The aim of this paper is to defend a naturalistic approach to instantiation and the Principle of Instantiation. I argue that the instantiation of an ordinary property F consists of two coordinated relationships at the levels of the manifest and scientific images, namely, constituency and entailment. Also, I offer an account of the Principle of Instantiation related to this conception of instantiation based on the notion of scientific prediction.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Vice and Naturalistic OntologyChristopher R. Williams (bio)Keywordscausality, criminality, determinism, medical model, positivismThese questions have been posed: Is vice (encompassing criminal and other wrongful conduct) best regarded as “sick” behavior, “immoral” behavior, or some other type altogether? Are we to understand vice in natural-medical terms, or are we better served by utilizing a moral framework? Is criminality reducible to and best categorized as a metaphysical type the essential features (...) of which are neurological or otherwise biological in nature? Or, perhaps, is criminality closer to a (non-natural) sociological type, the essential features of which can be understood only through reference to social norms and cultural conventions? These are torturously involved philosophical and theoretical questions that have given rise to an equally torturous volume of literature. Without pretending to do justice to these questions or their corresponding literature, several key considerations that must be inserted into and accounted for within the discursive pursuit of these inquiries are worth noting.Where a naturalistic ontology is employed within the study of vice, we reduce the intricacies of deviant behavioral phenomena to what we presume to be their underlying medical/biological properties. It is worth remembering that behavior itself cannot rightfully be said to be “sick”; rather, what we mean to say is that the behavior in question—in our case, various forms of “vice”—is symptomatic of some underlying illness or medical/biological condition. The presumed underlying sickness and the behavior itself are distinct, ontologically linked only through their theorized relationship to one another. This, then, is a key assumption of the medical approach to vice and its ontological classification as a natural-medical kind: that there exists a relationship between the behavior (a symptom) and the underlying illness or medical condition, and that the relationship is of the causal kind. Vice, it is suggested, is a change in state that is caused by (or, at the very least, is a direct consequence of) sickness or illness. Second, to legitimate such attributions, the illness supplying the requisite causal force must be identifiable and its causal connection to the behavior must be or be capable of being sufficiently explicated. In other words, once we have identified the relevant medical/biological properties and the behavior to which they stand in causal relatedness, we must be prepared to characterize this dynamic—we must be able to show exactly how and why such and such a condition gives rise to such and such a behavior.Problematically, causation itself is and has always been a contentious metaphysical specimen. Hume (1955) reminded us of the troubling reality [End Page 39] that we cannot ever “see” one thing cause or necessitate another. We are left, rather, to merely presume the existence of causal relationships between things. How is it, exactly, that disorder in neurodevelopment can necessitate certain behavioral outcomes? Even if we can “see” (in the empirical sense) the disorder and equally “see” the behavior, we cannot of course witness the precise causal action of the former upon the latter. Even if we are content inferring causal action in such cases, we still need to demonstrate the basic conditions of causality. To show that Condition X is causally related Behavior Y, we need to show that they are regularly associated with one another, that Condition X temporally preceded Behavior Y and, most challengingly, that no other conditions or factors have an intervening (e.g., additive, synergistic) influence. Hypothetically, if we were to posit a causal relationship between schizotypal personality traits and violent behavior, we would need to establish: (1) that schizotypal traits and violent behavior regularly coexist; (2) that those traits presented before the manifestation of the violent behavior; and (3) that no other factors (biological, psychological, and/or sociological) contributed in any meaningful way to those manifestations. We would thus need to systematically rule out family dynamics, income, education, intelligence, substance use, and so forth, as contributing factors. If, in turn, we were to determine that the presence of schizotypal traits alone is not sufficient—even if a necessary condition—to produce violent behavior but, rather, that those traits act in concert with other variables to produce the behavior, then we would not truly be... (shrink)

The present paper analyses the correctness of an argument aiming to show that Aristotelian ontology justifies a better interpretation of the world than naturalistic ontology. The problems connected with this argument can be reduced to three: (1) the assumption of a scientific appoach to the world does not imply the exclusion of subjectivity or intentionality; (2) the assumption of an ontology of substances does not imlpy the exclusion of ontological models deriving from the scientific approach to (...) the world; (3) the assumption of an ontology of substances is linked to the problem of the relation between the objective and the subjective world, involving the negation of causal closure of the objective world. An analysis of these problems will be presented below, together with a hypothesis of solution to the problem of illusoriness of the subjective dimension, in order to justify the confutation of an extreme naturalistic conception such as eliminativism. (shrink)

In Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor critiques the projectionist account of values and its underlying naturalistic ontology. Likewise, in Being and Time, Martin Heidegger demonstrates that the strata theoretical explanation of practical things invested with values does not adequately describe our experience of them. I aim to demonstrate that if we read these criticisms together, we find ourselves in a better position to reveal the reality of a practical and ethical life. Taylor himself raises the question of (...) what we are committed ontologically in our ethical commitments, but does not develop an answer. Heidegger’s ontological notion of the world in Being and Time could provide a partial answer. (shrink)

Mainstream cognitive science shows a strong tendency to explain the mind by postulating a level of analysis separate from the biological and the sociological, and by assuming that the idea of computation is essential. John Searle has challenged these assumptions and suggested a solution to the mind-body problem . I endorse his view that mental phenomena, consciousness and cognition, are genuine biological phenomena, but argue that Searle ignores some important entailments relative to essential features of the living phenomenon. First, these (...) entailments are in conflict with the objectivistic tradition on which Searle's work rests. This reveals a more serious problem underlying basic assumptions of cognitive science and the philosophy of mind: the inadequacy of ontological objectivism. Secondly, they point to the fact that biological naturalism ignores the very interactive and co-defining nature of biological systems that take place beyond the level of the individual. As a consequence it is incomplete in its foundations and limited in its ability to account for sociocultural processes as inseparable constituents of the mind. To overcome these difficulties a view is outlined that gives a coherent account of the mind and cognition without endorsing objectivism. This view emphasizes the non-separation between the mind and the medium in which it evolves, their biological co-definition, and also the supra-individual nature of the biology of mental phenomena. (shrink)

What is the so-called “question of ontology?” Is the question of ontology genuinely a question about “categories” (Lowe 2006), “structure” (Sider 2011), “existence” (Thomasson 2015), or rather “reality” (Fine 2009)? In this article, I defend the neo-Sellarsian approach to the question of ontology, a novel, naturalistic approach according to which the foundational question of ontology is about “understanding the manifest and the scientific images of the world, and their multiple relationships.” First, I argue for the (...) thesis of Impure Eliminativism, a form of constructive pluralism about the question of ontology by which the substantivity of questions of ontology which are not the neo-Sellarsian one is to be built upon certain relations with the neo-Sellarsian question of ontology. Second, I argue for the categorial plasticity of the two images and their relations in connection with the hypothesis of Weak Epistemic Factualism. Third, and lastly, I argue for a person-based ontology framed in terms of the crucial notions of “fact” and “understanding” in response to the eliminativist categorizations of the two images and their relationships proposed by substantialism and structuralism. (shrink)

Ontological Naturalism holds that our fundamental ontology contains only those generally natural objects, properties, and relations required by our best scientific theory. Logical principles are thought of as being normative of correct inference and as involving necessary truths and relations. Necessary relations are stronger than the relations described by science; norms are traditionally thought to be separate from the descriptive project of science. Yet, ontological theories, including ontological naturalism, employ logic freely without offering an account of logical normativity and (...) necessity. It appears that logical properties and relations are prima facie non-natural. If so, then ontological naturalism paradoxically presupposes the presence of non-natural properties and relations as a part of the ultimate fundamental ontology. I explore this tension between logic and ontology as a means to clarifying the standards of acceptability for ontological theories generally and as a means to clarifying the character of logical discourse. I conclude that all proposed ontological theories must provide a substantive account of logic which respects its intrinsic modal and normative character as a minimal test of meta-ontological acceptability. (shrink)

Most physicalists believe that physicalism is a thesis that denies the existence of fundamental mentality either as a substance or as a property. Therefore, since most physicalists also endorse a posteriori physicalism, according to them, if the future physical theory posits fundamental mentality as a fundamental physical concept, then physicalism will be falsified. In contrast, there are those who believe that the core idea of physicalism is an ontological deference to science (especially physics); the idea that is usually called scientism (...) and is closely related to methodological naturalism. According to them, if physicists posit fundamental mentality as an integral part of the future fundamental physical theory, physicalism will not be falsified, and physicalists may (or should) accept fundamental mentality as a genuine physical concept. In this paper, I argue that there is some historical evidence in support of the latter understanding of physicalism. First, I give some historical evidence that seems to suggest that the historical origin of physicalism is the failure of those explanations – or pseudo-explanations – that have appealed to supernatural non-physical entities. Second, I show that in some of the initial reflections on materialism – the predecessor of physicalism – in the first half of the twentieth century, philosophers understood materialism in terms of the very historical origin. (shrink)

Huw Price has argued that naturalistic philosophy inevitably leads to a deflationary approach to ontological questions. In this paper, I rebut these arguments. A more substantive, less language-focused approach to metaphysics remains open to naturalists. However, rebutting one of Price’s main arguments requires rejecting Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. So, even though Price’s argument is unsound, it reveals that naturalists cannot rest content with broadly Quinean, “mainstream metaphysics,” which, I suggest, naturalists also have independent reasons to reject.

