Can state sovereignty justify privileged receiving countries exercising authority over non‐members in a third country to safeguard their own interests? Under the current migration governance of the EU, state sovereignty is manifested in migrant interdiction, interception and detention policies employed to prevent unauthorized migrants from reaching the EU, and even from attempting to embark on cross‐Mediterranean journeys. While reinforcement of the Schengen region's external borders is a key aim of the EU's internal migration politics, collaboration with third countries regarding migration (...) control has, in the last decade, become a key feature of its external migration policy. In close collaboration with third countries, the EU has managed to curb the outflux of migrants from transit and sending countries. In effect, irregular migrants are prevented from exiting as well as from entering. This article explores the justifiability of such practices, by questioning commonly invoked models of justification such as the sovereignty “model”, with a special focus on partnership agreements regarding migration control between the EU and Libya. (shrink)

States more or less universally claim discretionary rights to decide who may or may not cross their boundaries, and to use force and violence to ensure compliance with these decisions. The justification of these practices has received much attention, but I think there is an important underexplored element of this debate. I argue that, in order to provide a plausible justification, it is indispensable to ask questions about feasibility. Any plausible defence of anything like the kind of border (...) class='Hi'>control regime actually in force will need to pay close attention to social scientific research into feasible alternatives. (shrink)

Extraterritorial border controls prevent migrants from arriving at the territory of the state and effectively undermine rights to apply for asylum and protections against non-refoulement. As a result, a wealth of scholarship argues that external border controls are illegitimate exercises of state power. This paper challenges two versions of this argument, first, the claim that carrier-sanctions are illegitimate because they subject migrants to morally impermissible forms of coercion and, second, the claim that carrier-sanctions are illegitimate because they subject (...) migrants to illegitimate claims to authority.Against coercion-based accounts of legitimacy, this paper defends the view that while carrier-sanctions are coercive, the coerciveness of a policy is not relevant to its legitimacy. What is relevant is instead whether the authority claimed by the state is legitimate. Against authority-based accounts, this paper argues that states are unable to claim authority in the relevant sense over migrants that are present in the territories of other states.The paper concludes by suggesting that the charge that carrier-sanctions are illegitimate should shift towards the state that allows carriers to enforce these policies on their territories. No state has the legitimate authority to permit other states to pressure carriers to prevent migrants in need of protection from travelling. The state that introduces carrier-sanction legislation, on the other hand, is not exercising illegitimate authority though they may act contrary to demands of justice. (shrink)

This chapter considers the extent to which the self-determination argument, which justifies a people in exercising jurisdictional authority over territory, can be extended to justify those people in exercising control over the flow of persons and goods across borders. It considers whether preventing people from entering a state is a violation of their rights to free movement and rights to subsistence. Whatever the legitimacy of the right to control borders, it has to be understood as at best a (...) qualified right, since it has to be pursued in ways consistent with basic human rights. Richer political communities, it is argued, have obligations to ensure that basic entitlements of people to live a decent life are met, even if that does not amount to a direct argument for open borders. (shrink)

Certain states in the Global North have responded to refugees seeking safety on their territories through harmful practices of border violence, detention, encampment and containment that serve to prevent and deter refugee arrivals. These practices are ostensibly justified through an appeal to a right to control borders. This paper therefore assesses whether these harmful practices can indeed be morally justified by a state’s right to control borders. It analyses whether Christopher Heath Wellman’s account of a state’s right (...) to freedom of association, which represents the most restrictive account of a state’s right to control borders available in the literature, can extend to justify current harmful practices against refugees. If not, then no available justification will be able to do so, and thus contemporary harmful practices used against refugees cannot be justified by a state’s right to control borders. (shrink)

The philosophical debate on the freedom of movement focuses almost exclusively on long-term migration, what I call, migration as settlement. The normative justifications defending border controls assume that the movement of people across political borders, independent of its purpose and the length of stay, refers to migration as settlement. “Global mobility,” “international movement,” and “immigration” are oftenused interchangeably. However, global mobility also refers to the movements of people across international borders for a short length of time such as travel, (...) short-term and circular migration. While most scholarly attention has focused on long-term migration, the vast majority of cross-border movement of people (approximately 85% of all cross-border movements in 2019) is short-term. The existing literature offers normative arguments for border controls, which are grounded on states’ right to self-determination, the freedom of (dis)association, the welfare state, the duty to compatriots, and brain drain. In this paper, I argue that these arguments do not justify excluding travelers, short-term and circular migrants from the territory. (shrink)

In philosophical debates about immigration, one of the most prominent arguments asserts that a state’s citizenry has a right to unilaterally control its territorial borders by virtue of its right to self-determination. This is the self-determination argument. The present article demonstrates that this argument is internally undermined by the Coercion Principle, according to which all persons subjected to coercive political power are entitled to an equal say in exercising that power. First, whichever way the self-determination argument identifies the relevant (...) self-determining self, it is bound to rely on the Coercion Principle. Specifying the self politically involves appealing to the Coercion Principle, as it is a core principle of democratic theory. Alternatively, specifying a pre-political self fails to circumvent this problem, as a similar issue arises further down the argumentative line, when inferring the right to unilaterally control borders from the right to self-determination. Finally, since border controls coerce would-be immigrants, this reliance on the Coercion Principle renders the self-determination argument self-defeating. (shrink)

