"An important contribution to contemporary jurisprudential debate and to legal thought more generally, Just Interpretations is far ahead of currently available work."--Peter Goodrich, author of Oedipus Lex "I was struck repeatedly by the clarity of expression throughout the book. Rosenfeld's description and criticism of the recent work of leading thinkers distinguishes his work within the legal theory genre. Furthermore, his own theory is quite original and provocative."--Aviam Soifer, author of Law and the Company We Keep.

Human rights discourse has been likened to a global lingua franca, and in more ways than one, the analogy seems apt. Human rights discourse is a language that is used by all yet belongs uniquely to no particular place. It crosses not only the borders between nation-states, but also the divide between national law and international law: it appears in national constitutions and international treaties alike. But is it possible to conceive of human rights (...) as a global language or lingua franca not just in a figurative or metaphorical sense, but in a literal or linguistic sense as a legal dialect defined by distinctive patterns of word choice and usage? Does there exist a global language of human rights that transcends not only national borders, but also the divide between domestic and international law? Empirical analysis suggests that the answer is yes, but this global language comes in at least two variants or dialects. New techniques for performing automated content analysis enable us to analyze the bulk of all national constitutions over the last two centuries, together with the world’s leading regional and international human rights instruments, for patterns of linguistic similarity and to evaluate how much language, if any, they share in common. Specifically, we employ a technique known as topic modeling that disassembles texts into recurring verbal patterns. The results highlight the existence of two species or dialects of rights talk—the universalist dialect and the positive-rights dialect—both of which are global in reach and rising in popularity. The universalist dialect is generic in content and draws heavily on the type of language found in international and regional human rights instruments. It appears in particularly large doses in the constitutions of transitional states, developing states, and states that have been heavily exposed to the influence of the international community. The positive-rights dialect, by contrast, is characterized by its substantive emphasis on positive rights of a social or economic variety, and by its prevalence in lengthier constitutions and constitutions from outside the common law world, especially those of the Spanish-speaking world. Both dialects of rights talk are truly transnational, in the sense that they appear simultaneously in national, regional, and international legal instruments and transcend the distinction between domestic and international law. Their existence attests to the blurring of the boundary between constitutional law and international law. (shrink)

Humiliation, as dealt with under different legal jurisdictions, poses a question about how these systems perceive and respond to humiliation. Are the laws' definitions, approach, and punishment appropriately determined? And if there are challenges to implementation, what are they?

Human rights law has been called upon to help with the problem of persistently high greenhouse gas emissions. An obligation on states and other legal entities to lower their emissions (mitigation) is said to be deducible from that body of law. I refute this thesis. First, I consider two practical difficulties—causality and non-triviality—that face a plaintiff who, with emission mitigation as the objective, attempts to prove a human rights violation using the regular pattern of proof for (...) a violation. Proponents of the “human rights approach” to mitigation have held that proof of an emission “contribution” by the defendant together with proof of an “impact” by climate change on the plaintiff’s human rights are sufficient to discharge the evidentiary burden for the proof of causation. The rest of the causation chain is simply presumed. Thus, the original proof pattern for a human rights violation is abandoned. The proponents’ answer to the triviality difficulty has been to aggregate emitters into very large entities and sue _them_. However, aggregation can be shown to lead to a _reductio ad absurdum_. In my argument’s second part, I identify a more fundamental difficulty with the human rights approach to mitigation: The defendant’s emissions do not amount to a norm violation. Everyone contributes emissions without legislative or other prohibition. Treaty law on climate change itself recognizes emitting behaviour as lawful and permits the continuation of state emissions through to at least 2050. A rise in global warming from preindustrial levels to 1.5° Celsius with room for an even greater rise to close to 2° Celsius has been _budgeted for_ by the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The setting up of a budget affirms the normalized status of within-budget emissions. This universal license to emit denies the human rights approach to mitigation the very conditions of application of human rights law. (shrink)

In this latest work by one of our leading political and legal philosophers, Allen Buchanan outlines a novel framework for assessing the system of international human rights law—the system that he takes to be the heart of modern human rights practice. Buchanan does not offer a full justification for the current system, but rather aims “to make a strong prima facie case that the existing system as a whole has what it takes to warrant our support (...) of it on moral grounds, even if some aspects of it are defective and should be the object of serious efforts at improvement”. (shrink)

