Originally published in 1971, this volume examines the relationship between the history and sociology of education. History does not stand in isolation, but has much to draw from and contribute to, other disciplines. The methods and concepts of sociology, in particular, are exerting increasing influence on historical studies, especially the history of education. Since education is considered to be part of the social system, historians and sociologists have come to survey similar fields; yet each discipline appears to (...) have its own aims and methodology. (shrink)

Politics and Modernity provides a critical review of the key interface of contemporary political theory and social theory about the questions of modernity and postmodernity. Review essays offer a broad-ranging assessment of the issues at stake in current debates. Among the works reviewed are those of William Connolly, Anthony Giddens, J[um]urgen Habermas, Alasdair MacIntyre, Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor and Roy Bhaskar. As well as reviewing the contemporary literature, the contributors assess the historical roots of current problems in the works of (...) Nietzsche and Max Weber. (shrink)

This encyclopedia article provides a procedural account of explication outlining each step that is part of the overall explicative effort (2). It is prefaced by a summary of the historical development of the method (1). The latter part of the article includes a rough structural theory of explication (3) and a detailed presentation of an examplary explication taken from the history of philosophy and the foundations of mathematics (4).

David Carr outlines a distinctively phenomenological approach to history. Rather than asking what history is or how we know history, a phenomenology of history inquires into history as a phenomenon and into the experience of the historical.

History in Lonergan's Early Historical and Economic Manuscripts.

In this book, Leon ter Schure demonstrates the value of Bergson's philosophy of life for a more expansive understanding of history. Bergson is known for his explorations of time as duration, yet in his writings rarely referred to history. At the same time, historians and philosophers of history have not significantly incorporated Bergson's ideas about the nature of time into their work. Modernity has brought change at an ever-accelerating rate, and one of the results of this has (...) been a tendency toward presentism. Only the here and now matters, as past and future have been absorbed by the "omnipresent present" of the digital age. Rather than isolating human history from the history of the natural world, Bergsonism situates history within the broader framework of the evolution of life and allows us to imagine the past instead as a living resource for the invention of the future. This not only reveals a unique sense of history's creative potential, it also allows for a rethinking of important topics in the study of history, such as historical time, the survival of the past, and historical progress. (shrink)

Contribution to a symposium on Kostas Gavroglu and Ana Simões, Neither Physics nor Chemistry, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

This article investigates the differential structure and representation of time in memory and history. It examines two moments in Jewish historical thought--in the Middle Ages, and in works written within and after the Holocaust--and demonstrates the fundamentally liturgical nature of Jewish historical memory in selected texts from these two periods. Following the groundbreaking work of Yerushalmi, it seeks to demonstrate that for Jews, historical experience is incorporated into the cyclical reenactment of paradigmatic events in Jewish sacred ritual. Recent or (...) contemporary experiences acquire meaning only insofar as they can be subsumed within Biblical categories of events and their interpretation bequeathed to the community through the medium of Scripture, that is to say, only insofar as they can be transfigured, ritually and liturgically, into repetitions and reenactments of ancient happening. In such liturgical commemoration, the past exists only by means of recitation; the fundamental goal of such recitation is to make it live again in the present, to fuse past and present, chanter and hearer, into a single collective entity. History, in the sense that we understand it to consist of unique events unfolding within irreversible linear time, is absorbed into cyclical, liturgical memory.This article argues that the question of Jewish history--both medieval and post-Holocaust--poses in a compelling fashion the question of the relationship between memory and history more generally, and serves to contest the current tendency in academic historiography to collapse history into memory. It claims that to the extent that memory "resurrects," " re-cycles," and makes the past "reappear" and live again in the present, it cannot perform historically, since it refuses to keep the past in the past, to draw the line, as it were, that is constitutive of the modern enterprise of historiography. (shrink)

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Contributors -- Introduction -- 1 The Concepts of Physics: Rational Contents and Constructions in History -- 2 Theory-change and the Logic of Enquiry: New Bearings in Philosophy of Science -- 3 Science, History and Philosophy in Kant and Hegel -- 4 Historicity, Social Psychology and Change -- 5 The Reality of History -- 6 The Social Location of Scientific Practices (...) -- 7 Kuhn, Different Worlds and Science as Historical -- 8 Incommensurability Modestly Recovered -- Index. (shrink)

The author of the article aims to find out the reasons for the modern rehabilitation of the history of philosophy, as well as to describe the factors that contributed to the negative attitude towards it in the past. The analysis of the factors and presuppositions of the criticism of the importance of the history of philosophy is based on the position of N. Malbranche, who understood historical and philosophical discourse as a useless reading of philosophical texts. The study (...) of the history of philosophy is the opposite of critical comprehension of the content. For Malbranche, there are also problems of the impossibility of mastering all the doctrines of the past, the lack of value in knowing about the reasoning of an individual philosopher, and the criterion for selecting interpretations of philosophical doctrine. The author concludes that the only thing that the history of philosophy can be as a reflection only in the "now" is its constant self-legitimation, because this is the only way to maintain its involvement in philosophy. (shrink)

