It is commonly thought that unconscious processes cannot produce actions deserving praise or blame. I present a thought experiment designed to generate a contradicting intuition: at least in this case, we do give credit for the product of an unconscious process. The target is creativity. Many instances of creative thought begin with a step that unconsciously generates a new idea by combining existing ideas. The resulting ideas are selected and developed by later processing. This first step could be replaced (...) with a simple machine that randomly pairs concepts. Now, imagine a philosopher, Liberty, who gets all of his paper ideas from this machine. Compare him to another philosopher, Libertad, who comes up with all the same papers using her own mind. If you share the intuition that Liberty’s work deserves less credit for creativity, you are giving credit for the product of an unconscious process. (shrink)

In scientific communications, journal articles, and philosophical aesthetic debates the words “art”, “creativity”, and “machine” are put together more and more frequently. Since some machines are designed to, or happens to, imitate human artistic creativity, it seems natural to use the same words to talk about human artists and machines which imitate them. However, the evolution of language in light of technology may conceal specific features of the phenomena it is supposed to describe. This makes it difficult (...) to understand what machine creativity actually is and how it is connected to human creativity. The aim of the paper is to investigate why, and in what sense, the functioning of some machines may be described in terms of artistic creativity and what is the relation between machine creativity and its human archetype. I start (§1) by introducing some general ideas concerning how language evolves alongside new technologies and focusing on the case of machine creativity. In §2 I review how some creative machines have been presented to the public, thus showing that a linguistic habit which connects machines to artistic creativity has already formed. In §3 I survey the debate on machine aesthetics and I highlight the main traits of the issue. In §4 I submit a primary scheme of machine creativity which draws on the concept of functional autonomy. Finally (§5), I argue that machine creativity cannot be mistaken for a substitute of the human kind, despite the fact that the word is the same. Creative machines are technological mediums by which new forms of human aesthetic experience can be explored. The kind of creativity machines enjoy displays a functional nature. (shrink)

Computational Creativity, Concept Invention, and General Intelligence in their own right all are flourishing research disciplines producing surprising and captivating results that continuously influence and change our view on where the limits of intelligent machines lie, each day pushing the boundaries a bit further. By 2014, all three fields also have left their marks on everyday life – machine-composed music has been performed in concert halls, automated theorem provers are accepted tools in enterprises’ R&D departments, and cognitive architectures (...) are being integrated in pilot assistance systems for next generation airplanes. Still, although the corresponding aims and goals are clearly similar (as are the common methods and approaches), the developments in each of these areas have happened mostly individually within the respective community and without closer relationships to the goings-on in the other two disciplines. In order to overcome this gap and to provide a common platform for interaction and exchange between the different directions, the International Workshops on “Computational Creativity, Concept Invention, and General Intelligence” (C3GI) have been started. At ECAI-2012 and IJCAI-2013, the first and second edition of C3GI each gathered researchers from all three fields, presenting recent developments and results from their research and in dialogue and joint debates bridging the disciplinary boundaries. The chapters contained in this book are based on expanded versions of accepted contributions to the workshops and additional selected contributions by renowned researchers in the relevant fields. Individually, they give an account of the state-of-the-art in their respective area, discussing both, theoretical approaches as well as implemented systems. When taken together and looked at from an integrative perspective, the book in its totality offers a starting point for a (re)integration of Computational Creativity, Concept Invention, and General Intelligence, making visible common lines of work and theoretical underpinnings, and pointing at chances and opportunities arising from the interplay of the three fields. (shrink)

As we write this research paper, we notice an explosion in popularity of machine learning in numerous fields (ranging from governance, education, and management to criminal justice, fraud detection, and internet of things). In this contribution, rather than focusing on any of those fields, which have been well-reviewed already, we decided to concentrate on a series of more recent applications of deep learning models and technologies that have only recently gained significant track in the relevant literature. These applications are (...) concerned with artistic production (Sect. 2.1), the writing process (Sect. 2.2), music production (Sect. 2.3), text recognition and attribution (Sect. 2.4). After reviewing and analyzing the positive contributions as well as some of the major limitations of these technologies in each of those fields, we critically reflect (Sect. 3) on how their widespread implementation may affect humans and their creativity. In Sect. 4, we notice that deep learning models are here to stay; so, rather than embracing a negative or pessimistic stance with respect to their future applications in creative domains, we suggest a balanced approach for their assessment and beneficial usage. Finally (Sect. 5), we conclude by summarising what we have achieved and by pointing out possible future research directions. (shrink)

The paper argues that machines cannot duplicate human linguistic creativity because linguistic meaning is context dependent in a way that eludes any machine.

