The merits of higher-order thought theories

Trans/Form/Ação 41 (s1):31-48 (2018)
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Abstract

Over many years and in many publications David Rosenthal has developed, defended and applied his justly well-known higher-order thought theory of consciousness.2 In this paper I explain the theory, then provide a brief history of a major objection to it. I suggest that this objection is ultimately ineffectual, but that behind it lies a reason to look beyond Rosenthal's theory to another sort of HOT theory. I then offer my own HOT theory as a suitable alternative, before concluding in a final section. Resumo Durante muitos anos, e em muitas publicações, David Rosenthal desenvolveu, defendeu e aplicou sua justamente reconhecida teoria da consciência, intitulada high-order thought. Neste artigo, explico a teoria e, em seguida, forneço uma breve história de uma objeção maior feita a ela. Sugiro que essa objeção é, em última análise, ineficaz, mas que por trás disso há uma razão para olhar além da teoria de Rosenthal, para outro tipo de teoria HOT. Então ofereço minha própria teoria HOT como uma alternativa adequada, antes de concluir, em uma seção final, a respeito de questões filosóficas aqui envolvidas.

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Sam Coleman
University of Hertfordshire

Citations of this work

Misrepresentation and mental appearance.David Rosenthal - 2018 - Trans/Form/Ação 41 (s1):49-74.
Higher-Order Awareness of What?Callum Zavos MacRae - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):2083-2095.

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References found in this work

On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.
Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

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