This article reports a notable misprint in J.C.G. Strachan's Oxford Classical Text of Plato's Phaedo.

Duncan Pritchard's version of the safety analysis of knowledge has it that for all contingent propositions, p, S knows that p iff S believes that p, p is true, and (the “safety principle”) in most nearby worlds in which S forms his belief in the same way as in the actual world, S believes that p only if p is true. Among the other virtues claimed by Pritchard for this view is its supposed ability to solve a version of the (...) lottery puzzle. In this paper, I argue that the safety analysis of knowledge in fact fails to solve the lottery puzzle. I also argue that a revised version of the safety principle recently put forward by Pritchard fares no better. (shrink)

The safety analysis of knowledge, due to Duncan Pritchard, has it that for all contingent propositions, p, S knows that p iff S believes that p, p is true, and (the “safety principle”) in most nearby worlds in which S forms his belief in the same way as in the actual world, S believes that p only if p is true. Among the other virtues claimed by Pritchard for this view is its supposed ability to solve a version of the (...) lottery puzzle. In this paper, I argue that the safety analysis of knowledge in fact fails to solve the lottery puzzle. I also argue that a revised version of the safety principle recently put forward by Pritchard fares no better. (shrink)

The safety analysis of knowledge, due to Duncan Pritchard, has it that for all contingent propositions, p, S knows that p iff S believes that p, p is true, and (the “safety principle”) in most nearby worlds in which S forms his belief in the same way as in the actual world, S believes that p only if p is true. Among the other virtues claimed by Pritchard for this view is its supposed ability to solve a version of the (...) lottery puzzle. In this paper, I argue that the safety analysis of knowledge in fact fails to solve the lottery puzzle. I also argue that a revised version of the safety principle recently put forward by Pritchard fares no better. (shrink)

The safety analysis of knowledge, due to Duncan Pritchard, has it that for all contingent propositions, p, S knows that p iff S believes that p, p is true, and (the “safety principle”) in most nearby worlds in which S forms his belief in the same way as in the actual world, S believes that p only if p is true. Among the other virtues claimed by Pritchard for this view is its supposed ability to solve a version of the (...) lottery puzzle. In this paper, I argue that the safety analysis of knowledge in fact fails to solve the lottery puzzle. I also argue that a revised version of the safety principle recently put forward by Pritchard fares no better. (shrink)

This is a popular philosophy book that offers ironic approach to analysis of post-Soviet societies and cultures. Author collected over 100 misprints that articulate deviant practices of currupt and kleptocratic societies. Stragedy instead of strategy, acomedy instead of academy, and many other new Concepts get interpreted and lead to a creation of new post-modern post-Soviet Encyclopedy.

The paper that follows continues a discussion with Tomis Kapitan in the pages of this journal over the compatibility of divine agency with divine foreknowledge. I had earlier argued against two premises in Kapitan's case for omniscient impotence: (i) that intentionally A-ing presupposes prior acquisition of the intention to A, and (ii) that acquiring the intention to A presupposes prior ignorance whether one will A. In response to my criticisms, Kapitan has recently offered new defences for these two premises. I (...) show in reply why neither defence succeeds in rehabilitating the case against omniscient agency. (Note that the very first sentence of the published version has a misprint: instead of "To claim that divine foreknowledge is inconsistent with divine agency has been pressed with increasing frequency of late . . .", it should read, "_The_ claim . . ."!). (shrink)

I would say that syntax is a significant, if shifty, index of a writer's perspective on his subject-matter. In this light, please consider the syntax of my title. It is two nouns connected by a logical term, ‘as’. On one version of the programme for this lecture series, the word ‘as’ is misprinted as ‘and’; this makes a big difference. A simple conjunction of two nouns, ‘Literature and Discourse’, would suggest that I accept the meanings of the two words as (...) stable, unanalysed. The connective ‘as’, however, is intended to announce that this juxtaposition of the two noun terms is an analysis of the two nouns, particularly the first – an examination of the nature of the first term in the light of the meaning of the second. (shrink)

I must explain at once that these few pages do not attempt or pretend to be anything like a formal review of the recently published posthumous volume of Professor Bowman with the same title. I am precluded from writing such a review partly by the wide range of problems attacked by the author, partly by my own insufficient familiarity with many of the positions of the most recent physical and natural science which are brought under review. I will therefore confine (...) myself, so far as the strict business of the reviewer is concerned, to the single remark that the editor, Professor J. W. Scott, has discharged his difficult task of preparing the book for publication—no easy matter, as will be seen from his Preface—with equal skill and devotion, and has laid himself open to no worse criticism than that there are less than a dozen obvious slight misprints which have escaped detection, but will readily be detected by a careful reader. What I propose to do in the remarks which follow is simply to indicate the very real importance of the book by saying something as to its main purpose and thesis, and the points where I still feel that there is some difficulty or ambiguity about the writer's position which would, no doubt, have been largely cleared up if he had lived to reconstruct the whole six of his Vanuxem Lectures for publication as he has done the first three. (shrink)

I would say that syntax is a significant, if shifty, index of a writer's perspective on his subject-matter. In this light, please consider the syntax of my title. It is two nouns connected by a logical term, ‘as’. On one version of the programme for this lecture series, the word ‘as’ is misprinted as ‘and’; this makes a big difference. A simple conjunction of two nouns, ‘Literature and Discourse’, would suggest that I accept the meanings of the two words as (...) stable, unanalysed. The connective ‘as’, however, is intended to announce that this juxtaposition of the two noun terms is an analysis of the two nouns, particularly the first – an examination of the nature of the first term in the light of the meaning of the second. (shrink)

The Acknowledgment section of this article was inadvertently misprinted. The following sentence should have concluded the Acknowledgment: Above all I would like to thank Spenser Powell. This essay would not have been possible without the many conversations we shared as he composed his exceptional undergraduate thesis, Equality of Participation, at the University of Tennessee. We deeply regret this omission.

