So numerous are the aspects of Dōgen’s writings that reflect the structures of vision that we might consider his philosophy “ocularcentric”. While recent scholarship scrutinizes both Greek and Mahāyāna forms of ocularcentrism, I argue that the hazards reside not in the prioritization of sight to the neglect of other senses, but in the latent positivism visual metaphor tends to, but need not, reinforce. I cast Dōgen as a “negative ocularcentrist” for his construing vision according to the Mahāyāna notion of (...) emptiness (śūnyatā). Rather than positivist ontology, epistemology or soteriology structured metaphorically as progressing from darkness into light, Dōgen inflects seeing with the visually negative, incorporating darkness, blindness, delusion, invisibility, and what he calls “dim sightedness” (gen’ei 眼翳), which are “obstructions” (keige 罣礙), but not the sort that can or must be overcome; For Dōgen, darkness is essential for illumination, delusion part of enlightenment, obstruction not an impediment for realization, but one of its conditions. I claim that implicit to Dōgen’s notion of “obstruction obstructing obstruction” (礙は礙を罜礙する なり、これ時なり) is a form of reflexivity, which if extended from language to vision distances his thought from both the positivism of ocularcentrism and challenges the ascription of realism to his mysticism. (shrink)

This collection of original essays by preeminent interpreters of continental philosophy explores the question of whether Western thought and culture have been dominated by a vision-centered paradigm of knowledge, ethics, and power. It focuses on the character of vision in modern philosophy and on arguments for and against the view that contemporary life and thought are distinctively "ocularcentric." The authors examine these ideas in the context of the history of philosophy and consider the character of visual discourse in the writings (...) of Plato, Descartes, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Benjamin, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Derrida, Foucault, Gadamer, Wittgenstein, and Habermas. With essays on television, the visual arts, and feminism, the book will interest readers in cultural studies, gender studies, and art history as well as philosophers. (shrink)

Discursive accounts of the body have been prominent recently. While acknowledging the usefulness of these, the author, drawing upon specific philosophers of the body and a wide range of other theorists, focuses attention on the experiencing body which she refers to as 'creatural existence’. Thinking in terms of the creatural, she argues, can better situate human beings in their environment, thus emphasizing a kind of 'ecological notion of subjectivity’, in which place-based existence is understood anew. The educational implications of focusing (...) on what bodies 'do' and not so much in terms of how they are socially inscribed, presents them as practico-sensory totalities which should perhaps be seen as systems rather than an as mere organisms or entities. Such an articulation of creatural existence emphasizes animality, and in so doing reminds us of the centrality of the senses in all knowing and doing, including crucially, in relation to those practices which we have understood as 'work'. Multi-sensorial education is a major sub-theme of the book and the author argues persuasively for this by means of a critical analysis of the ocularcentrism that is characteristic of contemporary culture. (shrink)

What happens when humans and birds engage each other through a collaboration-as-fantasy mediated by computers? Could such an exercise be modelled in a way that helps us to transcend the techno-ocularcentric fetishes for precision and certainty which demarcate our time? From Edgar Wind’s notion of 'incarnation' – as the place where empirical experience and metaphysical foundation meet in the single cognitive and experiential act – this article bridges the analogue with the digital, navigating nature’s strategies to embody inherited and learned (...) complex behaviours in the design of nests, in what I call data-nests. (shrink)

This paper contributes to non-ocularcentric theory and theorizing by way of a methodological application and extension of Henri Lefebvre’s Rhythmanalysis. It explores the cultural dynamics of echoes and history, using as an instrumental case study Steve Reich’s 1966 tape-loop composition, Come Out, to elucidate the ambivalent and contradictory relations of time, temporality, and possibility. While the focus is primarily on the text of Come Out and its context of police brutality and civil rights, it moreover contributes to an enriched and (...) historically grounded understanding of rhythmanalysis while engaging with rhythmanalysis as a methodology, based on the expanded conception of echoes proposed. (shrink)