Naturalism in philosophy is sometimes thought to imply both scientific realism and a brand of mathematical realism that has methodological consequences for the practice of mathematics. I suggest that naturalism does not yield such a brand of mathematical realism, that naturalism views ontology as irrelevant to mathematical methodology, and that approaching methodological questions from this naturalistic perspective illuminates issues and considerations previously overshadowed by (irrelevant) ontological concerns.

Contemporary naturalism, especially through ethology, neuroscience and cognitive science, challenges the traditional ontological points of reference for determining the specificity of human beings. After illustrating the full measure of this upheaval, I will show the inadequacy of a return to traditional essentialism and will then defend the relevance of a different type of essentialism: an approach to human specificity in terms of a homeostatic property cluster.

Contemporary naturalism, especially through ethology, neuroscience and cognitive science, challenges the traditional ontological points of reference for determining the specificity of human beings. After illustrating the full measure of this upheaval, I will show the inadequacy of a return to traditional essentialism and will then defend the relevance of a different type of essentialism: an approach to human specificity in terms of a homeostatic property cluster.

Ontological naturalism is the view that our best construal of what there is, is what science says there is. This paper argues that while such a doctrine is very appealing, unfortunately, determining what there is, is neither as simple, nor as straightforward, as ontological naturalism would have it seem. Determining what there is, it is claimed, involves three steps. First, one must decide which part of scientific discourse should be taken as true. One must then regiment that part of scientific (...) discourse, and finally, one has to apply a criterion for ontological commitment to that regimented discourse. This paper will concentrate on the first and third of these tasks. It is argued that resolving the tasks these steps put before us requires the employment of philosophical maneuvers, that is, maneuvers that neither originate within, nor are ratified by, the practice of science. But these are maneuvers that the ontological naturalist is not entitled to. Thus, ontological naturalism is not a feasible doctrine. (shrink)

Twenty-first century critics frequently misread Quinean ontological commitment as a toothless doctrine of anti-metaphysical pragmatism. Janssen-Lauret's historical investigations reveal that they misinterpret the influence of Quine's naturalism. His naturalistic view of philosophy as continuous with science informs a much more interesting conception of ontological commitments as generated by indispensable explanatory roles. But Janssen-Lauret uncovers a previously undetected weakness in Quine's meta-ontology. Careful examination of his debate with another naturalistic nominalist, Ruth Barcan Marcus, reveals that his holism leaves (...) him blind to her acquaintance-based ontological commitment via proper names. Janssen-Lauret examines some crucial misunderstandings between Barcan Marcus and Quine, centring on their wildly different interpretations of proper names, quantification and identity, and argues that these are motivated by their diametrically opposed positions on epistemology. (shrink)

Philosophical naturalism, according to which philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences, has dominated the Western academy for well over a century, but Michael Rea claims that it is without rational foundation. Rea argues compellingly to the surprising conclusion that naturalists are committed to rejecting realism about material objects, materialism, and perhaps realism about other minds.

In World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism, I argued that there is an important sense in which naturalism’s current status as methodological orthodoxy is without rational foundation, and I argued that naturalists must give up two views that many of them are inclined to hold dear—realism about material objects and materialism. In a review recently published in Faith and Philosophy, Dale Jacquette alleges that my arguments in World Without Design are directed mainly against strawmen and that I have (...) neglected to discuss at least one formulation of naturalism that straightforwardly addresses my main objections. In this reply, I show that these and other objections raised by Jacquette are unsound and, in fact, rest on egregious misrepresentations of the book. (shrink)

Many philosophers use “physicalism” and “naturalism” interchangeably. In this paper, I will distinguish ontological naturalism from physicalism. While broad versions of physicalism are compatible with naturalism, naturalism doesn't have to be committed to strong versions of physical reductionism, so it cannot be defined as equivalent to it. Instead of relying on the notion of ideal physics, naturalism can refer to the notion of ideal natural science that doesn't imply unity of science. The notion of ideal natural science, as well as (...) the notion of ideal physics, will be vindicated. I will shortly explicate the notion of ideal natural science, and define ontological naturalism based on it. (shrink)