This paper analyzes creative practice including virtual music composition by a human and sets of computer programs, improvisation of music and dance in human-robot ensembles, and drawings produced by a human and a robotic arm. In all of these examples, the paper argues that creativity arises from a process of human-robot collaboration. Human influences on the machines involved exist at many levels, from initial creation and programming, via processes of reprogramming and setup of underlying data and parameters, to engagement (...) throughout the process of creative production. The decision to value a machine as a creative other is supported most strongly when collaborating with the machine directly, while witnessing the creative team at work, as opposed simply to seeing the result, is more likely to bring an audience to a similar understanding. The creativity of the human-machine collaborations analyzed in this paper relies on close interaction, within which there is a continual recognition of the otherness of the machine and its nonhuman abilities. Such relations can be theorized by extending Emmanuel Levinas’ conception of the face-to-face encounter within which self and other are brought into proximity, but the alterity of the other is nonetheless retained. The paper’s analysis of creative interactions between humans and robots supports the idea that machines need not be regarded as challenging human artistic practice, but rather enable new ways for creativity to arise through human-machine collaborations within which human and nonhuman creative abilities are combined. (shrink)

In mid-twentieth century, the hypothesis, ‘a machine can think’ became very popular after, Alan Turing’s article on ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’. This hypothesis, ‘a machine can think’ established the foundations of machine intelligence (MI), and claimed that machines have consciousness and creativity, with the power to compete with human beings. In the first section, I shall show how consciousness and creativity is conceptualized in the domain of MI. The main aim of MI is not only (...) to construct difficult programs to solve our day-to-day problems, but also to reproduce mentality in machines. It was claimed that all the mental qualities are ascribable to machines. My intention in this paper is to clarify consciousness and creativity from a subjective point of view. My claim is that consciousness and creativity cannot be fully represented in a mechanistic domain. There are subjective mental or conscious states, which can be seen in a first-person perspective of their proper understanding. (shrink)

As machines take over more tasks previously done by humans, artistic creation is also considered as a candidate to be automated. But, can machines create art? This paper offers a conceptual framework for a philosophical discussion of this question regarding the status of machine art and machine creativity. It breaks the main question down in three sub-questions, and then analyses each question in order to arrive at more precise problems with regard to machine art and (...) class='Hi'>machine creativity: What is art creation? What do we mean by art? And, what do we mean by machines create art? This then provides criteria we can use to discuss the main question in relation to particular cases. In the course of the analysis, the paper engages with theory in aesthetics, refers to literature on computational creativity, and contributes to the philosophy of technology and philosophical anthropology by reflecting on the role of technology in art creation. It is shown that the distinctions between process versus outcome criteria and subjective versus objective criteria of creativity are unstable. It is also argued that we should consider non-human forms of creativity, and not only cases where either humans or machines create art but also collaborations between humans and machines, which makes us reflect on human-technology relations. Finally, the paper questions the very approach that seeks criteria and suggests that the artistic status of machines may be shown and revealed in the human/non-human encounter before any theorizing or agreement takes place; an experience which then is presupposed when we theorize. This hints at a more general model of what happens in artistic perception and engagement as a hybrid human-technological and emergent or even poetic process, a model which leaves more room for letting ourselves be surprised by creativity—human and perhaps non-human. (shrink)

North American music education is a commodity sold to pre-service and in-service music teachers. Like all mass-produced consumables, it is valuable to the extent that it is not creative, that is, to the extent that it is reproducible. This is demonstrated in curricular materials, notably general music series textbook and music scores available from a rapidly shrinking cadre of publishers, as well as rigid and pre-determined pedagogical practices. Distributing resources and techniques that produce predicable, consistent, and repeatable goods and services, (...) the economy of music teacher preparation and development must necessarily exclude creativity, which consequently must be viewed as not only inefficient but unprofitable. More than undesirable, however, creativity is constructed as dangerous as it injects difference in a system that relies on sameness. Because of its implications for music education discourse and practices, I focus my discussion on research in general and feminist critique in particular in music education. Reading through Monique Wittig's ‘The Trojan Horse’ as literary war machine, I argue that creative writing and academic research are not mutually exclusive, and that it is only through infusing the literary or creative in scholarly writing that interlocking systems of oppression may be altered and difference implicated in music education. My analysis of Roberta Lamb's (1995) research piece, ‘Tone Deaf/Symphonies Singing: Sketches for a Musicale’ depicts it as Trojan Horse, albeit one that Lamb herself, most likely as a function of editorial imperative, hobbles. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that machines can create works of art. My argument is based on an analysis of the so-called creative machines and focuses on technical functions and intentions. If my proposal is correct, then creative machines are technical artifacts with the proper function to bring about works of art. My account is based on sensible conceptual connections between makers, technical artifacts, intentions, and the creation of art. One upshot of the account presented here is that we do (...) not need a new conceptual framework or dubious assumptions about artistic agency on part of machines in order to arrive at the conclusion that creative machines make art. I will conclude the paper with some remarks regarding the artistic value of items produced by creative machines. (shrink)

The modern concept of creativity as an attribute of human beings has, since its very beginnings in the 18th Century, routinely been defined in opposition to that of the programme. In Edward Young’s...