European Journal of Political Theory, Volume 21, Issue 3, Page 601-607, July 2022. Ayelet Shachar's The Shifting Border deploys a powerful map metaphor to support rethinking of borders and their functions. I interrogate this metaphor, developing some of the representational, constructive, and normative functions of maps, along with their connections to legal mechanisms for decoupling migration from territory. I survey three responses to the extra-territorialization of migration: a cynical response that rejects the possibility of migration justice, an abolitionist response (...) connected to open borders, and a revisionist response that advocates for widescale institutional reform. The revisionist response illuminates how Shachar's essay challenges us to reflect on what sorts of maps and accompanying social and political organizations would best support migrant justice. (shrink)

Ayelet Shachar's The Shifting Border deploys a powerful map metaphor to support rethinking of borders and their functions. I interrogate this metaphor, developing some of the representational, constructive, and normative functions of maps, along with their connections to legal mechanisms for decoupling migration from territory. I survey three responses to the extra-territorialization of migration: a cynical response that rejects the possibility of migration justice, an abolitionist response connected to open borders, and a revisionist response that advocates for widescale institutional (...) reform. The revisionist response illuminates how Shachar's essay challenges us to reflect on what sorts of maps and accompanying social and political organizations would best support migrant justice. (shrink)

Establishing biotic borders was part and parcel of empire building. The question of which kinds of biological species were permitted to make their way into North American and West European territories shaped transregional border control in the imperial age. Biotic borders were intensely biocultural in that stereotypes around race and ethnic differences shaped them. Drawing on examples from the history of white ants (also known as termites) in the American and British empires, this essay argues that insects had (...) a sustained and global presence in modern imperial imaginations of borders and frontiers. (shrink)

The volume gathers theoretical contributions on human rights and global justice in the context of international migration. It addresses the need to reconsider human rights and the theories of justice in connection with the transformation of the social frames of reference that international migrations foster. The main goal of this collective volume is to analyze and propose principles of justice that serve to address two main challenges connected to international migrations that are analytically differentiable although inextricably linked in normative terms: (...) to better distribute the finite resources of the planet among all its inhabitants; and to ensure the recognition of human rights in current migration policies. Due to the very nature of the debate on global justice and the implementation of human rights and migration policies, this interdisciplinary volume aims at transcending the academic sphere and appeals to a large public through argumentative reflections. Challenging the Borders of Justice in the Age of Migrations represents a fresh and timely contribution. -/- IN A TIME when national interests are structurally overvalued and borders increasingly strengthened, it’s a breath of fresh air to read a book in which migration flows are not changed into a threat. We simply cannot understand the world around us through the lens of the ‘migration crisis’-a message the authors of this book have perfectly understood. Aimed at a strong link between theories of global justice and policies of border control, this timely book combines the normative and empirical to deeply question the way our territorial boundaries are justified. Professor Ronald Tinnevelt, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands.- -/- THIS BOOK IS essential reading for those frustrated by the limitations of the dominant ways of thinking about global justice especially in relation to migration. By bringing together discussions of global justice, cosmopolitan political theory and migration, this collection of essays has the potential to transform the way in which we think and debate the critical issues of membership and movement. Together they present a critical interdisciplinary approach to international migration, human rights and global justice, challenging disciplinary borders as well as political ones. Professor Phil Cole, University of the West of England, UK.-. (shrink)

Is it possible to justify territorial rights? Provided a justification for territorial rights can be found, does it ground claims toparticularterritories? And provided a claim to particular territories can be justified, what kind of claim is it? Is it a claim to jurisdiction? A claim to control resources? A claim to control the movement of people across borders? In this paper I review some prominent accounts seeking to answer these questions. After outlining their main features, I focus on (...) some difficulties they encounter, in particular with regard to the justification of exclusion. (shrink)

I revisit themes from Against Borders: Why the World Needs Free Movement of People (2020) in dialogue with Gillian Brock's Justice of People on the Move (2020) and Sarah Song's Immigration and Democracy (2019). We share the conviction that current border regimes are deeply unjust but differ in what migration justice requires. Brock and Song continue to give states significant discretion to exclude people from entering and settling in their territories, whereas I contend that migration justice demands open borders. (...) I reject the claim that state self-determination justifies migration restrictions. Central arguments for open borders highlight the role that restrictive border controls and the state category of ‘immigrant’ play in upholding racialised hierarchies and exploitative economic relations, as well as in inflicting violence against mobile people. (shrink)

Borders are never purely local institutions, never reducible to a simple history of conflicts and agreements between neighboring groups and powers. Borders are already global, ways of dividing the world into regions and thus make possible place and a ‘mapping imaginary’. Borders are characterized by an intrinsic ambivalence that derives from their internal and external functions, as the basis of collective belonging and state control over mobility and territory. The construction of political space takes place through modes of translation (...) between inside and outside that the border signifies. (shrink)

