Results for 'higher-order thought'

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  1.  96
    Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory.Sam Coleman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.
    Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are never properly conscious of our sensory states at all. In their place I offer a new higher-order theory of consciousness, with a view to making us suitably intimate with our (...)
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  2. Higher Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):69-98.
    Currently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal's version of higher-order-thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one-component and a two-component view. We further argue that the two-component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the empirical sciences. Unfortunately, the two-component view seems incapable of handling a group of counterexamples that we refer to as cases of (...)
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  3. Higher-Order Thought and Pathological Self: The Case of Somatoparaphrenia.Caleb Liang & Timothy Lane - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):661-668.
    According to Rosenthal’s Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, first-order mental states become conscious only when they are targeted by HOTs that necessarily represent the states as belonging to self. On this view a state represented as belonging to someone distinct from self could not be a conscious state. Rosenthal develops this view in terms of what he calls the ‘thin immunity principle’ (TIP). According to TIP, when I experience a conscious state, I cannot be wrong (...)
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  4.  28
    Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory.Kevin Timpe - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.
    Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are never properly conscious of our sensory states at all. In their place I offer a new higher-order theory of consciousness, with a view to making us suitably intimate with our (...)
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  5.  38
    Inserted Thoughts and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2021 - In Pascual Angel Gargiulo & Humbert Mesones-Arroyo (eds.), Psychiatry and Neurosciences Update: Vol 4. Springer. pp. 61-71.
    Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M” (Rosenthal 2005, Gennaro 2012). (...)
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  6. Higher-Order Thoughts, Neural Realization, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2016 - In Consciousness: Integrating Eastern and Western Perspectives. New Delhi, India: New Age Publishers. pp. 83-102.
    The higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness is a reductive representational theory of consciousness which says that what makes a mental state conscious is that there is a suitable HOT directed at that mental state. Although it seems that any neural realization of the theory must be somewhat widely distributed in the brain, it remains unclear just how widely distributed it needs to be. In section I, I provide some background and define some key terms. In section (...)
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  7.  56
    Higher-Order Thoughts and the Appendage Theory of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):155-66.
    Theories of what it is for a mental state to be conscious must answer two questions. We must say how we're conscious of our conscious mental states. And we must explain why we seem to be conscious of them in a way that's immediate. Thomas Natsoulas distinguishes three strategies for explaining what it is for mental states to be conscious. I show that the differences among those strategies are due to the divergent answers they give to the foregoing questions. Natsoulas (...)
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  8.  92
    Higher-Order Thoughts, Animal Consciousness, and Misrepresentation: A Reply to Carruthers and Levine.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2004 - In Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  9. Presentational Character and Higher Order Thoughts.Joseph Gottlieb - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8):103-123.
    Experiences, by definition, have phenomenal character. But many experiences have a specific type of phenomenal character: presentational character. While both visual experience and conscious thought make us aware of their objects, only in visual experience do objects seem present before the mind and available for direct access. I argue that Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness have a particularly steep hill to climb in accommodating presentational character.
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  10. Mental Ownership and Higher Order Thought.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):496-501.
    Mental ownership concerns who experiences a mental state. According to David Rosenthal (2005: 342), the proper way to characterize mental ownership is: ‘being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as belonging to somebody. And being conscious of a state as belonging to somebody other than oneself would plainly not make it a conscious state’. In other words, if a mental state is consciously present to a subject in virtue of a higher-order thought (...)
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  11. Enacting Higher Order Thoughts: Velazquez and Las Meninas.Gregory Minissale - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):165-89.
    This paper bridges art history and consciousness studies and investigates the network of gazes and frames in Las Meninas and how this engages with a system of higher-order thoughts and reflexive operations.
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  12. The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2012 - MIT Press.
    Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. In The Consciousness Paradox, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, (...)
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  13. Somatoparaphrenia, Anosognosia, and Higher-Order Thoughts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2015 - In Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 55-74.
    Somatoparaphrenia is a pathology of self characterized by the sense of alienaton from parts of one’s body. It is usually construed as a kind of delusional disorder caused by extensive right hemisphere lesions. Lesions in the temporoparietal junction are common in somatoparaphrenia but deep cortical regions (for example, the posterior insula) and subcortical regions (for example, the basal ganglia) are also sometimes implicated (Valler and Ronschi 2009). Patients are often described as feeling that a limb belongs to another person and (...)
