El objetivo de este artículo es realizar una revisión del estado de la cuestión sobre el concepto de estado de naturaleza en el pensamiento de Thomas Hobbes. Dicha revisión permite articular una comprensión de la naturaleza humana, puesto que a diferencia del realismo político el estado de naturaleza en Hobbes no tiene un rol meramente hipotético. Precisamente, la idea de naturaleza humana articula una proto-moralidad que permite comprender la transición hacia el estado civil. Las investigaciones Kavka, Gauthier y Hampton han (...) construido una compleja compresión de la naturaleza humana, la cual permite entender cierto sustrato de proto-moralidad en el pensamiento hobbesiano. (shrink)

El presente trabajo investiga las tesis sobre el poder civil de Alonso de la Veracruz que buscan incorporar en la comunidad política española a los habitantes autóctonos del Nuevo Mundo, tesis que suelen relacionarse con F. de Vitoria y el tomismo español, y que últimamente son consideradas parte del republicanismo novohispano elaborado desde la periferia americana. Se busca demostrar que su propósito era aplicar una teoría de derechos naturales, sin que ello implique participación política de los indios americanos. Se analiza (...) la postura del fraile frente a la diversidad cultural y la guerra contra los indios. The paper explores Alonso de la Veracruz's theses on civil power, which sought to integrate the native inhabitants of the New World into the Spanish political community. These theses, which have usually been associated with F. de Vitoria and Spanish Thomism, have recently come to be considered part of a Novohispanic republicanism developed in the American periphery. The article seeks to show that the purpose of such theses was to apply a theory of natural rights that did not entail the political participation of the indigenous population, as well as to analyze Veracruz's position regarding cultural diversity and the war against the indigenous peoples. (shrink)

El proceso de la civilización conlleva la domesticación de las funciones naturales, en especial de las excrementicias, y la exclusión del lenguaje que sirve para nombrarlas. Cuando la élite ilustrada está logrando estos objetivos, surge la Canción cantable de García Tejada, largo poema en torno a los excrementos. Con base en tres teóricos, nos proponemos estudiar las dos dimensiones de la risa en esta obra. Por un lado, la cara crítica, que parodia y desmitifica los discursos serios de la época (...) y su artificioso lenguaje. Por otro lado, la faz regeneradora, que recrea elementos de la cultura popular para luchar por un mundo libre e igualitario. En la conclusión, relacionamos el poema con la tradición de la sátira menipea, lo que subraya la importancia y originalidad de este olvidado poeta. (shrink)

Il presente contributo indaga la questione del fondamento della legge morale ebraica sulla scorta dell’insegnamento di Samuel David Luzzatto (1800-1865). Egli afferma che le norme etiche sono insite nell’essere umano, ma questo non basta perché vengano rispettate: la rivelazione divina sostiene quindi la morale naturale, senza insegnare nulla di diverso da quest’ultima, ma fornendo un’adeguata propedeutica e prevedendo sanzioni e premi chiari. Soltanto il monoteismo, con il suo necessario corollario cultuale, può dunque fondare una morale efficace, (...) che si manifesta essenzialmente nel praticare umanità e giustizia verso tutti gli esseri umani. This paper investigates the Jewish moral law’s foundation according with teaching of Samuel David Luzzatto (1800-1865). He affirms that ethical norms come from human being, but this is not enough for them to be respected: therefore divine revelation supports natural morality, teaching the same, but providing adequate preparation and providing penalties and rewards. Only monotheism, with its necessary worships, can therefore found an effective morality. It appears essentially in humanity and justice towards all human beings. (shrink)

L'idea di scrivere questo libro sul diritto naturale e nata dal desiderio dell'autore di approfondire il problema della fondazione della norma morale, nella convinzione che un'autentica visione giusnaturalistica apre nuove orizzonti per comprendere meglio la questione di Dio e dell'uomo nel discorso normativo che si inserisce armonicamente nella dimensione ecclesiale. Il tema ha avuto origine dall'osservazione del dialogo interdisciplinare tra toelogia morale, filosofia del diritto e scienze giuridiche. Prende in esame la relazione tra ordine morale e (...) giuridico individuando le questioni che si pongono per la teologia morale in quanto disciplina che tratta i problemi della fondazione della norma morale. La problematica verte sul temine natura normativa la quale si esplica in veste di progetto antropologico. La rinascita del pensiero giusnaturalistico in Germania e il fulcro di questa tesi. (shrink)

In this article we emphasize the relevance of the Critique of Pure Reason for modern thought and proposes an unorthodox reading of this work that, apart from the ortodox reading that centers itself primarily on the theoretical problems relative to knowledge, priviliges the rol of morality as a det..