European Journal of Political Theory, Volume 21, Issue 3, Page 594-600, July 2022. In The Shifting Border, Ayelet Shachar offers us two concrete proposals for combatting the danger posed by the shifting border, especially to those crossing borders in search of safety. One proposal suggests that human rights travel with migrants, so that agents who control the border must take responsibility for protecting their human rights at the border. A second proposal, which forms the basis (...) of my commentary below, asks that states consider alternative ways for migrants to seek protection safely. In responding to this second proposal, I make two proposals of my own that stem from Shachar's analysis: her analysis offers us the resources we need in order to expand, not only the channels available to migrants for seeking protection, but also our sense of who should be involved in controlling admission, and expanding the “who” that is involved in admission gives meaning to the concept of “moral proximity” which can help to overcome the territorial imperative that dominates the rules governing international migration, i.e., the imperative that protection travels with physical access to territory, only. (shrink)

In The Shifting Border, Ayelet Shachar offers us two concrete proposals for combatting the danger posed by the shifting border, especially to those crossing borders in search of safety. One proposal suggests that human rights travel with migrants, so that agents who control the border must take responsibility for protecting their human rights at the border. A second proposal, which forms the basis of my commentary below, asks that states consider alternative ways for migrants to (...) seek protection safely. In responding to this second proposal, I make two proposals of my own that stem from Shachar's analysis: her analysis offers us the resources we need in order to expand, not only the channels available to migrants for seeking protection, but also our sense of who should be involved in controlling admission, and expanding the “who” that is involved in admission gives meaning to the concept of “moral proximity” which can help to overcome the territorial imperative that dominates the rules governing international migration, i.e., the imperative that protection travels with physical access to territory, only. (shrink)

The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol are the main legal documents governing the movement of refugee and asylum seekers across international borders. As the number of displaced persons seeking refuge has reached unprecedented numbers, states have resorted to measures to circumvent their obligations under the Convention. These range from bilateral agreements condemning refugees to their vessels at sea to the excision of certain territories from national jurisdiction. While socio-economic developments and the rise of the worldwide web have led (...) to deterritorialization of vast domains of the economy and the media which enable them to escape from state control, territorial presence, whether on terra firma or on vessels at sea which are functional surrogates for territorial sovereignty, continues to be the basis for the entitlement to human and citizens’ rights. We are facing a dual movement of deterritorialization and territorialization at once, both of which threaten the end of the 1951 Convention. This article is an exercise in non-ideal theory which, nonetheless, has implications for a seminal question in ideal democratic theory as to how to define and justify the boundaries of the demos. If the demos refers to the constitutional subject of a self-determining entity in whose name sovereignty is exercised, regimes of sovereignty, including those which govern the movement of peoples across borders, define the prerogatives as well as obligations of such sovereign entities under international law. The period ushered in by the 1951 Convention was such a sovereignty regime which today may be nearing its end. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine how bordered reality is being imposed and resisted in the context of where we are placed right now, 'Greece'. Drawing on ethnographic research and discourse analysis, conducted in Lesvos, Samos, and Athens (from March to September 2016), we examine how resistance to a bordered reality took place, as islands in the north Aegean, as well as Greek and European territories, were being remapped according to the logic of the hotspot. We approach this process methodologically from (...) the situated angle of the embodiment of resistance in the concrete experiences of people (including the researchers ourselves), whose narratives reveal the distracted spatial coordinates of the 'hotspot regime', which becomes a traveling control device. Rather than approaching the hotspots on the five Greek border islands as geographically fixed entities we introduce the concept of the mobile hotspot to show how the logic of the hotspot suffuses the uneven geographies of a bordered reality. We use the ferry as an illustrative tool with which to critically explore the density, tensions, and conflict-ridden nature of movements within, around, and against the hotspots. (shrink)

Despite the prevalence of externalization, much work in the ethics of immigration continues to assume that the admission of immigrants is determined by state immigration officials who decide whether to admit travelers at official crossings. This assumption neglects how decisions about entrance have been increasingly relocated abroad – to international waters, consular offices, airports, or foreign territories – often with non-governmental or private actors, as well as foreign governments functioning as intermediaries. Externalization poses a fundamental challenge to achieving just migration (...) policies. It reliably harms vulnerable people, prevents refugees from receiving protection, leads to human rights abuses, and dissipates blame and accountability, creating a serious lacuna in assigning moral responsibility. (shrink)

– This paper aims to deal with an increasing securitization and criminalisation of migration in Europe highlighting ethical implications of the current surveillance-based EU migration governance. It is shown that EU member states employ surveillance regimes to control movements across borders and to restrict migrants' access to their territories. The ethical acceptability of such practices is questioned with a particular focus on the “freedom of movement”., – In order to establish the extent to which the current EU migration governance (...) can be considered ethically justifiable, the article starts out from the right to mobility as coded in the UN Declaration of Human Rights. It is shown that the current migration governance obstructs the rights specified in Articles 13 and 14. At the same time, shortcomings of the UN declaration are discussed and the need for a better protection of the freedom of movement is suggested., – It is established that human rights are such that promote normative agency and a type of rights that trump, for example, states interests in restricting access to their territories do not outweigh individuals rights to seek asylum. In order to make this relation more clear however, the right to mobility should be made symmetric, including both a right to leave and to enter (but not a right to immigrate and settle). An extensive right to freedom of movement is advocated based on the significance of mobility for normative agency. A substantial right to mobility supports the right to seek asylum., – As of yet, ethical implications of surveillance-based border control are under-researched. (shrink)