The Article explores relationships between contemporary international human rights and democracy. In what respects are they two sides of the same coin, in what respects are they different coins? Do they depend on and complete each other? Can the two be in contradiction? The Article looks at these questions from several perspectives, including their historical connections, the changing definitions and understandings of each, their functional links, their determinacy, and their character as universal phenomena. It also indicates ways in (...) which courts, which have long interpreted and applied human rights, now also reach decisions about constitutional issues by drawing on their conception of democracy. (shrink)

Consistent with Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice, the primary sources of international human rights law can be identified as treaty, custom, and general principles of law derived from national legal systems. Treaty provisions in human rights law are often textually fairly open‐ended and hence will need to be read in the light of institutionalized practices of interpretation, such as the jurisprudence by regional human rights courts and international human (...) rights treaty bodies. Despite the universal acceptance of human rights treaties and the recognition of human rights as norms of customary international law, human rights violations do occur in all parts of the world and are often systematic. Major shortcomings of the international monitoring mechanisms for human rights treaties are their underresourcing, lack of visibility, and ineffectiveness. Even if human rights treaties have become universally accepted, compliance control remains underdeveloped. (shrink)

This is a groundbreaking application of contemporary philosophy to human rights law that proposes significant innovations for the progressive development of human rights. Drawing on the works of prominent 'philosophers of the Other' including Emmanuel Levinas, Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak, Judith Butler and, most centrally, the Argentine philosopher of liberation Enrique Dussel, this book develops an ethics based on concrete face-to-face relationships with the Marginalized Other. It proposes that this should inspire a human rights law (...) that is grounded in transcendental justice and framed from the perspective of marginalized groups. This would continuously deconstruct the original violence found in all human rights treaties and tribunals and promote preferential treatment for the marginalized. It would be especially attentive to such issues as access to justice, voice, representation, agency and responsibility. This differs markedly from more conventional theories that prioritize the autonomy of the ego, state sovereignty, democracy and/or equality. (shrink)

I begin by summarizing some of the main features of Buchanan’s account. I argue next that his account gets no support from defeating his envisaged opponent, the Mirroring View of human rights. Then I discuss some general ideas about the concept and different conceptions of human rights before introducing my own conception and explaining why I think it has certain advantages over Buchanan’s. In particular, my account is better suited for the intellectual engagement with China that (...) philosophers should contribute to and whose centrality Buchanan recognizes. (shrink)

The relationship between legal pluralism and international human rights law is a complex and multi-faceted one. To fully appreciate the nature of this relationship, one has to desegregate the various forms of legal pluralism and analyse whether in their existence or operation they are compatible with international human rights law. This article undertakes such an exercise drawing on the jurisprudence of global and regional human rights bodies. In doing so, it goes beyond a mechanical (...) audit of legal pluralism in the light of specific human rights and explores more foundational issues such as the nature and extent of a State’s human rights obligations when legal pluralism exists within its borders, the possibility of waiving human rights and questions of cultural relativism which hover over any discussion of legal pluralism. What emerges from this analysis is that a tentative conceptual framework exists to regulate the relationship between legal pluralism and international human rights law. It is one that not only requires the State to render legal pluralism compatible with human rights but also stipulates the process by which this should be done. Effectively implemented, it can achieve this objective and harness the pull of religious and customary law to ensure the more effective protection of human rights. (shrink)

The Human Rights Studies Programme, School of International Studies (JNU), in collaboration with the Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies (JNU), and the Indian Law Institute (Delhi), organized a Human Rights Day Webinar on the Intersections of Human Rights and Criminal Law on December 9-10, 2021. Experts and young scholars from the field shared their insights and research on the webinar theme. The presentations were organized under four sessions, including Session I (...) on Rights Jurisprudence and Criminal Law, Session II on Proposals for Criminalisation and Decriminalisation, Session III on Crimes, Victims, and Punishments, and Session IV on Reforms in the Future. The Webinar was conceptualized keeping in view the responsibility of states under international human rights law to prohibit and punish for the protection of human rights and the redressal of violations. The obligations of States to prohibit and punish inform the development of criminal rules and procedures under different legal systems, leading to the near universalization of legislative frameworks, legal justifications, and punishments. In the working of international human rights institutions, the criminal laws adopted by States are an indicator or marker of the level of compliance of States with the international mandates. In recent years, the interface between the two fields, i.e., international human rights and domestic criminal laws, has sparked great jurisprudential, political, and constitutional debates in different parts of the world. Against this backdrop, the Webinar was organized on Human Rights Day to discuss the relevant issues. (shrink)

