Abstract: When things go badly, we notice that something is amiss, figure out what went wrong and why, and attempt to repair the problem. Artificial systems depend on their human designers to program in responses to every eventuality and therefore typically don’t even notice when things go wrong, following their programming over the proverbial, and in some cases literal, cliff. This article describes our work on the Meta-Cognitive Loop, a domain-general approach to giving artificial systems the ability to notice, assess, (...) and repair problems. The goal is to make artificial systems more robust. (shrink)

Sāyaṇa-Mādhava closed his exposition of the Cārvāka philosophy in his Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, Chap. 1 by quoting 11 and a half verses, the authorship of all of which was attributed to Bṛhaspati, the eponymous founder of materialism in India. One of these verses is presumably taken from the Viṣṇupurāṇa. However, it is not Bṛhaspati but some demons, deluded by a Jain and a Buddhist monk, who say this. Bṛhaspati does not appear at all in this Purāṇa. Variant versions of the same story (...) are found in other Purāṇas but Bṛhaspti is not invariably present in all of them. The origin of the story may be traced back to the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad. Although Bṛhaspati plays a leading part in that story, the background is quite different. By comparing all the versions found in the Purāṇas and the subject matter of the epigrams attributed to Bṛhaspati the paper proposes to show that the Viṣṇupurāṇa story has nothing to do with the materialists, whether the Pre-Cārvākas or the Cārvākas; the Jains and the Buddhists are the target of attack. Sāyaṇa-mādhava, by placing these satirical epigrams either in their original or in altered forms, and attributing them to Bṛhaspati, has mixed up the views of all sorts of nāstikas, particularly the Jains and the Buddhists, with the Cārvākas and thereby succeeded in deceiving several generations of readers and misleading even the best of scholars. (shrink)

This paper asks the following question: can an atheist reader fully taste the aesthetic meaning of poetry written by a theist author? This question is discussed with specific reference to the devotional poetry of Tagore. The paper discusses forms of pre-modern religious thinking which influenced Tagore’s conceptions of God, his relation to Nature, human society, and the human self. But it stresses that Tagore’s time was different from those of pre-modern believers. Tagore, as a modern thinker, had to fashion a (...) response to the ‘problem’ of disenchantment. He constructed a philosophic vision that embraced modern science, but argued that it did not dispel the sense of living in an enchanted universe. Consequently, it is argued that a nastika can enjoy his poetry. This requires the nastika to view the idea of God not as a failure of cognition, but as a triumph of the imagination. I can continue to enjoy Tagore’s poetry without unease. (shrink)

Study on the works of Ācārya Vidyāsāgara, contemporary Jaina saint and his contributions to Jaina religion and philosophy.

Darshana, in the sense of true philosophical knowledge, Darshana is first quoted in the Vaiśesika Sūtra (first century CE) to mean the perfect vision of everything. Etymologically, Darshana evolves from the Sanskr̥ti term Drś, that is, vision. The contemporary use of the term Darshana finds its new dimension in the writings of Haribhardra (eighteenth century CE), who considers different philosophical schools in the cord of Darshana in his text Ṣad-darśana-samuccaya. Later, eminent Vedāntin Mādhava in fourteenth century CE popularized and expatiated (...) the meaning of Darshana in Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha. The purport of the term Darshana is embedded in the notion of Indianness that caters to an influential uniqueness in Hinduism, Jainism (Samyak Darshana or liberation consists in right vision) and Mahayana Buddhism (Nagarjuna’s dictum tattva-darśana, i.e., the true reality, and Vasubandhu’s use of Darshana marga, i.e., the conduit of seeing). -/- The conception of the word guru in Indian cultures goes back to the Upanishadic era, especially in the Mundakopanishad, where Brahma (the creator of the world) taught the Brahma Vidya (the foundation of all knowledge or the speculative discussion about ultimate reality) to his eldest son, Atharvan. Later, Artharvan transmitted the Brahma Vidya to Angiras, who shared the absolute knowledge with Satyavaha, a successor of Sage Bharadwaja. Satyavaha narrated to Bharadwaja, who finally imparted the knowledge (both the higher and lower levels) to Angiras. One could find a significance herein using the Upanishadic term paraparam (Mundakopanishad, 1.2). The term not only indicates that the foundation of all knowledge has two different folds – para (transcendent) and apar (mundane) – but also that the term paraparam tinges on the transmission progression of the knowledge from guru (enlightened master) to his shisya (dedicated disciple). The proper way of learning Brahma Vidya depends on the gurupasadana; the only guru can condescend to expose wisdom to the devoted disciples. (shrink)

On Ambedkar's philosophy and views, and Indian philosophy on dalits; includes quotation extracted from Buddhist scriptures and literature.