The paper analyzes recognition in relation to the global legal arrangements. It articulates of an extra-territorial recognition of right-holders by means of the development of a philosophical theory of recognition on the global level. It examines contemporary possibilities of extra-territorial recognition that are bound to the nation-states hitherto. The paper indicates an increasing influence of various transnational agents in order to show (1) the possibilities and limits of extra-territorial recognition based on a state-centric approach, and (2) a demand of supranational (...) recognition. Therefore, it maps the development from thecontemporary international system to the system that can contain also important supranational elements. In its practical consequences, it leads not only to rethinking social, political and legal philosophy but also to a philosophical reinvention of the United Nations because a new supranational stage of recognition requires not only a responsibility of the nation-states but also a direct responsibility of non-state transnationalagents. (shrink)

The article reflects on the present confusion between the category of enemy and that of stranger as result of a process of multiplication and reinforcement of territorial borders along ethnic and racial criteria. In particular, the text considers the external and internal borders of Europe as complex dispositivs of territorial control, which produce specific forms of foreigners as strangers and as cultural enemies. In order to analyze and stop this process, a cosmopolitan rethinking of the idea of citizenship is (...) at stake here. Transnational citizenship will be discussed in the frame of a philological model of translation between cultures and opposed to the model of an absolute untranslatability that characterizes the global civil wars. Cosmopolitics is thus conceived as a practical universalism, a progressive overcoming of the idea of the stranger in view of an idea of co-citizenship. Transnational co-citizenship does not suppress national identities but puts them in relation to all other sorts of particular identities and interests in order to create a contingent, maybe precarious but always concrete world of commons and communality. (shrink)

Why should we have a system of different states that each claim both internal and external sovereignty? How can the state gain its legitimate authority to rule? What is the problem with the ideal of the ‘global citizen’? How should states respond to different groups’ secession claims? To what extent should states have the right to control their borders? If one finds such questions intriguing, one should read Anna Stilz’s book Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration. Stilz argues that a (...) system of territorial states serves to protect important values – occupancy, basic justice and collective self-determination – which are key to living an autonomous life. I focus on the theory’s implication for the debates on border control. I contend that Stilz’s arguments still have difficulties grounding the state’s right to exclude would-be immigrants. That said, the book has done a great job in providing a liberal theoretical framework for us to reflect upon citizenship, immigration, succession claims, cosmopolitan ideals, the colonial legacy and disputes over borders and resources. (shrink)

Martin Strel, a Slovenian hero, swam all 3004 km of Danube in 200, and Mississippi in 2002, to become one of nominees for the sportsperson of the year award. Surprisingly, an orchestrated attack on his status as a sportsperson and on status of his achievements as sport records followed successfully. Martin did not get the award. He continued with his activities, swimming Parana, Jang Tse, and Amazonas lately, but was never mentioned in sport context again. This case is examined to (...) show how definition struggles serve to strengthen the border control between sport as such, and its internationally institutionalised realm. To make a comparison, the case of art and its definition is mentioned. Martin Strel did not endanger sport, being a false pretender on sport-status, but he endangered sport management and sport business. He was thrown out of the ?sport city?, to swim ?extra portes? and to inhabit a place where sport as ?esportes? originally belonges. (shrink)

Jurisdictionism offers a new rationale for restricting immigration. Immigrants impose new obligations on the people whose territories they enter. Insofar as these obligations are unwanted, polities are justified in turning immigrants away, so long as the immigrants are from a country that respects their rights. The theory, however, employs a flawed account of obligation, which overlooks how we can be obliged to take on new duties to immigrants. Jurisdictionism also employs different standards when determining whether an obligation exists, only one (...) of which is sensitive to consequences. Finally, the theory falsely claims that obligations necessarily reduce the freedom of the obliged. (shrink)