This paper develops the notion of being right-with, a conceptual lens that underscores what happens when individuals turn to human rights law and other legal processes and proceedings to address injustices by the state. It does this through a critical multi-directional reading of two Uganda High Court appeal cases that overturned the decision of a lower court which at first instance had convicted Dr Stella Nyanzi of the offences of cyber harassment and offensive communications. Being right-with is a (...) regulative and coercive idea within human rights law that animates a violent irrepressible police drive. I use being right-with to assert that when individuals make rights claims under human rights law (however radical those assertions might be), they are still imbricated within a mode of liberal humanist subjecthood that is always conceptually unfree. In trying to move away from this conceptual and dialectical trap of being made right-with and unfree under liberal humanism, this paper tentatively considers Black feminist theorisations of care and freedom ‘to-come’, as well as Édouard Glissant’s notion of opacity to explore the concept of being with elsewhere as a way of articulating practices of Black life that make freedom elsewhere possible. (shrink)

Legal scholars and theorists have recently drawn a more sustained attention to the link between international human rights law (hereafter IHRL) and international criminal law (hereafter ICL). This concerns both positive and more normative accounts of the link. Whether positive or normative, the predominant approach to constructing the link is substantive. This overlap is normatively justified in similar terms by reference to a subset of moral human rights. In this paper, I offer an alternative to the (...) substantive approach. After identifying two flaws in the substantive approach (the problem of threshold and the problem of ethical neutrality), I defend what I call a structural account by focusing on duty‐holders. I start by reconstructing two structural characteristics common to IHRL and ICL qua international legal regimes: who has the authority to address violations of IHRL and ICL, and who can be liable for those violations. I then infer that public authority (functionally construed) constitutes the common structural core of IHRL and ICL. I rely on the extraterritorial application of IHRL and on the collective dimension of ICL violations to further support the argument. I finally offer an argument explaining the normative point of those structural features. I hold that IHRL and ICL (their adjudicative and liability regimes) are both necessary (but clearly not sufficient) to render this exercise of public authority legitimate to its subjects. (shrink)

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) boasts one of the strongest oversight systems in international human rights law, but implementing the ECtHR’s rulings is an inherently domestic and political process. This article begins to bridge the gap between the Court in Strasbourg and the domestic process of implementing the Court’s rulings by looking at the domestic institutions and politics that surround the execution of the ECtHR’s judgments. Using case studies from the UK and Russia, this (...) article identifies two factors that are critical for the domestic implementation of the Court’s rulings: strong domestic, democratic institutions dedicated to implementing the ECtHR’s judgments and an overarching sense of responsibility to set a good example at home and abroad for respecting human rights and the rule of law. This article concludes with a discussion of the steps necessary to facilitate better implementation of the ECtHR’s rulings. (shrink)

Since the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, over 165 countries have incorporated human rights standards into their legal systems: the resulting jurisprudence from diverse cultural traditions creates new dimensions to concepts first articulated in 1948. In this revised second edition, Nihal Jayawickrama draws on extensive sources to encapsulate the judicial interpretation of human rights law in one comprehensive volume. Jayawickrama covers the case law of the superior courts of 103 countries in (...) America, Europe, Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific, as well as jurisprudence of human rights monitoring bodies. He analyses the judicial application of human rights law to demonstrate empirically the universality of contemporary human rights norms. This definitive volume is essential for legal practitioners, and government and non-governmental officials, as well as academics and students of both constitutional law and the international law of human rights. (shrink)