S. A. Lloyd - Liberty, Rationality, and Agency in Hobbes's Leviathan - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.3 397-398 Book Review Liberty, Rationality, and Agency in Hobbes's Leviathan David van Mill. Liberty, Rationality, and Agency in Hobbes's Leviathan. Albany: The State University of New York Press, 2001. Pp. xii + 253. Cloth, $59.50. Paper, $19.95. David van Mill's provocative book is an ambitious and thoughtful argument by an author well-versed in Hobbes's writings (...) and the secondary literature on them, intended to revolutionize our understanding of Hobbes's theory of rational agency. It is a shame that the text is marred by such egregious copy-editing that its unrelenting misprints, misquotes, inaccurate references, and grammatical infelicities so distract from van Mill's.. (shrink)

To the Article Indication, Classes, Numbers, Validation, by A. N. White-head, Vol. XLIII, N.S., No. 171. Some misprints in the symbolrm of my article mast, I fear, make the whole unintelligible, apart from the following corrections. The proofs arrived from across the Atlantic on the day when I was overtaken by a dangerous illness which has incapacitated me for work during three months. Thus there has been no opportunity for autho-'s proof-corrections. I am obliged to the courtesy of the Editor (...) for the belated insertion of these corrigenda:— P. 286. Def. I, replace () by (3) P. 286. Def. II, replace 1st occurrence of p q by p g. P. 286. Def. III, replace Ec! x p by Ec x p. P. 286 Def. IV, replace p by p. P. 286 Four lines below, replace Ec! x Ec ! x by Eo x Ec! x P. 287. Lines 2 and 4, replace () by (). P. 287. Def. VIII, replace () by (). P. 287. Last line but one, replace o by 2, P. 291. Def. XXIII, replace (S) by (S). P. 292. Def. XXVII, end of 2nd line, replace xy by y. P. 292. Def. XXVIII, replace (c) by (c) P. 292. Def. XXVIII, replace c by c. P. 292. Def. XXIX, replace (1, 0) by , c). P. 292. Def. XXIX, replace (u + cm, v + c1) by (u + cm, v + c1). P. 293. Def. XXXI, replace (x) by (x). P. 293. Line 8, replace by . P. 293. Def. XXXIV, replace (x) by (x). P. 294. Lines 1 and 5, replace by Q. (shrink)

In his essay on 'Broad on Induction and Probability' (first published in 1959, reprinted in this volume), Professor G. H. von Wright writes: "If Broad's writings on induction have remained less known than some of his other contributions to philosophy . . . , one reason for this is that Broad never has published a book on the subject. It is very much to be hoped that, for the benefit of future students, Broad's chief papers on induction and probability will (...) be collected in a single volume . . . . " The present volume attempts to perform this service to future students of induction and probability. The suggestion of publishing a volume of this kind in Synthese Library was first made by Professor Donald Davidson, one of the editors of the Library, and was partly prompted by Professor von Wright's statement. In carrying out this suggestion, the editors of Synthese Library have had the generous support of Professor Broad who has among other things supplied a new Addendum to 'The Principles of Problematic Induction' and corrected a number of misprints found in the first printings of this paper. The editors gratefully acknow ledge Professor Broad's help and encouragement. A bibliography of Professor Broad's writings (up to 1959) has been compiled by Dr. C. Lewy and has appeared in P. A. Schilpp, editor, The Philosophy of C. D. Broad (The Library of Living Philosophers), pp. 833-852. (shrink)

Historians generally grumble at the liberties taken with letters and papers by editors and biographers in the past, while reviewers may complain at the professorial pomposities which interfere with the reader's interaction with the text. Certainly, reading is not a mere matter of information retrieval or of source-mining, but a meeting of minds, and any over-zealous editing which makes this more difficult will have failed. Editors, whether of journals or of documents, are midwives of ideas—self-effacingly bringing an author's meaning and (...) style into the world. What reviewers praise is the unobtrusive, and what they damn is ‘a manner at once slapdash and intrusive’, making allowances perhaps for an ‘introduction which is as admirable as his footnotes are useless’. When in the 1960s new technology brought us a flood of facsimile reprints of scientific works, some avoided these problems by appearing naked and unashamed: but for a text on phrenology, or for Goethe's Theory of Colours, a fig leaf or two of commentary is really necessary to help the innocent reader to interact with the book. Facsimiles of nineteenth-century editions of Wilkins' papers, of some Newton correspondence, or of Henry More's poetry are even more problematic; the reader should know that these editors' assumptions cannot be taken for granted, and that their introductions are themselves historical documents. The exact reproduction of misprints and misbindings is of dubious assistance to the modern reader. (shrink)

Sophie Botros's criticism of my review depends in part on certain misprints which appear in the review as printed. In particular, words are omitted from my summary of her position. What I wrote was as follows.