This collection of original essays by preeminent interpreters of continental philosophy explores the question of whether Western thought and culture have been dominated by a vision-centered paradigm of knowledge, ethics, and power. It focuses on the character of vision in modern philosophy and on arguments for and against the view that contemporary life and thought are distinctively "ocularcentric." The authors examine these ideas in the context of the history of philosophy and consider the character of visual discourse in the writings (...) of Plato, Descartes, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Benjamin, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Derrida, Foucault, Gadamer, Wittgenstein, and Habermas. With essays on television, the visual arts, and feminism, the book will interest readers in cultural studies, gender studies, and art history as well as philosophers. (shrink)

As legal scholar Ariela Dubler notes, the institution of marriage casts a long shadow across contemporary social life. Much more than a way of conferring social sanction on sexual and romantic relationships, marriage unlocks a wide range of social goods, from inheritance rights to medical records access. In addition, though, and as generations of feminists, queer activists, and others have made clear, this institution is part of a wider network of power relationships that it helps to shore up and conceal. (...) Critics most often point to the way the marital regime quietly reinforces patriarchal, bourgeois liberal, and heteronormative assumptions, hiding them in the shadow of putatively benign, private, and natural social structures. This article brings the overlooked connections between marriage and race out of the shadows and more fully into view. Using and refining a fourfold notion of racial invisibility developed in Taylor’s Black Is Beautiful, we consider two respects in which this ocularcentric metaphor for racialized epistemic short-circuiting is particularly appropriate for discussing the marital regime. (shrink)

In modern philosophy acquires relevance a problem of confrontation of linguistic and visual practices of philosophical knowledge. Since Antiquity, ways of contemplation are formed as ways of recognition characterized as “ocularcentrism”. In the historical and philosophical prospective “sight” and “vision” are metaphors of thinking. They are considered as internal contemplation, and as a means of establishing human cognitive abilities. It is shown that technology and models of representation in Western culture of thinking are based on practices that appeal to (...) “visualization”. The create a “videological matrix” and make certain common stratagems of visual discourse like metaphors, diagrams, representation, etc. The article emphasizes that “the ocular dictionary” of philosophy represents a wide range of options for visual metaphors that occupy an important place in a number of key philosophical concepts. On the one hand, there are metaphors that appeal to visual perception, visual experience. But on the other hand there is a traditional interpretation of philosophical activity through the prism of visual metaphors. These includes a metaphor of vision, metaphor of light, metaphor of mirror and others. The author highlights a metaphor of vision as a key metaphor of philosophical activity, in which the philosopher is a spectator, contemplating the truth, just as the spectator of a play, sport event or religious mysteries. In antiquity this kind of contemplation was a specific activity, called “theory”. Contemporary studies show that a term “theory” can establish an association between theory as specific activity in social life and a theory as a specific activity of a philosopher. Philosophical theory is an act of “contemplation”, as evidenced by the writings of Plato and Aristotle. “Theory” was also associated with a certain contemplative work, public instruction, pilgrimage. The “theory” was the action, which took place in three steps: leaving home, contemplation, returning home. A contemplation was in the center of theory as an activity. Consequently, the philosophical theory, the article says, is born with cultural practices, the origins of which are located primarily in the social life of ancient Greek. Thus, contemplation as a “theory” is understood as the process of getting information about images, ideas which is transformed into something new in the processes if intellectual activity. Consequently, the visibility immanently contained in the philosophy and describes the philosophical activity, as a way of philosophical research and is associated with philosophical thinking. Activity of a philosopher in the contest of contemplation is essentially a “metaphor of vision”, which acts as a certain type of philosophical activity. (shrink)