Secondo un programma di ricerca inaugurato da Darwin e oggi sempre più popolare, gli aspetti fondamentali della nostra psicologia morale sono il prodotto della selezione naturale. Le nostre convinzioni morali, così come la nostra tendenza a comportarci in accordo con queste convinzioni, sarebbero il risultato di processi analoghi a quelli che hanno prodotto il collo delle giraffe e le ali degli uccelli: la ragione per cui siamo convinti di dover tener fede alla parola data è che questa credenza (...) è stata adattiva per i nostri antenati, che ce l'hanno trasmessa. Il libro introduce i lettori a questo affascinante ambito di ricerca, spaziando dalla teoria dei giochi evolutiva alla selezione parentale e alla selezione di gruppo, per poi passare a discutere le conseguenze di tali risultati per la questione della natura della morale, sostenendo che se la nostra psicologia morale è davvero il prodotto della selezione naturale allora dovremmo abbandonare l'idea che esistano norme morali oggettive. (shrink)

This article puts into question the desire to prove the free existence of the will thru resources provided by neurobiology. To achieve this the author asks himself how morality is possible considering this view. The argumentation first resorts to kantian theory to make a distinction between the l..

Per il successo della filosofia di Kant non meno importanti delle opere pubblicate furono le trascrizioni delle lezioni, che circolarono in tutta la Germania in innumerevoli copie. Esse costituiscono da circa trent'anni un oggetto centrale della Kantforschung. Di queste lezioni, una parte significativa è rappresentata dai corsi che Kant tenne regolarmente sul diritto naturale, dei quali ci è rimasta oggi una sola trascrizione manoscritta, relativa a quello tenuto nel semestre estivo del 1784. Si tratta però di un testo di (...) grande importanza: Kant tenne infatti il corso mentre stava finendo di scrivere la Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi onde i due testi si illuminano a vicenda, aprendo scorci importanti per comprendere la filosofia morale kantiana in un suo snodo decisivo. Tale corrispondenza tra i due scritti non è certo casuale: Kant era infatti fermamente convinto che lo studio del diritto presupponesse una formazione filosofica e que le lezioni sul diritto naturale iniziano infatti con una presentazione della sua filosofia pratica in generale. Dal punto di vista della filosofia del diritto, un motivo centrale d'interesse di queste lezioni è che costituiscono la prima presentazione organica del pensiero giuridico di Kant, tredici anni prima della Metafisica dei costumi (1797). Esse consentono perciò di gettare uno sguardo nuovo sull'evoluzione di tale pensiero e inoltre sulla formazione della filosofia della storia e della politica di Kant. (shrink)

An erotapòkrisis of the Corpus macarianum presents an exegesis and interpretation of Rm 2,14b as found in an ascetical brotherhood with origins in the fourth century. The lemma forms the beginning of the erotapòkrisis and invites a single response. The Author orients this lemma toward a moral, ascetical and “spiritual” interpretation of the natural law and the divine law written in the conscience, one which is obscure and not entirely comprehendable by moderns. The exegetical and hermeneutical procedure at work in (...) the text may offer a suggestion for further reflection and reconsideration of the environment and identity of the author, as well as of the origins of those writings comprising the Corpus macarianum. (shrink)

Descartes’ “natural light” has been interpreted as a faculty of the mind, the sense-imagination-reason-under-standing composite, the principle of intellectual integrity and growth, or even God himself. In Meditations III and IV in particular, the meaning of lumen natural depends on recognizing how light and nature define one another and how “my nature” serves as the basis for pointing to what is beyond the domain of natural reason, including religious faith and natural belief (especially regarding morality).