Contributions of Vaiśeṣika philosophy to Ayurvedic medicine; a study.

On the life of Ravidāsa, 15th century Awadhi, Hindi, and Panjabi religious poet and impact of Buddhist philosophy on his thoughts.

Festschrift in honor of S.P. Dubey, Indian philosopher; contributed articles.

The main purpose of this volume is the admirable one of preparing a series of volumes on the global history of philosophy. While the effort falls far short of what we might have hoped for, it must be judged as a good beginning in this area. The volume begins with a listing of introductory works dealing with the philosophies of major cultures: India, China, Japan, Islam, Russia and Latin America. The difficulties of launching into a study of world philosophy become (...) apparent at this point; the bibliographical categories are a mixture of geographical areas and religio-cultural traditions which overlap land-boundaries. The authors now depart from the geographical-cultural schema by organizing the material along a mixture of historical and topical structures--all taken from the western context. The list of historical segments include: Classical Period, Pan-Hellenistic-Bactrian Period, Early "Medieval" Period, The Great Summas, Late "Medieval" Period, "Renaissance" Period, Transition to the Modern Period, and Modern Period. The book concludes with a section dedicated to works concerning the Scientific Revolution and the Philosophy of International Law. In a pocket on the back cover the reader will find two large fold-outs which present "A Synchronological Chart to the Global History of Philosophy."--J. B. L. (shrink)

The Book Presents The Darsana Mala Comprising Hundred Sanskrit Verses Of Mystic-Poet Narayana Guru, Along With Its Transliteration In Roman Script And Its English Translation, Word Meanings, And Extensive Commentaries. Nataraja Guru Spells Out His Mentor S Visions Of The Absolute In Contemporary Idiom And Shows That They Are Validated By Modern Science.

Philosophers affiliated with the Nyāya school of classical Indian philosophy developed an impressive species of realism. Nyāya philosophers defended direct realism in holding that we perceive bodies, not just their qualities or mental images of their qualities. This sort of realism has been out of favor for centuries in the West and faces a number of problems that the Nyāya knew and answered in a sophisticated way. Rather than focus on the Nyāya defense of direct realism, we focus on the (...) Nyāya defense of epistemological realism in order to explicate what Nyāya philosophers took to be implications of their view that we know something about the way things are in themselves. Specifically, we argue that the epistemological realism of the Nyāya philosophers commits them to a strong form of essentialism, which furthermore entails that substances exist and instantiate natural-kind universals. (shrink)

The article elaborates the notion of darśana from the point of view of some prominent contemporary Indian academic philosophers. After dealing with the two major misconceptions on the concept of darśana, it proposes an alternative approach towards darśana.

Jaina Philosophy and Religion.. Translated by Nagin J. Shah. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1998. xxv, 469 pp. Rs. 450.

The author of this paper discusses the source experience defined in terms of the ancient Indian philosophy. She focuses on two out of six mainstream Hindu philosophical schools, Sāṃkhya and Yoga. While doing so the author refers to the oldest preserved texts of this classical tradition, namely Yogasūtra c. 3rd CE and Sāṃkhyakārikā 5th CE, together with their most authoritative commentaries. First, three major connotations of darśana, the Sanskrit equivalent of φιλοσοφια, are introduced and contextualised appropriately for the comparative study (...) of source experience. Then, three means of knowledge (pramāṇa-s) as well as the purpose of search for source experience are explained. Next, a specific understanding of source experience in the context of Sāṃkhya-Yoga is discussed to reveal both its contents and the reasons for apophatic formulation of the liberating insight. The self-knowledge and true knowledge both result from source experience based on distinguished discernment (vivekakhyāti) between “I”/ego and the self, gained during the multistage meditative absorption (samādhi). The analysis of discriminative cognition is followed by reconstruction of the arguments offered by the author of Sāṃkhyakārikā in favour of the existence of the self (puruṣa), immutable, inactive, and opposed to the domain of nature (prakṛti) characterised as spontaneously active and creative, which includes empirical consciousness, or “I”. The last section is devoted to the issue of the possible communication of achieved knowledge and its application in the everyday life practice. In conclusion, it is claimed that in Indian philosophy there has been no clear distinction between the practical value of subjective cognitive insight and theoretical ambitions of philosophy, which is why many authors of classical treatises are also recognised as eminent sapiential mentors. Often, especially in the texts of Yoga, Nyāyā and Buddhism philosophy is associated with therapy and philosophical exposition of the “cognitive ailments” is compared to medical treatment. -/- . (shrink)