The embargo on touching in museums is increasingly being brought into question, not least by blind activists who are calling for greater access to collections. The provision of opportunities to touch could be read as a potential conflict between established optic knowledge and illicit haptic experience, between the conservation of objects and access to collections. Instead I suggest that touch is not necessarily other to the museum; rather, the status of who does the touching and knowing is crucial and not (...) the use of touch per se. It is expert territory and vested academic interests that are at stake here. Using Bruno Latour’s (1993) conceptions of hybrid networks and purified zones of academic practice, I then explore what the unacknowledged existence of touch means for museums and for notions of authority more generally. I suggest that if the apparent boundaries of disciplines are unconvincing in practice, then the possibility of expert knowledge is seriously undermined. Blind people’s demand for access through touch is not then a challenge of one paradigm to another but implicitly questions the accreditation of authority itself. As such it forms part of a wider institutional shift with regard to expertise and an increased need for negotiating between different conceptual frameworks. The ocularcentric bias of museums is increasingly being questioned by blind and visually impaired visitors who emphasize touch as a learning and aesthetic experience. This challenge is contentious not least because it ostensibly brings the individuals’ rights of access into direct conflict with museum conservation. I argue that concerns over conservation can, however, mask and serve to legitimate preconceptions about who should have access to collections; what counts as damage or dirt; and the means by which art and artefacts can be understood or enjoyed. It is expertise rather than the conservation of objects which is at stake. This article suggests that in campaigning for access through touch, blind people physically move beyond the barriers which reserve contact for the museum elite and simultaneously establish the viability of learning in a way that is not sanctioned by the art historical community. Thus resistance to touch in museums is not so much a concern for preservation as a defence of territory and expertise. (shrink)

One of the recent areas of discussion in aesthetics and the visual arts is the tension between the so-called “ocularcentric” tradition, on the one hand, and the tendency to move in a multisensory, multimodal direction, on the other. My aim in this paper is to bring out this tension by tracing it in a number of moments; firstly, in the late 19th-early 20th century discussion, concerning the “total art work” and the contribution of synaesthesia; secondly, the reaction to what Clement (...) Greenberg called the modernist “reduction to the visual”, expressed in a variety of multimodal art forms in the latter half of the 20th century. The weight of my paper is given to two contemporary discussions with significant repercussions in aesthetics: a. the opposition between “disembodiment” and “embodied immersion” in the area of new media; and b. the debate between modularity and plasticity of perception in neuroscience. The conclusion to which I am led is that the possibilities of sensory integration offered by new media and of sensory plasticity - offered by synaesthesia - suggest new creative ways in which our senses may interact and enhance our experience of the world, as well as elucidate artistic creativity and aesthetic appreciation. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to consider Jewish philosophy in opposition to the anti-ocularcentrism that defined the German Jewish philosophical tradition after Kant, namely the idea that Judaism—or at least its philosophical expression in Maimonidean philosophy—is aniconic and cognitively abstract. I do so by attempting to rethink the epistemic-veridical place of the imagination and visual experience in the Guide of the Perplexed . Once the imagination has been disciplined by reason, is there any cognitive status to an image or (...) sound that the eye or the ear perceives, and to that mental faculty that combines and recombines such impressions? Is the sight or sound of revelation a hallucination or just a mere figure of speech? Does it bear any relation to a spiritual reality external to the human mind and finite physical existence? To address these questions I explore the visual images, both iconic and aniconic-abstract, that distinguish the Guide . There is no getting past the visual imagination, although I am not sure Maimonides would have recognized it as such. Even when he leaves behind figurative visual cues such as the false image-work of the undisciplined imagination or the appearance of angels and images of God found in lower grades of prophecy, he turns to another visual register, namely the “abstract art“ of pure, dazzling light. In regard to these questions, Maimonides was more Greek than German, ascribing, cautiously, penultimate cognitive status to the visual imagination. (shrink)

This essay examines women's spectacularly visible status in feminised mass cultural domains in the first decades of the twentieth century. Feminine spectacles are commonly understood to invite viewers to access women's bodies, yet early twentieth-century spectacles paradoxically called renewed attention to women's illegibility. Women's visual prominence made apparent their ‘unknowability’, recasting an ancient ideational heritage in modern terms. Representations of women as opaque in the early twentieth century constituted a challenge to ocularcentrism and reveal the centrality of femininity in (...) mass mediations of epistemology and ontology. Drawing on written accounts of women's opacity in the fashion and beauty press, I argue that attention to spectacles of unknowability can be productive for feminist modernist studies. The texturing of histories of feminine spectacle challenges some tenacious dichotomies that continue to inform accounts of women's place in the modern, including those of subject and object, and visibility and invisibility. Focusing on opacity leads us to a productive account of the variable visibility of women in the modern, which foregrounds the multiple historical relations of different groups of women to regimes of visibility and keeps in view the diverse ways that differently classed and raced women were positioned vis-à-vis spectacle. The essay draws on feminist and postcolonial theory to suggest that an attunement to the unknowable not only nuances our understanding of a discrete historical period, but can lead the feminist researcher to confront and expand her own gaze in the era of capitalist modernity. (shrink)