While human rights law has evolved to provide guidance to governments in realizing human rights in public health emergencies, the COVID-19 pandemic has challenged the foundations of human rights in global health governance. Public health responses to the pandemic have undermined international human rights obligations to realize the rights to health and life, human rights that underlie public health, and international assistance and cooperation. As governments prepare for revisions of (...) global health law, new opportunities are presented to harmonize global health law and human rights law, strengthening rights-based governance to respond to future threats. (shrink)

Paradigms of International Human Rights Law explores the legal, ethical, and other policy consequences of three core structural features of international human rights law: the focus on individual rights instead of duties; the division of rights into substantive and nondiscrimination categories; and the use of positive and negative right paradigms. Part I explains the types of individual, corporate, and state duties available, and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of incorporating each type of duty into (...) the world public order, with special attention to supplementing individual rights with explicit individual and state duties. Part II evaluates how substantive rights and nondiscrimination rights are used to protect similar values through different channels; summarizes the nondiscrimination right in international practice; proposes refinements; and explains how the paradigms synergize. Part III discusses negative and positive paradigms by dispelling a common misconception about positive rights, and then justifies and defines the concept of negative rights, justifies positive rights, and concludes with a discussion of the ethical consequences of structuring the human rights system on a purely negative paradigm. For each set of alternatives, the author analyzes how human rights law incorporates the paradigms, the technical legal implications of the various alternatives, and the ethical and other policy consequences of using each alternative while dispelling common misconceptions about the paradigms and considering the arguments justifying or opposing one or the other. (shrink)

This article interrogates whether and how the concept of ‘patriarchy’ is used by UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies (treaty bodies) and special procedures to interpret state obligations to respect and ensure women’s human rights. There are two key points that arise out of this study: first, that several treaty bodies and special procedures purposely and consistently use the concept of ‘patriarchy’ when discussing women’s human rights, and second, that although not all treaty bodies (...) and special procedures have referred to the terms ‘patriarchy’ or ‘patriarchal’, an examination of those that have reveals a marked difference in how the terms are used by treaty bodies when compared with special procedures. While treaty bodies render the meaning of ‘patriarchy’ as being synonymous with certain harmful practices, such as female-genital mutilation (FGM), special procedures utilise ‘patriarchy’ as a system of power, permeating every facet of society. In this article I will argue that the current state of dissonance between the understandings of ‘patriarchy’ by treaty bodies and special procedures creates an unnecessary ambiguity that does nothing to advance gender equality. Furthermore, utilising a nuanced understanding of patriarchy, as articulated by intersectional and anti-essentialist feminist scholars, would potentially equip treaty bodies and special procedures for more meaningful interpretation of rights themselves, and greater protection of women’s human rights. (shrink)

By most measures, the impact of international human rights law ratification in the Arab Gulf region primarily in the 1990s and 2000s has been minimal. Scholars have found little evidence of correlation between ratification of the core human rights conventions with the minimal improvements in human rights practice in the region. Ratification of most human rights instruments Arab Gulf states in recent decades has, however, offered new cases from which to explore the (...) impact of international human rights law in countries where human rights monitors find protections to be most limited. Using the case of Kuwait’s ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, this article examines the impact of ratification in 1994 on discourses on discrimination against women in national press on human rights in the country. Through analysis of reporting in national newspaper Al-Anba, the article identifies how ratification has shaped the language used in national press reporting on women’s rights to increasingly reference the convention and frame rights violations in the language of “discrimination.” In tracing these connections between the convention and related content in local press, the article identifies new avenue to explore the “impact” of human rights treaty ratification, even when formal changes in laws and policies so far have been limited. (shrink)

This paper explores the difficulties of implementing international human rights standards in post conflict states, particularly in Islamic States, using Afghanistan as a case study. The paper will submit that imposing international human rights law with a ‘top down' approach is ineffective, using the example of the western-style Afghan constitution which contains many human rights protections, such as freedom of religion, that cannot be realized in contemporary Afghan society. It will be argued that a (...) more transparent, consultative and long-term approach to human rights implementation should be taken in post conflict situations, if ‘human rights' is to be more than a catch phrase for membership of the international community. (shrink)

In international human rights law ‘jurisdiction’ is the centre of the debate on extraterritorial obligations. The purpose of the present paper is to a) analyse how facts and principles contribute t...