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  14.  21
    The Merits of Higher-Order Thought Theories.Sam Coleman - 2018 - Trans/Form/Ação 41 (s1):31-48.
    Over many years and in many publications David Rosenthal has developed, defended and applied his justly well-known higher-order thought theory of consciousness.2 In this paper I explain the theory, then provide a brief history of a major objection to it. I suggest that this objection is ultimately ineffectual, but that behind it lies a reason to look beyond Rosenthal's theory to another sort of HOT theory. I then offer my own HOT theory as a suitable alternative, before (...)
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  15. On Whether the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness Entails Cognitive Phenomenology, Or: What is It Like to Think That One Thinks That P?Richard Brown & Pete Mandik - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):1-12.
    Among our conscious states are conscious thoughts. The question at the center of the recent growing literature on cognitive phenomenology is this: In consciously thinking P, is there thereby any phenomenology—is there something it’s like? One way of clarifying the question is to say that it concerns whether there is any proprietary phenomenology associated with conscious thought. Is there any phenomenology due to thinking, as opposed to phenomenology that is due to some co-occurring sensation or mental image? In this (...)
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  16.  54
    Telic Higher-Order Thoughts and Moore's Paradox.Bernard W. Kobes - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:291-312.
  17. Metacognition and Higher-Order Thoughts.David M. Rosenthal - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):231-242.
    Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis.
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  18.  9
    Change Blindness in Higher-Order Thought: Misrepresentation or Good Enough?Ingar Brinck & Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (5-6):50-73.
    Abstract: To evaluate the explanation of change blindness in terms of misrepresentation and determine its role for Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory of consciousness, we present an alternative account of change blindness that affords an independent outlook and provides a viable alternative. First we describe Rosenthal’s actualism and the notion of misrepresentation, then introduce change blindness and the explanation of it by misrepresentation. Rosenthal asserts that, in change blindness, the first-order state tracks the post-change stimulus, but the (...)
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  19.  82
    How Things Seem to Higher-Order Thought Theorists.Jacob Berger - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (3):503-526.
    According to David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious just in case one is aware of being in that state via a suitable HOT. Jesse Mulder (2016) recently objects: though HOT theory holds that conscious states are states that it seems to one that one is in, the view seems unable to explain how HOTs engender such seemings. I clarify here how HOT theory can adequately explain the relevant mental appearances, illustrating (...)
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  20.  41
    Higher-Order Thought and Naturalist Accounts of Consciousness.Jurgen Schroder - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):27-46.
    This paper makes a comparison between naturalist and non-naturalist theories of consciousness with respect to their explanatory merits. It focuses on David Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory, arguing that the motives for higher-order theories are based on a confusion of three distinct meanings of the term 'intrinsic'. The explanatory power of HOT theories is compared with that of an alternative nonrepresentational theory, offered as an example of a naturalistic account. The latter is found overall to have (...)
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  21.  26
    Higher-Order Thought, Self-Identification, and Delusions of Disownership.Michelle Maiese - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):281-298.
    David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory says that for a mental state to be conscious, it must be accompanied by a higher-order thought about that state. One objection to Rosenthal’s account is that HOTs do not secure what Sydney Shoemaker has called ‘immunity to error through misidentification’. I will argue that Rosenthal’s discussion of dissociative identity order fails to salvage his account from this objection and that his thin immunity principle is in tension with (...)
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  22.  74
    Consciousness, Higher-Order Thought, and Stimulus Reinforcement.José Luis Bermúdez - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):194-195.
    Rolls defends a higher-order thought theory of phenomenal consciousness, mapping the distinction between conscious and non-conscious states onto a distinction between two types of action and corresponding neural pathways. Only one type of action involves higher-order thought and consequently consciousness. This account of consciousness has implausible consequences for the nature of stimulus-reinforcement learning.
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  23.  39
    Higher-Order Thoughts and Conscious Experience.Robert Francescotti - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):239-254.