Understanding the neural underpinnings of emotion enables a re-imagining of traditional aesthetics in which landscape art is conceived as "dance for the dancer." Eschewing the "ocularcentric" for the _kinesthetic_ yields a fresh theory of artistic expression in landscape applicable to all fine art.

Le but de cet article est de réévaluer l’impact du projet philosophique de Jean Wahl sur la philosophie française postmoderne. L’angle choisi consiste à replacer le projet wahlien dans le cadre des deux grands motifs de la philosophie française de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle: le rejet du paradigme dominant de la vision et le rapport ambivalent à l’hégélianisme, cristallisé dans la ????igure de la conscience malheureuse. En suivant ces deux fils conducteurs, l’article retrace le parcours intellectuel de Jean (...) Wahl depuis sa thèse de doctorat sur les philosophies pluralistes angloaméricaines, en passant par sa réception de l’hégélianisme, pour le mettre en relation avec sa période la moins commentée, celle de l’introduction dans le paysage philosophique français des grands noms du roman moderniste américain de l’époque.The goal of this paper is to re-evaluate the impact of Jean Wahl’s philosophical project on French postmodern philosophy. To complete this task, it is necessary to put the Wahlian project into the context of the two major aims of 20th Century French philosophy: the rejection of ocularcentrism and the ambiguous relationship to Hegelianism characterized by the figure of the Unhappy Consciousness. Following these two threads, the article reconstructs Wahl’s intellectual journey from his Ph.D. on American pluralism to his reception of Hegelianism in order to connect them to his less known work, which consists of introducing American modernist writers into the French philosophical landscape. (shrink)

The development of immersive media-communication environments, and their theorization in terms of the `haptic', calls for a reconsideration of the relationship between sensuality and the ethics of contact. For the most part, the cultural theorization of the virtual which remains preoccupied with the visual has tended to limit its scope to the paradoxes, politics and ethics of representation. Much of media and cultural studies work, for instance, has adopted, directly or indirectly, the traditional visual and ocularcentric paradigm in its analyses (...) of cultural forms and technologies as these have become integrated into contemporary life. Whilst it has been argued, for instance by Mark Hansen in his recent books, that this paradigm is inadequate to digital media and the developments of human-machine interactions the digital introduces, few comentators have addressed how new developments in immersive sensory media environments bear on the ethics of communication. By way of a reflection on the themes of the tactility of contact and the ethics of touch in the work of Emmanuel Levinas, this article critically evaluates the ethical significance of the `sensory extension' haptic media represent. It identifies and argues against the neo-positivist tendency of Hansen's reliance on the empiricism of the neurosciences whilst locating the resources for an ethics of touch in Levinas' concept of time as `diachrony'. (shrink)

This article critiques contemporary feminist theory's frequent ocularcentric readings of the anorexic body as a surface of cultural inscription or as a paradigmatic sign of the female body's alienation through sexual difference. In an initial speculative attempt to find a theoretical framework that might sustain a more generative and embodied account of anorexia, I read anorexia through Butler's theory of gender as psychic `incorporation' because she problematizes an interior/exterior topography of the subject. This Butlerian framework proves problematic because, by establishing (...) an association between visibly queer gender and subversion, it effectively designates as hegemonic any sense of gender as a felt interiority. In a second framework, I draw on Prosser's anti-ocularcentric reading of transsexual `body narratives' derived from Anzieu's theory of the `skin ego'. Filtering Butler's theory of melancholia through this skin ego framework, I find a theoretical space for anorexia as a transitional embodied subjectivity which both re-lives and relieves the melancholic trauma of gender. (shrink)