RESUMEN Recientes intentos por conectar la ética y la biología aristotélicas marcan una suerte de continuidad entre el carácter de los animales no racionales y de los seres humanos, de modo tal que en la descripción de los caracteres de los animales no racionales puede identificarse el punto de partida biológico del propio ser humano en el desarrollo de su carácter moral. En este artículo, propongo señalar los límites de este tipo de lectura, ya que, entendida de cierto modo, ella (...) implica una continuidad entre la normatividad natural y la normatividadpráctica propia de un naturalismo fundacionalista que no puede atribuirse a Aristóteles. En conexión con ello, sostengo que el concepto de virtud natural no es un concepto natural, sino ético, tal que sólo cobra sentido en el marco de la normatividad práctica; la virtud natural, en este sentido, no forma parte de una explicación genética de la virtud sino de un análisis que va del todo a las partes, de acuerdo al cual ella no es anterior sino posterior a la virtud ética. ABSTRACT A recent trend in Aristotelian scholarship tries to link ethics and biology. Within these attempts, some sort of continuity between the character of non-rational animals and that of human beings has been proposed, so that the starting point ofmoral development could be identified in Aristotle’s description of animal’s character. In this article I argue that this reading should strongly qualified, for understood in some ways it entails a sort of continuity between natural normativity and practical normativity that belongs to an Archimedean ethical naturalism, which cannot be reconstructed from Aristotle’s writings. Connected to this, I argue that the concept of natural virtue is not a natural concept, but an ethical one that only makes sense from within the realm of practical normativity; natural virtue, thus understood, is not part of a genetic explanation of virtue, but emerges from a conceptual whole-part analysis. In this manner, natural virtue is no prior, but posterior to ethical virtue. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene por objeto reconocer la Ecología Integral en su relación entre hombre, naturaleza y sociedad, como base para el uso sensato, adecuado y oportuno de los recursos naturales. Se trata de implementar una visión integral de la vida y su relación con el cosmos con el fin de afinar una conciencia ética que estimule una nueva forma de vivir y estar en el mundo. La revisión documental sobre el tema y el aporte del papa Francisco en su (...) Carta Encíclica Laudato Si’ se convierte en el insumo básico para lograr esta visión. Cualquier momento de la vida requiere cuidado y atención de las ciencias en general y de las ciencias humanas en particular, llamadas a fortalecer con sus conocimientos, estrategias y recursos, el desarrollo de la personalidad y su ubicación en el contexto medio ambiental, por lo que interesarse por construir ambientes propicios que estimulen estilos de vida saludable, en perspectiva de ecología integral, es una responsabilidad que implica conciencia de sí mismo, uso adecuado de recursos naturales, aprovechamiento de los aportes científicos y la práctica de principios éticos, estéticos y morales durante el desarrollo de la vida; por lo tanto, hacer conciencia del cuidado y conexión con la naturaleza significa reconocer la unidad del ser humano y el cosmos, apreciar las etapas evolutivas de la vida y actuar en consecuencia, con conocimiento y sabiduría. (shrink)

Kant considers that organisms contain inherited natural dispositions which define their main characteristics as organisms of a certain species. The human being possesses four different fundamental dispositions. The aim of this article is to describe these dispositions in detail. Firstly, there is the disposition to animality. The human being shares this disposition with some animals. This disposition consists of five inclinations: to self-preservation, sexual reproduction, sociability, physical enjoyment and freedom. Secondly, there is the group of dispositions specific to the human (...) being as a rational being. This group contains three dispositions: technical, pragmatic and moral. These dispositions contribute respectively to culture, civilisation and morality. (shrink)

My research takes as its guiding thread the statement from Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of spirit of 1805-06, that «cognition is recognition[Erkennen ist Anerkennen]». In this perspective I delineate, first, the consequences of this position for Hegel's epistemology, in particular with reference to the question of skepticism. Then, I show in what sense the recognitive conception of knowledge makes it possible for Hegel to comprehend unitarily, on one hand, cognition as exercise of natural capacities and cognition as exercise of (...) normative capacities socially articulated, and,on the other hand, theoretical self-consciousness and practical self-consciousness. The gnoseological importance of this solution can be comprehended only if we reconstruct the evolution of Hegel's thought in that span of time in which he most directly tackles the issue of skepsis: that is, from 1797 - the beginning of his Frankfurt period - when he began to occupy himself with gnoseological questions, until the end of his stay in Jena,which begins in 1801 and concludes in 1807 with the writing of the Phenomenology. The analysis of the development of the Hegelian theory of knowledge - worked out in the first part of my study - is dealt with in the context of a reconstruction of the historico-argumentative constellation within which it matured. The constellation of importance for our analysis is represented by the skeptical crisis - triggered by authors such as Schulze, Maimonand Platner - that invested the post-Kantian galaxy, within which the idealist solutions to the problem of cognition matured. Through the analysis of journals and authors with whom Hegel came directly or indirectly into contact - from Platner to Reinhold, Jacobi, Fichte and Schelling, to Hölderlin and Sinclair, concluding with Zeender, Krug, Bouterwek and Werneburg, and among the journals Fülleborn's Beiträge and Niethammer's Journal in particular - it is possible to map the various solutions proposed for the skeptical problem andsee how it is in relation to this problem that the conceptions of self-consciousness evolve and the very concept of "interpersonality" - "intersubjectivity" - emerges for the first time. At the same time, pursuing my objective of broadening the investigation of the phenomenon of recognition, which in my view is not reducible to the field of practical philosophy, I proposea fresh reconstruction of the lexical and conceptual evolution of the various terms -Erkennen, Wiedererkennen, Recognition, Anerkennen - through which the various modalities of the phenomenon of recognition were indicated in the philosophical tradition to which Hegel refers: recognition of objects as perceptive reidentification; reminiscence on the level of theory of memory; recognition of subjects as self-recognition (apperception) and attribution to others of intentionality; logical recognition as recognition of the validity of a proposition; moral recognition, where "recognizing" generally means approving, accepting(more specifically, someone may be "recognized" as an autonomous subject and as a unique,genuine individuality). I focus in particular on the theory of memory as «recognitio» in Wolff and in his school, on the conception of «reconnaissance» in Bonnet, on Kantian«Recognition» and on the theory of «Anerkennen» in Ernst Platner. This investigation serves, on the one hand, to show how the phenomenon of recognition is central for a comprehension of the structure both of the lower and of the higher cognitive faculties. This ought to allow us to understand in what sense Hegel, taking intersubjective recognition as hisleading phenomenon, attempts to reunite the various meanings of recognition within a theory of knowledge on the basis of which «cognition is recognition». On the other hand, my conceptual and lexicographic investigation also serves to bring to light - in a new way with respect to the studies on Anerkennung - a hitherto unknown problematic constellation and the input of certain authors, such as Werneburg and Platner, whose conceptions may haveinfluenced Hegel's approach.The second part and the third of my study - a reconstruction of the pre- phenomenological Jena writings dealing with «Anerkennung» - dwells on the theme of the notion of natural recognition, whose centrality for the Hegelian conception of recognition has not yet been adequately grasped. This reconstruction of the theory of natural recognition gives due weight to the influence of Schelling on Hegel's understanding of «Anerkennung» -while the critical literature has generally concentrated on Fichte. Analyzing the conception of the animal organism developed in particular in the lectures on the philosophy of nature of 1803-04 brings to light how Hegel already individuates the recognitive phenomenon at the level of sexual reproduction: it is from here that he posits the natural prerequisites for the development of consciousness of self. The category of natural recognition will present itself anew in Hegel's analysis of the social ontology of the human world in the philosophy of spirit, where it concerns sexual love, reproduction and child raising: natural recognition is, then, that on the basis of which Hegel develops his theory that cognition is recognition.Recognition, as a «middle» of spirit, is a cognitive phenomenon that is primitive with respectto linguistically structured human intersubjectivity; it is, properly, that cognitive structure which is necessarily presupposed by a self-conscious subjectivity that expresses itself linguistically: linguistic intersubjectivity expresses various modes of recognition, but notevery form of recognition is linguistic. The evolutional theory of cognition as recognition is in fact designed to show how increasingly complex recognitive relations emerge from a basic level of natural interactions to take on a linguistically mediated and universal structure. Withthe notion of spiritual recognition Hegel indicates just that ensemble of normative relations that constitute the infrastructure of action and thus mediate the formation of socially articulated self-conscious knowing of self. In the lectures on the philosophy of spirit of 1803-04 and of 1805-06 Hegel thus reconstructs the recognitive structure of the social institutions of right, of labor, and of exchange, showing that, within a politically structured community,dyadic (I-you) interactions are mediated by the universal viewpoint of the "we" incarnated in institutions that can be recognized by citizens as their own and by which citizens can be recognized. (shrink)