A book on history and theory which takes a fresh new look at the whole subject. It takes as its starting point historical ideas and thought about the past - rather than falling into the usual pattern of endlessly debating what history as a discipline does or should do. He doesn't take it for granted that history as a discipline has to exist at all - and looks at the influence and importance of historical ideas across the (...) disciplines more generally. This is quite a complex argument, but the book is written very clearly and takes on real empirical questions as well as theoretical ones. (shrink)

Pierre de Fermat is known as the inventor of modern number theory. He invented–improved many methods useful in this discipline. Fermat often claimed to have proved his most difficult theorems thanks to a method of his own invention: the infinite descent. He wrote of numerous applications of this procedure. Unfortunately, he left only one almost complete demonstration and an outline of another demonstration. The outline concerns the theorem that every prime number of the form 4n + 1 is the sum (...) of two squares. In this paper, we analyse a recent proof of this theorem. It is interesting because: it follows all the elements of which Fermat wrote in his outline; it represents a good introduction to all logical nuances and mathematical variants concerning this method of which Fermat spoke. The assertions by Fermat will also be framed inside their historical context. Therefore, the aims of this paper are related to the history of mathematics and to the logic of proof-methods. (shrink)

This article traces the historical co-evolution of microbiology, bacteriology, and virology, framed within industrial and agricultural contexts, as well as their role in colonial and national history between the end of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century. The epistemology of germ theory, coupled with the economic interests of European colonies, has shaped the understanding of human-microbial relationships in a reductionist way. We explore a brief history of the medical and biological sciences, focusing on (...) microbes and the difficulty of implementing germ theory outside of biology laboratories. Furthermore, we highlight the work of Lynn Margulis, who conceptualized microbes within their ecological contexts. Such research shows the active role microbes play in handling life-sustaining biological and biochemical processes. We outline how the industrial and technological advancements of the last two centuries not only impacted almost all human societies, but also changed the world on microbial, biological, and geological levels. The narration of these histories is a complex task, and depends on how national, international, and intergovernmental institutions (such as the World Health Organization) conceive of the selective environmental pressures exerted by industry and biotechnological companies. (shrink)

This book explores the historical dimension of David Hume's philosophy, a feature that Spencer Wertz calls 'historical empiricism.' According to Wertz, Hume sought to understand the present in terms of the past in a way that anticipates the historical constructionism of R.G. Collingwood and Herbert Butterfield. Hume's method is to tell a story about something's origin in which ideas yield impressions. These impressions eventually yield to experience that includes history as part of its structure. Arguing that Hume worked between (...) history and philosophy, Wertz demonstrates that Hume's historical empiricism consists of four key concepts. These concepts are history, human nature, experience, and nature, all of which play a role in historical narration, taste, moral judgments, and the historiography of science. Bringing new insights to the study of Hume's work, this book will be an important resource for scholars of philosophy. (shrink)

Interpretation is construed, here, as synonymous with hermeneutics: understood as a source of knowledge – perhaps, after the apparently irremediable decline of epistemological foundationalism, the main modern epistemological strategy. In this sense, there is no difference in principle between epistemology and interpretation; the first is a form of the second.

Biologists in the last 50 years have increasingly emphasized the role of historical contingency in explaining the distribution and dynamics of biological systems. However, recent work in philosophy of biology has shown that historical contingency carries various interpretations and that we are still lacking a general understanding of historicity, i.e., a framework from which to interpret why and to what extent history matters in biological processes. Building from examples and analyses of the long-term experimental evolution (LTEE) project, this (...) paper argues that historicity possess three essential conditions: (1) multiple possible pasts, (2) multiple possible outcomes at a given instant, and (3) a relationship of causal dependence between these two sets. These criteria can be further specified in two general forms of historicity: dependence on initial conditions and path dependence. More attention is devoted to developing a rigorous account of the latter, which captures the type of historicity displayed by stochastic processes. This paper also highlights that it is often more productive to adopt an instant-relative approach and think in terms of degree of historicity instead of trying to maintain a rigid and absolute dichotomy between historical and ahistorical (completely convergent) processes. (shrink)