National identity and attachment to national culture have taken root even in this era of globalization. National sentiments find expression in multiple political spheres and cause troubles of various kinds in many societies, both domestically and across state borders. Some of these problems are rooted in history; others are the result of massive global immigration. As US Secretary of State John Kerry tries to broker a new round of Israel-Palestine peace talks, the Israeli government continues expanding its settlements in disputed (...) territories. As this proposal is being written, Japanese citizens are debating whether their politicians should visit the Yasukuni Shrine (靖國神社), where the spirits of fourteen Class A war criminals from WWII and more than one thousand others convicted of war crimes by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East are honored with a distinguished resting place. As the Chinese government’s plan to bring economic prosperity to the Xinjian province unfolds, ethnic conflicts between Han Chinese and local Uyghur Muslims intensify. Tibetans still demonstrate to the Chinese government, some through the dramatic sacrifice of self-immolation, their determination to pursue a Tibet that is truly free and autonomous. The recent inflow of Muslim immigrants across Europa and North America forces those liberal democratic societies to rethink the meaning of multiculturalism. Should the state respect Muslim women’s freedom to wear burkas in public? What about other aspects of certain Muslim traditions such as arranged marriages or the honor killing of teenage girls who see boys their parents do not approve? Since these immigrants voluntarily moved from their homeland to a new society, do they have a duty to give up such practices, which conflict with their new societies’ fundamental commitment to individual autonomy? Eric Hobsbawm suggests that nationalism is a contingent phenomenon in history—it arises with important historical events such as industrialization and print journalism; eventually, it will disappear. Anthony Smith, on the other hand, argues that nationalism is deeply rooted in the human need for collective faith and dignity. How should we understand today’s nationalism? Is it a transient phenomenon that eventually will be eradicated from the world, or is it a timeless issue that confronts and will remain a challenge for every society? Is the conventional distinction between civic and cultural nationalism still relevant or helpful? The problems and ongoing challenges of nationalism are very much alive throughout East Asia where the myth of ethnically and culturally homogeneous nations is still paramount. In addition to the examples provided above, East Asian societies are increasingly multicultural, inevitably forcing their governments to come up with new immigration and border-control policies, revisit their laws regarding labor policies, sociopolitical discrimination, socioeconomic welfare, and, more fundamentally, rethink the constitutional make-up of the citizenry and the ideal of social harmony, one of their most cherished political values. Nevertheless, contemporary theoretical analyses, whether philosophical or empirical, of the phenomena surrounding nationalism, in all its forms, are almost exclusively focused on cases in western cultures and societies, preventing the East Asian people from developing a coherent idea of who they are or should be in a way that can track their deeply-held values and norms (such as Confucianism). One of the primary aims of this conference therefore is to address this ongoing neglect and explore new concepts and theories that are socially relevant in East Asia. Not only will this provide access to the particular experiences of nation, citizenship, and nationalism throughout East Asia but it will bring to bear philosophical concepts, approaches, and styles of reasoning about them that currently are not part of this critical debate. Providing an opportunity to hear these distinct and different East Asian voices and opening up these conceptual and methodological resources to scholars around the world will greatly advance the understanding and appreciation of nationalism. In addition to this primary aim, the proposed conference will achieve two other, novel, and important goals. First, by design, it will bring to bear a multi and interdisciplinary approach to the problems of nationalism. We are not privileging either conceptual or empirical studies in the organization of our conference and will bring together philosophers, political scientists, sociologists, and historians, making every effort to invite scholars who explicitly employ or are interested in exploring different and at times hybrid approaches. Second, we will draw together scholars from around the world: China, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, North America, and Europe, including leading figures in the field, who will serve as keynote speakers for the conference. Combining these two additional goals will enable us to organize a uniquely diverse conference, both in terms of intellectual discipline and national origin. Along with our primary aim of introducing East Asian voices and theories, this will make our event original, distinctive, and unprecedented in value. Our age is one in which it is unavoidable for people of different cultural backgrounds to live together in many different places. For the sake of justice and stability, a comprehensive re-examination of nationalism is both urgent and necessary. (shrink)

Calls to recognize a right of return are a recurring feature of refugee crises. Particularly when such crises become long-term, advocates of displaced people insist that they be allowed to return to their country of origin. I argue that this right is best understood as the right of refugees to return, not to a prior territory, but to a prior political status. This status is one that sees not just any state, but a refugee's state of origin, take responsibility for (...) safeguarding their welfare. This entitlement I characterize as an institutional right: a right that presupposes, and is a necessary feature of, a particular institution. The institution of which the right of return is an indispensable part is the international political system that sees authority exercised by sovereign states. The institutional argument for a right of refugee return presupposes two basic factual claims about states: they play a central role in safeguarding rights and they pursue exclusionary policies of border control. Importantly, the institutional view presupposes only that states do perform both functions, not that they are justified in doing so. On a purely normative level, the institutional account assumes little more than the moral equality of human beings. (shrink)

In his preface to Beyond the Verse, written in 1981, Emmanuel Levinas poses the following provocative question: “Can democracy and the ‘rights of man’divorce themselves without danger from their prophetic and ethical depth?” (BV xv / AV 12–13). The question is clearly intended to threaten the comfortable consensus that has gathered around these icons of our time and, more specifically, to displace what have come to be known under the title the “rights of man” from the context of the European (...) Enlightenment with which they are so often identified. Levinas performs this act of displacement in the first instance by relocatingthem within the tradition of the Jewish prophets. However, this effort ultimately leads him to a more radical displacement, one that amounts to a certain re-placing of them, a relocating of them elsewhere altogether. What does that mean? What are its implications for the doctrine of the “rights of man”? (shrink)

How might we historicize the idea of border control? If state borders can be understood as institutional sites of governance, what forms of governance do they enact? This article asks what insights Foucauldian political sociology might offer these questions. Drawing on Deleuze's analytic of ‘control’, the article seeks to bring new meaning to the idea of border control. Under standing control as a particular technology of power, special attention to the changing topography of (...) class='Hi'>border control as well as the changing subjectivities presupposed by this form of power is paid. (shrink)

Publication date: 24 January 2019 Source: Author: Timurlenk Chekovik, Jugoslav Achkoski The control of migrants in Europe has become increasingly challenging, marked by a number of illegal border-crossing. It revealed a crisis without equivalent since World War II. The European borders are now one of the most affected by migrants from Asia and Africa. Border police is the most responsible for the first interview with the asylum seeker. In terms of basic contribution to the asylum procedure, good (...) cooperation between the border police and the services of asylum is of primary importance. There is a need of risk assessment. While the risk assessment is made there can be a violation of the humanitarian aspect of conducting regular border check. By determining the race and color of migrants, screening made on the border crossing can put legality of the border police actions in question. The Humanitarian efforts with border management, cooperation between the government services and use of appropriate methodology are an important segment handling migrant crisis. One of the known methodologies is Analysis of Competitive Hypotheses used to better assess the choice of a suitable place for migrants and their acceptance or readmission. Тhe procedure for vulnerable categories of citizens can jeopardize the legality and the manner of dealing with illegal migrants and this arises from the legal and physical protection of persons seeking asylum. The `politics of pity' changes into psychological cases to be governed by risk technologies within a `politics of risk', the humanitarian and security interventions are shown to be in no way mutually exclusive. (shrink)