Are there qualities of sound and the experience of listening that educators can extrapolate to inform the philosophy and practice of music education? In this essay, I imagine a music education where sound—how it behaves and how we experience it—serves not only as the subject of study, but generates the framework of the pedagogy. A sonic music education is not automatic because ocularcentrism privileges the vision and influences the listening and educational experiences, often in unrecognized ways. I explore two (...) qualities of sounds: they are, first, impermanent and continually changing and, second, diffuse—seemingly inside and outside our bodies. These qualities contrast with the visual experience, which makes objects appear permanent, fixed, and separate from our bodies. Pedagogies based on sound might present truth as impermanent and their aims as multidirectional and might employ social constructivist epistemologies and democratic education. A music education based on sounds may be a corrective to ocularcentric banking pedagogies where knowledge is fixed and progress is unidirectionally measured. (shrink)

In modern philosophy acquires relevance a problem of confrontation of linguistic and visual practices of philosophical knowledge. Since Antiquity, ways of contemplation are formed as ways of recognition characterized as “ocularcentrism”. In the historical and philosophical prospective “sight” and “vision” are metaphors of thinking. They are considered as internal contemplation, and as a means of establishing human cognitive abilities. It is shown that technology and models of representation in Western culture of thinking are based on practices that appeal to (...) “visualization”. The create a “videological matrix” and make certain common stratagems of visual discourse like metaphors, diagrams, representation, etc. The article emphasizes that “the ocular dictionary” of philosophy represents a wide range of options for visual metaphors that occupy an important place in a number of key philosophical concepts. On the one hand, there are metaphors that appeal to visual perception, visual experience. But on the other hand there is a traditional interpretation of philosophical activity through the prism of visual metaphors. These includes a metaphor of vision, metaphor of light, metaphor of mirror and others. The author highlights a metaphor of vision as a key metaphor of philosophical activity, in which the philosopher is a spectator, contemplating the truth, just as the spectator of a play, sport event or religious mysteries. In antiquity this kind of contemplation was a specific activity, called “theory”. Contemporary studies show that a term “theory” can establish an association between theory as specific activity in social life and a theory as a specific activity of a philosopher. Philosophical theory is an act of “contemplation”, as evidenced by the writings of Plato and Aristotle. “Theory” was also associated with a certain contemplative work, public instruction, pilgrimage. The “theory” was the action, which took place in three steps: leaving home, contemplation, returning home. A contemplation was in the center of theory as an activity. Consequently, the philosophical theory, the article says, is born with cultural practices, the origins of which are located primarily in the social life of ancient Greek. Thus, contemplation as a “theory” is understood as the process of getting information about images, ideas which is transformed into something new in the processes if intellectual activity. Consequently, the visibility immanently contained in the philosophy and describes the philosophical activity, as a way of philosophical research and is associated with philosophical thinking. Activity of a philosopher in the contest of contemplation is essentially a “metaphor of vision”, which acts as a certain type of philosophical activity. (shrink)

This study places Nāgārjuna and Plato in dialogue regarding how both seek to orient philosophy in the face of indeterminacy observed at the elemental level of existence, specifically, the indeterminacy of fire’s light. Looking to the elemental within Chōra and Śūnyatā, a directive becomes discernible for calibrating philosophy to this indeterminacy, and crucial limitations are disclosed, which expand philosophy by enabling a productive relation to the non-philosophical. What emerges are directives for language, which serve to modify philosophy’s violence towards the (...) world by striking a middle way between the binaries of reification and nihilism, speech and silence. (shrink)

