato’s way, is also too constricting. Also, some contemporary ‘analytic’ work in the ‘history of philosophy’, so called, is not invalidated by Rorty’s strictures - especially his implied accusation that we shan’t be interested in the (...) intellectual past if we can’t look down on it. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Arbeit thematisiert eine sowohl im deutschen als auch im spanischen und englischen Sprachraum weitgehend unbekannte philosophische Kontroverse zweier herausragender Figuren der Rezeptionsgeschichte von Husserls Phänomenologie in Mexiko zur Zeit des spanischen republikanischen Exils. Es handelt sich um die Diskussion zwischen José Gaos und Luis Villoro über den phänomenologischen Begriff der Lebenswelt. Im ersten Teil meiner Darstellung werde ich den akademischen Kontext dieser Diskussion erörtern. Im zweiten Teil gehe ich auf die Hauptthese eines Vortrags ein, den Gaos (...) 1963 in Mexiko-Stadt vor einem internationalen Publikum hielt und der als die erste dokumentierte Behandlung des Lebensweltbegriffs in der spanischsprachigen Philosophie gilt. Der dritte Teil behandelt Villoros Erwiderung auf Gaos’ Vortrag und die sich daraus ergebende Auseinandersetzung der beiden Philosophen. Im vierten Teil ziehe ich eine kritische Bilanz des Inhalts dieser Diskussion im Licht des aktuellen Stands der Husserlforschung. Dabei, und schließlich auch im fünften Teil, wird sich die unverkennbar radikale Bedeutung dieser Diskussion für die aktuelle phänomenologische Forschung herausstellen, insbesondere im Hinblick auf das Forschungsdesiderat einer Erklärung der systematischen Verhältnisse zwischen transzendentaler Erkenntniskritik und Lebenswelttheorie. (shrink)

Two issues are at the core of a seemingly never-ending debate about Groundwork III: First, does Kant in GMS III still think he has to deduce the moral law partly from non-moral presuppositions by making a transition from theoretical to practical freedom, as Schönecker argues? Or does Kant already regard the categorical imperative as grounded in a fact of reason, as Puls argues? It is, secondly, no less unclear what exactly is meant by the “deduction” Kant mentions in three places (...) in GMS III. While Puls claims that Kant is referring to the deduction of the idea of freedom from the unquestionable consciousness of pure practical reason, Schönecker contends that GMS III is ultimately about the deduction of the categorical imperative. Schönecker takes issue with Puls’s position as developed, and Puls replies. (shrink)

Richard Rorty argues that the present state of analytic philosophy is the result of the collapse of the logical empiricist program. But most of the characteristics of analytic philosophy which Rorty ascribes to that collapse predated logical empiricism. The historical explanation of the present state of philosophy must begin not later than with the schism between philosophy and the other disciplines in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To begin then leads to a different view of how philosophical problems are generated.

This short note argues that the basic points Coleman (1993) makes against my critical paper (1993) are incorrect. These points concern the possibility of a single agent holding a corporate goal, the doxastic conditions concerning group action, and 'jointness-effects'.

The paper is a reply to the critical reviews of the author’s A Theory of social Action by Anton Leist, Marvin Belzer, and Julian Nida-Rümelin in this journal. As to Leist’s main criticisms, which concern the notions of social action, social practical reasoning, individualism, and social norms, they are argued to be incorrect and unjustified. Belzer’s criticisms are on the whole well taken, and in fact all of them have been noted by the author in his later work.Belzer does not, (...) however, consider these newest analyses and improvements. Nida-Rümelin presents some comments on the relationships between collective preferences and we- intentions. These points are correct. (shrink)