The notion of computation has changed the world more than any previous expressions of knowledge. However, as know-how in its particular algorithmic embodiment, computation is closed to meaning. Therefore, computer-based data processing can only mimic life’s creative aspects, without being creative itself. AI’s current record of accomplishments shows that it automates tasks associated with intelligence, without being intelligent itself. Mistaking the abstract for the concrete has led to the religion of “everything is an output of computation”—even the humankind that conceived (...) the computer. The hypostatized role of computers explains the increased dependence on them. The convergence machine called deep learning is only the most recent form through which the deterministic theology of the machine claims more than what it actually is: extremely effective data processing. A proper understanding of complexity, as well as the need to distinguish between the reactive nature of the artificial and the anticipatory nature of the living are suggested as practical responses to the challenges posed by machine theology. (shrink)

Can matter, things, nonhuman organisms, technologies, tools and machines, biota or institutions be seen as creative? How does such creativity reposition the visionary activities of humans? This article is an elaboration of such questions as well as an attempt at a partial response. It was written as an editorial for the special issue of the Digital Creativity journal that interrogates the conception of Post-Anthropocentric Creativity. However, the text below is a rather unconventional editorial. It does not attempt (...) to provide an overview of the issue’s theme but, instead, samples it via a particular example. The idea of the issue was to think about post-anthropocentricism by considering (1) agents, recipients and processes of creativity alongside with its (2) purpose, value, ethics and politics. This article addresses the first subtheme by puzzling at the paradoxes of “field learning” and picks at the second by considering the texture of “automated beauty”. Both of these parts use chess for an example. The narrative on chess is intermitted by a section “on creativity” that attempts to contextualize the case-based discussion in the wider context and to consider motivations and implications. (shrink)

This paper explores the intersection of art history and AI technology. Special attention is paid to Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), a machine learning technology widely used in AI art. This technology is particularly interesting to art history and the philosophy of art because it raises enduring questions about the creative process of artmaking, especially what constitutes a new and original work of art. While this is a relatively new area, it is possible to discern emerging directions where art and (...) AI intersect. One pressing issue concerns the use (or misuse) of algorithmically enabled technologies and datasets to perpetuate longstanding art-historical biases. The critical position adopted in this paper shares this concern. I examine a notable example of GAN technology that claims to create original art styles. While such experiments in computational creativity are technically interesting, their artistic aims can be questionable. I argue a mechanical model of artistic development based solely on the autonomy of style is problematic for at least two reasons: 1) it uncritically reinstates a formalist view of art history; 2) it recreates a narrow style-centric ‘historical modernism.’ However, despite voicing these reservations, I also discuss the potential of this technology to engage with topics of critical relevance to art history and the philosophy of art. (shrink)

The Turing Test is claimed by many to be a way to test for the presence, in computers, of such ``deep'' phenomena as thought and consciousness. Unfortunately, attempts to build computational systems able to pass TT have devolved into shallow symbol manipulation designed to, by hook or by crook, trick. The human creators of such systems know all too well that they have merely tried to fool those people who interact with their systems into believing that these systems really have (...) minds. And the problem is fundamental: the structure of the TT is such as to cultivate tricksters. A better test is one that insists on a certain restrictive epistemic relation between an artificial agent A, its output o, and the human architect H of A – a relation which, roughly speaking, obtains when H cannot account for how A produced o. We call this test the ``Lovelace Test'' in honor of Lady Lovelace, who believed that only when computers originate things should they be believed to have minds. (shrink)

Mahadevan proposes that we are at the cusp of imagination science, one of whose primary concerns will be the design of imagination machines. Programs have been written that are capable of generating jokes, producing line-drawings that have been exhibited at such galleries as the Tate, composing music in several styles reminiscent of such greats as Vivaldi and Mozart, proving geometry theorems, and inducing quantitative laws from empirical data. In recent years, Dartmouth has been hosting Turing Tests in creativity in (...) three categories: short stories, sonnets, and dance music DJ sets. In this post, I will provide a brief and non-exhaustive survey of some plausible responses to these imagination machines and the related prospects for our understanding of the imagination. (shrink)

In this Element, we’ll explore the nature of both imagination and creative thinking in an effort to understand the relation between them and also to understand their role in the vast array of activities in which they are typically implicated, from art, music, and literature to technology, medicine, and science. Focusing on the contemporary philosophical literature, we will take up several interrelated questions: What is imagination, and how does it fit into the cognitive architecture of the mind? What is (...) class='Hi'>creativity? Is imagination required for creativity? Is creativity required for imagination? Is a person simply born either imaginative or not (and likewise, either creative or not), or are imagination and creativity skills that can be cultivated? And finally, are imagination and creativity uniquely human capacities, or can they be had by nonbiological entities such as AI systems? (shrink)