Through the elaboration of his political philosophy, Hobbes wishes to present himself as a representative of the new mechanistic and deterministic science of the seventeenth century, by applying Galilei’s method in politics and by refusing the Aristotelian metaphysics and natural philosophy as well. The aim of the present article is to challenge this claim. As a matter of fact, Hobbes’s thought seems to be characterised by an original co-existence of decisionism and mechanism and his view of the natural law does (...) not appear to be based on deterministic principles, but on a voluntarist and moral character condensed in his theory of passions. (shrink)

Introspection is a fundamental part of our mental lives. Nevertheless, its reliability and its underlying cognitive architecture have been widely disputed. Here, I propose a principled way to model introspection. By using time-tested principles from signal detection theory (SDT) and extrapolating them from perception to introspection, I offer a new framework for an introspective signal detection theory (iSDT). In SDT, the reliability of perceptual judgments is a function of the strength of an internal perceptual response (signal- to-noise ratio) which is, (...) to a large extent, driven by the intensity of the stimulus. In parallel to perception, iSDT models the reliability of introspective judgments as a function of the strength of an internal introspective response (signal-to-noise ratio) which is, to a large extent, driven by the intensity of conscious experiences. Thus, by modelling introspection after perception, iSDT can calibrate introspection’s reliability across a whole range of contexts. iSDT offers a novel, illuminating way of thinking about introspection and the cognitive processes that support it. (shrink)

La disolución del poder colonial en la América española creó una serie de interrogantes respecto al ordenamiento jurídico-político de los futuros estados soberanos. En este sentido, Simón Bolívar (1783–1830) insistió en la idea de que el control político de los territorios liberados por él debía estar al mando de un poder central conservador capaz de garantizar los derechos ciudadanos sin menoscabo de la estabilidad sociopolítica del orden republicano. Aunque algunos aspectos del ideario constitucional bolivariano resultaron inaceptables para sus contemporáneos, sus (...) medidas para asegurar el goce de los derechos civiles y políticos de los americanos se ajustaban a la realidad social de su tiempo. Con base en una amplia consulta bibliográfica, el presente artículo examina la concepción bolivariana del cuerpo político a la luz de las circunstancias sociohistóricas a las que el Libertador debió hacer frente. (shrink)