A central question in the current neurolegal and neuroethical literature is how brain-reading technologies could contribute to criminal justice. Some of these technologies have already been deployed within different criminal justice systems in Europe, including Slovenia, Italy, England and Wales, and the Netherlands, typically to determine guilt, legal responsibility, or recidivism risk. In this regard, the question arises whether brain-reading could permissibly be used against the person's will. To provide adequate legal protection from such non-consensual brain-reading in the European legal (...) context, ethicists have called for the recognition of a novel fundamental legal right to mental privacy. In this paper, we explore whether these ethical calls for recognising a novel legal right to mental privacy are necessary in the European context. We argue that a right to mental privacy could be derived from, or at least developed within in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and that introducing an additional fundamental right to protect against brain-reading is not necessary. What is required, however, is a specification of the implications of existing rights for particular neurotechnologies and purposes. (shrink)

Despite its absence in the written text of the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights now regularly uses the concept of autonomy when deciding cases concerning assisted dying, sexuality and reproductive rights, self-determination, fulfilment of choices and control over body and mind. But is the concept of autonomy as expressed in the ECtHR reasoning an appropriate tool for regulating reproduction or medical practice? Caring Autonomy reveals and evaluates the type of (...) individual the ECtHR expresses and shapes through its autonomy-based case law. It claims that from a social and ethical perspective, the current individualistic interpretation of the concept of autonomy is inadequate, and proposes a new reading of the concept that is rooted in the acknowledgment and appreciation of human interdependence and the importance of interpersonal trust and care. (shrink)

In an article in this journal, Katherine Drabiak argues that green lighting genome editing of human embryos is contrary to “fundamental human rights law.” According to the author, genome editing of human embryos violates what we should recognize as a fundamental human right to inherit a genome without deliberate manipulation. In this reply article, we assess Drabiak's legal analysis and show methodological and substantive flaws. Methodologically, her analysis omits the key international legal instruments that form (...) the so‐called International Bill of Rights and thus fails to provide a full and accurate account of the fundamental international human rights standards. Substantively, Drabiak invokes, as a basis for prohibiting gene editing of human embryos, a legal standard (the rights and integrity of the future child) that is unknown to international law. Contrary to Drabiak's account, genome editing of human embryos is not prohibited under international law. Indeed, the right to health and the right to benefit from scientific progress may be interpreted as the basis of a legal duty to provide equality of access to germline gene editing, once determined it is beneficial and safe to use. (shrink)

Martha Nussbaum has argued for the superiority of her capabilities approach over the language of human rights. In this article it is argued that the capabilities approach is incapable of justifying something crucially important expressed in international human rights law: the requirement that every government treat all people as having equal status. Nussbaum has recently grappled with the role of equality within her approach, but has failed to offer a satisfactory explanation of its importance. The reason (...) is that the value and importance of equal status cannot be fully articulated in the language of capabilities alone. While most philosophical conceptions of human rights also fail to incorporate the importance of equal respect, the limitations of the capability approach are more serious. For the purposes of specifying the duties of governments, capabilities are not the only things that matter. (shrink)

It is argued that the current policy of the British Medical Association (BMA) on conscientious objection is not aligned with recent human rights developments. These grant a right to conscientious objection to doctors in many more circumstances than the very few recognised by the BMA. However, this wide-ranging right may be overridden if the refusal to accommodate the conscientious objection is proportionate. It is shown that it is very likely that it is lawful to refuse to accommodate conscientious (...) objections that would result in discrimination of protected groups. It is still uncertain, however, in what particular circumstances the objection may be lawfully refused, if it poses risks to the health and safety of patients. The BMA's policy has not caught up with these human rights developments and ought to be changed. (shrink)

The United Nations Special Representative on Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, John Ruggie, has adopted a new framework for considering this issue within the international legal system. This article examines this framework in terms of its coherence, its consistency with international human rights law and how it can be 'operationalized' (which is required by the United Nations). In regard to the states legal obligation to protect human rights, it is considered whether this obligation is (...) broader and deeper than is envisaged in the framework, especially if it can include the extra-territorial activities of corporations. The corporate responsibility to respect human rights is examined in terms of its conceptual and definitional problems, and the article also questions whether there will be sufficient legal remedies available to victims under the framework. (shrink)