In the field of philosophy of history, the problem of historical representation has become one of the central points of interest during the past few decades. Through the publication of Hayden White’s influential Metahistory , Louis Mink’s studies of the narrative form, and recent openings in the so-called “new philosophy of history” , we have witnessed a new interest in the questions of narrativity and emplotment—that is, the ways in which historical knowledge is constructed through the creative activity (...) of the historian. Although history deals with facts and real events, it is argued, this past reality is always given to us in a certain narrative form: historical explanation cannot merely employ universally valid causal laws because it concerns particular beings—humans, groups, institutions—and their intentions, which are bound to unique circumstances and contexts. Further, history is not just about facts or general ideas but involves an element .. (shrink)

These remarks preface two volumes consisting of the proceedings of the Third International Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science. The conference was held under the auspices of the Union, The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Science. The meetings took place in Montreal, Canada, 25-29 August 1980, with Concordia University as host institution. The program (...) of the conference was arranged by a Joint Commission of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science consisting of Robert E. Butts (Canada), John Murdoch (U. S. A. ), Vladimir Kirsanov (U. S. S. R. ), and Paul Weingartner (Austria). The Local Arrangements Committee consisted of Stanley G. French, Chair (Concordia), Michel Paradis, treasurer (McGill), Fran~ois Duchesneau (Universite de Montreal), Robert Nadeau (Universite du Quebec it Montreal), and William Shea (McGill University). Both committees are indebted to Dr. G. R. Paterson, then President of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Science, who shared his expertise in many ways. Dr. French and his staff worked diligently and efficiently on behalf of all participants. The city of Montreal was, as always, the subtle mixture of extravagance, charm, warmth and excitement that retains her status as the jewel of Canadian cities. The funding of major international conferences is always a problem. (shrink)

The author of this paper contends that Kathleen Wallace’s model of the self is a highly original contribution to contemporary thought. He, however, highlights important respects in which Wallace is adumbrating themes highlighted by Justus Buchler’s scattered insights into human selfhood. In addition, the author identifies two possible lines of inquiry rooted in Wallace’s project calling for further pursuit. Questions regarding self‐division, ones importantly bearing upon the topic of autonomy, and also questions regarding the somatic mechanisms, processes, and practices by (...) which embodied selves maintain themselves as cumulative networks are ones that, above all else, he tries to throw into sharp relief through the defining features of Wallace’s network model and to underscore the inherent power of Wallace’s nuanced approach to a highly contested and intricately complex topic. (shrink)

Skepticism is one of the most enduring and profound of philosophical problems. With its roots in Plato and the Sceptics to Descartes, Hume, Kant and Wittgenstein, skepticism presents a challenge that every philosopher must reckon with. In this outstanding collection philosophers engage with skepticism in five clear sections: the philosophical history of skepticism in Greek, Cartesian and Kantian thought; the nature and limits of certainty; the possibility of knowledge and related problems such as perception and the debates between objective (...) knowledge and constructivism; the transcendental method as a response to skepticism and the challenge of naturalism; overcoming the skeptical challenge. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:As part of a Christian-Buddhist-Muslim trialogue on comparative theological concepts, this article examines Islamic conceptions of both myth and history in relation to different theological conceptions of time. Focused particularly on a comparison with Jewish and Christian traditions, this article argues that myth, while present in the Islamic tradition, plays a comparatively minor role, and one that does not align with some theoretical conceptions of how myth functions in other religious traditions. By contrast, history, as the arena of (...) God's agency in the world, is as important and well developed in Islam as it is in Judaism and Christianity. Unlike these latter two traditions, however, the Islamic and especially Qur'anic conception of sacred history is not only structured on a predominantly linear, progressive conception of time, but also considers historical time as unfolding in cyclical and circular patterns. The effect is a more variegated conception of theological time, which effectively blurs the lines between myth, sacred history, and religious/communal history. (shrink)

At issue in this paper is the question of the appropriate relationship between the philosophy and history of science. The discussion starts with a brief sketch of Kuhn's approach, followed by an analysis of the so-called ‘testing-theories-of-scientific-change programme’. This programme is an attempt at a more rigorous approach to the historical philosophy of science. Since my conclusion is that, by and large, this attempt has failed, I proceed to examine some more promising approaches. First, I deal with Hacking's recent (...) views on the issues in question, particularly his notion of a ‘style of reasoning’. Next, Nickles's reconstructionist interpretation of the development of science and his views on Whig history are addressed. Finally, I propose an account of philosophy as a theoretical, an interpretative and explanatory, enterprise. Thus, three alternatives to the Kuhnian paradigm are discussed, alternatives that share a recognition of the relative autonomy of philosophy from history. Hence, they assume a less tight relationship between philosophy and history of science than is the case within the Kuhnian paradigm. (shrink)