In his essay on 'Broad on Induction and Probability' (first published in 1959, reprinted in this volume), Professor G. H. von Wright writes: "If Broad's writings on induction have remained less known than some of his other contributions to philosophy..., one reason for this is that Broad never has published a book on the subject. It is very much to be hoped that, for the benefit of future students, Broad's chief papers on induction and probability will be collected in a (...) single volume.... " The present volume attempts to perform this service to future students of induction and probability. The suggestion of publishing a volume of this kind in Synthese Library was first made by Professor Donald Davidson, one of the editors of the Library, and was partly prompted by Professor von Wright's statement. In carrying out this suggestion, the editors of Synthese Library have had the generous support of Professor Broad who has among other things supplied a new Addendum to 'The Principles of Problematic Induction' and corrected a number of misprints found in the first printings of this paper. The editors gratefully acknow ledge Professor Broad's help and encouragement. A bibliography of Professor Broad's writings (up to 1959) has been compiled by Dr. C. Lewy and has appeared in P. A. Schilpp, editor, The Philosophy of C. D. Broad (The Library of Living Philosophers), pp. 833-852. (shrink)

In a previous study the author proposed that the second edition of Leviathan arose from an abortive attempt to print the text in London in 1670, and consisted partly of sheets salvaged from that attempt, and partly of new sheets printed in Amsterdam later in the 1670s. This article defends and amplifies that account of the printing. It responds to the alternative account presented by the late Karl Schuhmann, noting some problematic features of his theory; it considers the evidence of (...) misprints and typographical changes in the Bear; it offers an analysis of the skeleton formes, which, combined with the evidence of misprints, confirms the scenario previously presented; and it also presents some new external evidence which helps to identify the publishers of the Bear edition. (shrink)

Also published in 1998 in S.R.Hameroff, A.W.Kaszniak and .C.Scott (Eds) _Toward a Science of_ _Consciousness II._ MIT Press. 701-707. Note that there were problems with the editing of this volume and there are some misprints. This version is correct.

These are three welcome works on medieval logic. The Summa Logica of William of Ockham has long been a classic, and scholars have been waiting for this critical edition, begun almost a quarter of a century ago by Philotheus Boehner and finally brought to completion by the combined efforts of Stephen Brown and especially Gedeon Gal, now the general editor of the Opera Philosophica et Theologica being prepared at the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University. The editors date this work (...) after the Commentary on the Sentences, two volumes of which have already appeared in the above mentioned series. It also postdates Ockham’s commentaries on Porphyry, the Praedicamenta, Perihermenias, and Sophisticis Elenchis, as well as the first four books of Aristotle’s Physics. As a terminus ante quem the editors take the fifth book of this same Physics and see it as certainly prior to the Tractatus de praedestinatione, and to the De corpore Christi and De Sacramento Altaris. Parts of the Quodlibetal questions, however, precede it, and others follow. Loux’s translation, unfortunately, antedated this splendid edition of the Summa Logicae, being based on only the partial, earlier edition of Boehner. Nevertheless, it is a useful instrument providing a good and relatively complete introduction to the basic themes of Ockham’s philosophy of language as well as his ontology. A spot check reveals some misprints, e.g., on pp. 56, 192 and on page 38, lines 68-83 of the Latin edition he used have not been translated. The work is introduced by two essays: "The Ontology of William Ockham" and "Ockham on Generality"—the latter dealing with his theory of supposition. Nuchelmans’ interesting work, though it deals mostly with the medieval history of propositions as bearers of truth and falsity, contains some six chapters which trace the history of the term as early as Plato’s treatment in the Sophist, through Aristotle and the important Stoic lekton and axioma. He also concludes with a useful chapter on the significance of a true propositio, both as a mode of being of a thing and as the mental conception.—A.B.W. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:554 BOOK REVIEWS though he had carried out a radical interpretation of Thomas Aquinas's esse in his transcendental turn. Thus, Sheehan has brilliantly shown both Rahner's indebtedness to Heidegger (especially his notion of the human person as a bivalent and kinetic being; note the parallels between Rahner's cogitative sense and Heidegger's Temporalitiit, between Rahner's agent intellect and Heidegger's Existentialitiit, between Rahner 's possible intellect and Heidegger's Faktizitiit) and Rahner's (...) profound differences from Heidegger, especially in his understanding of being (see pp. 110-116; 280-291). Finally, Sheehan has provided the clearest exposition to date on Rahner's theory of " inner-worldly efficient causality " (pp. 244-255). The book would have been much more helpful if an index of topics and a bibliography had been provided. There are two omissions. On p. 135, the last line should read: " Chapter VIII concludes the study by laying out the critical difference between Rahner's effort to re-establish the science of metaphysics on a transcendental base and Heidegger's attempt to overcome metaphysics." On p. 186, line 19: "In whatever way we read the content of predicate (Aquinas: quiddities)." There are also a number of minor misprints. Strange that this book was published only in 1987, even though the research was apparently completed before 1982 (see p. 171, note 62). But its many assets will make Sheehan's work a permanent feature among the best Rahnerian studies. The Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. PETER c. PHAN The World and Language in Wittgenstein's Philosophy. By GORDON HUNNINGS. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1989. Pp. xiv +266. $34.50. This book will not find a place among the distinguished commentaries on Wittgenstein's work. Aiming to cover the full sweep of that work, Hunnings devotes three of his eight chapters to the Tractatus, one to the" Notes on Logical Form" (1929) and Philosophical Grammar, one to the transitional material of The Blue and Brown Books, one to writings and lectures on the philosophy of mathematics, and just two to the central themes of the later philosophy. Indeed, of the book's 256 pages of text, 193 are spent before the reader finds himself dealing with Philosophical Investigations. So there is a problem of balance. For a book of this size and scope striving to cover the whole of Wittgenstein's BOOK REVIEWS 555 thought on representation and grammar, there is too much exposition of transitional detail and too little attention to the difficult but fertile work at the heart of the mature later Wittgenstein. There are now many fine expository studies of Wittgenstein's work. This is not to say that all important matters of interpretation are settled. Indeed, there are significant areas of rival interpretation and there are varying assessments of the adequacy of Wittgenstein's views. There is contention over the degree to which his work is assimilable to the philosophical tradition. These facts suggest, not that there is no profit in further investigation of his work, but that new studies-particularly ones attempting a comprehensive survey of Wittgenstein's work from the Notebooks to On Certainty-should situate themselves in a well cultivated terrain of commentary and interpretation. But Hunning's work does little to inform prospective readers of the extent to which scholarly study of Wittgenstein's work has advanced. Eschewing a bibliography, Hunnings makes it somewhat difficult for the reader to discern his command of the scholarship. In construing the Tractatus he relies on Anscombe, Stenius, Griffin, and Black-all standard sources. But in dealing with the later philosophy and the much-debated transitional period between Wittgenstein's resumption of philosophical work in the late 1920's and the period of the Investigations, Hunnings simply does not scratch the surface of the huge body of secondary writing available to serious students of Wittgenstein's work. It would be pointless to list the important commentators whose works are ignored; suffice to say that Hunnings's book is apparently unassisted by a full scholarly command of the available literature. In this regard it suffers by comparison with A. C. Grayling's Wittgenstein in the Oxford University Press... (shrink)