In a document penned under the direction of its then-president Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the Vatican’s International Theological Commission observed that many neo-Darwinian materialists and their Christian critics share a misunderstanding of the nature of divine causality. This article explores the thought of Joseph Ratzinger in view of proposing the features of a path that seeks to eschew these faulty understandings of how God causes evolutionary change within our world, thus providing an alternative to the Intelligent Design movement’s approach to creation.. (...) Ratzinger has a deep respect for the integrity of nature, rejecting the notion that God is a “craftsman” who “tinkers” with the world. According to Ratzinger, evolutionary change occurs “precisely in the processes of a living being” even as human beings are “not the mere product of development.” Finally, the emeritus pontiff insists that creation is an ever-present act that unfolds “in the manner in which thought is creative,” a dynamic that he describes variously as a story, drama, melody, and symphony. Wedding these and other key insights, this article submits that Ratzinger’s thought on evolution should lead us to conceive of creation less along the lines of an intelligently designed machine and more as a masterpiece story that is continually being told as its plot unfolds naturally over the course of time. (shrink)

Current developments in fields such as quantum physics, fine arts, robotics, cognitive sciences or defense and security indicate the emergence of creative systems capable of producing new and innovative solutions through combinations of machine learning algorithms. These systems, called machine invention systems, challenge the established invention paradigm in promising the automation of – at least parts of – the innovation process. This paper’s main contribution is twofold. Based on the identified state-of-the-art examples in the above mentioned fields, key (...) components for machine invention systems and their relations are identified, creating a conceptual model as well as proposing a working definition for machine invention systems. The differences and delimitations to other concepts in the field of machine learning and artificial intelligence, such as machine discovery systems are discussed as well. Furthermore, the paper briefly addresses the social and societal implications and limitations that come with the adoption of the technology. Because of their revolutionizing potential, there are widespread implications to consider from ethical and moral implications to policymaking and societal changes, like changes in the job structure. The discussion part approaches some of these implications, as well as solutions to some of the proposed challenges. The paper concludes by discussing some of the systemic benefits that can be accessed through machine invention. (shrink)

Human creativity generates novel ideas to solve real-world problems. This thereby grants us the power to transform the surrounding world and extend our human attributes beyond what is currently possible. Creative ideas are not just new and unexpected, but are also successful in providing solutions that are useful, efficient and valuable. Thus, creativity optimizes the use of available resources and increases wealth. The origin of human creativity, however, is poorly understood, and semantic measures that could predict the (...) success of generated ideas are currently unknown. Here, we analyze a dataset of design problem-solving conversations in real-world settings by using 49 semantic measures based on WordNet 3.1 and demonstrate that a divergence of semantic similarity, an increased information content, and a decreased polysemy predict the success of generated ideas. The first feedback from clients also enhances information content and leads to a divergence of successful ideas in creative problem solving. These results advance cognitive science by identifying real-world processes in human problem solving that are relevant to the success of produced solutions and provide tools for real-time monitoring of problem solving, student training and skill acquisition. A selected subset of information content (IC Sánchez–Batet) and semantic similarity (Lin/Sánchez–Batet) measures, which are both statistically powerful and computationally fast, could support the development of technologies for computer-assisted enhancements of human creativity or for the implementation of creativity in machines endowed with general artificial intelligence. (shrink)

As art produced by autonomous machines becomes increasingly common, and as such machines grow increasingly sophisticated, we risk a confusion between art produced by a person but mediated by a machine, and art produced by what might be legitimately considered a machine artist. This distinction will be examined here. In particular, my argument seeks to close a gap between, on one hand, a philosophically grounded theory of art and, on the other hand, theories concerned with behavior, intentionality, expression, (...) and creativity in natural and artificial agents. This latter set of theories in some cases addresses creative behavior in relation to visual art, music, and literature, in the frequently overlapping contexts of philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. However, research in these areas does not typically address problems in the philosophy of art as a central line of inquiry. Similarly, the philosophy of art does not typically address issues pertaining to artificial agents. (shrink)

Recent philosophy of mind has increasingly focused on the role of technology in shaping, influencing, and extending our mental faculties. Technology extends the mind in two basic ways: through the creative design of artifacts and the purposive use of instruments. If the meaningful activity of technological artifacts were exhaustively described in these mind-dependent terms, then a philosophy of technology would depend entirely on our theory of mind. In this dissertation, I argue that a mind-dependent approach to technology is mistaken. Instead, (...) some machines are best understood as independent participants in their own right, contributing to and augmenting a variety of social practices as active, though often unrecognized, community members. Beginning with Turing’s call for “fair play for machines”, I trace an argument concerning the social autonomy of nonhuman agents through the artificial intelligence debates of the 20th century. I’ll argue that undue focus on the mind has obscured the force of Turing’s proposal, leaving the debates in an unfortunate stalemate. I will then examine a network theoretic alternative to the study of multi-agent complex systems that can avoid anthropocentric, mind-dependent ways of framing human-machine interactions. I argue that this approach allows for both scientific and philosophical treatment of large and complicated sociotechnical systems, and suggests novel methods for designing, managing, and maintaining such systems. Rethinking machines in mind-independent terms will illuminate the nature, scope, and evolution of our social and technological practices, and will help clarify the relationships between minds, machines, and the environments we share. (shrink)