Naturalism, as I understand it, includes cosmological naturalism, ontological naturalism and methodological naturalism. After clarifying these three theses I argue that the combination of ontological with methodological naturalism is untenable. I do so by providing a pro tanto case against ontological naturalism and show that it can be resisted, but only by abandoning methodological naturalism. The pro tanto case is that ontological naturalism requires a version of what I call Redundancy Nominalism, but methodological naturalists should either reject it or at (...) very least treat it, and hence ontological naturalism, as a speculation. (shrink)

Most physicalists believe that physicalism is a thesis that denies the existence of fundamental mentality either as a substance or as a property. Therefore, since most physicalists also endorse a posteriori physicalism, according to them, if the future physical theory posits fundamental mentality as a fundamental physical concept, then physicalism will be falsified. In contrast, there are those who believe that the core idea of physicalism is an ontological deference to science (especially physics); the idea that is usually called scientism (...) and is closely related to methodological naturalism. According to them, if physicists posit fundamental mentality as an integral part of the future fundamental physical theory, physicalism will not be falsified, and physicalists may (or should) accept fundamental mentality as a genuine physical concept. In this paper, I argue that there is some historical evidence in support of the latter understanding of physicalism. First, I give some historical evidence that seems to suggest that the historical origin of physicalism is the failure of those explanations – or pseudo-explanations – that have appealed to supernatural non-physical entities. Second, I show that in some of the initial reflections on materialism – the predecessor of physicalism – in the first half of the twentieth century, philosophers understood materialism in terms of the very historical origin. (shrink)

J. Šmajs’ concept of evolutionary ontology has attracted much attention in recent years especially in Czech and Slovak academic circles, yet it remains, as some of its proponents claim, undervalued in Britain and the US. Even in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, there are, in addition to its strong supporters, several authors who almost a priori reject the concept, pointing to several questionable, contradictory or even mutually exclusive or self-refuting arguments. In this paper, mainly based on a comprehensive analysis (...) of the first part of Šmajs’ book, Evoluční ontologie kultury a problém podnikání (2012) [Evolutionary Ontology of Culture and The Issues Of Business], we attempt to demonstrate that the opponents of Šmajs’ concept are closer to the truth, since the concept, we believe, is just another variation on the extreme escalation of philosophical naturalism. (shrink)

Philosophical naturalism, according to which philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences, has dominated the Western academy for well over a century; but Michael Rea claims that it is without rational foundation, and that the costs of embracing it are surprisingly high. Rea argues compellingly to the surprising conclusion that naturalists are committed to rejecting realism about material objects, materialism, and perhaps realism about other minds. That is surely a price that naturalists are unwilling to pay: this philosophical orthodoxy should (...) be rejected. (shrink)

Philosophical naturalism, according to which philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences, has dominated the Western academy for well over a century; but Michael Rea claims that it is without rational foundation, and that the costs of embracing it are surprisingly high. The first part of World Without Design aims to provide a fair and historically informed characterization of naturalism. Rea then argues compellingly to the surprising conclusion that naturalists are committed to rejecting realism about material objects, materialism, and perhaps (...) realism about other minds. This conclusion is striking, largely because naturalism is often simply identified with materialism, and the remaining two theses are ones that naturalists very typically want to endorse. Rea goes on to examine two alternative research programs: intuitionism and supernaturalism, and argues for the conclusion that intuitionism, under certain circumstances, is self-defeating.World Without Design offers a provocative challenge to philosophical orthodoxy. It will make uncomfortable reading for many philosophers. (shrink)

I argue that a certain kind of naturalist approach to social ontology is likely to be both philosophically fruitful and relevant to empirical social science. The kind of naturalism I employ might be called contextualism, which emphasizes the constant presence of assumed background knowledge, is suspicious of general inference rules and all or nothing claims about the ontology of the social sciences, and argues that Quine’s quantificational criterion for ontological commitment has to be supplemented with local interpretations and (...) arguments about what specific social science research is committed to. I look at three case studies employing this perspective, one on agent based models and individualism, a second on the reality of social class, and a third on the reality of race. In all three cases work is first needed to clarifying what empirical social science is claiming, what ontology or ontologies it seems to presuppose, and then description of the kinds of evidence that supports its commitments. (shrink)