"Of the making of many books there is no end" seems reasonable enough when the subject is infinity but after reading this well-organized study one is not so sure; a figure suggested by Zeno speaks of "a fog [which] the incessant labours of modern scholars often cause." Sweeney’s methodology is to use the ever-increasing body of modern critical discussions as a help in interpreting and assessing the presocratic fragments and their ancient commentators. For Anaximander a particularly detailed and nuanced coverage (...) of the literature between 1947 and 1970 is presented-over twenty major interpretations, with supplementary articles treated in an Appendix. Subsequent chapters treat in less detail the positions on infinity of the other Ionians, Pythagoras, the Eleatics, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists. Here the author relies heavily on existing surveys like those of Kirk and Raven and Guthrie. This raises a question about the kind of audience envisaged. To a sentence like "Let us now trace as simply and yet accurately as possible Raven’s views", Raven could be pardoned for reacting with the impression that he had already done just that himself. Much of the book is a perhaps over-leisurely doxography of work written in uncomplicated English, albeit in widely scattered journals; nonetheless Sweeney’s imposing, almost intimidating, coverage of bibliography will save even seasoned ancient philosophers many hours of L'année philologique-hunting and makes his work an important and eminently worthwhile contribution. Apart from some relatively minor misprints there is a serious confusion of Alcmaeon with the poet Alcman. Alcman deserves better treatment in the exegesis of Anaximander’s "rather poetical terms."—T. H. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 745 and psycholOgical doctrine developed in Bks. I-II in terms of the traditional theme of macrocosm and microcosm. Theologically, the author understands the classical gods as symbolizing intellects, heavenly bodies, or spirits. The allegorizing tendencies of Porphyry and even Proclus are much in evidence, as abundant citation of parallel texts demonstrates. The most important psychological doctrine inherited from the Neoplatonists, albeit greatly simplified and heavily allegorized, is (...) the deification of the divine (Mercury) and human (Philology) intellects. Gersh breaks no new ground in this chapter, but his crisp presentation of Martianus's allegory against the Neoplatonic metaphysical background affords an easy grasp of how he fits into the Platonic tradition. The outstanding virtue of this study is that it assembles the fruits of decades of scholarship and, together with exhaustive textual summaries and quotations, weds Quellenforschung with incisive analysis. It is a gold mine of information for scholars of late antique and medieval philosophy, who now have all the evidence at their fingertips, even if specific interpretations do not always warrant assent. I look forward with great eagerness to the appearance of the subsequent volumes. The bibliography is outstanding and the index of Latin texts is quite useful. In this time of increasingly shoddy copy editing, the University of Notre Dame Press is to be commended for producing such a large and complex book with so few misprints (I noticed fewer than half a dozen, and all of them minor). Department of Philosophy University of New Mexico Albuquerque, New Mexico JOHN BussANICH Ordering Wisdom. The Hierarchy of Philosophical Discourse in Aquinas. By MARK D. JoRDAN. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986. 297 pp., bibliography and index. Hardcover, $35.00. Thomas Aquinas is primarily a theologian. The object of the majority of his works is the revealed God. He is also a philosopher-a great one-although in thiis modality he is much less known. The greater part of his philosophical works are commentaries on Aristotle. Consequently, although his commentaries are masterpieces, the reader does not know how much Thomas ·agrees with the Greek philosopher, and how much his commentaries are his own doctrine. Any serious study of Aquinas as a philosopher is therefore welcome. 746 BOOK REVIEWS The present volume, Ordering Wisdom: The Hierarchy of Philosophical Discourse in Aquinas, by Mark Jordan, is indeed a profound and professional investigation of Aquinas as a philosopher. The scope of Jordan's volume is ambtitious and modest at the same time. Ambitious because there are a lot of philosophical questions discussed in the volume. Modest because the reader cannot expect an exhaustive explanation of the contents of Aquinas's philosophical works. The present work is not easy to read. It is very synthetic and dense, on occasion a little obscure, but always profound and very personal. Jordan 1is a philosopher familiar with his subject. The book is really an "ordering wisdom," which positions the different discourses as part of a whole. Analysis and synthesis are used hand in hand, and the reader feels satisfied with new insights. The texts are presented in relation to their historical sources. We know few studies on Aquinas with so many and valuable references to the sources: Aristotle, Plato, Boethius, Averroes, Avicena, Maimonides, and countless others are to light, and their connection with Aquinas revealed. To know AqUJinas in relation to his philosophical sources is to know him better. Jordan's treatise may become a classical volume for the understanding of Aquinas's philosophy in relation to tradition. The philosophical discourses of appeal to the hut this intelligibility is always incomplete and subordinated to the greater intelligibility of revelation and theology. Jordan never forgets this, and he always reminds us of the intrinsic value of philosophy which, in the end, gives way to a greater wisdom. The quotations of Aquinas are carefully selected and in Latin. This may perhaps narrow the number of readers of this work, but it gains in exactitude and clarity, for no ideal translation can match the original Latin text. For whom is this volume written? What is the purpose of these discourses? Those who wish to investigate the hooks of Physics and Metaphysics must engross themselves in a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 127 Chernyshevskii: The Man and the Journalist. By William F. Woehrlin. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 404. $12.50) Professor Woehrlin's book on Nicholas Chernyshevskii is the first full, rich, and precise treatment of that crucially important Russian intellectual in English. The narrative moves, in ten chapters, from "Boyhood in Saratov," "University Years," "The Teacher," and "The Journalist" to a consideration of its protagonist's concern with (...) "Philosophy," "Aesthetics and Literary Criticism," "Economics and Social Theory," and "Politics and the Theory of Revolution." It closes with chapters on "The Revolutionary Movement" and on "Prison and Exile." The volume contains also a bibliography, notes unfortunately relegated to the back, an index, and two photographs of Chcrnyshevskii. The book is on the whole attractively presented, although there are some misprints in the text and several misspelled names in the index. Fairness, judiciousness, care, and common sense characterize Professor Woehrlin's work. Consistently sympathetic and understanding in regard to his subject, he is nevertheless poles apart from the hackneyed hagiography of Soviet specialists. "Were Chernyshevskii's philosophical writings to be judged from the point of view of technical philosophy alone, there would be little to recommend them" (p. 140). Entirely derivative in his philosophy, the Russian radical combined Feuerbach's rejection of God and of German idealism with "the older position of materialistic monism, buttressed by the scientific popularizers of his own day" (p. 141). It was especially this latter orientation, peculiarly congenial to him, that he proceeded to preach with absolute conviction. Chernyshevskii's importance resided in the facts that on the basis of his world view he affirmed the need of revolution in Russia and that his message had a profound impact on the emerging Russian radicalism. Yet the author indicates, in a characteristicaily scrupulous and balanced examination of the sources, that Chernyshevskii as publicist also tried to influence the government in the direction of more far-reaching peasant reform and that there is no conclusive evidence that he himself took part in revolutionary activities. There is distinctly more to praise than to criticize in Professor Woehrlin's book, but the reader does wish at times that the author would develop his analysis. As man, Chernyshevskii stands clearly and sympathetically delineated; yet the author does little to resolve psychological contradictions or offer insights. In terms of ideas, Professor Woehrlin suggests that What Is To Be Done? could be approached as a parody (pp. 314 ft.). But surely more than a suggestion is needed to establish that point. And if not a parody, then what was the real nature of that strange novel and what did it mean to its author? It is when dealing with the obsessive, utopian side of Chernyshevskii that Professor Woehrlin often finds himself ill at ease. But, while one is always entitled to ask for more, one must also be grateful for what is given. Professor Woehrlin has written a very useful book and the best introduction to Chernyshevskii in any language. NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY University of California, Berkeley... (shrink)