Kant considera que las disposiciones específicas de la especie humana sólo pueden desarrollarse plenamente en un Estado con una constitución justa. Tales disposiciones son la técnica, la pragmática y la moral. Mostraremos de qué manera la existencia de un Estado justo fomenta y asegura el desarrollo de esas disposiciones. En Idea para una historia universal en intención cosmopolita (1784), Kant sostiene que una constitución totalmente justa es solamente una idea de la razón práctica a la que debemos aproximarnos asintóticamente. La (...) realización integral de esta constitución es imposible. En cambio, en Hacia la paz perpetua (1795), Kant presenta una concepción de las repúblicas como Estados justos, realizables y pacíficos. Mientras que en el texto de 1784 la disposición moral es una condición de posibilidad de un Estado justo, en la obra de 1795 un Estado republicano es una condición de fomento de la moralidad de los ciudadanos. (shrink)

en este ensayo presento seis consideraciones acerca del lugar de la moral en la crisis económica actual, a saber: 1) Esta crisis, ¿se puede reducir a criterios exclusivamente económicos?; 2) La paradoja de que, a pesar de que los recursos naturales son limitados, cada año se tiene que crecer: ¿pero hacia dónde?; 3) ¿Retorno a Marx o introducir unas gotas de moral al viejo capitalismo?; 4) Si el Estado existe porque el hombre es un lobo para el hombre, el “libre” (...) mercado, compuesto de esos lobos, ¿no será un lobo para el hombre, a menos que un Estado lo regule adecuadamente?; 5) La ética, al igual que la economía, o es consecuencialista, o no es; 6) ¿Cabe entender, por tanto, la economía al margen de la moral? (shrink)

En este artículo exploraremos un dilema surgido del progresivo asentamiento de una disciplina reciente en el ámbito de la teoría moral, comprendida como una rama de los enfoques naturalistas de la ética, a saber, la ‘ética evolutiva’. Esta disciplina incluye en sus investigaciones de orden ético conocimientos de tipo biológico y, particularmente, estudios en clave de las teorías posdarwinianas de la evolución. En pocas palabras, el dilema surgido de la articulación entre ética y naturalismo evolutivo consiste en lo siguiente: (i) (...) o bien las propiedades morales son naturales y explican nuestro comportamiento como resultado de procesos evolutivos, pero no alcanzan para justificar el comportamiento moral; (ii) o bien lo justifican, pues tales propiedades retienen su autonomía respecto de las propiedades naturales, pero dejan de explicar o anclar la moral en bases ‘reales’ (naturales, fácticas) objetivas de la moralidad como tal. Nuestra propuesta en este artículo busca, si no solucionar dicho dilema, al menos ‘relajar’ la tensión que contiene. Para ello realizaremos una exploración del debate en torno al realismo moral que subyace al dilema en cuestión, así como también, y particularmente, a los posibles aportes que algunas perspectivas neoaristotélicas contemporáneas podrían ofrecer para la elucidación de una vía intermedia, que evite caer en ambos extremos. (shrink)

Legal positivists maintain that the legality of a rule is fundamentally determined by social facts. Yet for much of legal history, ordinary officials used legal terminology in ways that seem inconsistent with positivism. Judges regularly cited, analyzed, and predicated their decisions on the ‘laws of justice’ which they claimed had universal legal import. This practice, though well-documented by historians, has received surprisingly little philosophical attention; I argue that it invites explanation from positivists. After taxonomizing the positivist’s explanatory options, I suggest (...) that the most viable option appeals to conceptual change: classical Romans, early modern Europeans, founding-era Americans were not using ‘law’ (or ‘lex’ or ‘jus’) to refer to the subject matter of contemporary legal philosophy. But the strategy is costly. It renders positivism’s truth surprisingly parochial. And it supplies new reasons for doubting positivist accounts of contemporary practices, including the treatment of moral principles in modern adjudication. (shrink)

In this chapter, we discuss a selection of current views of the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). We focus on the different predictions they make, in particular with respect to the role of prefrontal cortex (PFC) during visual experiences, which is an area of critical interest and some source of contention. Our discussion of these views focuses on the level of functional anatomy, rather than at the neuronal circuitry level. We take this approach because we currently understand more about experimental (...) evidence at this coarse level and because these results are appropriate for arbitrating between current theoretical frameworks. We discuss the Two-Visual-Systems Hypothesis (Milner & Goodale 1995; 2006), Local Recurrency (Lamme 2010; Lamme 2006), Higher Order (Lau 2008; Lau & Rosenthal 2011) and Global Workspace theories (Baars 1997; Baars 2005; Dehaene & Naccache 2001; Dehaene 2014). Despite the apparent stark differences between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing, available evidence suggests that their neural substrates must be largely shared. This indicates that the difference in neural activity between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing is likely to be subtle and highly specialized. We argue that current experimental evidence about the involvement of specific activity in prefrontal cortex supports the higher order neural theory of consciousness. In consequence, imaging techniques that focus only on marked differences between conscious and unconscious level of activity are likely to be insensitive to the relevant neural activity patterns that underlie conscious experiences. Finally, it follows from the evidence we discuss that the functional advantages of conscious over unconscious perceptual processing may be more limited than commonly thought. (shrink)