Legitimate states have a general right to control their borders and decide who to admit as future citizens. Such decisions, however, are constrained by principles of justice. But which principles? To answer this we have to analyse the multifaceted relationships that may hold between states and prospective immigrants, distinguishing on the one hand between those who are either inside or outside the state’s territory, and on the other between refugees, economic migrants and ‘particularity claimants’. The claims of refugees, stemming (...) from their human rights, are powerful though limited in scope: they hold against eligible states generally rather than the specific one to which they apply for asylum. Economic migrants cannot claim a right to be admitted as such, but only a right to have legitimate selection criteria applied to them. Particularity claimants, such as those seeking redress for harms inflicted on them or reward for the services they have rendered to the state, must show why awarding a right to enter is the appropriate response to their claims. Finally, does justice enable us to establish admission priorities between these different categories of migrants? (shrink)

Modern states claim rights of jurisdiction and control over particular geographical areas and their associated natural resources. Boundaries of Authority explores the possible moral bases for such territorial claims by states, in the process arguing that many of these territorial claims in fact lack any moral justification. The book maintains throughout that the requirement of states' justified authority over persons has normative priority over, and as a result severely restricts, the kinds of territorial rights that states can justifiably claim, (...) and it argues that the mere effective administration of justice within a geographical area is insufficient to ground moral authority over residents of that area. The book argues that only a theory of territorial rights that takes seriously the morality of the actual history of states' acquisitions of power over land and the land's residents can adequately explain the nature and extent of states' moral rights over particular territories. Part I of the book examines the interconnections between states' claimed rights of authority over particular sets of subject persons and states' claimed authority to control particular territories. It contains an extended critique of the dominant. (shrink)

Abstract: In this essay a set of principles is defended that yields a determinate allocation of sovereign competences across a global system of territorially nested jurisdictions. All local sovereign competences are constrained by a universal, justiciable human rights regime that also incorporates a conception of cross-border distributive justice and regulates the competence to control immigration for a given territory. Subject to human rights constraints, sovereign competences are allocated according to a conception of global democracy. The proposed allocation scheme (...) can accommodate substantial local autonomy while at the same time ensuring that everyone has a voice in the political decisions that affect his or her interests. The relevant class of affected interests is fully specified. Relevant affects are of two kinds: those that impose norms of governance on individuals, and those that impose external costs on them. The favored sense of "an external cost" is developed and defended. (shrink)

This paper discusses what implications global luck egalitarianism (GLE) has for border control. Some authors suggest that an open‐borders policy follows from GLE. The idea is that various unchosen inequalities inevitably follow from differences in birthplace, such that GLE will always have principled reason to condemn closed borders. Others are skeptical of the assumption that GLE will have liberal implications for border control, because open borders may have other, adverse effects that outweigh the reductions in unjust (...) inequality. Against such skeptics, we argue that GLE will (typically) have quite liberal implications for border control. However, this connection is not a principled one: Whether (and to what extent) GLE favors opening or closing borders will depend upon empirical circumstances. (shrink)

It is normally taken for granted that states have a right to control immigration into their territory. When immigration is raised as a normative issue two questions become salient, one about what the right to exclude is, and one about whether and how it might be justified. This paper considers the first question. The paper starts by noting that standard debates about immigration have not addressed what the right to exclude is. Standard debates about immigration furthermore tend to result (...) either in fairly strong cases for open borders or in denials that considerations of justice apply to immigration at all, which results in state discretion positions. This state of debate is both theoretically unsatisfactory and normatively implausible. The paper therefore explores an alternative approach to the right to exclude immigrants from the perspective of recent debates about the territorial rights of states. The right to exclude claimed by states is analysed and it is shown to differ both conceptually and normatively from rights to impose political authority within a territory. The paper finally indicates how this analysis might broaden the focus of debates about immigration and suggest alternative regimes of migration regulation the possibility of which is obscured by traditional justice approaches. (shrink)

The steep rise in small boat crossings across the English Channel is deeply worrying. Ever more lives are put at risk in making the 21-mile journey. Human trafficking gangs trade in human misery. The UK’s asylum system is put under additional strain and at ever higher cost to taxpayers. The public has lost trust in the Government to put this right. In order to address the problem, we must understand it and grasp its underlying causes. A key issue is that (...) the Government did not see the problem of small boat crossings as a consequence of its policy failures, most notably its failure to secure a post-Brexit returns arrangement with the EU. An effective plan to deal with small boat crossings is urgently needed to win back public confidence, to save lives, to improve our asylum system and help put illegal human traffickers out of business. This Report is an attempt to outline such a plan with over a dozen recommendations. (shrink)