The Book Recounts 100 Darsanas Delving Into The Meaning Of The Atmopadesa Satakam One Hundred Verses Of Self-Instruction Of Narayana Guru To Present Insights Into The Essence Of Guru-Disciple Transmission. It Combines The Mystical Element With Scientific Rigour To Attempt A Total Transformation Of Consciousness In The Reader.

Partiendo de la distinción entre śivaísmo pre-tántrico y śivaísmo tántrico proponemos una introducción al śivaísmo no dualista de Cachemira, especialmente de las escuelas que componen el sistema Trika y de una de sus principales figuras, tanto místicas como intelectuales: Abhinavagupta (ss. X-XI d.n.e.). Conocida como el «darśana de la reconciliación», la filosofía tántrica de Cachemira se caracteriza por conjugar liberación (mokṣa) y placer (bhoga) en una actitud vital y filosófica diferente y, en ocasiones, incluso opuesta al resto de darśanas propias (...) del conservadurismo brahmánico. Finalmente, describiremos las tres vías de liberación principales y la no-vía siguiendo el célebre tratado de Abhinavagupta, el Tantrāloka. (shrink)

In Categorisation in Indian Philosophy: Thinking Inside the Box, Jessica Frazier has brought together an impressive array of scholars who have contributed nine essays, plus an introductory and concluding chapter, both written by her, which collectively provide a most fruitful perspective for examining classical South Asian traditions of thought. Creating categorial frameworks was certainly a prolific activity among the ancient and medieval authors of the darśanas, and indeed these authors drew heavily from pre-scholastic texts and language to build their systems. (...) Frazier in her concluding chapter gives a helpful synopsis of the various roles played by categories in Indian philosophies, classifying them as.. (shrink)

The rivalry among the philosophical schools in India was not purely intellectual, but had far-reaching social implications. The rivalry between vedic and non-vedic schools had a socio-political dimension. This paper claims that commentaries of the source texts of schools on both sides played an important role in development of inter-darśana politics. This paper deals with some of the interpretative moves made by Vācaspatimiśra in his two famous commentaries: Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī, the commentary on Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, the commentary on Nyāyavārtika (...) of Udyotakara. The paper argues that some of Vācaspatimiśra’s interpretative moves in these commentaries can be called “political moves.” The paper shows how these interpretative moves deviate from the natural or unforced meanings of the texts. It argues that these deviations aim at strengthening the orthodox front of Indian philosophy. (shrink)

In a doxography of views called the Ṣaṭtantrīsāra, a seventeenth century commentator and Advaitin, Nīlakaṇṭha Caturdhara, describes the doctrines of a group he calls the Miśras. Nīlakaṇṭha represents the doctrines of the Miśras as in most ways distinct from those of the canonical positions that usually appear in such doxographies, both āstika and nāstika. And indeed, some of the doctrines he describes resemble those of the Abrahamic faiths, concerning the creator, a permanent afterlife in heaven or hell, and the unique (...) births of souls. Other doctriness are difficult to associate with any known South Asian religion, for example the emphasis placed on astrological determinism in the moral economy of the creation. As the Ṣaṭtantrīsāra is unpublished to date, a preliminary edition of those portions that concern the Miśras is presented here, together with a translation, notes, and some further discussion. Though the identification is not certain, it seems most likely that the views Nīlakaṇṭha describes in this text belonged to Vanamālī Miśra, a North Indian Mādhva who had lived in the Ganges-Yamuna doab in the mid to late seventeenth century. Even if that identification turns out to be correct, many questions remain. (shrink)