The essay presents a novel theory of meaning-as-response inspired by the pragmatist cultural historian Morse Peckham in the mid-twentieth century. This approach is useful here in consideration of how artistic behavior can make a difference in technical culture and in relation to innovative technical practices. Continuing from Félix Guattari's notion of the machine as a partial object, this essay examines the essentialist idea of computational machines as creative collaborators which haunts the model of interaction prevailing today. Following this negative (...) critique, the essay advances a positive approach emphasizing partiality in experimental design practices as a step toward a renewed art of living. (shrink)

The Minimum Description Length principle is the modernformalisation of Occam's razor. It has been extensively and successfullyused in machine learning, especially for noisy and long sources ofdata. However, the MDL principle presents some paradoxes andinconveniences. After discussing all these, we address two of the mostrelevant: lack of explanation and lack of creativity. We present newalternatives to address these problems. The first one, intensionalcomplexity, avoids extensional parts in a description, so distributingcompression ratio in a more even way than the (...) MDL principle. The secondone, information gain, forces that the hypothesis is informative wrt. the evidence, so giving a formaldefinition of what is to discover. (shrink)

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari redefine the relation between the state and its war machine. Far from being a part of the state, warriers are nomads who always come from the outside and keep threatening the authority of the state. In this daring essay inspired by Nietzsche, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari redefine the relation between the state and its war machine. Far from being a part of the state, warriers are nomads who always come from the outside (...) and keep threatening the authority of the state. In the same vein, nomadic science keeps infiltrating royal science, undermining its axioms and principles. Nomadology is a speedy, pocket-sized treatise that refuses to be pinned down. Theorizing a dynamic relationship between sedentary power and "schizophrenic lines of flight," this volume is meant to be read in transit, smuggled into urban nightclubs, offices, and subways. Deleuze and Guattari propose a creative and resistant ethics of becoming-imperceptible, strategizing a continuous invention of weapons on the run. An anarchic bricolage of ideas uprooted from anthropology, aesthetics, history, and military strategy, Nomadology carries out Deleuze's desire to "leave philosophy, but to leave it as a philosopher.". (shrink)

This paper presents a basically new theory of values. Potential goods such as flying machines have been creatively actualized and thus value is creative actualization. Norms, ideals, standards, and theories also require creative actualization. As actions melioristically transform the world for the better, the goals of action provide purpose and meaning, as well as the ground of change, a superior goal providing the end for which agents undertake action. The kinds of value represent irreducibly plural categories of good: beauty, knowledge, (...) prosperity, intimacy, and so on. (shrink)

This paper questions the notion of creativity found in certain artworks produced with A.I. technologies. The artistic examples concerned are: The Giver of names by David Rokeby, Oscar by Catherine Ikam and Louis Fléri, and Emotion Vending Machine by Maurice Benayoun. These artworks were selected because they stand out for their autonomous behavior in front of the human public. In this context, creativity is revealed as a consequence of the functional autonomy, which is very typical of these (...) pieces of art. The intention is to establish a relationship between the notion of autonomy and that of creativity, reviewing their meanings and applications in philosophy and in the field of life science. (shrink)

As we move towards a world that is using machine learning and nascent artificial intelligence to analyse and, in many ways, guide most aspects of our lives, new forms of heterogeneous collaborative teams that include human/intelligent machine agents will become not just possible, but an inevitable part of our shared world. The conscious participation of the arts in the conversation about, and development and implementation of, these new collaborative possibilities is crucial, as the arts serve as our best (...) lens through which we can explore the full spectrum of potential possibilities and futures. Through the complex relationships formed through heterogeneous human/intelligent agent collaboration, we are given the opportunity to re-examine some of our assumptions and suppositions of teamwork and forms of relating and thinking within a group environment. (shrink)

If artificial neural networks are ever to form the foundation for higher level cognitive behaviors in machines or to realize their full potential as explanatory devices for human cognition, they must show signs of autonomy, multifunction operation, and intersystem integration that are absent in most existing models. This model begins to address these issues by integrating predictive learning, sequence interleaving, and sequence creation components to simulate a spectrum of higher-order cognitive behaviors which have eluded the grasp of simpler systems. Its (...) capabilities are described based on simulations calling for increasing levels of functionality and are used to show how the model can progress from fundamental sequence learning and recall tasks to sophisticated behaviors such as an ability to solve simple mathematical expressions and a creative capacity for the formation and application of inductive rules. (shrink)