La "Grande Morale," progettata da J.-P. Sartre tra il 1947 e il 1949 come naturale completamento della filosofia esistenzialista esposta ne L'essere e il nulla e L'esistenzialismo e un umanismo, non e mai stata pubblicata: abbandonata e ripresa piu volte nei successivi vent'anni, ha finito per costituire un serbatoio di annotazioni e di riflessioni sempre dirottate altrove, una specie di fantasma letterario, onnipresente, ma pronto a dileguarsi ogni volta che sembrava avere raggiunto una forma consistente. Sappiamo oggi, grazie (...) alla pubblicazione dei molti inediti sartriani, che la riflessione sulla morale ha accompagnato tutti gli snodi fondamentali del pensiero di Sartre, dai cosiddetti scritti giovanili alle opere della maturita, dalla svolta "dialettica" sino all'ultima discussa intervista, rilasciata poco prima della scomparsa. Gli studi qui riuniti hanno nei Quaderni per una morale (1947-48) il loro centro di gravita e di maggiore interesse. Di questo tentativo abortito di scrivere una "Morale" essi provano a disegnare la parabola, dalle origini remote nei Taccuini della strana guerra (1939) sino al Santo Genet commediante e martire (1952), che ne sancisce l'abbandono. Senza disdegnare qualche incursione nell'estetica sartriana, poiche della "morale introvabile" non c'e in realta testo che non rechi qualche traccia.". (shrink)

A lo largo de la historia de la humanidad, se ha creído que los seres humanos poseen cierta superioridad sobre el resto de los animales y de los recursos naturales en general, esto se debe en gran parte a las religiones que sostienen esta postura, otorgándoles a los seres humanos cierta proximidad divina, cuando en la Biblia se menciona que Dios hizo al hombre a imagen y semejanza suya, por ejemplo, y que dejó al resto de los animales en un (...) plano inferior y a la disposición del ser humano para hacer cuanto se le antoje con ellos. (shrink)

En la tradición ilustrada de Kant y en la tradición aristotélica de Tomás de Aquino encontramos los mismos elementos para explicar la experiencia moral: razón práctica del hombre común, ley moral, voluntad, inclinaciones naturales. Pero la relación de estos elementos entre sí varía radicalmente de una tradición a otra, ya que en la tradición kantiana la razón práctica y la ley moral son completamente heterogéneas respecto a las inclinaciones naturales. En la tradición aristotélica de Tomás de Aquino, en cambio, la (...) razón práctica que conoce la ley moral es parte de la naturaleza del hombre. En la tradición kantiana la ética se encuentra completamente separada de la antropología, y no se conoce a partir de la experiencia. En la tradición aristotélico-tomista, la ética se conoce a partir de la experiencia y su conocimiento es explicable a partir de ella. Both Kant’s Enlightenment tradition and Aquinas’ Aristotelian tradition will usually manage the same elements in order to explain the reality of moral experience, namely: practical reason of the common man, moral law, will, and natural inclinations. Yet the relation existing between these elements certainly varies from one tradition to the other since, within Kantian tradition, practical reason and moral law are completely heterogeneous with regard to natural inclinations. On the contrary, within Aquinas’ Aristotelian tradition, the same practical reason that recognizes the moral law is itself an element of human nature as well. Thus, according to Kantian tradition, ethics are totally detached from anthropology, and they are not grasped out of experience. Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition would state that ethics are grasped through experience and, although they are certainly not derived from anthropology, this later would make the grasping of the former explicable. (shrink)

When a circular coin is rotated in depth, is there any sense in which it comes to resemble an ellipse? While this question is at the center of a rich and divided philosophical tradition (with some scholars answering affirmatively and some negatively), Morales et al. (2020, 2021) took an empirical approach, reporting 10 experiments whose results favor such perspectival similarity. Recently, Burge and Burge (2022) offered a vigorous critique of this work, objecting to its approach and conclusions on both philosophical (...) and empirical grounds. Here, we answer these objections on both fronts. We show that Burge and Burge’s critique rests on misunderstandings of Morales et al.’s claims; of the relation between the data and conclusions; and of the philosophical context in which the work appears. Specifically, Burge and Burge attribute to us a much stronger (and stranger) view than we hold, involving the introduction of “a new entity” located “in some intermediate position(s) between the distal shape and the retinal image.” We do not hold this view. Indeed, once properly understood, most of Burge and Burge’s objections favor Morales et al.’s claims rather than oppose them. Finally, we discuss several questions that remain unanswered, and reflect on a productive path forward on these issues of foundational scientific and philosophical interest. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo de homenaje al Profesor Julio De Zan, me concentro en su crítica al realismo moral. En su libro, La ética, los derechos y la justicia, Julio De Zan niega que existan en el ámbito moral propiedades naturales o metafísicas. Para comprender su crítica, propongo una reconstrucción conceptual de los presupuestos filosóficos que existen para su rechazo del realismo moral. Con este propósito, mi propuesta de reconstrucción conceptual consiste en complementar la ética del discurso defendida por Julio (...) De Zan, relacionando su propuesta con dos complementos filosóficos: por un lado, con el rechazo hacia el realismo moral realizado por Ronald Dworkin en su libro Justicia para erizos; por otro lado, con el rechazo hacia el realismo moral dirigido por Christine Korsgaard en su libro Las Fuentes de la Normatividad. Aunque los tres filósofos mantienen diferencias relevantes, mantienen también un rechazo al realismo moral basado en ciertos parecidos de familia. (shrink)