How can respect for cultural and religious differences be reconciled with the conviction that everyone has basic human rights that must be secured? Should liberal states require that non-liberal states secure human rights, and can they do so without being intolerant and oppressive? Is there a human right to democracy, and should a liberal hold that all states must become modern liberal democracies and may be pressured to reform their traditional practices and institutions? Do (...) class='Hi'>human rights include only the classical liberal civil and political rights, and no economic rights? ;In this dissertation I defend a conception of human rights derived from John Rawls's Political Liberalism, which comprises both Justice as Fairness, the view he presented in A Theory of Justice , and the Law of Peoples, the view he presented in The Law of Peoples . According to this conception, human rights are binding on all societies, and cannot be rejected as peculiarly liberal or politically parochial. Outlaw states that violate them are to be condemned and may in grave cases be subjected to sanctions or intervention. Moreover, human rights include not only basic civil and political rights but also basic economic rights. However, while there may be a human right to live under a procedurally democratic government, it would not be a basic right but a derivative one. ;The conception of human rights that I here defend is a rational reconstruction of Rawls's view. In Chapters 1--3 I argue against the most natural interpretation of The Law of Peoples, defend a different interpretation, and expose and bridge a logical gap in that text. I then develop new responses to objections by Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, who hold that liberals who endorse Justice as Fairness must reject the Law of Peoples as insufficiently egalitarian. I also respond to the additional objection that the set of human rights cannot include economic rights. As I show, endorsing Justice as Fairness requires endorsing the Law of Peoples, and public reason can reconcile respect for cultural and religious differences with the conviction that everyone has basic human rights that must be secured. (shrink)

In July 2018, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics released the report Genome editing and human reproduction: Social and ethical issues, concluding that human germline modification of human embryos for implantation is not ‘morally unacceptable in itself’ and could be ethically permissible in certain circumstances once the risks of adverse outcomes have been assessed and the procedure appears ‘reasonably safe’. The Nuffield Council set forth two main principles governing anticipated uses and envisions applications that may include health enhancements (...) as a public health measure. This essay provides a critique of three aspects in the Nuffield Council’s Report: its presumption of therapeutic efficacy, its inflation of parental rights to create a certain type of child, and its reliance on a specially commissioned report that appears to distort key definitions in international law. (shrink)

The article begins with reflections on the nature, and basis, of human rights considered as moral standards. It recommends an orthodox view of their nature, as moral rights possessed by all human beings simply in virtue of their humanity and discoverable through the workings of natural reason, that makes them strongly continuous with natural rights. It then offers some criticisms of recent attempts to depart from orthodoxy by explicating human rights by reference to (...) the supposedly constitutive connection they bear to the matter of political legitimacy. The second half of the article turns to the legitimacy of international law, with a special focus on international human rights law. An account is sketched of the legitimacy of international law based on the service conception of legitimate authority. The article concludes by discussing three sources of potential limitations on international law’s legitimacy: pluralism, freedom (sovereignty) and exceptionalism. (shrink)

This paper examines how international law contributes to contemporary understandings of transitional justice with respect to reparations for victims of gross and systematic human rights abuses. The author surveys the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights through 2003 to determine how the Court’s practice can be used to guide the formulation of reparatory policies during political transition. Recognizing that the direct application of Inter-American case law to situations of mass atrocity is not always viable (...) in practice, the author analyzes regional human rights jurisprudence, particularly that relating to compensation, to determine what role the Court’s rules can and cannot play as a reference for policymakers and societies faced with the challenge of designing a reparations program. He concludes that while landmark Court decisions like Velásquez Rodríguez provide general normative guidance, there are significant obstacles to extending to the transitional justice context many of the measures, amounts, and formulas relied upon by the Court in awarding compensation. The fairness of compensation outside the courtroom cannot be determined with reference to predetermined rules, but depends on the factual context in which the measures are adopted including the number of victims involved. A better source of comparative inspiration is found in the Court’s growing practice of adopting non-monetary reparations measures to deal with moral harm. (shrink)