This symposium brings into conversation normative political theory on migration and critical border/migration studies, with a particular focus on digital border control technology. Normative theorists have long been concerned with questions about the extent and nature of control over migration that the state should exercise, and the balance of rights and duties between states and migrants. To date, however, there has been little reflection among such theorists on digital border control technology. Critical border/migration (...) studies scholars, on the other hand, have paid considerable attention to the rapid development of digital technology in the border control/mobility management space, and revealed a range of problems with the technology itself and the ways it is deployed. What has thus far been lacking, however, is sustained ethical reflection on what should be done about the use of this technology. The papers in this symposium thus seek to bring these two groups of scholars together and to prompt what we hope will be a sustained conversation on these rapidly evolving and deeply problematic practices. This introduction contextualises the issue at the heart of this symposium – the rapid expansion of digital border controls and the ethical challenges that these pose – and offers brief summaries of the contributions. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to question, from the perspective of a principled theory of criminalization, the legitimacy of making irregular immigration a crime. In order to do this, I identify three main ways in which the political decision to introduce a crime of IM may be defended: according to the first, IM is a malum in se the wrongness of which resides in its being a violation of states’ territorial sovereignty; according to the second, IM is a justified (...) malum prohibitum the wrongness of which resides in its being a violation of a justified immigration regulation; according to the third, IM is a malum in se the wrongness of which resides in its harmful consequences for receiving states’ citizens. My thesis is that none of these arguments succeeds in providing us with sufficiently good reasons to justify the use of criminal punishment to enforce the closure of state borders. As regards the first, I argue that it relies on a misleading conception of what is entailed by states’ territorial sovereignty, and that therefore it is unsound as an argument for the state’s right to control immigration. With regard to the second, I argue that, be they legitimate or not, immigration regulations enacted by states cannot provide those would-be immigrants they aim to exclude with content-independent reasons to comply with them; and this is a necessary pre-condition to conclude that IM is a justified malum prohibitum. As regards harm-based approaches, I argue that the notions they rely on are completely unfit as criteria for criminalization. This leads me to the conclusion that, unless other more convincing arguments are provided for, IM should not be criminalized. (shrink)

Traditionally, people, territory, and rights must align to justify state control. However, states have recently shifted their borders so that these three elements are decoupled. How should we understand state legitimacy then? This paper examines three contemporary responses to the phenomenon of shifting borders. First, sovereigntism seeks to stabilize the relation of people and territory, even if that requires limiting the scope of rights. Second, democratic cosmopolitanism tolerates shifts in territory, as long as the people and rights coincide. Finally, (...) the Watershed Model keeps rights within the territory, but it accepts changes in the people, as it separates democratic governance and rights from a particular national identity. The paper argues that the Watershed Model can better respond to the challenges posed by human mobility in times of planetary crises. Tradicionalmente, pueblo, territorio y derechos deben coincidir para justificar el control estatal. Sin embargo, los Estados han desplazado recientemente sus fronteras de modo que estos tres elementos se encuentran desacoplados. ¿Cómo debemos entender entonces la legitimidad del Estado? Este artículo examina tres respuestas contemporáneas al fenómeno del desplazamiento de las fronteras. En primer lugar, el soberanismo trata de estabilizar la relación entre pueblo y territorio, aunque para ello haya que limitar el alcance de los derechos. En segundo lugar, el cosmopolitismo democrático tolera los desplazamientos del territorio, siempre que pueblos y derechos coincidan. Por último, el modelo de la cuenca hidrográfica mantiene los derechos dentro del territorio, pero acepta cambios en el pueblo, ya que separa la gobernanza democrática y los derechos de una identidad nacional concreta. En el artículo se sostiene que el modelo de cuencas hidrográficas puede responder mejor a los retos que plantea la movilidad humana en tiempos de crisis planetaria. (shrink)

Arash Abizadeh claims that ‘[a]nyone accepting the democratic theory of political legitimation domestically is thereby committed to rejecting the unilateral domestic right to control state boundaries’. He bases this conclusion on the premise that ‘to be democratically legitimate, a state’s regime of border control must result from political processes in which those subject to it—including foreigners—have a right of democratic participation’. I shall argue that this premise, even if it were correct, does not support the conclusion since (...) ‘democratic legitimacy’ is morally irrelevant: that something is ‘democratically illegitimate’ in no way suggests, let alone implies, that it is also morally impermissible or contravenes a moral right. I shall consider counter-arguments advanced against this objection by Maxime Lepoutre and Abizadeh himself and argue that they fail. Thus there is no valid democratic argument against border coercion. (shrink)

Japan has often been regarded as an ethnically homogeneous society whose restrictive immigration policies reflect the deep-seated cultural peculiarities of this ‘island nation’. By contrast, I shall argue that Japan’s post- 1945 cultural separation from the other countries of East Asia, and its strict border controls, were to a large extent products of Cold War politics. The postwar democratization of Japan went hand in hand with the introduction of tight restrictions on cross-border mobility: restrictions which had profound consequences (...) for the rights of ethnic minorities in Japan (particularly Koreans and Taiwanese). An exploration of the emergence and impact of this border control regime casts new light, not just on Japan’s role in the Northeast Asian region, but also on key limitations of nation-state centred notions of liberal democracy. (shrink)