The aim of this virtual special issue is to bring together philosophical and historical perspectives to address long-standing issues in the interpretation, utility, and impacts of quantitative genetics methods and findings. Methodological approaches and the underlying scientific understanding of genetics and heredity have transformed since the field's inception. These advances have brought with them new philosophical issues regarding the interpretation and understanding of quantitative genetic results. The contributions in this issue demonstrate that there is still work to be done integrating (...) old and new methodological and conceptual frameworks. In some cases, new results are interpreted using assumptions based on old concepts and methodologies that need to be explicitly recognised and updated. In other cases, new philosophical tools can be employed to synthesise historical quantitative genetics work with modern methodologies and findings. This introductory article surveys three general themes that have dominated philosophical discussion of quantitative genetics throughout history: (1) how methodologies have changed and transformed our knowledge and interpretations; (2) whether or not quantitative genetics can offer explanations relating to causation and prediction; and (3) the importance of defining the phenotypes under study. We situate the contributions in this virtual special issue within a historical framework addressing these three themes. (shrink)

Throughout the recent history of research at the intersection of evolution and development, notions such as developmental constraint, evolutionary novelty, and evolvability have been prominent, but the term ‘developmental bias’ has scarcely been used. And one may even doubt whether a unique and principled definition of bias is possible. I argue that the concept of developmental bias can still play a vital scientific role by means of setting an explanatory agenda that motivates investigation and guides the formulation of integrative (...) explanatory frameworks. Less crucial is a definition that would classify patterns of phenotypic variation and unify variational patterns involving different traits and taxa as all being ‘bias.’ Instead, what we should want is a concept that generates intellectual identity across various researchers, and that unites the diverse fields and approaches relevant to the study of developmental bias, from paleontology to behavioral biology. I point to some advantages of conducting research specifically under the label of ‘developmental bias,’ compared to employing other, more common terms such as ‘evolvability.’. (shrink)

This edited collection provides the first comprehensive volume on A. J. Ayer’s 1936 masterpiece, Language, Truth and Logic. With eleven original chapters the volume reconsiders the historical and philosophical significance of Ayer’s work, examining its place in the history of analytic philosophy and its subsequent legacy. Making use of pioneering research in logical empiricism, the contributors explore a wide variety of topics, from ethics, values and religion, to truth, epistemology and philosophy of language. Among the questions discussed are: How (...) did Ayer preserve or distort the views and conceptions of logical empiricists? How are Ayer's arguments different from the ones he aimed at reconstructing? And which aspects of the book were responsible for its immense impact? The volume expertly places Language, Truth and Logic in the intellectual and socio-cultural history of twentieth-century philosophical thought, providing both introductory and contextual chapters, as well as specific explorations of a variety of topics covering the main themes of the book. Providing important insights of both historical and contemporary significance, this collection is an essential resource for scholars interested in the legacy of the Vienna Circle and its effect on ethics and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This study is a reading of Lonergan on "system and history," a topic central to his thought. The study begins by establishing two preliminary contexts. First, it constructs an overview of the problematic in chapter one. Second, it establishes a further context in chapter two by analyzing his writings on the topic in 1959, the year he gave a graduate seminar on "System and History." Subsequent chapters trace the emergence in the history of Lonergan's thought of historical (...) heuristics, of historical maieutics, and of the relation of both in his theory and philosophy of history. ;The study largely prescinds, however, from Lonergan's theory of the dialectic of history. Instead, it draws attention to the role of the emergence of an adequate human science in what Lonergan calls "the challenge of history," that is, the challenge of decreasing the role of mere chance and fate in history while increasing the role of conscious grasp and deliberate choice. Meeting that challenge requires, as Lonergan insists, "a human science that is concerned, to adapt a phrase from Marx, not only with knowing history but also with directing it." Lonergan considered the needed human science at once a possible project and "a vastly ambitious task." The needed human science involves "a critique of history" in the service of the "intelligent direction of history," and Lonergan holds some combination of the two central to a practical theory of history. Those two components emerge first in historical and economic manuscripts Lonergan wrote in the 1930s as examined in chapter three of the study. Chapter four examines those topics in Insight, together with Lonergan's view that emergent probability generically determines the course of human history. Chapter five examines the relation of historical scholarship to the need for an upper blade of historical heuristics in the period between Insight and Method. Finally, chapter six explores how the themes of historical heuristics and historical maieutics meet, albeit in subtle ways, in Lonergan's Method in Theology. (shrink)

I begin by discussing views about the permissibility of lying by political leaders. Sections II and III address historically important lies and lies about history and the historical record. These two categories overlap - some lies about the historical record were historically important events. In section IV, I discuss the related notion of half-truths and give examples of misleading/deceptive half-truths about history. In the final section of this chapter, I briefly discuss the obligations of historians to give truthful (...) accounts of historical events. (shrink)