En este artículo discuto la importancia que tiene para la teoría de la justicia de Rawls el desarrollo del sentido de la justicia como condición para la estabilidad social. Para cumplir con dicho objetivo analizo la interpretación que Rawls ofrece de nuestra psicología moral con la finalidad de evaluar su rol en la aceptación de los principios de justicia, así como las razones para fundar dicha estabilidad en determinados sentimientos morales. El análisis anterior me permitirá concluir que la búsqueda de (...) bases naturales para fundar los sentimientos morales constituye para Rawls una vía alternativa tanto al deductivismo moral, así como a cualquier forma de fundamentación metafísica de los principios que guían nuestras prácticas sociales. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Instinct of Nature: Natural Law, Synderesis, and the Moral SenseRobert A. Greene“Instinct is a great matter.”—Sir John FalstaffThis essay traces the evolution of the meaning of the expression instinctus naturae in the discussion of the natural law from Justinian’s Digest through its association with synderesis to Francis Hutcheson’s theory of the moral sense. The introduction of instinctus naturae into Ulpian’s definition of the natural law by Isidore of Seville (...) in the seventh century posed a problem of definition for medieval commentators. Some said that it meant a universal and providential natura naturans; some defined it as the urge to self and species preservation in animals, degenerating in man into sensual and shameful impulses; some advanced the humanistic and paradoxical notion that it referred to a unique exercise of human reason in coming to know the natural law. The contemporaneous revival in the twelfth century of St. Jerome’s puzzling new term “synderesis,” and its gradual definition as the immediate apprehension of the first practical moral principles of the natural law, brought the two terms into proximity and loose association.A half-century later St. Bonaventure made explicit what had remained latent in the thinking of Thomas Aquinas by relocating synderesis in the affective rather than the intellectual part of man’s nature. Accordingly the moral discoveries of synderesis came to be spoken of as not only non-discursive but instinctive in nature—apprehensions for which no reason could be given, apprehensions somehow rooted in affective human experience. During the bilingual early modern period an increasingly secularized, internalized, and reified instinctus [End Page 173] naturae, together with its abbreviated vernacular cognate, “instinct,” came to serve as a substitute and synonym for the obsolescent synderesis. Edward Herbert’s attention to instinctus naturae in his De Veritate (1624), Sir Matthew Hale’s speculations about the place of rational instinct in the natural law, and Francis Hutcheson’s theory of a moral sense all exemplify this semantic legacy.The first entry in Justinian’s Digest has had a disproportionate influence on later speculation about the natural law. It begins a chapter that gives pride of place to general definitions of justice, law, jus naturale and jus gentium, and it is drawn from the writings of the Roman jurisconsult Domitius Ulpianus (d. 223), whose work constitutes forty percent of the Digest. Ulpian defines the natural law, with insistent repetition, as that which nature has taught to, or is common to, all animals:Jus naturale is that which nature has taught to all animals; for it is not a law specific to mankind but is common to all animals—land animals, sea animals, and the birds as well. Out of this comes the union of man and woman [male and female] which we call marriage, and the procreation of children, and their rearing. So we can see that the other animals, wild beasts included, are rightly understood to be acquainted with this law. Jus gentium, the law of the nations, is that which all human peoples observe. That it is not coextensive with natural law can be grasped easily, since this latter is common to all animals whereas jus gentium is common only to human beings among themselves. 1Justinian’s compilers gave Ulpian’s definition striking prominence at the beginning of the Digest and then in the same short chapter quoted the incompatible and more traditional definitions of his contemporaries Gaius and Paulus. They confined the operation of the natural law to mankind and spoke of reason as its source. 2 The compilers had been charged to eliminate just such conflicts; yet here at the very outset they set a conundrum that perplexed commentators [End Page 174] and invited explanation from Isidore of Seville to Hugo Grotius. Their selection of quotations suggests that as lawyers they regarded such general definitions as “for legal purposes no more than ornament to discussion.” 3 For those of a more speculative bent, however, the dilemmas could not have been more fundamental. How was the natural law to be defined in relation to those appetitive and self-preservative urges that man seemed to share with animals? Or did the term law apply only... (shrink)