Richard Rorty’s assessment of the American philosophical scene is unduly cynical. Part of the reason for this seems to lie in his recognition (in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature) of the incoherence of “grounding” a linguistic or conceptual scheme on a “given”, but proceeding, nevertheless, to think of representation and truth as requiring conformity to a “given”. He, therefore, fails to appreciate the unity and seriousness of American philosophers who, abandoning the “given”, are working with some success·on plausible accounts (...) of representation and truth. Surprisingly, neither in his article nor his book does he attend to the remarkable increase in sophistication and serious research on the part of historians of philosophy and historians of science. Both in serious work on representation and truth and in historical research there is more rapprochement between American and Continental philosophers than Rorty seems prepared to credit. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDieser Beitrag konzentriert sich auf eine starke und auf eine schwache Seite von Bayers Zugang zu Luthers Theologie. So wird als Stärke angesehen, dass das Thema der Rechtfertigung in Luthers Theologie als allumfassend angesetzt wird. Dagegen besteht eine Schwäche in der Art und Weise, wie Bayer durch Luthers Dialektik der zwei Arten, in denen Gott sich verbirgt – also verborgen »unter dem Gegenteil« und absolut verborgen – hindurch bricht, indem er die beiden trennt und diese Aufteilung als Kriterium verwendet, um (...) zwischen einer Periode, in der Luther die reformatorische Einsicht vollständig ausarbeitet, und einem vor-reformatorischen Luther zu unterscheiden. Diese Luther-Interpretation sollte nochmals überdacht werden, denn sie verneint die Entsprechung und die kontrapunktisch zu verstehende Beziehung zwischen dieser doppelten Verborgenheit im Lichte des »offenbaren Gottes«. Ein ähnliches Problem taucht dann auf, wenn Bayer die Rede vom dreieinigen Gott, die ausschließlich am Evangelium orientiert ist, unterscheidet von einer allgemeinen Art und Weise, von Gott zu reden, die allein auf dem Gesetz basiert. Luthers Vorstellung, dass die Unterscheidung zwischen Gesetz und Evangelium vollständig in Gottes Offenbarung des Evangeliums integriert ist, widerspricht einer solchen Unterscheidung. Dieser Beitrag betrachtet nicht nur die Unterscheidung zwischen einem unreifen und einem reifen Luther, der alle Implikationen der reformatorischen Einsicht ausgearbeitet hat, als unnötig, sondern er würdigt den jungen Luther als einen Theologen, der in der Lage ist, dasjenige zusammen zu halten, was beim späten Luther auseinander zu fallen droht. Glücklicherweise beinhaltet Bayers Studie auch Anknüpfungsmöglichkeiten für eine solche Interpretation Luthers, die die positiven ebenso wie die negativen Aspekte beider Arten der Verborgenheit ebenso wie Gesetz und Evangelium in einem einzigen kontinuierlichen Prozess integriert.SummaryThis contribution concentrates on one strong and one weak side of Bayer's approach to Luther's theology. It finds a strength in the universally implemented theme of justification in Luther's theological thought. A weakness is however found in the way Bayer breaks through Luther's dialectics concerning the dual way God hides himself – i. e. hidden ‘under the opposite’ and absolutely hidden – by separating them and using this division as a criterion to distinguish between the period where Luther had fully worked out the insight of the Reformation and the pre-Reformation Luther. Such an interpretation of Luther needs to be reconsidered because it neglects the correspondence and the contrapuntal relation between this double hiddeness in the light of the ‘revealed God’.A similar problem arises when Bayer divides speaking about the triune God, which is exclusively orientated towards the Gospel, from a general way of speaking about God, which is only based on the Law. Luther's idea that the distinction between Law and Gospel is fully integrated into God's revelation of the Gospel contradicts such a division.This contribution considers not only a distinction between an immature and a mature Luther who has worked out all the implications of the reformation insight unnecessary, but appreciates the young Luther as a theologian who is capable of holding together what the later Luther is in danger of letting fall apart. Fortunately, in Bayer's study there are also openings for a Luther interpretation that includes the positive as well as the negative aspect of both kinds of hiddeness and of Law and Gospel in a single continuous process. (shrink)

This paper explores the nature of the dispute between the competing theses of intentionality and physicalism, as discussed by A. Marras in his paper “Intentionality and Physicalism: a Resolvable Dispute“. Although as originally conceived neither thesis is viable, it is apparent that a physicalist account of human behavior must take into consideration the intentionality of human behavior. This paper reviews a recent attempt to give a physicalist reconstruction of intentionality and shows that such an approach succeeds in providing scientifically acceptable (...) explanations of human behavior without needing to answer the metaphysical questions that this dispute implies. (shrink)

Contrary to Marras: (1) the third of Chisholm’s Intentional criteria of sentences about mental states and events succeeds in highlighting an intuitive feature of Intentionality. (2) If there is such a thing as modality, it resides either in the way we speak of things or in the things, regardless of the way we speak of them. If the latter, modal sentences fail to satisfy Chisholm’s criterion for mentalistic sentences; and if the former, modal sentences turn out to be mentalistic sentences. (...) So either way − if either the latter or the former − modal sentences fail to provide a counterexample to Chisholm’s claim that his criterion picks out only mentalistic sentences. (3) Functionalism doesn’t enable physicalism to accomodate Intentional states and events, because functionalism rejects a traditional tenet of physicalism. (shrink)

Lüderssen’s definition of legal and moral norms according to the varying degree of consent given to them is rejected. The definition proposed is not only imprecise, but also inadequate in substance as it is in contradiction with central and plausible aspects of our conception of morals. On the face of it the definition put forward is convincing only in the context of a “recognition-theory” of law. It is argued that this theory is not convincing either and moreover can manage without (...) this definition. (shrink)