There are two classical and opposite positions about scientific discovery: the one that conceives scientific discovery activity as fully rational and the one that conceives scientific discovery activity as fully irrational. In the first case, machines are regarded as able to perform the scientific discovery process whereas, in the second case, machines are considered unable to perform any part of the scientific discovery process.We adopt a third intermediate approach that envisages a new role for machines, which are conceived as descriptions (...) of the results of scientific discovery activity. More precisely, the purpose of the paper is to illustrate the multilevel structure of a machine, called creative dynamic agency, that represents the articulated and incremental description of the product of scientific discovery process. The multilevel architecture reflects the composition relation that holds among phenomena described by creative agents that compose creative dynamic agency. (shrink)

Computational Creativity: A Continuing Journey Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11023-010-9212-0 Authors Tony Veale, Departamento de Ingeniera del Software e Inteligencia Artificial, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Pablo Gervás, Departamento de Ingeniera del Software e Inteligencia Artificial, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Rafael Pérez y Pérez, Departamento de Ingeniera del Software e Inteligencia Artificial, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Journal Minds and Machines Online ISSN 1572-8641 Print ISSN 0924-6495 Journal Volume Volume 20 Journal Issue Volume 20, (...) Number 4. (shrink)

We consider only the relationship of consciousness to physical reality, whether physical reality is interpreted as the brain, artificial intelligence, or the universe as a whole. The difficulties with starting the analysis with physical reality on the one hand and with consciousness on the other are delineated. We consider how one may derive from the other. Concepts of universal or pure consciousness versus local or ego consciousness are explored with the possibility that consciousness may be physically creative. We examine whether (...) artificial intelligence can possess consciousness as an extension of the interrelationship between consciousness and the brain or material reality. (shrink)

The tendency to idealise artificial intelligence as independent from human manipulators, combined with the growing ontological entanglement of humans and digital machines, has created an “anthrobotic” horizon, in which data analytics, statistics and probabilities throw our agential power into question. How can we avoid the consequences of a reified definition of intelligence as universal operation becoming imposed upon our destinies? It is here argued that the fantasised autonomy of automated intelligence presents a contradistinctive opportunity for philosophical consciousness to understand itself (...) anew as holistic and co-creative, beyond the recent “analytic” moment of the history of philosophy. Here we introduce the concept of “crealectic intelligence”, a meta-analytic and meta-dialectic aspect of consciousness. Intelligent behaviour may consist in distinguishing discrete familiar parts or reproducible functions in the midst of noise via an analytic process of segmentation; intelligence may also manifest itself in the constitution of larger wholes and dynamic unities through a dialectic process of association or assemblage. But, by contrast, crealectic intelligence co-creates realities in the image of an ideal or truth, taking into account the desiring agent imbued with a sense of possibility, in a relationship not only with the Real but also with the creative sublime or “Creal”. (shrink)

The greatest rhetorical challenge to developers of creative artificial intelligence systems is convincingly arguing that their software is more than just an extension of their own creativity. This paper suggests that “creative autonomy,” which exists when a system not only evaluates creations on its own, but also changes its standards without explicit direction, is a necessary condition for making this argument. Rather than requiring that the system be hermetically sealed to avoid perceptions of human influence, developing creative autonomy is (...) argued to be more plausible if the system is intimately embedded in a broader society of other creators and critics. Ideas are presented for constructing systems that might be able to achieve creative autonomy. (shrink)

We have always had some fear of our machines. During the Industrial Revolution, for instance, we developed machines fueled by steam and oil to assist us in our labour-intensive tasks, and saw dramatic increases in our productivity. But we worried, maybe rightfully so, because we saw machines that outpaced us physically and we knew that we could not compete. After a while, we learned to accept them. It has been our nature to accept new technologies after we have seen how (...) they can improve our way of life—at least up to now. Today we have a new type of machine to worry about. This one is powered not by steam but by knowledge, and is designed to aid us in our mental tasks. It is this design goal that troubles us the most. Perhaps it stems from the notion that although we can now accept being surpassed by machines in mechanical tasks, we consider mental creativity to be the province of humanity. The development of an intelligent machine, therefore, stirs our emotions. This paper looks at our emotional relationship with intelligent machines. It considers questions, both old and new, that may have concerned us about our machines and ourselves. To focus the discussion on this introspection, the paper takes a close look at the films "2001: A Space Odyssey" and "Artificial Intelligence: A.I." By no means does this paper answer the questions that we have lived with when building intelligent machines. It simply casts the questions in a light that we should consider. (shrink)