The Wofford symposium was the first of the North American bi-centennial conferences on Hegel. Except for a considerable number of troublesome misprints, the present volume preserves the quality of the meeting, and its editor is to be thanked for bringing off the conference and bringing out the volume. Circumstances led him to substitute a general exposition of Hegelian concepts for an intended introduction to the conference theme. As a result the Introduction is too general for most readers of the volume. (...) The spirited use of examples - an Eskimo, an apprentice, a burglar and Moses - will interest pedagogues who have tried to present Hegel. I am not sure, however, that the student would be made sufficiently aware of Hegel’s departure from ordinary dualistic modes of thought. Thus, we read of ideas as “contents coming before the mind,” of Hegel’s “theory of innate ideas,” of mind “having” its thoughts. I am, moreover, puzzled by assertions which I may not have understood well. For example, I do not know what it means to say that for Hegel the unity of a concept “cannot contain a contradictory content,” ; it seems to me that Hegel demands something like this for the concept as notion. Nor does it seem true to say that “the concept of God… is … an exemplification of the triumph of the monistic principle in Hegel’s philosophy”, since he closes the Encyclopedia with an exposition of the necessity for a Trinitarian conception of the divine. These points also seem to trouble the much more sophisticated study which the editor contributed to the conference itself. Although somewhat removed from the specific theme of the conference, it raises one of the most serious questions in Hegelian studies. In what way can Hegel’s readers judge the truth of his assertions? Mr. Christensen sets out to answer by clearly stating the “formal properties” of Hegel’s dialectic method, so that its results will be falsifiable and thereby meet a test which every historical account must meet. It seems to me, however, that Mr. Christensen has shifted from Hegel’s logic to some alleged “method,” and from his philosophical account of history to an “historical” account. Now this introduces presuppositions alien to Hegel’s enterprise, however compatible they may be with some theory of falsifiability. Moreover, we read of two types of content belonging to the Notion, which look very much like an a priori formal and an a posteriori material content. Furthermore, Mr. Christensen seems to suppose that the dialectic must present only those stages which advance spirit and contain their predecessors in a straightforwardly accumulative way. Towards the end of what is a vigorous paper, he confesses that Hegel’s “blurring” of the distinction between method and notion renders a dialectical account of history in principle not falsifiable. It seems to me, however, that in framing the question - while the author has avoided gross reductions of Hegel to formalism or dualism - his thought has shifted towards Verstand and away from Begriff. He is uneasy with his more abstract approach, and with good cause, for the shift works at cross-purposes to the expressed intent of his analysis. Professor Findlay recognizes the importance of calling Hegel to some kind of critical account, but at the end of his prudent comment he returns to an initial scepticism regarding any single formulation of the vital and revisionary character of the dialectic. While he finds many Hegelian accounts “profoundly illuminating”, he also finds that he “cannot further illuminate this illumination”. (shrink)