Анотація. В статті здійснюється спроба деконструкції раціоналістичного наративу візуальної парадигми пізнання у філософії епохи Модерну. Мета статті полягає у виявленні основних аспектів розуміння візуальної парадигми пізнання у філософських концепціях раціоналістичного спрямування епохи Модерну в співвідношенні з окулярцентризмом як процесом фіксації зорової інформації в свідомості людини. Показано, що поряд з античними експериментами, в яких зорове сприйняття збільшує свої можливості одержання знання про світ, увага зосереджується на концепті «світла» в ряді смислових аспектів. Аналізується метафора «природне світло розуму». В епістемології Нового часу виокремлюються (...) дві візуальні техніки пізнання – «огляд» і «панорама бачення», які дозволяють одержати максимум інформації для подальшої ментальної обробки в розумі. В контексті порівняльного методу досліджено, що в ажливим аспектом розуміння проблеми «візуальності» в епоху Нового часу постає досягнення можливості ясного і чіткого бачення реальності Бога. Але якщо в епоху античності і середніх віків споглядання реальності Бога пов’язувалося з духовним очищенням від пристрастей, то в ситуації Модерну чіткість бачення стає результатом використання методу, який є процесом впорядкованої процедури розгляду ідеї. Результати дослідження. Візуальні образи мають подвійне втілення у філософії Модерну – зовнішнього, фізичного характеру та внутрішнього, метафоричного. Перший пов’язаний із активною увагою мислителів Модерну до оптики та фізіології зору. Другий – з істиною та шляхами її досягнення, що є наслідком осмислення методологічних наслідків з появи нової оптики, нових теорій зору, розвитку оптичних приладів, появи нових художніх засобів виразності. Висновок. Важливим аспектом новочасової візуалістики є використання методу, який впорядковує процедуру розгляду ідей. В його контексті «світло» перетворюється в метафору освіти, яка стала смислом епохи Просвітництва. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophy of Taste by Huanan GongChunpeng Hao (bio)Philosophy of Taste. By Huanan Gong. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2022. Pp. xii + 312. Paperback ¥59.00, isbn 978-7-108-07489-8. Postmodern thought in Western philosophy often criticizes the tradition of logocentrism and ocularcentrism. This tradition of philosophical observation can be found in Pythagoras' definition of the philosopher, who is a spectator as distinct from the sportsman and the merchant in (...) the Great Games. The attitude of observation reflects the logical, objective, and neutral characteristics of philosophy. Especially in Plato's philosophy we could find this objectified "observation" (p. 18). This tradition laid the foundation of Western philosophy. Since then, philosophy has developed "metaphysics," "ontology," "epistemology," "rationalism," "idealism," and other themes. However, if we examine the original meaning of the word "philosophy," it only refers to the "love" (philia) of "wisdom" (sophia). The Chinese "love of wisdom" is different from that of Western philosophers. Professor Gong Huanan's Philosophy of Taste is a work about "taste" and "Dao". It represents a different path from the ancient Greek philosophical tradition. In the book, Gong reveals how the Chinese use these three core concepts ("taste", "sense" and "xiang") to identify things, discuss nature, understand the Dao and live in the world, thus outlining a world of Chinese culture that is different from that of the West. He delves into the principles and rich meanings inherent in these fundamental concepts of Chinese philosophy, and then explores ways of reconstructing Chinese philosophy drawing on contemporary resources (p. 307). There are seven chapters in Philosophy of Taste. In Chapters 1 and 2, which offer a discussion on "taste," Gong gives a broad overview of the definition of "taste" and its scope in Chinese thought; Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the subject of "sense," which moves from taste to the relationship between the senses and the mind. Finally, in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, the main discussion is on "xiang" (象, shape, appearance), where the author distinguishes between "xiang" and "form". "Xiang" in Chinese culture has no form, so it has little relevance to vision, and there is no Western ocularcentrism in China (p. 192). Gong also discusses expressions in the Chinese tradition that equate wisdom with sight and hearing, for example, cong ming 聪明 (intelligent, clever, bright), which is synonymous with wisdom, originally refers to good hearing and [End Page 1] good sight (p. 36). However, Chinese culture is diverse and not "monotheistic." There are many ways of attaining wisdom or the Dao, and Buddhism uses the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body and mind as a method of practice to attain it (p. 19). For it is basically through the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, etc. that one receives information, and among them the sense of taste of the tongue is a viewpoint with Chinese characteristics. Chinese people are very fond of eating, but eating does not simply mean desire and unruliness--there is thought in it. As The Doctrine of the Mean or Zhongyong 中庸 says, "There is no body but eats and drinks. But they