The present work is the English translation of Muni Nyayavijayaji`s (A.D. 1890-1970) original Gujarati work `Jaina Darsana` which has run into twelve editions. No one has ever explained the Jaina concepts of nine `reals`, six substances, causation, spiritual attitude, spiritualness, non-violence, austerity, God, Karma, non-absolutism, relativity of commandments, etc. as interestingly and lucidly as Nyayavijayaji has done. The work reveals his stupendous scholarship, his positive approach, his non-sectarian outlook, his wisdom and competence in attempting synthesis of conflicting views, his mastery (...) of India philosophical and religious thought, his insight into the heart of religion, freshness of his interpretation of old texts, his sensitivity to all aspects of a problem, and his spiritual craving. It attempts to arouse sympathetic responses to the ethical and spiritual aspirations of man. It deals with all the main topics of Jaina metaphysics, ethics, epistemology and logic. It covers a wide variety of problems. It is a fascinating and splendid work of constructive scholarship, and an authentic source of information about Jaina philosophy and religion that will serve as a good reference book for many years to come. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to clarify the meaning of the term saṁketa, which is usually translated as ‘ convention’, in the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, the first and the most authoritative commentary to the Yogasūtras. This paper is a contribution to the reconstruction of the classical Yoga view on the relation between word and its meaning, for saṁketa is a key term used by this darśana in discussing this relation. The textual analysis of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya has led me to the conclusion (...) that its author’s understanding of the linguistic convention is different from the notion of the linguistic convention of the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas and similar to the notion of the linguistic convention of the Grammarians. These are interpretations of the term saṁketa which reflect Yogasūtrabhāṣya’s understanding of the linguistic convention: the tradition of the usage of words, established usage of words. Saṁketa of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, unlike saṁketa/samaya of the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas, is not an agreement established by anyone, but an agreement in the sense of tradition, established practice, or established custom. Unlike the saṁketa/samaya of these philosophers, the saṁketa of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya, having neither beginning nor end, is not re-created, but only made known at the beginning of each cycle of existence of the world. (shrink)

A cognitive science perspective of yoga system of thought will be developed in conjugation with the Samkhya Darsana. This development will be further advanced using Advaita Vedanta and will be translated into modern scientific terms to arrive at an idea about cognition process. The stalling of the cognitive process and stilling the mind will be critically discussed in the light of this perspective. This critical analysis and translation into cognitive science and modern scientific terms will be presented together with its (...) implications and applications to the disciplines of mind-machine modeling, natural language comprehension branch of artificial intelligence and physiological psychology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cit: ConsciousnessAlan PretiCit: Consciousness. By Bina Gupta. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xi + 203.In his 1988 essay "Consciousness in Vedānta,"1 J. N. Mohanty pointed out that, Heidegger notwithstanding, a metaphysics of consciousness has been the destiny of Indian thought. Indeed, from the earliest Upaniṣadic speculations to the growth of the systems, the centrality of the concept of consciousness to the development of Indian philosophy can (...) hardly be denied. It is even arguable that the nature and function of consciousness was perhaps the greatest bone of contention among the darśanas, with some of the more critical disputes turning on the details of a particular theory of consciousness. The importance of the concept lies in the almost universal agreement among classical Indian philosophers that consciousness enjoys a fundamental epistemic priority regarding the guarantee of any ontological claim; any claim with respect to the existence of such and such, to the way the world is, ultimately depends on evidence that is (or was) in some way present to consciousness. Consciousness is thus the fons et origo of all knowledge; in its absence nothing can be claimed about the world.One of the most recent additions to a growing body of literature concerned with examining the concept of consciousness in Indian thought is Bina Gupta's Cit: Consciousness, the inaugural release of Oxford's Foundations of Philosophy in India series, initiated by the Centre for Philosophy and Foundations of Science in New Delhi. The editors intend for the series "to make available a critical reassessment of the philosophical achievement of the classical Indian tradition in such a way that it contributes to the dialogue between civilizations of the new century"—a prospect most welcome by those engaged in Indian and comparative philosophy. [End Page 619]Cit: Consciousness is a natural extension of Gupta's work in The Disinterested Witness: A Fragment of Advaita Vedānta Phenomenology (1998). While concerned there primarily with the notion of the witness consciousness (sākṣin) in the Vivarana tradition of Advaita Vedānta, in Cit Gupta seeks to provide a more general account of consciousness in Indian thought. Her stated goals are "(1) to demonstrate the profound contribution of Indian thought to the theme of consciousness, and (2) to make Indian thought accessible to my readers, irrespective of whether they belong to the Indian or Western tradition" (p. 11). Consistent with the aims of the series, Gupta's approach is conceptual, rather than historical; her focus is specifically on various theories of the nature of consciousness and on the arguments advanced on their behalf. Concerns regarding the losses incurred by abstracting the theories from their historical context are balanced by the recognition that the historical development of a particular school yields one type of understanding, its conceptual structure another (p. 12). In this connection, one may note that Gupta's emphasis on the arguments and conceptual frameworks could make for greater accessibility to those unfamiliar with the territory; certainly the prominence of philological and historical concerns found in many accounts of the development of the schools can prove distracting to the reader seeking the specific philosophical issues.Cit unfolds dialectically, beginning with an analysis of consciousness distilled from the Upaniṣads, continuing through the Nyāya-Vaiśesika and Yogācāra Buddhist views, and culminating with an examination of Advaita Vedānta, both in its classical form and in its "transformations" effected by the contemporary philosophers Sri Aurobindo, K. C. Bhattacharyya, and J. N Mohanty. The order in which the views are discussed is not arbitrary; Gupta's arrangement of the themes purposefully leads to an analysis of Advaita not only because it is, to her mind, "an amazing case of a sublime metaphysical system, subtle logical discursivity, and detailed phenomenological description" (p. x), but also in order to "show that the conceptual nature of the Advaitic theory of consciousness undergoes transformations in the hands of many contemporary thinkers, which makes the Advaitic theory of consciousness stronger and more responsive to modern philosophic challenges" (p. 13). The book, thus, in effect, seeks to vindicate an Advaitic view of consciousness. The final chapter includes a comparative assessment... (shrink)