The present volume is an important and highly useful contribution to Reid studies that adds considerably to our knowledge of his work. The book is well made, and I noticed only one misprint. It contains three sets of manuscripts, one dealing with natural history, another on physiology, and a third, much the largest, on Reid’s work on materialism. It also contains a statement by Paul Wood of very sensible editorial principles, seventy-four pages of introductions to the manuscript material, some (...) explanatory notes with translations of Latin passages in the manuscripts and information about the papers and books Reid quotes or refers to in his texts, an index of manuscripts, a set of textual notes, and a not very useful index for the volume as a whole. Lamentably, the usefulness of the volume is compromised by Wood’s having used editions of Reid’s printed works that are rare and not easily available instead of the standard 1895 Hamilton eighth edition in the Georg Olms reprinted edition. Wood does, on rare occasions, quote from or refer to the Hamilton 1854 fourth edition of Reid’s work whose pagination appears to coincide with the 1895 edition, but these references are too few to be helpful. (shrink)

This rather compendious volume contains twelve articles, eleven of which have been published in the last twenty years; the last, from which the book takes its title, appears in print for the first time. There are four chapters: "Confirmation, Induction, and Rational Belief" contains the paper "Inductive Inconsistencies" as well as "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation"; "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance" appears in the section "Conceptions of Cognitive Significance"; the very well-known "The Theoretician's Dilemma" appears in the third chapter—"Structure (...) and Function of Scientific Concepts and Theories"—along with "Typological Methods in the Natural and Social Sciences"; "Scientific Explanation," the fourth chapter, contains "Studies in the Logic of Explanation" and "The Logic of Functional Analysis," as well as the title article. "Aspects" runs to nearly book length and is concerned to survey and contribute to the range of scientific explanation—from physics to history. Hempel discusses the Deductive-Nomological approach and compares it to certain forms of Statistical Explanation; the Covering-law Model of Explanation is introduced and defended against proponents of Explanation-by-Concept, Dispositional Explanation, and Genetic Explanation: Hempel asserts that these three can be subsumed under the Covering-law model. The relation of rationality and decision to Explanation, and the related pragmatic aspects of Explanation are also considered. These are postscripts to certain articles which bring their discussions up to date. There are several rather confusing misprints, but overall the presentation is workmanlike. Hempel's contributions in the philosophy of science have been influential and important, and it is gratifying to have the most important of these collected together.—P. J. M. (shrink)