A central question in the current neurolegal and neuroethical literature is how brain-reading technologies could contribute to criminal justice. Some of these technologies have already been deployed within different criminal justice systems in Europe, including Slovenia, Italy, England and Wales, and the Netherlands, typically to determine guilt, legal responsibility, or recidivism risk. In this regard, the question arises whether brain-reading could permissibly be used against the person's will. To provide adequate legal protection from such non-consensual brain-reading in the European legal (...) context, ethicists have called for the recognition of a novel fundamental legal right to mental privacy. In this paper, we explore whether these ethical calls for recognising a novel legal right to mental privacy are necessary in the European context. We argue that a right to mental privacy could be derived from, or at least developed within in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and that introducing an additional fundamental right to protect against brain-reading is not necessary. What is required, however, is a specification of the implications of existing rights for particular neurotechnologies and purposes. (shrink)

The concept of reproductive health promises to play a crucial role in improving health care provision and legal protection for women around the world. This is an authoritative and much-needed introduction to and defence of the concept of reproductive health, which though internationally endorsed, is still contested. The authors are leading authorities on reproductive medicine, women's health, human rights, medical law, and bioethics. They integrate their disciplines to provide an accessible but comprehensive picture. They analyse 15 cases from (...) different countries and cultures, and explore options for resolution. The aim is to equip readers to fashion solutions in their own health care circumstances, compatibly with ethical, legal and human rights principles. (shrink)

This paper examines the position of international human rights law towards missionary or proselytizing activities with a special focus on the American context. By evaluating UN legal acts such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1960 Arcot Krishnaswami Study and the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief and the American Convention of Human Rights, it investigates the extent to which such (...) activities fall within the scope of the right to free speech and to freedom of religion for religious organizations. This is exemplified by looking at two Evangelical religious organizations founded for the purpose of luring away groups of believers from their original religious communities: “Mission to Amish People”, targeting the Amish People, and “Jews for Jesus”, aimed at the Jewish community. The clash of one religious community which considers mission a fundamental element of its religion with a religious community who is highly skeptical about mission constitute the extreme test case of the right to free speech and to corporate freedom of religion. Given the highly various importance which mission can play in different religions, the article suggests to solve each case individually by carefully examining the content of each religious doctrine. (shrink)

Human rights law does not appear to enjoy as high a level of compliance as the laws of war, yet is institutionalized to a greater degree. This Article argues that the reason for this difference is related to the strategic structure of international law. The laws of war are governed by a regime of reciprocity, which can produce selfenforcing patterns of behavior, whereas the human rights regime attempts to produce public goods and is thus subject to (...) collective action problems. The more elaborate human rights institutions are designed to overcome these problems but fall prey to second-order collective action problems. The simple laws of war institutions have been successful because they can exploit the logic of reciprocity. The Article also suggests that limits on military reprisals are in tension with self-enforcement of the laws of war. The U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda is discussed. (shrink)

The connection between health and human rights continues to play a prominent role within global health law. In particular, a number of theorists rely on the claim that there is a relation of interdependence between health and human rights. The nature and extent of this relation, however, is rarely defined, developed or defended in a conceptually robust way. This paper seeks to explore the source, scope and strength of this putative relation and what role it might (...) play in developing a global health law framework. (shrink)

International human rights law has struggled to define a standard for determining the extraterritorial applicability of its norms that would reconcile the ethos of universal entitlement, on the one hand, with the centrality of borders in delineating state powers and responsibilities under international law, on the other hand. The case law of the UN Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights favors barring states from engaging in conduct outside their borders that (...) would be impermissible if undertaken inside their borders. Still, attempts to demarcate the precise scope of extraterritorial application through allusion to degrees of control over individuals or areas, or by the nature of the obligation itself – have led to unsatisfactory, if not arbitrary results. This article opines a move to functionalism as the basis for extraterritorial applicability – requiring states to protect IHRL in situations they can do so. Under this approach, which takes universality seriously, borders lose much their normative significance. I suggest limiting the functional approach to extraterritorial applicability in accordance with two key notions: the intensity of power relations – factual relations of power entailing direct, significant and foreseeable potential impact – should result in the application of IHRL obligations; or, alternatively, special legal relations – relations of power that put the state in a unique legal position to afford IHRL protection would also justify the imposition of extraterritorial obligations. (shrink)