Supporters of open borders sometimes argue that the state has no pro tanto right to restrict immigration, because such a right would also entail a right to exclude existing citizens for whatever reasons justify excluding immigrants. These arguments can be defeated by suggesting that people have a right to stay put. I present a new form of the exclusion argument against closed borders which escapes this “right to stay put” reply. I do this by describing a kind of exclusion that (...) has not been discussed in depth, which I call “territorial exclusion.” Territorial exclusion is the process according to which the group that wishes to exclude current citizens secedes from the territory in which those citizens reside. I argue that the wrongness of territorial exclusion explains why there is no pro tanto right for a state to exclude immigrants, because otherwise there would be a pro tanto right for the state to kick people out by seceding from the territory they inhabit. Because kicking people out like this is typically wrong, borders cannot be closed. (shrink)

Abstract:Through dismantling the territorial integrity of the modern nation-state, Indigenous sovereignty threatens state imposed hegemonic systems. While these systems exist at the threshold spatially—borders and boundaries—they are the ideological epicenter for controlling human and non-human life, rendering them manageable by the state. These borders are also perpetually liminal spaces, and it is in this liminality that artists intervene through poetics, confronting state rhetorics and exercising sovereignty to address colonial wounds. In 2015 and 2017, two land-based ephemeral art projects were created (...) to challenge the terms by which territory is instrumentalized in order to justify the commodification of both land and humans. In 2015, the artist collective, Post-commodity, set up a land-based art installation, Repellent Fence, intersecting the US/Mexico border in an effort to “stitch” the Americas together again. The gesture of stitching is also employed in Maureen Gruben's Stitching My Landscape from 2017 in which Gruben stitched a segment of ocean ice with vibrant red broad cloth near her home in Tuktoyaktuk, Northwest Territories alongside the Ibyuk Pingo, a national landmark administered by Parks Canada. Both of these projects provide entry points into the various methods by which land is abstracted into an oppressive and singular form. They push back against the rigidity of prescribed borders, instead investigating more fluid entanglements with land.This paper provides a comparative analysis of these projects, examining the ways in which counterpoints are central to them as artistic interventions. Crossing diagonally to the borders that the nation-state has institutionalized produces a moment of reprise to a highly specific end: to heal. Pivotal to these anti-colonial critiques are rejection, dismissal and a refusal to translate. A symbolic reorientation of the ways humans interact with land arises, evoked through a performative gesture of stitching across fragmentations and divides. (shrink)

"In The Ethics of Migration: An Introduction Adam Hosein systematically and comprehensively examines the ethical issues surrounding the concept of immigration. The book addresses important questions such as: - Can states claim a right to control their borders and if so to what extent? - Is detention ever a justifiable means of border enforcement? - Which criteria may states use to determine who should be admitted into their territory and how do these criteria interact with existing hierarchies of (...) race and gender? - Who should be considered a refugee? - Which rights are migrants who are present in a territory entitled to? - Is there an acceptable way to design a temporary worker program? - When, if ever, are amnesties for unauthorized migrants appropriate? Featuring case studies throughout, this textbook provides a philosophical introduction to an incredibly topical issue studied by students within the fields of political philosophy, applied ethics, global studies, politics, law, sociology and public policy"--. (shrink)

In contemporary sociology, there has been significant interest in the idea of mobility, the decline of the nation state, the rise of flexible citizenship, and the porous quality of political boundaries. There is much talk of medicine without borders and sociology without borders. These social developments are obviously linked to the processes of globalization, leading some to argue that we need a `sociology beyond society' in order to account for these flows and global networks. In this article, I propose an (...) alternative analysis. There are important developments involving the securitization of modern societies that create significant forms of immobility. One striking illustration is the increasing use of walls to quarantine or secure territories and communities against outsiders or to regulate the flow of migrants in Israel, in Europe and along the Mexican-US border. Modern societies are in particular characterized by a deep contradiction between the economic need for labour mobility and the state's political need to assert sovereignty. Gated societies, ghettoes, quarantine zones, prisons, camps and similar arrangements are in many respects pre-modern institutions of spatial regulation for political ends. Contemporary technical developments in biomedicine offer new opportunities for political control and spatial regulation in terms of forensic policing, bio-tattooing and bioprofiling. Globalization paradoxically produces significant forms of immobility for political regulation of persons alongside the mobility of goods and services. (shrink)

This article considers two questions: Do democratic states have the right to deport non-citizens present or residing on their territory? And, if so, what principles should guide deportation in democratic states? The overall objective is to offer an account of what deportation should look like in a liberal democratic state. I begin by situating the practice of deportation in larger discussions of the extent of state discretion in controlling both borders and membership; here, I will argue that potential deportees occupy (...) an awkward middle space, i.e. it is not clear whether they should be treated according to the principles that regulate discretion at the border or discretion in admitting migrants to membership. I then consider more deeply whether deportation can be rendered non-arbitrary, or whether it is bound to remain unjustly applied; where it cannot be rendered non-arbitrary, it must be rejected, or so I shall argue. To be non-arbitrary, the practice of deportation must meet three criteria: a publicity criterion, a justification criterion, and a collective interest criterion. In the final section of the article, I disentangle deportation into its component parts – I distinguish just cause for deportation from just action in deportation – and consider how the criteria that stem from a commitment to non-arbitrariness constrain its application to non-citizen residents. The consequence of requiring deportation to be applied, if at all, in a non-arbitrary way is that there will certainly be cases where liberal democracies find themselves unable to deport those who might otherwise be thought eligible for deportation. Ultimately, I conclude that deportation from liberal democratic states can be fair only in a small number of cases. (shrink)