are few who can distinguish flavors" (p. 1). The Chinese word for "sense" (ganjue 感觉) has two parts, one is feel (gan 感) and another is awareness (jue 觉). Everyone has the ability to sense, but few have awareness. Only those who have both can know the truth. "Taste" seems to be closer to feeling and is an attribute of objects, of which there are several kinds, such as sour, sweet, bitter, and spicy. But it is not unrelated to the perceiver, for without the organ of perception, there would be no taste. This organ of taste reception is the tongue. In Chinese, "tongue" is also known as the root of the soul, or the opening of the mind (p. 25). The tongue and the mind work together to create the activity of the sense of taste. In short, the sense of taste is the unification of the attributes of things and the human mind in sensation. It is the same as knowing the Dao, which is in everything around us, but one needs to have a "heart" to discover it (p. 89). Gong holds that, in Chinese thought... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French ThoughtVirginia A. La CharitéDowncast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought, by Martin Jay; xi & 632 pp. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, $35.00.The book jacket flyleaf for Martin Jay’s Downcast Eyes proclaims in exuberant and laudatory terms that this study has a double agenda: one is to show that vision is by no means the (...) dominant sense in ordering Western culture and the other is to posit instead a “plurality of ‘scopic regimes, particularly in the climate of postmodernism. Indeed, antiocularcentrism provides the unifying thread of Jay’s work, which reviews the theory of vision from Plato to Bergson in the first three chapters and concentrates on “the culture of modernity” in chapters four through eight; the ninth chapter interestingly and curiously places Derrida and feminist criticism side by side under the aegis of “phallogocularcentrism” and presents Derrida and Irigaray if not as the high points of modernism, then at least as the center of the poststructuralist discourse, which argues for the elevation of the word over the eye and so offers downcast eyes as the new logo for what is now identified as postmodernism. Jay’s last chapter addresses postmodernism as a foreclosure on visual practice or the ocularcentric. The short seven-page conclusion attempts to place a positive note on the author’s admitted denigration of the notion of visuality in modern French intellectual thought and culture by calling for a plural or multiple—“polyscopic”—visual experience. Hence, Jay concludes that his notion of downcast eyes or disillusionment is “no solution” (p. 592) to the problem. Certainly, Broodthaer’s “L’Oeil” on the jacket cover does not present [End Page 162] downcast eyes but rather the very feminine alluring eye of a seductress. In this sense, the real message of Jay’s work is reader, beware! His provocative title and even more provocative subtitle initiate from the outset a critique of one of the long-held and cherished myths about the dominance and prominence of the visual sense in Western culture, especially in modern French thought. It is the unsettling of the comfortableness of this notion which Jay’s work successfully undertakes.The study is well-organized and lucidly written. It forcefully argues the author’s case. Unfortunately, there is no bibliography. The omission of a bibliography undercuts the project and casts scholarly suspicion on the entire venture. In all truth, the inclusion of a bibliography would dramatically call attention to serious lacunae in the scholarship. The French thinkers presented and analyzed, such as Bataille, Barthes, Sartre, Foucault, Derrida, Irigaray, and Lyotard, have been studied in depth—at times brilliantly—but Jay ignores this rich corpus of critical material. In particular, his treatment of important French poets such as Rimbaud, the surrealists, Ponge, and others is so skewed in order to reinforce his denigration of the dominant role of vision in twentieth-century French writing that the reader in the field of French studies questions the quality of the basic research undertaken for the project and the author’s skill at reading with understanding and sensitivity hermetic material in the original French. Once these questions are raised, the very nature of Jay’s study itself becomes suspect.As the reader progresses through the volume, it seems that most of Jay’s analyses of the primary texts are based on English translations and are in fact limited to those works available in translation. While this may not be the actual case, the lack of a bibliography reinforces such a suspicion and contributes to the steady erosion of the credibility of the study. Even worse, it poses a troubling if not invidious question: who is the audience for Downcast Eyes? Surely, the audience is not humanists who specialize in twentieth-century French studies. If the intended audience is one of scholars and their students in cultural history and the social sciences with little grounding in contemporary French intellectual thought as manifested in its literature and literary criticism, this audience needs to begin its reading with Jay’s conclusion which is a masterfully subtle denigration of his own work on... (shrink)