Whether the prefrontal cortex is part of the neural substrates of consciousness is currently debated. Against prefrontal theories of consciousness, many have argued that neural activity in the prefrontal cortex does not correlate with consciousness but with subjective reports. We defend prefrontal theories of consciousness against this argument. We surmise that the requirement for reports is not a satisfying explanation of the difference in neural activity between conscious and unconscious trials, and that prefrontal theories of consciousness come out of this (...) debate unscathed. (shrink)

En este libro se reconstruye el modelo de fundamentación ética naturalista que el estoicismo desa¬r¬rolló a partir de la noción clave de la oikeiosis. Lo sorprendente de este modelo con¬sis¬te en el hecho de que, a pesar de orientarse a partir de la noción de autoconservación, los estoicos no desarrollaron una ética de la supervivencia ni asumieron ninguna otra variante habitual del egoísmo moral, sino que elaboraron, por el contrario, una ética de marcado contenido social, que adquiere in¬clu¬so un carácter (...) decididamente universalista y cosmopolita. A través de un estudio detallado de los textos estoicos más relevantes y en diálogo con las voces contemporáneas que lideran el estudio de esta escuela helenística, el autor analiza las diferentes fases del proceso de modulación de los impulsos naturales que se da en el ser humano con el surgimiento de la razón, y explica en qué sentido el logro de la virtud equivale para un estoico a una “vida en conformidad con naturaleza”. This book makes a critical examination of the Stoic theory of oikeiosis offering a systematic reconstruction of the natural basis of morality within this philosophical school. What is striking about this theory is the fact that, despite being guided by the notion of self-preservation, the Stoics did not develop an ethics of survival or assume any other variant of the usual ethical egoism but rather developed a model of ethics replete with social content, which takes on a decidedly universal and cosmopolitan character. Through a detailed study of classical sources and in dialogue with leading contemporary scholars in the field of Stoic studies, the author accounts for the different stages of the process of modulation of natural impulses that occurs in human beings with the emergence of reason, and also explains in what sense the attainment of virtue is for a Stoic equivalent to a “life in accordance with nature”. (shrink)

De acuerdo con Hume, las evaluaciones morales se basan en los sentimientos de aprobación o de desaprobación que experimentamos al contemplar el carácter de una persona desde un punto de vista general. También sostiene que la adopción de esta perspectiva no se debe a una exigencia de la razón, sino que obedece a operaciones naturales de la imaginación. En este trabajo discuto la pregunta sobre el mecanismo psicológico por el que adoptamos este punto de vista general. Para ello explico primero (...) otras operaciones de la imaginación que son centrales en las evaluaciones morales: la asociación de percepciones en la producción de las pasiones del amor, el orgullo, el odio y la humildad; la transmisión de fuerza y vivacidad entre las percepciones; y la simpatía. A continuación señalo que el supuesto mecanismo natural de la imaginación por el cual adoptaríamos el punto de vista general parece no poder existir. Sugiero que, en lugar de ello, esta perspectiva puede concebirse como una construcción social o, como Hume diría, un "artificio" de los seres humanos. Si esto último es plausible, sin embargo, se desdibuja la distinción entre virtudes naturales y artificiales. (shrink)

La virtud y el conocimiento son momentos indisociables para el modo de vida del su!smo islámico en general Los elementos constituyentes de dicha praxis aparecen integrados por un primer estadio ascético seguido de otro de místico. Trataremos de mostrar que el su!smo construye una imagen del hombre determinada por el grado de moralidad inherente al obrar y a la intención y en función después, del modo y de la cualidad del conocimiento adquirido por el individuo. Presentamos, el marco general en (...) el que se encuadra la ética sufíe. Analizaremos, después las posibilidades naturales y trascendentales con las que cuenta el individuo para desarrollar su existencia dentro del marco profético. Un último descenso desde el cuerpo del individuo hacía el espacio de la conciencia, nos mostrará el terreno en el que acontecerá el ejercicio purgativo de la ascesis. For the Islamic Su! way of life, virtue and knowledge are moments which cannot be separated. "e constituting elements of that praxis consist on a!rst ascetic state followed by a second mystic state which we shall try to make clear via two examples. We intend to demonstrate that Su!sm constructs an image of man determined by the level of morality inherent to his actions, in the intention and in the resulting function; of the method and the quality of the knowledge acquired by the individual. We will present the general frame upon which Su! ethics are founded. We will then analyse the natural and transcendental possibilities that the individual has in order to develop his existence within the prophetic frame. One last descent from the body of the individual towards the space of conscience will show us the terrain where the purging exercise of the ascesis occurs. (shrink)