Bursill-Hall, writing as a linguist, has produced a book of interest and use to all students of philosophy who are intrigued either by medieval or by modern theories of language, or by both. Bursill-Hall’s book is the first full-length presentation of this material in English. After a brief, not to say, desultory, survey of the history of linguistic theory from the Greeks until the appearance of the so-called Modistae, the author discusses the descriptive technique and the terminology of the speculative (...) grammarians. The third chapter, "Metalanguage," offers a valuable analysis of the basic "elements" and "categories" of modistic grammar. One especially striking feature of this chapter is the author’s account of the sequence of operations through which a vox, or meaningless sound, becomes, first, a dictio, or sound capable of signifying, and, then, a pars orationis, a part of speech or word-class, capable of entering into syntactic relations with other partes orationis so as to produce a meaningful and well-formed sentence. The next four chapters form the core of the work. Taking as his primary sources the Belgian Siger of Courtrai, the German Thomas of Erfurt, and the Dane Martin of Dacia, Bursill-Hall expounds in detail the modistic treatments of the essential, specific and accidental features of the declinable and indeclinable word-classes and the modistic theories of syntax. An evaluative conclusion comparing modistic and modern linguistic theory is followed by a series of appendices in which detailed diagrams make visible the definitions and interrelations of the various modes and partes orationis in the texts of Siger, Thomas and Martin. The work includes a useful bibliography, a table of passages cited from medieval authors, an index of examples cited in the main text, an index of names and an index of subjects. The exposition and the apparatus combine to yield a volume of quickly apparent value for both reference and research. This said, and with due regard for the fact that the author is writing as a professional linguist, it must be said that a certain sense of philosophical disappointment cannot be suppressed. Looked at linguistically, speculative grammar is an attempt to inventory and describe those features of word-classes in virtue of which an element of language is potentially expressive of meaning and capable of entering into syntactic relations with other significant elements. Looked at philosophically, speculative grammar is a theory of the intelligibility of linguistic expressions—cp. Thomas of Erfurt, #225: the end served by a complete expression is "to express a composite mental concept and to generate a perfect understanding in the mind of the hearer." Intelligibility is seen in this theory as the product of the concurrence or interpenetration of the ontological constitution of extramental realities, the apprehensive powers of the intellect and the manners of signifying conferred by the intellect on the linguistic medium in accordance with its appreciation of extramental reality. The author is certainly aware of the philosophical matrix of the grammatical theories he rehearses. At the same time, he seems to give these underlying philosophical considerations rather short shrift. To say, as he does, that the Modistae "seem to have been unaware of... the fact that their theories were in fact a projection into reality of the basic patterns of the language in which they were expressed," is surely not to do justice to the complex ontological, epistemological and semantic issues informing their work. Similarly, a statement that comparison between modistic and modern theories faces the difficulty that "the medieval vision of man in his environment and the metaphysical theories of the world are entirely different from those of today" is, at best, uninformative and, at worst, a piece of vaporous historicism. At other times, it is not entirely clear what interpretation the author is recommending. This is especially true of his remarks about the inactive character of the modus intelligendi. While the Modistae were, after all, doing grammar and not epistemology or, should one say, rational psychology, still, their grammatical theory rests on their insistence that the forms of language are linked appropriately to the forms of being and it is the modus intelligendi activus that is responsible both for the possibility and the success of this linkage. This volume is well-produced and almost completely free of misprints. However, the obnoxiously high price asked by the publisher is not justified either by the quality of production or by the inclusion of numerous Latin citations; it only serves, I fear, as a barrier to the wide circulation the book deserves.—D. L. (shrink)

An enlargement of a previous work by the author, this work is intended as a reference source for study in the theory of models of logical systems, and as a textbook; the latter aim is reached by including numerous problems, many of them of a high level of difficulty, at the end of each chapter. The sections deal with, respectively, the lower predicate calculus, the structure of algebraic theories, concepts from model theory, completeness of various systems, definability of concepts, generalizations (...) of algebraic concepts, the metamathematical theories of ideals and varieties, and various selected topics including non-standard analysis. Unfortunately, there are numerous misprints which mar an otherwise excellent presentation. Much of the material presented is new, or is presented in new form. Robinson's approach is mildly idiosyncratic and often at variance with more conventional presentations, and this may make for difficulty in relating it to these presentations. Nevertheless, for the reader with a working knowledge of algebra and no small perseverance, this book will be rewarding.—P. J. M. (shrink)

We have here a systematic examination of systems of logic cast in "natural deduction" form, in the widest sense of that word. Naturally enough, the author begins with Gentzen-style systems, moves by means of the inversion principle in int-elim logics to deductions of classical and intuitionistic logic which have a canonical "normal form"; more briefly, but always with clarity, Prawitz examines natural deduction for second-order and modal logics, and also systems with even less usual forms of implication. Three appendices cover (...) the Sequenzen-kalkül of Gentzen, a system of set theory of Fitch, and some alternative formulations of natural deductions due to Jáskowski and others. There is a short bibliography. There are also some hilarious misprints, few serious.—P. J. M. (shrink)

This seventh of the eight volumes in E. S. de Beer's superb edition of Locke's extant correspondence covers the period 27 January, 1700, through 14 May, 1703. Of the approximately 620 letters included, some 190 are from Locke. Of these almost two thirds are letters to his cousin and financial agent Peter King. The letters are in English, French, or Latin. Those in Latin are translated, quite ably, if with occasional misprints. The enormously helpful editorial materials of the first volume (...) are, of course, not repeated. But the editor does provide, economically and unobtrusively, a great deal of needed assistance of a textual, biographical, background, or cross-referential sort. (shrink)