What is Yoga? How is Self-realization achieved through Yoga? The great Sage Pātañjali (3rd Century B.C.) defined yoga in the Yoga-Sūtras as “the restraint of the modifications of the mind” (yogaś-citta-vritti-nirodah). In his Yoga-Sūtras (196 sutras), Pātañjali systematically laid down the exact methods and techniques for attaining Self-realization through the Eight Limbs of Pātañjali’s Yoga (Ashtānga-yoga). This system is commonly known as Rāja-yoga (Royal yoga). This Eight Steps is the way to attain self-transcendence. It consists of yama, niyama, āsanas, prānāyāma, (...) pratyāhāra, dhāranā, dhyāna and samādhi. This article will focus on Ashtānga-yoga in the practical and philosophical contexts. Other systems of yoga also use this Eight Steps, but each yoga may start from and emphasize different aspects of yoga. However all systems of yoga accept and practice the Eight Steps of yoga to achieve the final goal, that is liberation (kaivalya, moksha, mukti). Yoga also reconciles the six systems of Indian Philosophy (Shadh Darśana). Keywords: Rāja-yoga (Royal yoga), Hatha-yoga (Hard yoga), Bhakti-yoga (Yoga of Devotion), Jñāna-yoga (Yoga of Knowledge), Ashtānga-yoga (Eight limbs of Yoga), Citta-vritti-nirodha (Restraint of modification of the mind), Purusha (Spirit), Prakriti (Matter), Iśvara-pranidhāna (Surrender to God), Moksha (Liberation). (shrink)

In His Learned Book, Development Of Nyaya Philosophy And Its Social Context Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharyya Has Traced The History Of Nyaya Philosophy With Reference To Its Social Contexts. That This System Of Philosophy, Darsana, Is Not Unnecessarily Abstract But Has Taken Congizance Of Its Theoretical Ancestry As Well As Practical Circumstances Will Be Evident To The Perceptive Reader. As A Branch Of Knowledge, Vidya, Philosophy As Darsana Was Known In India For A Long Time. In Kautilya'S Arthasastra The Recognized Branches (...) Of Knowledge Are Four: (I) The Three Vedas (Trayi), (Ii) Trade And Commerce (Varta); (Iii) Law And Order (Dandaniti) And (Iv) Anvisiki, Which According To Kautilya Means Sankhya, Yoga And Lokayata. However, Later On Anvisiki Stood For Logic And Metaphysic. In The History Of Indian Philosophy The First Use Of The Term Darsana Has Been Attributed To Haribhadrasuri, The Jaina Philosopher And Author Of The Sad Darsana Samuccaya. Nearly 400 Years After Haribhadrasuri The Term Darsana In The Current Sense Was Used By Sankaracarya In His Commentary On The Brahmasutra. In This Comprehensive Book Professor Bhattacharyya Has Dealt With The Works Of Mostof The Famous Nyaya Thinkers Like Gautama, Vatsyayana, Jayanta Bhatta, Bhasarvajna, Udayana, Vardhamana And Various Other Writers Down The Centuries. This Scholarly Book From The Pen Of Bhattacharyya Is Highly Readable And Informative. It Is Hoped That The Book Will Be Profitably Used By Researchers, Scholars And The General Reading Public. (shrink)