In Malicious Deceivers, Ioana B. Jucan traces a genealogy of post-truth intimately tied to globalizing modernity and connects the production of repeatable fakeness with capitalism and Cartesian metaphysics. Through case studies that cross times and geographies, the book unpacks the notion of fakeness through the related logics of dissimulation (deception) and simulation (performativity) as seen with software/AI, television, plastics, and the internet. Specifically, Jucan shows how these (dis)simulation machines and performative objects construct impoverished pictures of the world, ensuring a repeatable (...) sameness through processes of hollowing out embodied histories and lived experience. Through both its methodology and its subjects-objects of study, the book further seeks ways to counter the abstracting mode of thinking and the processes of voiding performed by the twinning of Cartesian metaphysics and global capitalism. Enacting a model of creative scholarship rooted in the tradition of writing as performance, Jucan, a multimedia performance-maker and theatre director, uses the embodied "I" as a framing and situating device for the book and its sites of investigation. In this way, she aims to counter the Cartesian voiding of the thinking "I" and to enact a different kind of relationship between self and world from the one posited by Descartes and replayed in much Western philosophical and - more broadly - academic writing: a relationship of separation that situates the "I" on a pedestal of abstraction that voids it of its embodied histories and fails to account for its positionality within a socio-historical context and the operations of power that define it. (shrink)

here has been a large number of studies in neurological sciences on how human brain works, especially in reading and parallel information processing. So I think this statement is really sweeping. Perhaps it is better to knowledge the abilities of human brains and to comment on the limitations of the human brain. The book “Adapt” by Tim Hartford advocates micro-step changes. An important aspect in this area is to understand the processes involved behind the scenes so that it gives us (...) a better formulation of the creativity algorithms involved. I will try to put in some pointers on the depths to which higher level intelligence has been simulated by AI in the past years. Some of the higher level intelligence mechanisms such as creativity, dreams and logical thinking have been implemented in machines in certain ways. However, they are still not implemented in the way humans do the same. The exact mechanism in which these intelligence mechanisms are used by human brains is still way ahead of that done by computers. However, we now look at other aspects in them as well as other functions which might be explored in the years ahead in AI. (shrink)

This article proposes a cybernetic photographic theory that takes seriously the philosophical claim that cameras, images and human beings exist as evolving systems of machines-organisms. It provides an epistemological challenge to the modernist problematic of representation – namely, the emergence of human consciousness outside and above nature, and a rationalist distinction between an active, visual-reasoning subject and a passive object. I utilize the philosophy of Francois Lauruelle in order to foreground and deepen the understanding of the ethical thought in cybernetics. (...) My purpose is to build upon ethical philosophy that, as Gilbert Simondon contended, would ‘save the technical object’. There is some urgency to this task as, in saving machines from their own histories and statuses as non-human, representational things in the world, we may begin an ethico-political programme that evaluates the complementary creative processes of human and machine – in a word, our shared Art – in order to save ourselves. It is perhaps the case that any recuperation of cybernetic and photographic theory today be poised not to reckon with our ‘digital’ moment but rather with our Anthropocene era defined by human’s extinction level powers of destruction. (shrink)

This article proposes a cybernetic photographic theory that takes seriously the philosophical claim that cameras, images and human beings exist as evolving systems of machines-organisms. It provides an epistemological challenge to the modernist problematic of representation – namely, the emergence of human consciousness outside and above nature, and a rationalist distinction between an active, visual-reasoning subject and a passive object. I utilize the (non)philosophy of Francois Lauruelle in order to foreground and deepen the understanding of the ethical thought in cybernetics. (...) My purpose is to build upon ethical philosophy that, as Gilbert Simondon contended, would ‘save the technical object’. There is some urgency to this task as, in saving machines from their own histories and statuses as non-human, representational things in the world, we may begin an ethico-political programme that evaluates the complementary creative processes of human and machine – in a word, our shared Art – in order to save ourselves. It is perhaps the case that any recuperation of cybernetic and photographic theory today be poised not to reckon with our ‘digital’ moment but rather with our Anthropocene era defined by human’s extinction level powers of destruction. (shrink)

In this daring essay inspired by Nietzsche, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari redefine the relation between the state and its war machine. Far from being a part of the state, warriers are nomads who always come from the outside and keep threatening the authority of the state. In the same vein, nomadic science keeps infiltrating royal science, undermining its axioms and principles. Nomadology is a speedy, pocket-sized treatise that refuses to be pinned down. Theorizing a dynamic relationship between sedentary (...) power and "schizophrenic lines of flight," this volume is meant to be read in transit, smuggled into urban nightclubs, offices, and subways.Deleuze and Guattari propose a creative and resistant ethics of becoming-imperceptible, strategizing a continuous invention of weapons on the run. An anarchic bricolage of ideas uprooted from anthropology, aesthetics, history, and military strategy, Nomadology carries out Deleuze's desire to "leave philosophy, but to leave it as a philosopher.". (shrink)

In a discussion of Sherlock Holmes’ “science of deduction” and the related “method of exclusion,” I show that Holmes’ claim that his inferences are deductive makes sense, if we consider his theoretical presuppositions. So, it is more accurate to say that he tries to reduce abduction to deduction than that he confuses them. His theoretical framework, albeit inadequate as a theory of empirical reasoning, can be seen as a basic model of classical (symbolic) AI. The main problems of this approach (...) are surveyed, and abduction is brought into play as both a better characterization of Holmes’ inferences and a better guide for building AI systems. This is a good background for raising the question of creativity because, according to Peirce, it relates to abduction in a substantial way. Is Sherlock Holmes creative? Can machines be creative? An affirmative answer to the second question might be given by a “logic of discovery” but the problem remains that inventing such a logic already presupposes creativity. (shrink)