    For nearly a decade, David Rosenthal has proposed that a mental state M of a creature C is conscious just in case C has a suitable higher-order thought directed toward M. While this theory has had its share of criticism in recent years, I believe that the real difficulties have been ignored. In this essay, I show that the presence of a higher order is insufficient for conscious experience, even if we suppose that the (...) satisfies the constraints that Rosenthal lists . The only way Rosenthal's view could possibly yield sufficient conditions is by requiring that the higher-order thought be suitably causally related to its object. Yet, as I also show, the only causal constraint strong enough to do the job is not only ill-motivated but probably false. (shrink)
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  24. Drop It Like It’s HOT: A Vicious Regress for Higher-Order Thought Theories.Miguel Sebastián - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1563-1572.
    Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a (...)
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  25. E. Higher., Order Thought and Representationalism.Explaining Consciousness - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 406.
  26.  8
    Higher-Order Thought Rendered Defenseless: Review of Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness by Rocco Gennaro. [REVIEW]Drew Mcdermott - 1998 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 4.
  27.  68
    Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts.Mark Rowlands - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (3):290-310.
  28.  95
    Consciousness as Higher-Order Thoughts: Two Objections.Richard E. Aquila - 1990 - American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):81-87.
  29. Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought.David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
    The problem of consciousness is to say what it is for some of our thoughts, feelings, and sensations to be conscious, given that others are not. This is different from saying what it is for a person to be conscious or not conscious. Even when people are conscious, many of their thoughts and sensations typically are not. And there's nothing problematic about a person's being conscious; it's just the person's being awake and responsive to sensory input.
     
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  30.  8
    Higher-Order Thoughts, Animal.Rocco I. Gennaro - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.. pp. 56--45.
  31. A Heterodox Defense of the Actualist Higher-Order Thought Theory.Andrea Marchesi - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1715-1737.
    I defend the actualist higher-order thought theory against four objections. The first objection contends that the theory is circular. The second one contends that the theory is unable to account for the alleged epistemic position we are in with respect to our own conscious mental states. The third one contends that the theory is unable to account for the evidence we have for the proposition that all conscious mental states are represented. The fourth one contends that the (...)
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  32. Two HOTS to Handle: The Concept of State Consciousness in the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Jennifer Matey - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):151-175.
    David Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory is one of the most widely argued for of the higher-order accounts of consciousness. I argue that Rosenthal vacillates between two models of the HOT theory. First, I argue that these models employ different concepts of 'state consciousness'; the two concepts each refer to mental state tokens, but in virtue of different properties. In one model, the concept of 'state consciousness' is more consistent with how the term is typically used, (...)
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  33. Multiple Drafts and Higher-Order Thoughts. [REVIEW]David M. Rosenthal - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):911-18.
    whatever it is that occurs in between the two. Though superficially tempting, this idea heightens the air of mystery surrounding consciousness. As far..
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  34.  62
    Brute Experience and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 1993 - Philosophical Papers 22 (1):51-69.
  35.  95
    Assumptions of Subjective Measures of Unconscious Mental States: Higher Order Thoughts and Bias.Zoltán Dienes - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):25-45.
    This paper considers two subjective measures of the existence of unconscious mental states - the guessing criterion, and the zero correlation criterion - and considers the assumptions underlying their application in experimental paradigms. Using higher order thought theory the impact of different types of biases on the zero correlation and guessing criteria are considered. It is argued that subjective measures of consciousness can be biased in various specified ways, some of which involve the relation between first (...) states and second order thoughts, and hence are not errors in measurement of the conscious status of mental states; but other sorts of biases are measurement errors, involving the relation between higher order thoughts and their expression. Nonetheless, it is argued this type of bias does not preclude subjective measures - both the guessing criterion and the zero correlation criterion - as being amongst the most appropriate and useful tools for measuring the conscious status of mental states. (shrink)
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  36. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 1996 - John Benjamins.
    This interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness.
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  37. Some Like It HOT: Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts.Alex Byrne - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (2):103-29.
    Consciousness is the subject of many metaphors, and one of the most hardy perennials compares consciousness to a spotlight, illuminating certain mental goings-on, while leaving others to do their work in the dark. One way of elaborating the spotlight metaphor is this: mental events are loaded on to one end of a conveyer belt by the senses, and move with the belt.
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  38. Addressing Higher-Order Misrepresentation with Quotational Thought.Vincent Picciuto - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4):109-136.
    In this paper it is argued that existing ‘self-representational’ theories of phenomenal consciousness do not adequately address the problem of higher-order misrepresentation. Drawing a page from the phenomenal concepts literature, a novel self-representational account is introduced that does. This is the quotational theory of phenomenal consciousness, according to which the higher-order component of a conscious state is constituted by the quotational component of a quotational phenomenal concept. According to the quotational theory of consciousness, phenomenal concepts help (...)