Bursill-Hall, writing as a linguist, has produced a book of interest and use to all students of philosophy who are intrigued either by medieval or by modern theories of language, or by both. Bursill-Hall’s book is the first full-length presentation of this material in English. After a brief, not to say, desultory, survey of the history of linguistic theory from the Greeks until the appearance of the so-called Modistae, the author discusses the descriptive technique and the terminology of the speculative (...) grammarians. The third chapter, "Metalanguage," offers a valuable analysis of the basic "elements" and "categories" of modistic grammar. One especially striking feature of this chapter is the author’s account of the sequence of operations through which a vox, or meaningless sound, becomes, first, a dictio, or sound capable of signifying, and, then, a pars orationis, a part of speech or word-class, capable of entering into syntactic relations with other partes orationis so as to produce a meaningful and well-formed sentence. The next four chapters form the core of the work. Taking as his primary sources the Belgian Siger of Courtrai, the German Thomas of Erfurt, and the Dane Martin of Dacia, Bursill-Hall expounds in detail the modistic treatments of the essential, specific and accidental features of the declinable and indeclinable word-classes and the modistic theories of syntax. An evaluative conclusion comparing modistic and modern linguistic theory is followed by a series of appendices in which detailed diagrams make visible the definitions and interrelations of the various modes and partes orationis in the texts of Siger, Thomas and Martin. The work includes a useful bibliography, a table of passages cited from medieval authors, an index of examples cited in the main text, an index of names and an index of subjects. The exposition and the apparatus combine to yield a volume of quickly apparent value for both reference and research. This said, and with due regard for the fact that the author is writing as a professional linguist, it must be said that a certain sense of philosophical disappointment cannot be suppressed. Looked at linguistically, speculative grammar is an attempt to inventory and describe those features of word-classes in virtue of which an element of language is potentially expressive of meaning and capable of entering into syntactic relations with other significant elements. Looked at philosophically, speculative grammar is a theory of the intelligibility of linguistic expressions—cp. Thomas of Erfurt, #225: the end served by a complete expression is "to express a composite mental concept and to generate a perfect understanding in the mind of the hearer." Intelligibility is seen in this theory as the product of the concurrence or interpenetration of the ontological constitution of extramental realities, the apprehensive powers of the intellect and the manners of signifying conferred by the intellect on the linguistic medium in accordance with its appreciation of extramental reality. The author is certainly aware of the philosophical matrix of the grammatical theories he rehearses. At the same time, he seems to give these underlying philosophical considerations rather short shrift. To say, as he does, that the Modistae "seem to have been unaware of... the fact that their theories were in fact a projection into reality of the basic patterns of the language in which they were expressed," is surely not to do justice to the complex ontological, epistemological and semantic issues informing their work. Similarly, a statement that comparison between modistic and modern theories faces the difficulty that "the medieval vision of man in his environment and the metaphysical theories of the world are entirely different from those of today" is, at best, uninformative and, at worst, a piece of vaporous historicism. At other times, it is not entirely clear what interpretation the author is recommending. This is especially true of his remarks about the inactive character of the modus intelligendi. While the Modistae were, after all, doing grammar and not epistemology or, should one say, rational psychology, still, their grammatical theory rests on their insistence that the forms of language are linked appropriately to the forms of being and it is the modus intelligendi activus that is responsible both for the possibility and the success of this linkage. This volume is well-produced and almost completely free of misprints. However, the obnoxiously high price asked by the publisher is not justified either by the quality of production or by the inclusion of numerous Latin citations; it only serves, I fear, as a barrier to the wide circulation the book deserves.—D. L. (shrink)

"Of the making of many books there is no end" seems reasonable enough when the subject is infinity but after reading this well-organized study one is not so sure; a figure suggested by Zeno speaks of "a fog [which] the incessant labours of modern scholars often cause." Sweeney’s methodology is to use the ever-increasing body of modern critical discussions as a help in interpreting and assessing the presocratic fragments and their ancient commentators. For Anaximander a particularly detailed and nuanced coverage (...) of the literature between 1947 and 1970 is presented-over twenty major interpretations, with supplementary articles treated in an Appendix. Subsequent chapters treat in less detail the positions on infinity of the other Ionians, Pythagoras, the Eleatics, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists. Here the author relies heavily on existing surveys like those of Kirk and Raven and Guthrie. This raises a question about the kind of audience envisaged. To a sentence like "Let us now trace as simply and yet accurately as possible Raven’s views", Raven could be pardoned for reacting with the impression that he had already done just that himself. Much of the book is a perhaps over-leisurely doxography of work written in uncomplicated English, albeit in widely scattered journals; nonetheless Sweeney’s imposing, almost intimidating, coverage of bibliography will save even seasoned ancient philosophers many hours of L'année philologique-hunting and makes his work an important and eminently worthwhile contribution. Apart from some relatively minor misprints there is a serious confusion of Alcmaeon with the poet Alcman. Alcman deserves better treatment in the exegesis of Anaximander’s "rather poetical terms."—T. H. (shrink)