ExcerptAs Jürgen Habermas has recently pointed out, scientific naturalism represents one of the “two countervailing trends that mark the intellectual tenor of our age,” the other being religious worldviews.1 In a broader intellectual landscape dominated by research programs in neuro- and cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, behavioral genetics and so on, contemporary naturalism symbolizes not only the meta-philosophical framework of these leading intellectual enterprises, but more fundamentally a sort of zeitgeist for our epoch. This is true not only at an epistemological (...) level, characterized today by the efforts of an entire generation of philosophers to “naturalize” knowledge, the mind, consciousness, and…. (shrink)

This paper argues that Davidson’s position in the philosophy of mind undergoes a change from his early writings to his later ones. Whereas the early Davidson emphasizes how anomalous monism expresses a token-identity form of physicalism, his later writings instead suggest that anomalous monism articulates an “a-ontological” position. I aim to show both how the later a-ontological position results from Davidson’s particular form of naturalism, which in his philosophy of mind gets expressed in the way he configures the mental/physical distinction (...) as a conceptual as opposed to an ontological distinction, as well as how it provides him with new avenues of response to two influential criticisms anomalous monism has faced. I finish by explaining the Kantian significance that mental vocabulary has for Davidson in this a-ontological landscape. (shrink)

Much of the ontology made in the analytic tradition of philosophy nowadays is founded on some of Quine’s proposals. His naturalism and the binding between existence and quantification are respectively two of his very influential metaphilosophical and methodological theses. Nevertheless, many of his specific claims are quite controversial and contemporaneously have few followers. Some of them are: (a) his rejection of higher-order logic; (b) his resistance in accepting the intensionality of ontological commitments; (c) his rejection of first-order modal logic; (...) and (d) his rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. I intend to argue that these controversial negative claims are just interconnected consequences of those much more accepted and apparently less harmful metaphilosophical and methodological theses, and that the glue linking all these consequences to its causes is the notion of extensionality. (shrink)

Quinean Ontological Naturalism addresses the question “What is there?” Advocates of the view maintain that we can answer this question by applying Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment to our best scientific theories. In this paper, I discuss two major objections that are commonly offered to this view, what I call the “Paraphrase Objection” and “First Philosophy Objection”. I argue that these objections arise from a common uncharitable characterization of the Quinean Ontological Naturalist’s project that fails to distinguish two distinct roles (...) for Quine’s Criterion, a descriptive role and a normative role. The objections target the descriptive role, but only the normative role is important to Quinean Ontological Naturalism. (shrink)

The essays address a wide range of topics, including normativity and naturalized epistemology, holism, consciousness, the philosophy of logic, perception, value ...

Social ontological inquiry has been pursued in analytic philosophy as well as in the social scientific tradition of critical realism. These traditions have remained largely separate despite partly overlapping concerns and similar underlying strategies of argumentation. They have also both been the subject of similar criticisms based on naturalistic approaches to the philosophy of science, which have addressed their apparent reliance on a transcendental mode of reasoning, their seeming distance from social scientific practice, and their (erroneous?) tendency to advocate (...) global solutions to local and pragmatic problems. Two approaches aiming to naturalize these two traditions of social ontology have been proposed in recent years: one drawing on a Gierean, model-based approach to scientific practice, the other drawing on inference to the best explanation. In our paper, we compare and contrast these naturalistic approaches to social ontology in terms of their capacity to respond to the aforementioned challenges. We also defend a form of methodological pluralism, according to which there are multiple different naturalistically acceptable approaches to social ontology, which emphasize contrasting procedural continuities between social scientific research and philosophical practice. (shrink)

In the paper, I propose a project of social coordination as naturalistic social ontology (CNSO) based on the rules-in-equilibria theory of social institutions (Guala and Hindriks 2015; Hindriks and Guala 2015). It takes coordination as the main ontological unit of the social, a mechanism homological across animals and humans, for both can handle coordination problems: in the forms of “animal conventions” and social institutions, respectively. On this account, institutions are correlated equilibria with normative force. However, if both humans (...) and animals solve coordination problems in a similar way, and only humans have social institutions, how do the latter evolve? I suggest identifying possible causes of this evolution among cognitive capacities like mindreading and imitation by building dynamic models. Social ontology becomes constrained by the evolution of the forms of coordination and by the cognitive mechanisms involved in the emergence and persistence of social institutions. It means that it becomes bound to what might be derived from social institutions, i.e., social roles, structures and their derivatives. It shows how conceptual relations might emerge from causal. I conclude the paper with the discussion of the relationship between involved types of explanation, mechanistic and equilibrium ones. (shrink)

da Costa’s conception of being modifies that of Quine to incorporate relativization to non-classical logics. A naturalistic view of this conception is discussed. This view tries to extend to logic some ideas of Maddy’s naturalism concerning mathematics.