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  39. Phenomenality and Higher Order Thought[REVIEW]K. Balog - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (215-219).
  40.  16
    Some Like It Hot: Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts.Alex Byrne - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (2):103-129.
  41. V. Consciousness, Interpretation, and Higher-Order-Thought.David Rosenthal - unknown
    Few contemporary researchers in psychology, philosophy, and the cognitive sciences have any doubt about whether mental phenomena occur without being conscious. There is extensive and convincing clinical and experimental evidence for the existence of thoughts, desires, and related mental states that aren’t conscious. We characterize thoughts, desires, intentions, expectations, hopes, and many other mental states in terms of the things they are about and, more fully, in terms of their content, as captured by a sentence nominalization, such as a clause (...)
     
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  42.  32
    The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts. [REVIEW]David Pereplyotchik - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (3):434-448.
    Gennaro presents a version of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness that differs from the version defended by Rosenthal . I explore several key differences between Gennaro's and Rosenthal's views, with an eye toward establishing that Rosenthal's Extrinsic Higher-Order Thought theory is preferable to Gennaro's Wide Intrinsicality View . Gennaro's attempts to demonstrate the superiority of the WIV rest on an unargued and implausible assumption to the effect that the higher-order intentional contents (...)
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  43.  87
    Review of 'The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts' by Rocco J. Gennaro. [REVIEW]Richard Brown - 2012 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    There is much that is interesting in Gennaro's discussion of concepts and concept acquisition, and in general I am very sympathetic to the goals of his book, even if not with every detail (for another account of these issues that I don't fully agree with see Rosenthal 2005, chapter 7). I agree that we have good reason to think that some version of a higher-order thought theory of consciousness could be true and that this is consistent with (...)
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  44. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2018 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An overview of higher-order representational theories of consciousness. Representational theories of consciousness attempt to reduce consciousness to “mental representations” rather than directly to neural or other physical states. This approach has been fairly popular over the past few decades. Examples include first-order representationalism (FOR) which attempts to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of world-directed (or first-order) intentional states (Tye 2005) as well as several versions of higher-order representationalism (HOR) which holds that what makes (...)
     
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  45. What Does Language Tell Us About Consciousness? First-Person Mental Discourse and Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness.Neil Campbell Manson - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):221 – 238.
    The fact that we can engage in first-person discourse about our own mental states seems, intuitively, to be bound up with consciousness. David Rosenthal draws upon this intuition in arguing for his higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Rosenthal's argument relies upon the assumption that the truth-conditions for "p" and "I think that p" differ. It is argued here that the truth-conditional schema debars "I think" from playing one of its roles and thus is not a good test (...)
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  46. Emotion, Higher-Order Syntactic Thoughts, and Consciousness.Edmund T. Rolls - 2008 - In Lawrence Weiskrantz & Martin Davies (eds.), Frontiers of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 131--167.
  47.  38
    A Higher Order Syntactic Thought Theory of Consciousness.Edmund T. Rolls - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  48.  13
    Precis of The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, & Higher-Order Thoughts.Rocco Gennaro - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12):6-30.
    My overall goal in The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts is to solve what I take to be a paradox with regard to holding a series of interrelated theses, including a version of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness which says that what makes a mental state conscious is that there is a suitable higher-order thought directed at the mental state. Higher-order thoughts are metapsychological or meta-cognitive states, that (...)
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  49.  65
    The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts, by Rocco J Gennaro: Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2012, Pp. X+ 378, US $42 (Cloth). [REVIEW]Josh Weisberg - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):401-404.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 92, Issue 2, Page 401-404, June 2014.
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  50.  78
    Higher-Order Evidence and the Dynamics of Self-Location: An Accuracy-Based Argument for Calibrationism.Brett Topey - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    The thesis that agents should calibrate their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence—i.e., should adjust their first-order beliefs in response to evidence suggesting that the reasoning underlying those beliefs is faulty—is sometimes thought to be in tension with Bayesian approaches to belief update: in order to obey Bayesian norms, it's claimed, agents must remain steadfast in the face of higher-order evidence. But I argue that this claim is incorrect. In particular, I motivate (...)
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