This paper looks at frameworks for the practice of moral and ethical values for children, drawn from Yoga and Buddhist Philosophies. Verily the purpose is to inculcate a repository of thought and behaviour through which they align moral and ethical behaviours by becoming important cogs in establishing harmony in the world that we exist. Harmony between one child and another child, harmony between children and their families, harmony between the families and larger society and harmony between society and other sentient (...) beings and life forms is what constitutes cosmic-harmony. In this sense, Confucius’ triadic cosmic-harmony and the timeless Vedic Ṛta are not merely a philosophical thought or idea envisaged in ivory towers but real-time experiencing or darsana. This is realized through disciplined individual behaviours in balancing of our purusharthas with our dharma; aligning these with a sense of universal responsibility out of care and concern for one another. This would ensure in connecting and building synergy with all that surrounds us since these practices fostering morals and ethics could also be befitting measures to counter the Anthropocene epoch’s negative geologic impact on our planet. This paper is being written from the perspective of human beings and their practice of humanism via moral and ethical behaviour. The point of departure being that humans are placed as a dominant species at the centre of our planet with unprecedented power to influence the fate of other species, the environment and the future of the quality of bio-diversity of life on earth. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sikh Philosophy as a Philosophy-of-PracticeMonika Kirloskar-Steinbach (bio)Some recent publications on Indian philosophy argue that the colonial narrative about the philosophical traditions from the subcontinent was erroneous. It wrongly suggested that the erstwhile Brahmanic thought embodied by the darśanas was an exhaustive representation of philosophical activity on the subcontinent and that this activity came to a grinding halt with the onset of European modernity. In an attempt at rectifying this (...) story, one path proposed by philosopher Vrinda Dalmiya (Dalmiya 2016, p. 125) is to cognize and fix the "epistemophilic excesses" in the field, that is, the obsessive compulsion in conventional academic philosophy to engage in theory for theory's sake. In the study of Indian philosophy, this malady manifests as the practice of channeling philosophical analysis solely through a darśanic framing. This monofocal lens, however, is unable to reflect either the diversity of practices on the ground or values like intellectual freedom that drive some such practices.Arvind-Pal Mandair's Sikh Philosophy: Exploring Gurmat Concepts in a Decolonizing World (Bloomsbury, 2022), discussed here in this forum, speaks to these concerns and offers a possible way forward. Sikh Philosophy advocates a liminal perspective from which to engage with the set of philosophical practices that emanated on the subcontinent around the figure of Guru Nanak (1469–1539) and the teachings of the Sikh gurus (gurmat). In the first part of my response, I will bring into this conversation Mandair's philosophical orientation to ask whether and how he would contribute to that debate. In the second part, I will project the haumai—one concept doing much of the work in Sikh Philosophy—as one viable path that may be able to contribute to the correction of the epistemophilia currently afflicting a judicious study of world-philosophical traditions.In my limited understanding, Mandair's rendition of the haumai may serve as one component that could be implemented fruitfully in broadening the perspective on Indian philosophy. Mandair observes that a postcolonial sensibility demands a philosophical orientation that does not continue its proprietary attitude toward philosophical positions. I share his view. Instead of parading these positions as possessions that embellish one's academic finesse, they should be considered as ways of navigating life adequately. In doing so, however, the making of such navigational routes may profit from a deliberate reflection on them from different standpoints. [End Page 348]Halting Exclusivist Historiographical Trends in PhilosophyTwo recent handbooks on Indian philosophy reflect the growing awareness that changes in the field's self-understanding are imperative, should imperialist and colonial historiographies that affect this understanding be upturned. Jonardon Ganeri's editorial introduction to the Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy—"Why Indian Philosophy? Why Now?"—argues that students of Indian philosophy should overcome the routinized fixation on the classical darśanas. In developing their accounts, they should factor in the "regionality, vernaculars, subaltern communities, [and] eccentrics" through which "scholarly networks, nodes of philosophical activity, transnational encounters, and contexts of philosophical invention" arose on the subcontinent (Ganeri 2017, p. 2). This broader approach would, in his view, not only be viable in halting the elitist and exclusivist historiography that was the default mode in the recent colonial past. In addition, it would be better equipped to grasp the richness of practices on the ground.Accordingly, his Handbook departs from the handbook genre on one core point: instead of delivering a supposedly comprehensive study of positions that would be indispensable to the reader to understand the intricacies of the field marked out as Indian philosophy, this Handbook chooses to narrate one multi-perspectival story about practices on the subcontinent that were philosophically motivated and are worthy of study today. It suggests through this move that there are other such possible stories that can be narrated. Relatedly, Purushottama Bilimoria and Amy Rayner's History of Indian Philosophy strives as well to make a case to go beyond the darśanic mold. It includes a variety of philosophical positions located on its peripheries. For example, Sikh philosophy, which notably is not included in the Ganeri volume, is incorporated here as a tradition that engaged darśanic practices. Balbinder Singh Bhogal, the author of... (shrink)