The University of Greenwich Generator is setting sail on a thrilling new journey of knowledge exchange with the launch of its first-ever podcast the Navigator. Crafted in collaboration with Lucien von Schomberg, Senior Lecturer in Creativity and Innovation at Greenwich Business School it promises to be an exciting platform for innovation, entrepreneurship, and thought-provoking conversation. The podcast aims to bridge the gap between academic insights and real-world issues in an easily digestible way. Through engaging conversations, listeners can expect to (...) gain valuable knowledge from industry leaders and academic experts alike. Operating on three key principles—knowledge communication, knowledge exchange, and knowledge creation—this podcast embodies the essence of the Generator's mission, inspiring, educating and fostering collaboration. The first episode explores the limitless potential of AI in today's world, unravelling its impact on business, education, and society. Guests share their profound insights, experiences, and practical advice, shedding light on how AI is shaping our future. The episode delved deep into the ethical implications but also vast potential of using AI in the future and how it will affect both education and the wider world. The episode boasts an impressive lineup of inaugural guests, including Jane Harrington, the Vice-Chancellor of The University of Greenwich, Carl Thomas, Enterprise Advisor, and founder of Audiowings, Ghislaine Boddington, Professor in Digital Immersion, and Neil Saunders, Senior Lecturer in Mathematical Sciences. Together, these guests provide diverse perspectives on the future of AI at the university and beyond. (shrink)

The recent emergence of generative AI software as viable tools for use in the cultural and creative industries has sparked debates about the potential for “creativity” to be automated and “augmented” by algorithmic machines. Such discussions, however, begin from an ontological position, attempting to define creativity by either falling prey to universalism (i.e. “creativity is X”) or reductionism (i.e. “only humans can be truly creative” or “human creativity will be fully replaced by creative machines”). Furthermore, such (...) an approach evades addressing the real and material impacts of AI on creative labour in these industries. This article thus offers more expansive methodological and conceptual approaches to the recent hype on generative AI. By combining (Csikszentmihalyi, The systems model of creativity, Springer, Dordrecht, 2014) systems view of creativity, in which we emphasise the shift from “what” to “where” is creativity, with (Lievrouw, Media technologies, The MIT Press, 2014) relational-materialist theory of “mediation”, we argue that the study of “creativity” in the context of generative AI must be attentive to the interactions between technologies, practices, and social arrangements. When exploring the relational space between these elements, three core concepts become pertinent: creative labour, automation, and distributed agency. Critiquing “creativity” through these conceptual lenses allows us to re-situate the use of generative AI within discourses of labour in post-industrial capitalism and brings us to a conceptualisation of creativity that privileges neither the human user nor machine algorithm but instead emphasises a relational and distributed form of agency. (shrink)

Good sciences have good metaphors. Indeed, good sciences are good because they have good metaphors. AI could use more good metaphors. In this editorial, I would like to propose a new metaphor to help us understand intelligence. Of course, whether the metaphor is any good or not depends on whether it actually does help us. (What I am going to propose is not something opposed to computationalism -- the hypothesis that cognition is computation. Noncomputational metaphors are in vogue these days, (...) and to date they have all been equally plausible and equally successful. And, just to be explicit, I do not mean “IQ” by “intelligence.” I am using “intelligence” in the way AI uses it: as a semi-techical term referring to a general property of all intelligent systems, animal (including humans), or machine, alike.). (shrink)

I describe several historical cases of engineers or inventors obsessed with perfecting their products, illustrating how in some of those cases the perfectionist impulse led to tremendously valuable innovation, while in others to disaster, or at least to failure of the project to make the mark in history it otherwise could have. The psychological tendency towards perfecting an instrument for achieving some telos beyond what is pragmatically necessary or even desirable was diagnosed by Adam Smith, and may always be a (...) source of mixed blessings. (shrink)

Intellectual property (IP) offices and courts around the world are debating whether machines are similar enough to humans in terms of their consciousness and creativity to be eligible for inventors...

Over recent decades there has been a growing interest in the question of whether computer programs are capable of genuinely creative activity. Although this notion can be explored as a purely philosophical debate, an alternative perspective is to consider what aspects of the behaviour of a program might be noted or measured in order to arrive at an empirically supported judgement that creativity has occurred. We sketch out, in general abstract terms, what goes on when a potentially creative program (...) is constructed and run, and list some of the relationships (for example, between input and output) which might contribute to a decision about creativity. Specifically, we list a number of criteria which might indicate interesting properties of a program’s behaviour, from the perspective of possible creativity. We go on to review some ways in which these criteria have been applied to actual implementations, and some possible improvements to this way of assessing creativity. (shrink)