These are the Mahavira Extension Lectures 12 (2nd Series), delivered by Dr. Mookerjee, under the patronage of Sri Santi Prasad Jain, Jainism reveals an ideology entirely different from the Vedic. The study of Jainism in its earlier aspects suggests some kind of animistic philosophy of the people,and especially its literature, having been written in Prakrit, shows a definitive trend towards a sort of folk-philosophy interested in overstraining the moral aspects without any theistic bias. This folk-philosophy reveals elements developed into logical (...) doctrines remarkable for their originality, acuteness and subtlety. Dr. Mookerjee lays bare the fundamentals of the Jaina doctrine, Syadvada of Anekantavada, with all the relevant problems to the benefit of the reader. With a rich background in other darsanas both East and West the author has endeavoured to give a thorough and powerful exposition of Jaina Thought, which could be done only by an adherent of Jaina faith. (shrink)

1. Philosophy, or the nature of philosophical knowledge, is defined as darsana, which means "seeing" or "vision." Seeing is, perhaps, the best instance of what we mean by "direct experience"; in this sense, Indian philosophy is "empirical." Its empiricism is, however, an "empiricism without limits." I shall not discuss here whether "seeing," "hearing," etc., are instances of immediate experience, or of mediate knowledge. If we see with the eyes, or through them, it may be argued that seeing and hearing, etc., (...) are instances of mediate knowledge. But the motive in defining the nature of philosophical knowledge as darsana or "vision" is that Indian philosophy distrusts abstract reasoning or knowledge. Philosophy is not, according to Indian philosophy, primarily a "theory" about reality but an experience of reality: an experience verified or verifiable. The Vedänta is the "end" of knowledge in the sense that knowledge ends in experience: in direct realization. This is the meaning of the Vedäntic statement: we cannot know Brahman but we can be Brahman. The nature of ultimate reality is atarkyam, "non-logical," as the Upanisads say. This does not mean that logic should not be used as a method or that logical knowledge has no use. Logical knowledge gives knowledge of "existence" in some sense, e.g., if I say, "No statement is true," then, this statement is, at least, true: therefore it exists. Whereas philosophy as darsana is an intuition of the existent and not of existence. In a certain sense, there is no problem for Indian philosophy of the reality and proof of the external world. The Katha Upanisad says that the senses are "pierced outwards"; "therefore, they see external objects": tasmät parang pasyati. But why the expression "external world" if there is not another world in some sense? However this may be, it is an historical fact that, in its quest for the Real, Indian thought changed from the objective to the subjective method: its search for the reality of the objective universe was through its search for the inner essence of man's being. The Katha Upanisad speaks of seeing "with eyes turned within": ävratta çaksu. The conception of philosophy as darsana corresponds to Plato's definition of the Dialectic as "the eye of the soul": "not implanting eyes, for they exist already, but giving them a right direction which they have not." Philosophy as darsana is the sight of "those who have eyes to see," though not the sight of "those who see only what they want to see." Darsana as defined is "discovery": there is in it, or through it, an unveiling of Reality. Darsana is a perceptual or "intuitive" situation in which the existent is beheld "face to face"; pratyagätänamaiksat: "beheld the Atman face to face": but this relation of "face to face" cannot properly be described as an "encounter," if this means seeing another. (shrink)